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Türkiye’s BRICS bid discussed at Shanghai University

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On 24 September, the Institute of Global Studies of Shanghai University organised a workshop on ‘Türkiye’s Re-Asia Initiative’.

Moderated by Prof. Guo Changgang, Director of the Centre for Turkish Studies at Shanghai University, the workshop discussed China and Türkiye’s foreign policies, the rising global South, the BRICS agenda and Türkiye’s membership bid.

Opening the event, Prof. Guo Changgang said: “As Ankara is applying to join BRICS, it is a good time to talk about Türkiye’s Asia policy,” highlighting the Re-Asia Initiative.

“Türkiye’s efforts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and participate in ASEAN show that Türkiye has adopted a ‘pendulum’ position between the West and the East,” said Prof. Dr. Gürol Baba of Ankara Social Sciences University. Gürol Baba said Türkiye’s move to join BRICS will make it a more ‘visible’ actor in the region: “Türkiye is an active middle power. It should cooperate with like-minded powers. For example, Türkiye is a founding member of the MIKTA group. BRICS is also a place where Türkiye can find like-minded countries. Baba said Türkiye wanted to keep East and West together in its foreign policy.

Prof Zou Zhigiang of Fudan University said: ‘Türkiye is changing its Asia policy. This is because an Asia that is economically and technologically confident, competitive and rising in every sense cannot be ignored. Türkiye is currently seeking to increase its engagement in the region. President Erdoğan attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in 2022 for the first time as a NATO country. It has also been confirmed that Türkiye has applied to join BRICS,” he said. Prof Zou summed up why Türkiye attaches such importance to Asia in 4 points:

  1. Accumulated frustration with the West and the European Union. It is now clear that Türkiye’s EU membership will not happen in the near future.

  2. Türkiye is seeking strategic autonomy. It wants to be a central power in the world and pursue a balanced policy. It wants to be a centre between East and West and not give up its NATO membership.

  3. The growing global influence and attractiveness of the SCO and BRICS.

  4. Türkiye’s domestic economy faces challenges. New economic markets and capital inflows are vital for Türkiye.

Prof Zhou Shixin of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies commented on China’s Asia policy:

“China is seen by the US as the biggest threat, so it is blocked and ostracised by the US and some of its allies. China-US relations are one of the most important factors driving the regional power shift and order transition in the Asia-Pacific. China is expanding its presence and increasing its influence in the Asia-Pacific. China is acting as a modern and sovereign country, making great efforts to defend its territorial integrity and sovereign independence and to achieve national reunification. China also seeks peaceful and equal coexistence and interaction with the US, but does not seek to coerce the US. China seeks to strengthen security and economic relations with more regional countries on the basis of the principles of ‘friendship, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness’. China seeks to manage and resolve territorial disputes with its neighbours primarily through bilateral diplomatic consultations and negotiations”.

Commenting on Türkiye’s Asia Re-entry Initiative, Prof. Zhou said that Ankara has demonstrated its willingness to pursue a multi-dimensional foreign policy based on the Strategic Depth Doctrine and made the following suggestions: “Türkiye can focus more on Southeast Asia rather than South Asia and Northeast Asia, Türkiye can interact with Asia-Pacific countries as a sovereign country, not as a NATO member, even with Japan and South Korea. Türkiye could promote more economic cooperation rather than security cooperation, Türkiye could apply to join the ASEAN Regional Forum as an Asian country, and Türkiye could negotiate more free trade agreements with Asia-Pacific countries beyond South Korea (1 May 2013), Malaysia (1 August 2015) and Singapore (1 October 2017) before joining the EU. As a result, China is willing to help Türkiye further coordinate with some regional countries.”

Prof Zhou Yiqi of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies spoke about China’s Middle East policy:

“There are four major parties in the Middle East: Arab countries, Israel, Iran and Türkiye. China has strengthened its relations with most of the major powers there. However, Türkiye remains the only party that has not yet signed a partnership agreement with China. Diplomatic relations between the two: Strategic Cooperation Relations. Although relations between China and Israel are rather poor, there is still a relationship of innovative partnership. In addition, China has successfully negotiated the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. China’s partnership between these two countries has become a bridge that brings them together.

The traditional stereotype is that China is only interested in economic issues and is a free rider on security in the region. However, after its mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its efforts to bring peace to Gaza, China has become an active player in Middle East security issues. However, this still differs from US efforts to use the alliance as a bargaining chip. China has always been quite fair in the Middle East, which has earned it trust. But it is also on the side of justice, for example on the Palestinian issue.”

Commenting on Türkiye’s Re-Asia Initiative, Prof. Zhou Yiqi said: “I think it is important for Türkiye to improve its relations with China, because China-Türkiye relations are even weaker than China-Israel relations. China is looking for stability in the face of apparent uncertainty. But I don’t understand why the foreign minister went back to Türkiye and suddenly raised taxes on electric cars imported from China. Such issues have become a hot topic on Chinese social media and this is definitely not positive for people-to-people understanding,” he said.

Dr Selçuk Aydın of Boğaziçi University commented on Türkiye’s relations with Asia:

“The origins of modern Türkiye go back to the early 19th century. The biggest event of that period was the abolition of the Janissaries. In other words, while the Ottoman Empire was undergoing a transformation, this process was expressed with a ‘new’ term. If we look back to the 1920s, there were again discussions about ‘New Türkiye’. When Erdoğan came to power, all the news was about ‘New Türkiye’. In fact, Asia is nothing new for Türkiye; it already has historical, cultural and religious links. I think Dr Serdar has been working on Uighur and Xinjiang issues. Historically, this region has been very connected and interacted with Türkiye.

Secondly, Türkiye’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is a great initiative. There is a mystery in Türkiye about China and in China about Türkiye. How is Türkiye perceived? For China, the concept of Türkiye is probably limited to NATO. Then there is the Xinjiang issue. There are two important issues that hinder Türkiye’s cooperation with China.

The first step we need to discuss is Türkiye’s dissatisfaction with what the US is forcing it to do in the Middle East. Especially the Syria incident. That was a turning point in diplomacy. Another example is the FETO case. Gulen had a close relationship with the US and there was a coup attempt. After this incident, Türkiye’s diplomatic direction changed. After the Arab Spring, Türkiye realised that the US did not support liberal movements in the Middle East, but only focused on its own interests. Subsequently, Türkiye became more involved in Middle Eastern affairs, for example by mobilising its military abroad in Syria, Azerbaijan and elsewhere.

We need to analyse Türkiye’s foreign policy from these perspectives. First, history, which is also intertwined with religion. The Ottoman Empire was the centre of the Caliphate. The second is the racial dimension, which also bears traces of the late Ottoman Empire. Turkish consulates are therefore the main pillar of Turkish foreign policy. The third pillar of Turkish policy is the promotion of a non-Western approach. This is related to the foundations of modern Türkiye and is very anti-colonialist. At the same time, Türkiye is geographically close to Western countries and has historically cooperated with them.

Türkiye’s neighbours are often in civil war or conflict. So Türkiye has to look to Asia, because China has incredible lessons to teach in that region. China may be the only superpower that wants peace in the Middle East.”

Commenting on Türkiye-China relations, Dr Serdar Yurtçiçek said:

“Professor Yiqi mentioned that there are four important powers in the Middle East (Türkiye, Arabia, Iran and Israel) and although China has very good relations with three of them, it has not been able to improve its relations with Türkiye. The reason for this is the Uighur issue, as Selçuk mentioned earlier. Since 2016, I have been living in China and researching Türkiye’s China policy. During this time, I have met many Chinese academics and politicians. The conclusion I have drawn from my experience and research is that the most important issue between Türkiye and China is the Uyghur issue, and unless this issue is resolved, all other areas of cooperation cannot be built in a relationship of mutual trust. Last year, former ambassador Emin Önen said: ‘There is mutual understanding on 99 points in Türkiye-China relations, but let’s not agree on one point. This should not hinder the development of bilateral relations’. Prof. Yang Chen said that China wants to improve its relations with Türkiye, but this point is as important as the other 99 points and the two countries should keep their mutual promises. That point is the Uighur issue. And it is clear that Turkish academics and politicians do not understand how important the Xinjiang issue is for China and that it is a non-negotiable issue in terms of national sovereignty.

After the Second World War, Turkish-Chinese relations developed largely within the foreign policy boundaries drawn by the United States. In particular, the fight against China in the Korean Civil War and Türkiye’s eventual accession to NATO led to Uighur figures such as Isa Yusuf Alptekin and Mehmet Emin Buğra defecting to Türkiye, making Türkiye a centre for anti-China Uighur separatist organisations. Even diplomatic relations between Türkiye and China only started after the US established diplomatic relations with China.

The situation was no different before the Second World War. Türkiye prioritised its friendship with the Soviets in its foreign policy and was wary of taking any steps that might anger the Soviets. For example, in 1944, Türkiye and the Republic of China almost signed a treaty of friendship, but Türkiye cancelled the treaty at the last minute so as not to anger the Soviets. This was because Türkiye had serious problems with the Soviets, especially the issue of the Straits Convention. The situation was similar in China. Xinjiang was largely under Soviet control. According to a Turkish diplomat, if a Chinese official wanted to go to Xinjiang, he first had to get permission from the Soviet consul in Kashgar.

Today, for the first time, there is a possibility of strategic relations between China and Türkiye without the shadow of a third country. Türkiye’s application for BRICS membership should be seen in this context.”

ASIA

How will Trump’s potential tariffs affect Southeast Asia?

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Southeast Asia is worried about Donald Trump’s threat of universal tariffs and a new trade war with China. Five of the region’s six largest economies run a trade surplus with the United States.

But experts say the situation may not be so bad. The region, which tries to remain geopolitically neutral, saw an increase in gross trade with both China and the U.S. between 2017 and 2020 during Trump’s first presidency. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have benefited as companies from China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. have expanded their production bases in Southeast Asia to avoid U.S. tariffs.

Experts say exports and economic growth will take a hit in the short term, but the region could benefit from trade diversion and substitution.

What is Trump’s tariff threat?

The goal of Trump’s trade policy is to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. and decouple supply chains from China. Trump and his advisers claim that China’s trade advantage is due to “currency manipulation, intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer”.

During his first term, Trump used executive powers to impose tariffs of up to 25% on $250bn of electronics, machinery and consumer goods imported from China. Beijing retaliated with similar measures on U.S. agricultural, automotive and technology exports.

Now Trump has proposed a 60 per cent tariff on all Chinese goods entering the U.S. and tariffs of up to 20 per cent on imports from everywhere else.

How bad could it be for Southeast Asia?

According to Oxford Economics, about 40 per cent of Cambodia’s exports go to the U.S., making it the largest exporter in Asean as a percentage of total exports, followed by Vietnam with 27.4 per cent and Thailand with 17 per cent. Thanavath Phonvichai, president of the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, said the Thai economy could take a 160.5 billion baht ($4.6 billion) hit if Trump fulfils his promises.

Vietnam has the world’s fourth-largest trade surplus with the United States. This imbalance has been growing rapidly as Chinese, Taiwanese and South Korean companies have used Vietnam to avoid Trump-era tariffs. Vietnam’s fortunes could change just as quickly, especially if the U.S. continues to classify Vietnam as a ‘non-market economy’, which requires higher tariffs.

Uncertainty over Trump’s tariffs could cause companies to pause or halt investment plans in Southeast Asia. U.S. companies accounted for about half of Singapore’s $9.5 billion in fixed-asset investment last year, according to the city-state’s Economic Development Board. In his congratulatory letter to Trump, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong was quick to remind him that the United States enjoys a “consistent trade surplus” with Singapore.

Any blow to the Chinese economy will have repercussions for Asean countries that depend on Chinese consumption, export demand and tourism. A reduced appetite for Chinese goods will also affect Southeast Asian suppliers of inputs to Chinese producers. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, will suffer the most because it exports 24.2 per cent of its goods to China, mainly commodities.

Unable to send their goods to the U.S., Chinese exporters may turn to Southeast Asia, where governments have faced complaints from local producers hurt by dumping in metals, textiles, and consumer goods.

What is Southeast Asia’s advantage?

Southeast Asia’s current manufacturing boom started because of the trade war. Over time, analysts expect trade substitution and diversion to outweigh the hit to growth.

“We think a stronger crackdown on China could lead to more supply chain diversion as Chinese companies trade and invest more in Asia,” said Jayden Vantarakis, head of ASEAN research at Macquarie Capital.

“Electric vehicle factories, which some Southeast Asian governments are aggressively pursuing, could provide an economic buffer. Demand for EVs is also growing outside the U.S., so I think there could be a net benefit for Indonesia. Smaller countries that are trying to be carbon neutral, especially as petrol prices get more expensive, will try to take over the supply and buy more electric cars,” said Sumit Agarwal, a professor at the National University of Singapore’s School of Business.

Trump’s promised tariffs could embolden Asean governments to impose anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods, as Thailand did on rolled steel this year. Stricter U.S. rules of origin could also give governments an opportunity to ensure that more high-value parts are produced and assembled locally.

How will Southeast Asian currencies and markets be affected?

Trump’s tariffs could reduce pressure on Southeast Asian central banks to ease monetary policy further.

“Essentially, Trump’s victory is inflationary for the world because of his planned tariffs, so the global monetary normalization or easing cycle will probably not be as sharp as previously thought, including in the Philippines,” said Miguel Chanco, chief emerging Asia economist at UK-based Pantheon Macroeconomics.

Speaking to Nikkei Asia, Chanco said Southeast Asian currencies will not strengthen as much as previously expected, partly because markets are re-pricing the pace of easing by the U.S. Federal Reserve and thus the dollar will continue to strengthen.

Among Southeast Asia’s six major economies, the Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit have been the worst-performing currencies since Trump’s victory, losing 3.2 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively against the U.S. dollar through Wednesday.

Thai brokerage InnovestX recommended stocks that would benefit from a strong dollar and weak baht. These include companies with significant export earnings, such as CP Foods and Delta Electronics, or tourism-related companies such as Airports of Thailand, property developers and hoteliers.

Governments are already taking steps to reduce their over-dependence on the U.S. or China by deepening ties with other countries and regions and emphasizing their neutrality.

Southeast Asian economies in particular are also expected to focus on building resilience by strengthening intra-ASEAN trade.

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Japan’s exports rise despite global risks, boosted by China

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Japan’s exports rose more than expected in October, driven by strong demand from China and other parts of Asia, despite growing uncertainties in global markets.

Exports increased by 3.1% year-on-year, led by significant growth in shipments of chip-making equipment, particularly to China, according to the Finance Ministry’s report on Wednesday. This marked a rebound following the first drop in 10 months in September. October’s figures exceeded economists’ forecasts of a 1% rise and were also bolstered by increased shipments of medical products to the United States.

Meanwhile, imports edged up by 0.4%, defying expectations of a 1.9% decline. As a result, the trade deficit widened to 461.2 billion yen ($2.98 billion), compared to 294.1 billion yen in the previous month.

This stronger-than-expected export performance has raised optimism about Japan’s economic recovery. Although the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) expanded for the second consecutive quarter through September, the pace of growth has been tempered by the drag from net exports.

“Today’s data raises hopes that external demand will revive in the October-December quarter,” said Hiroshi Miyazaki, Senior Research Fellow at the Itochu Research Institute. “The Chinese government’s stimulus measures have stabilized its economy and reversed the prior decline.”

Exports to China rose by 1.5% last month, rebounding from a 7.3% drop in September, with semiconductor manufacturing equipment exports surging by nearly a third. These gains align with signs that China’s stimulus policies are beginning to yield results, driving growth in certain sectors and boosting consumer spending.

Notably, Japanese exports grew despite the yen’s strengthening against the dollar, averaging 145.87 yen per dollar in October—2% stronger than the previous year, according to ministry data.

The export rebound occurs against a backdrop of heightened concerns about global trade policies. Business leaders are bracing for the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House, with fears that his proposed tariffs—60% on imports from China and 20% on other nations—could disrupt international commerce.

Some regions are already experiencing a slowdown. Shipments to the United States and Europe declined by 6.2% and 11.3%, respectively, in October.

The Bank of Japan (BoJ) is closely monitoring these developments. BoJ Governor Kazuo Ueda noted on Monday that while the Federal Reserve’s prospects for a soft landing have improved, risks tied to the U.S. economy and their impact on global markets require careful consideration.

The most pressing concern for Japan’s trade outlook is the impact of potential U.S. tariffs. Historical data from the U.S.-China trade war (2018-2019) suggests that a 1% increase in export prices, including tariffs, led to a 0.35 percentage-point reduction in profit margins for Chinese exporters, according to research from Stanford University’s Centre for Chinese Economics and Institutions. A similar scenario could hurt Japanese firms’ profitability, counteracting gains from the yen’s depreciation.

“We are not yet at a stage where Trump’s tariff policy is clearly impacting export volumes or exporters’ behavior,” Miyazaki told The Japan Times. “However, there remains significant uncertainty, and we must continue to monitor the policy stance of the next Trump administration,” he added.

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IMF reviews Pakistan’s $7bn bailout

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An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team conducted an unscheduled visit to Pakistan last week to assess the country’s progress on the terms of its $7 billion bailout package. The surprise visit, coming less than two months after the loan’s approval, has raised questions about the future of the bailout program. IMF staff are expected to present their findings to the Washington-based executive board for review.

What prompted the IMF’s unexpected visit to Pakistan?

Several officials, speaking to Nikkei Asia on condition of anonymity, highlighted key factors prompting the visit. These included a $685 million shortfall in the government’s tax collection target for the first quarter of the current fiscal year and a $2.5 billion deficit in the external financing required under the bailout terms. Compounding these issues was the failed sale of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), a key component of the IMF-recommended privatisation drive.

While routine IMF program review visits are standard, the timing of this visit—just seven weeks after board approval—has raised concerns. “This suggests significant difficulties in implementing the program,” said Naafey Sardar, an economics professor at St. Olaf College in the United States, speaking to Nikkei Asia.

Ikram ul Haq, a lawyer specializing in economic and tax policy, added, “The reality is that the government’s promises to the IMF have not been fulfilled.”

What were the key issues discussed?

The IMF raised the issue of the tax gap and urged action to ensure that Pakistan meets its annual tax collection target of $46 billion.

Islamabad was also asked to engage with Saudi Arabia and China, the largest investor, to bridge the external financing gap. Promised energy sector reforms and the repayment of billions of dollars of debt owed to mostly Chinese-backed power plants in Pakistan were also discussed.

Another issue was for the IMF to press provincial governments for more funds, such as the Benazir Income Support Programme, which provides a $2.1 billion annual cash transfer for poverty alleviation, currently paid for by the central government.

How does agricultural income tax fit into this picture?

As part of the loan agreement, Pakistan’s provinces missed an end-October deadline to harmonize their agricultural income tax laws with the federal income tax.

The IMF had previously said that Pakistan’s loan agreement would be in jeopardy if agricultural income remained largely untaxed. During the meetings, provincial government officials told the IMF that they would face significant difficulties in implementing a higher tax.

Economist Aqdas Afzal said such a move would face significant opposition from big landowners, who are disproportionately represented in the federal and provincial assemblies.

“Given the weak mandate of the current government, a higher agricultural income tax is unlikely as it could trigger major social and political unrest,” he added.

What assurances has the government given to the IMF?

Pakistan has assured the IMF that it will increase the provincial agricultural income tax rate by up to 45 percent. It has also pledged to meet annual tax collection targets and to continue reforms in the energy sector and state-owned enterprises.

“This is an ongoing dialogue process and there have been discussions [with the IMF] on energy and SOE reforms, the privatization agenda and public finance,” Pakistan’s Finance and Revenue Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb told local media.

Haq, a tax expert, said the government’s primary focus would be on meeting the six-month revenue collection target set by Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue, a government agency that regulates and collects taxes.

What are the challenges ahead for Pakistan’s loan agreement?

Meeting tough tax targets and implementing structural reforms are major hurdles for the government to overcome.

The IMF has previously cancelled other loan programmes when conditions were not met. Payments to Pakistan could be suspended or stopped altogether, which would be a serious blow to a country struggling with a sputtering economy.

The IMF is pressing for cuts in government spending.

“Structural reforms are being resisted by vested interests, making efforts to meet IMF conditions even more difficult,” Haq said.

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