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What are the structural problems in EU-Türkiye relations?

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In recent days, the remarks regarding Türkiye made by European Union (EU) officials—most recently by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen—have provoked a sharp backlash within our country. Those voicing their reaction have spoken of Türkiye’s significance, the EU’s dependence on Türkiye, and the conviction that Türkiye will persevere even without the EU. Yet, the question remains: has Türkiye taken the necessary steps in response to these remarks, is it doing so now, or will it do so in the future? The answer is no. This is precisely what the EU relies upon most. Despite the far more severe rhetoric directed at Türkiye to date, has the fact that Türkiye has taken no action beyond mere verbal declarations—failing to offer any substantive response—rendered EU officials more audacious, or even insolent? Indeed, it has.

It is, therefore, prudent to examine the structural problems inherent in Türkiye-EU relations.

This is because Türkiye-EU relations are not merely about the bilateral ties between two entities; they represent something far more profound. The EU is an active participant in the internal contradictions and power struggles within Türkiye. Consequently, the struggle between those who seek to leverage European support (large capital circles, pseudo-republicans, separatist Kurds, and merchants of faith) and those who oppose this constitutes a fundamental dimension of Türkiye-EU relations. In short, the EU is a partisan actor in Türkiye’s domestic politics. It sides with political Islamists, ethnic separatists, liberals, pseudo-republicans, and sectarianists. These groups, emboldened by EU support, have sought—and continue to seek—to marginalize the Nationalists, Kemalists, patriots, republicans, and those leftists and revolutionaries whose roots are firmly planted in Anatolian soil. Türkiye witnessed this clearly during the Ergenekon, Balyoz, and Oda TV trials. While the EU championed the FETÖ terrorist organization just as it did the PKK, it failed to issue even the slightest statement in support of the commanders, journalists, authors, and scientists held captive in Silivri at that time. On the contrary, it endorsed that very lawlessness. Today, the EU remains the primary sanctuary and supporter for members of both the PKK and FETÖ.

Who does the EU support in Türkiye?

The European Union interferes in Türkiye’s internal affairs and consistently aligns itself with the opposing party in bilateral and multilateral disputes. It does so under various pretexts: sometimes invoking harmonization laws, the UN Twin Covenants, or the “Kurdish issue”; at other times through the invention of “minorities” not recognized by the Treaty of Lausanne, or by attempting to frame our Alevi citizens as an extra-Islamic minority; and further through issues such as the Ecumenical Patriarchate, so-called genocide allegations, Cyprus, the Aegean islands, the Annan Plan, or the rhetoric of democracy and freedoms.

While ethnic separatists, sectarianists, religious exploiters, pseudo-republicans, liberals, and “liberal-leftists” (whatever that may mean) in Türkiye have effectively utilized the EU for their own ends, the EU has utilized them even more productively. Through these channels, the EU has leveled hundreds of demands detrimental to Türkiye’s independence, integrity, sovereignty, and political unity. In the TRNC (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus), the EU has engaged in all manner of activities directed against the founding president and national hero, Rauf Denktaş, seeking to liquidate Türkiye’s presence on the island. EU officials such as Karen Fogg and Günter Verheugen drew immense ire with their remarks against Atatürk and Kemalism, as well as their statements targeting the Turkish nation, state, and history. They have persistently attempted to define citizens of the Alevi faith as a minority, just as they have done with citizens of Kurdish origin. They have provided overt support to the PKK terrorist organization.

Certain circles of large-scale capital in Türkiye have also instrumentalized the EU to strengthen their domestic standing. They have issued statements calculated to please the EU and commissioned the types of reports the Union favors. The objective here is to leave our country defenseless and fully open to the service of Western capitalism. Alongside these capital circles, several trade unions—including those claiming to be revolutionary or identifying as “on the left”—have accepted EU funding. They have engaged in vapid rhetoric about “building a Europe of Labor.”

For all these circles, the EU has functioned as a protective umbrella. Under this aegis—provided by the US and its subordinate partner, the EU—large capital, religious exploiters, ethnicists, the PKK, pseudo-republicans, and neo-liberals acted in concert to sever Northern Iraq from the mainland and establish a puppet Kurdish state. In essence, domestic power centers have utilized the prospect of EU membership—which is, in reality, impossible—as a lever against Türkiye itself.

For whom does the West desire democracy?

One must recognize this reality: the imperialist West does not desire for the rest of the world what it claims for itself. It speaks of democracy, but it practices it only for its own benefit. In the rest of the world, it supports anti-democratic regimes to further its own interests. The West is democratic unto itself; externally, it is colonialist, expansionist, predatory, racist, a staunch supporter of authoritarian regimes, and imperialist. History is replete with countless examples of this.

As Türkiye is being transformed toward federalism through the hands of feudalism, the West has supported and continues to support this process in the name of democracy, freedom, human rights, and civil society. Pro-US and pro-EU advocates have repeatedly told the Turkish nation: “This is what the EU demands; there is no other option.” In truth, however, the EU is opposed to the Treaty of Lausanne and harbors a longing for the Treaty of Sèvres.

There is more.

In foreign policy, relationships are reciprocal; they are grounded in mutual interest and a search for equilibrium. This is absent in Türkiye-EU relations. The EU is perpetually the receiving party, while Türkiye is perpetually the giver.

The US and the EU have always found partners within Türkiye. It matters little to them whether it is ANAP, DYP, SHP, CHP, or the AKP. Nor does it matter whether the figure is Kemal Derviş, Ali Babacan, or Mehmet Şimşek. Whether they are center-right, social democrat, nationalist, or conservative is irrelevant. Brussels focuses solely on what it can extract from Ankara and to what extent. It takes what it requires without regard for the political history, ideology, or economic policy preferences of those who grant the concessions. For this reason, the EU abandoned the ANAP leader—who famously claimed “The path to the EU passes through Diyarbakır”—in an instant, choosing instead to walk the path with the AKP leadership. This leadership, promising to be “one step ahead of everyone on the EU road,” supported the Annan Plan in the TRNC and publicly rebuked a national hero, Rauf Denktaş, telling him to “go and speak in his own parliament and stop blocking the solution.”

The EU secures its demands through the Customs Union

Through the Customs Union, signed on March 6, 1995, and enacted on January 1, 1996, the EU extracts more than enough from Türkiye without granting it full membership. As the first and only country to join the Customs Union without being an EU member, Türkiye has allowed the Union to establish dominance over its domestic market, its customs regime, and its foreign trade policy. The EU has secured a degree of tutelage over our country’s global economic relations to whatever extent it desires.

The EU has consistently behaved with hypocrisy toward Türkiye, applying a blatant double standard. Under normal circumstances, the EU first notifies a candidate of the membership decision and affirms that the country will be admitted. Only then do negotiations begin. The duration of negotiations and the commencement of membership are generally clear, and an approximate membership date is typically provided. None of this has applied to Türkiye. The EU has given Türkiye no guarantee of membership. It has declared the negotiations to be “open-ended,” stating that they do not guarantee accession. It has specified that even if Türkiye becomes a full member, Turkish citizens may not benefit from the right to free movement. It has emphasized that even if Türkiye is not admitted, it must remain strictly bound to EU institutions. It has asserted that even if governments approve Türkiye’s membership, any individual member state may subject the decision to a referendum. It has underlined that Türkiye’s full membership is contingent upon the EU’s “absorption capacity.”

It was for this reason that my esteemed teacher and friend, the late Prof. Dr. Erol Manisalı—one of the scholars who knew the EU best and reflected most deeply on Türkiye-EU relations—titled one of his many books Bekleme Odasında İğfal (Violation in the Waiting Room, Derin Publishing, Istanbul, 2007). He emphasized that this is not a relationship between two equals, but rather one of concubinage or a mistress-like dependency.

While debating the future of the EU, Türkiye must not forget this reality: the EU’s decision to admit Türkiye depends less on Türkiye fulfilling the EU’s demands and more on how the EU perceives itself on the global stage. If the EU aspires to be a global power and is willing to bear the associated costs, it will admit Türkiye. If it prefers to remain under the wing of the US, benefiting from NATO’s capabilities without the ambition of becoming a global power, it will not.

Most importantly, one must not overlook the current state of the EU, the condition and priorities of its leader, Germany, and the divergent views stemming from the differences in scale, priority, interest, and preference among member states.

Rather than pursuing the phantom of an EU membership that will never be granted—an EU that has, in any case, lost its allure—Türkiye should leverage the immense advantages of its geopolitical position. In a multilateral, multipolar world, Türkiye must establish relations with the East, the West, the North, and the South based on mutual benefit and common interest. It must reject the role of an actor balancing the East on behalf of the West or Asia on behalf of Europe, and instead emerge as a cornerstone of stability within its own region.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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