Opinion
2025 will be a year of hard choices for Iran

What we have seen in Iran in the past year is more than a European will see in his whole life. I read this sentence on an Iranian’s X (formerly Twitter) page a few months ago. Interestingly, on my last trip to Iran, a taxi driver said exactly the same thing and mentioned that he was tired of reading the news.
Indeed, Iran has experienced such extraordinary times in the past year that this year can be described as the longest for the country in several decades. Any one of the events Iranians experienced in 2024 would have been a historic milestone for any country. But in 2024, Iran experienced all these events together.
Perhaps the most important feature of 2024 is that the problems experienced will be carried over to 2025 without the slightest solution. This makes it uncertain whether Iranians will have a calmer year next year than they did in 2024.
So, what were the most important events in Iran last year?
Domestic politics:
Parliamentary elections:
The 12th Majlis elections of the Islamic Republic of Iran were held on 1 March 2024 and as expected, the conservatives managed to gain a majority in the Majlis. Only 40 per cent of eligible voters turned out for the election, the lowest turnout in the political history of the Islamic Republic. This was a major turning point in the political history of post-revolutionary Iran. Opponents saw it as a symbol of popular disenchantment with Iran’s current political system, while the pro-government camp interpreted it as a message of protest from the Iranian people to the government.
The disqualification of many reformists, and even critical conservative parliamentary candidates by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, preventing them from taking part in the elections, was seen as the main reason for these political reactions. The poor economic situation was also seen as another reason.
Many believed that the 12th Parliament was designed to be the most harmonious and cooperative with the government of then President Ibrahim Raisi. The extremely low voter turnout in large cities and the higher turnout in smaller cities was interpreted as an indication of changes in the political sociology of Iranian society.
Election of the Assembly of Experts:
Simultaneously with the parliamentary elections, the Iranian people elected 88 mujtahids, whose nominations had been approved by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, to the sixth term of the Assembly of Experts (Majlis-e Khobregan).
According to Article 107 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Assembly of Experts is made up of ‘qualified’ faqihs who are responsible for electing and dismissing the Leader and monitoring his conduct. Each term of this Assembly lasts 8 years and is of particular importance as it is responsible for overseeing the behavior of the Leader and, in the event of the death of the current Leader, selecting the next Leader.
Many believe that given the age of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the next leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran is likely to be elected by the members of the Assembly of Experts in its sixth term. Therefore, the Assembly of Experts elections in this term are more important than in previous terms.
Perhaps because of this importance, the Council for the Protection of the Constitution, which is tasked with approving the nominations of representatives to the Assembly of Experts, has conducted a very strict vetting process this term, rejecting the nominations of those who have previously served multiple terms in the Assembly of Experts, such as former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani.
It is believed that this strict vetting process was carried out in order to create a more unified structure in the Assembly of Experts and to minimize controversy and disagreement in the selection of the next Leader.
Death of the President
On 19 May, when all the news agencies were analysing the end of the political stalemate between the two neighbouring countries following the inauguration of the joint Kizil Kalesi border dam in the presence of the Iranian and Azerbaijani presidents, the news suddenly broke of the ’emergency landing of the presidential helicopter’.
An hour later, it was discovered that the communication line of Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and the accompanying delegation had been cut. Also, on board the helicopter was Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdullahiyan, Governor of East Azerbaijan Malik Rahmati, Governor-Faqih Representative of East Azerbaijan Province Seyyed Mohammad Ali Al-Hashim, Commander of the Presidential Protection Unit and three pilots.
The rescue operation was hampered by the dense forest and poor weather conditions (rain and dense fog). Various drones, search and rescue teams and trained search dogs were used, and it took 15 hours to obtain definitive information on the condition of the President and his entourage. The news of the President’s death was finally confirmed the following morning.
The president’s death came at a time when he was seen as one of the contenders for the future leadership of Iran, and many believed that the new Majlis would give full support to his government.
On the one hand, the death has led to foreign policy uncertainties at a time of escalating tensions between Iran and Israel over events in Gaza, and on the other it has raised the possibility of an assassination attempt on the president. Although the official state reports have explained that the main cause of the helicopter crash was dense fog and bad weather conditions, the public is not convinced by the following questions Why did only the helicopter carrying the President and the Foreign Minister crash, and why was the helicopter not located for 15 hours?
Early presidential elections:
Following the death of Ebrahim Raisi, presidential elections were held with 6 candidates, based on Article 131 of the Iranian Constitution, which stipulates that “in cases such as the death, resignation, illness or dismissal of the President of the Republic, the interim Presidential Council is obliged to ensure the election of a new President within fifty days at the latest, and during this period it assumes the presidential powers except for the referendum”.
This election was also overshadowed by the process of eliminating candidates by the Council for the Protection of the Constitution. One reformist candidate stood against 5 conservative candidates. Many prominent figures from the reformist or moderate conservative wing were disqualified and could not take part in the elections. From the reformist wing, only Masoud Pezeshkian, former Minister of Health and a member of the cabinet of Mohammad Khatami, the leading figure of the reformist movement, managed to participate in the elections.
Pezeshkian won 53.6% of the vote, defeating his ultra-conservative rival Said Jalili, and was elected president. He campaigned on promises to abolish the morality police, economic reforms and a diplomatic opening.
The reformist movement continues to support Pezeshkian’s presidency, viewing the conservative representatives in parliament as a minority elected with little public participation. However, according to the election results, Pezeshkian received the direct support of only 25% of the population. The success or failure of the Pezeshkian government will be discussed in another article.
Ongoing economic crisis:
In 2024, as in previous years, Iran continued to struggle with the economic crisis. The value of the national currency fell by 100% in one year, and the inflation rate continued to hover around 40%, according to the Central Bank. This situation has become a chronic disease of the Iranian economy. From 2020 to the end of 2024, the value of the Iranian national currency fell from 13,000 to 89,000 divisions to $1. In other words, Iranians have seen their currency depreciate by more than 600 per cent in the last five years, with a significant portion of this loss occurring in the last year. Most worryingly, there is no hope that this situation will improve.
The devaluation of the national currency and the resulting inflation and uncontrolled price increases have fueled public discontent, which has only deepened over time.
Energy crisis:
Another issue that has emerged as a major concern in Iran since the summer of this year and has been at the top of the agenda in recent weeks is the energy shortage and the inability of the country’s electricity and gas infrastructure to meet demand. Iran faced frequent electricity and water shortages this summer and repeated power cuts in the winter. The energy crisis has also resulted in air pollution due to the irregular operation of power plants, which has caused and continues to cause environmental crises.
Experts believe that the lack of infrastructure investment in the country’s energy sector, especially the heavy sanctions and mismanagement by government officials in recent years, are the main reasons for this situation. This problem is likely to become more complex in the coming year, with significant social and political consequences.
Improvement in civil liberties:
With a reformist president in power and given the significant protests in Iran last year over the headscarf issue, state repression of women’s dress appears to have decreased significantly in 2024. In recent weeks, some popular messaging apps that were blocked last year have been made available, signaling an improvement in civil liberties.
Foreign policy:
Throughout 2024, Iran’s foreign policy was heavily influenced by the Gaza war. The escalation of Israel’s military operations in Gaza in the early months of the year, and their escalation into an unprecedented genocide, showed that the conflict would be protracted and would have consequences for Iran.
As the war dragged on, analyses in Iran fell into two main groups: The first group argued that Iran should not fall into Israel’s war trap. According to this group, by provoking Iran, Israel was trying to turn the war in Gaza from a confrontation with the defenseless people of Gaza into a confrontation with Iran. In this way, Israel would be able to ignore its genocidal crimes in Gaza and win the support of an international coalition from the United States and Europe by portraying itself as the victim. This group argued that Iran should engage in a minimal conflict with Israel and that Israel should not be allowed to draw Iran into a wider war. They saw Iran’s current economic difficulties, popular dissatisfaction with the government, the death of the president and internal political changes, possible attacks on Iran’s oil infrastructure and the cutting off of Iran’s main sources of income as the main reasons for avoiding war.
The second group argued that Israel had decided to destroy Iran’s influence in the Middle East and that Iran should inflict heavy blows on Israel. According to them, if Iran did not react seriously against Israel, it would pay a much higher price for this war in the future. This group believed that by inflicting heavy blows on Israel, Iran would be making a strategic choice between life and death, but that avoiding conflict with Israel would lead to an inevitable collapse in the future. This group argued that Iran was capable of striking hard blows against Israel, that Iran had demonstrated its technological capability in ballistic missile attacks, and that it could provide an important deterrent against Israel by shifting its nuclear strategy towards the production and testing of atomic bombs.
The events of the past year show that Iran has favored the view of the first group but has not refrained from some attacks against Israel.
The main developments in Iran’s foreign policy over the past year can be summarized as follows:
First military operation against Israel: The conflict between Iran and Israel has been going on at the security level or through proxy groups for the past few decades. However, on 14 April 2024, Iran finally carried out a direct missile operation in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. This operation was dubbed “Operation True Promise-1”. The operation has been described as the first direct confrontation between Iran and Israel, the world’s largest drone strike, and the largest missile strike in Iran’s history.
In Operation True Promise, Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles into the Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories. Some of these missiles are said to have penetrated Israel’s defense systems and hit important military targets such as the Nevatim airbase.
The operation was carried out in response to the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April. The Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces made it clear that the reason for this operation was that Israel had crossed Iran’s red lines and attacked the Iranian consulate in Damascus. Seven people were killed in this Israeli attack, including Mohammad Reza Zahidi, a senior commander of the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.
Iran’s mission to the UN stated that this military operation was carried out under the right of self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Many experts have said that this operation was not intended to harm Israel, but rather to demonstrate Iran’s ability to overcome Israel’s missile defense systems and its ability to deliver a direct blow to Israel.
Assassination of Haniyeh in Tehran:
Ismail Haniyeh, head of the political bureau of Hamas and one of its leaders, was assassinated by Israel on 31 July 2024 at 01:37 in Tehran, accompanied by his bodyguard. Haniyeh was assassinated as he was returning to an accommodation centre of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards after attending the swearing-in ceremony of Iranian President Massoud Pezeshkian.
As well as being a major security disaster for the Iranian security services, it meant that Israel had crossed every possible red line. The assassination was seen as a serious loss of face for Iran.
Operation True Promise:
On 1 October 2024, Iran carried out a second missile attack against Israel, Operation True Promise-2. This attack came two months after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and in the wake of increased Israeli attacks on Hezbollah’s command center. In particular, it was carried out four days after an airstrike that killed Hezbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah Southern Front Commander Ali Kirki and Deputy Operations Chief of the Revolutionary Guards Abbas Nilforshan.
The operation involved the launch of 200 ballistic missiles, hypersonic Fateh and Khybershiken missiles from areas around Tehran, Kashan, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Kermanshah.
This operation was seen as a real show of Iranian strength against Israel and created an important national unity in Iranian society. Iranians, regardless of their political and ideological affiliations, saw this operation as an act of defending their national honor.
Israel’s attack on Iran:
On 26 October 2024, Israel launched three waves of air strikes on Iran under the name of “Operation Days of Penance”. These strikes continued throughout the night and into the morning in several Iranian provinces, causing limited damage according to Iranian officials. Israel said the strikes were in response to ‘months of continuous attacks’ by Iran and its proxies, as well as Iran’s rocket attack on Israel in October 2024. In this operation, 4 members of the Iranian air defense forces were killed.
Although this attack caused no visible destruction in Iran, it was seen as a new page in the history of the Iran-Israel conflict, as it was the first time that Israel had launched a direct military attack on Iranian territory.
The nuclear impasse continues:
Although the confrontation between Iran and Israel has overshadowed attention to the Iranian nuclear issue, Iran faces a dangerous reality: According to the 10-year agreement adopted by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 in 2015, if Iran is found to be in violation of the nuclear deal, previous UN sanctions can be automatically reimposed within 60 days at the request of any permanent member if the 5+1 Commission notifies the UN Security Council.
As the 10-year term of the nuclear deal nears its end, European countries and the United States are seeking to accuse Iran of violating its nuclear commitments, thereby portraying Iran as a threat to global security and seeking to reinstate UN sanctions. A few weeks ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi described this situation as a potential crisis for Iran and warned that it could have serious consequences for Iran. (It is not a far-fetched prediction that we will hear much more in the coming months about the automatic sanctions mechanism known as the ‘trigger mechanism’ or ‘snapback’).
This situation will be further complicated by the re-election of Donald Trump as US President.
Weakening regional position:
Although Israel failed to make noteworthy progress on the ground in Lebanon and was forced to retreat, it managed to deal a major strategic blow to the Lebanese resistance and thus to Iran by assassinating the Hezbollah leadership. The subsequent departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from the political scene and the rise to power of anti-Iranian groups in Syria meant that Iran severed its land link with Hezbollah and weakened its logistical support line to Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other resistance groups. These developments weaken Iran’s regional position and power and will continue to force Iran to seriously reconsider its regional policies.
…
Throughout 2024, Iran managed to end the year without a major crisis, although it had an eventful year in domestic politics. However, Iran faced serious crises in its foreign policy, which will lead to a future change in Iran’s regional and international policies. This political change will also mean a change in the actions of some groups associated with Iran, leading to new developments in regional dynamics.
2025 will undoubtedly be a challenging and volatile year for Iran and a year of difficult choices.
Opinion
A new peace or an old exploitation? A closer look at the Rwanda-Congo agreement

Barış Karaağaç, Faculty Member at Trent University
Peace, you say?
On June 27, 2025, a peace agreement was signed in Washington between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. Mediated by the United States and Qatar, this signing ceremony was presented, at first glance, as a promising development for the region. But a closer look reveals a much more complex picture.
The symbolic photo circulated from the agreement is thought-provoking: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stands between the foreign ministers of Rwanda and Congo as they shake hands. Behind them looms a giant portrait of Colin Powell. Signing a peace treaty under the shadow of Powell, one of the architects of the 2003 invasion and plunder of Iraq, is surely the height of historical irony.
In this article, let’s look behind the curtain of this peace agreement: Is peace truly on its way, or are other agendas at play? Let’s try to understand together what both the Congolese people and the great powers stand to gain or lose from this deal.
Background: Minerals, refugees, and the shadow of M23
This agreement came at a time when the rebel group known as M23 had captured strategic cities in eastern Congo, displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and seized control of rich mineral deposits. There are serious allegations that Rwanda is behind M23. The Kigali government, however, denies these accusations and, in turn, demands the neutralization of the FDLR, a Hutu militia group in Congo.
But the roots of these conflicts lie much deeper. Approximately 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The privileges granted to the Tutsis by Belgium during the colonial era had, over the years, unleashed the pent-up rage of the Hutu majority. In the aftermath of the genocide, thousands of Hutus, along with armed groups, fled to the neighboring country of Zaire (today’s Democratic Republic of Congo). This further inflamed ethnic tensions in the region.
For years, eastern Congo has been ravaged by wars fought not only over people but also over precious minerals like gold, cobalt, and coltan.
Official rhetoric: Praise for peace, questions between the lines
Official statements are dominated by an atmosphere of peace. Rwanda’s state newspaper, The New Times, described the agreement as a “historic opportunity,” while the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, hailed the development as a “milestone for regional peace.”
The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, stated, “Our real work begins now,” emphasizing that peace is possible not just with a signature, but with justice, the return of refugees, and the true silencing of guns.
However, Congo’s independent newspapers are approaching this process more cautiously. Kinshasa-based publications like Le Potentiel, L’Avenir, and Le Soft International are known for their independent stance from the official government line and for listening to the voices of social opposition. These outlets point out that the agreement’s implementation depends on domestic political will, foreign interference, and the actual conditions on the ground. Their writings expose the chasm between the peace on paper and the reality on the ground.
Through a critical lens: Mining disguised as peace
Now, let’s get to the heart of the matter: Congo is the world’s largest producer of cobalt. Nearly every mineral of strategic importance—coltan, gold, copper, lithium—can be found in this country. Numerous sectors, from electric vehicles to the defense industry, are dependent on these minerals.
U.S. President Donald Trump spoke quite openly after the signing: “We are getting a lot of mineral rights from Congo. This is a huge win for us.”
Around the same time, a Newsweek report explicitly stated that the U.S. agreement with the region was aimed at breaking China’s influence over rare earth metals. China should not be forgotten in this picture. Over the last decade, China has made massive investments in Africa. With its “infrastructure for resources” model, it has built roads, railways, and dams. Now, the U.S. wants to counterbalance China’s influence in the region and create space for its own companies. In short, on one side are the minerals, and on the other is the arm-wrestling of superpowers.
In this context, “peace” also comes to mean a new investment opportunity. Many thinkers on the international left interpret such processes as a “capitalist maneuver packaged as peace.” Development, stability, foreign aid… behind these flowery concepts operates a model where multinational corporations lay claim to the mines.
Congo, for its part, offered the U.S. “resources in exchange for security.” This hardly seems like a “partnership of equals.”
Moreover, the person leading the diplomatic process is Massad Boulos, an advisor to President Trump and also his daughter’s father-in-law. This makes the peace process look like both a family affair and a foreign trade deal. U.S. diplomacy, this time, seems to be operating like a family business.
Conclusion: A peace ‘Made in Congo’?
For over a century, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been at the center of colonialism, wars, and international power plays. Now there is a peace agreement, but whether it will benefit the people or the corporations remains debatable.
True peace comes—and should come—not just with the silencing of guns, but with the fair distribution of resources, accountable governance, and the right of peoples to self-determination. Otherwise, a new system of exploitation will simply be given the name “peace.”
Who knows, maybe one day electric bicycles with a “Made in Congo” label will appear on the world market. But as it stands today, this peace seems to bear the stamp “Made for US Corporations.”
Opinion
From the Six-Day War to the ‘Twelve-Day War’

The first round of the Iran-Israel conflict/war has likely concluded. This round, which consisted of mutual air strikes and missile salvos, will go down in the recent history of the Middle East as the Twelve-Day War. In the past, there was the Six-Day War; on June 5, 1967, Israel attacked Egypt first, followed by Syria and Jordan in the succeeding days, inflicting a crushing defeat on three Arab states in six days and quadrupling its territory.
Israel had previously fought these three states in 1948, immediately after its declaration of independence. In that war, it dealt a serious defeat to Egypt and Syria but was defeated by Jordan. Jordanian forces, largely trained and commanded by British officers, had ‘occupied’ the areas of what are today the West Bank and East Jerusalem. When Israel attacked its Arab neighbors in June 1967, it once again inflicted a devastating defeat on the two states it had beaten in the 1948 war, occupying Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Syria’s Golan region. It also defeated Jordan, annexing East Jerusalem and the West Bank, thereby roughly quadrupling its own territory. And because it managed to do all this in six days, these conflicts went down in history as the Six-Day War.
This defeat was not only devastating and humiliating for the warring Arab states and the Arab world in general, but it also brought about the end of the legendary Egyptian leader Nasser. Following his death from a sudden heart attack three years later (1970), it marked the end of the Pan-Arabism ideology not just in Egypt but across the entire Arab world. When the Arab states of Egypt and Syria responded to this defeat in 1973 with what was perhaps their first synchronized and well-planned attack (the Yom Kippur War, October 7, 1973), they managed to reclaim all the territory Israel had occupied in the Six-Day War on the very first day. However, thanks to the most extensive arms and ammunition airlift in history, conducted by the United States with large military transport planes flying directly to the front lines, Israel managed to turn the tide of the war and bring it to a close at its starting point. A similar airlift by the Soviet Union to the Arab countries saved Egypt’s encircled Third Army in the Sinai Peninsula from annihilation, but it was not enough for them to regain the military successes of the initial days.
Israel has not fought a war with any state since 1973
The Yom Kippur War would also be a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The policy initiated by Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat just before the war—of rapidly distancing from the Soviet Union and moving closer to the US—paid off for Cairo. Through the US-mediated peace process (Camp David), Egypt largely recovered the territories it had lost in the 1967 war, briefly regained in the early days of the 1973 war, and then lost again as the war turned in Israel’s favor. However, when this process, which began with recognizing Israel’s right to exist in the Middle East, progressed to the appointment of ambassadors between the two countries and the signing of the Camp David Accords, Egypt would be expelled from the Arab League at the initiative of Arab nations led by Syria, Iraq, and Libya.
The subsequent years were not at all positive for the Arab states and Palestinians who favored continuing the struggle against Israel to the end. The unipolar world order that emerged under American leadership after the collapse of the Soviet Union opened every window of opportunity for Israel. Eventually, the Iraqi and Libyan regimes that opposed reconciliation with Israel were overthrown, and their leaders (Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi) were killed. Syria, destabilized by our [Türkiye’s] own misguided policies, was added to this chain of events (2011-2024). Meanwhile, the Oslo Peace Process, initiated in the early 1990s, was sabotaged by extremist parties and the political elite in Israel.
During this period, while Israel tormented Palestinians and the groups in Southern Lebanon that would become Hezbollah for years, the instability and popular discontent in Iraq helped Iran gain tremendous strategic depth in that country and in Syria. Thus began the emergence of the forces known as the Axis of Resistance. The Hamas, Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi [Popular Mobilization Forces], and Yemen’s Ansar Allah movements either began or developed during this period. The Syrian state seemed to act as a bridge connecting the Axis of Resistance, from Iran to Hezbollah and even to Hamas.
It would be appropriate to view Israel’s June 13 attack on Iran as a continuation of the series of wars it launched in response to Hamas’s attacks on October 7, 2023, waged first against Hamas in Gaza, which a majority of global expert opinion has deemed a ‘genocide’. Perhaps the most significant development that paved the way for Israel, which had been unable to achieve sufficient success against Hezbollah, was the completely unexpected fall of the Syrian regime in December 2024 and former President Bashar al-Assad’s flight to Moscow.
Israel engaged in war with a state actor for the first time since 1973
Israel’s air operation against Iran, launched on June 13, is its first conflict with a state actor since the three-week war against Egypt and Syria in 1973. Moreover, this cannot be considered a full-scale war, as the land and naval forces of these two states, separated by approximately two thousand kilometers of land borders, did not participate in the clashes, and their special forces did not conduct operations against each other.
Israel’s air strikes on Iran were launched simultaneously with assassination operations by opposition/espionage elements it had cultivated within Iran, killing high-level civilian/military officials in Tehran. In this respect, Israel’s attack must have achieved the effect of a complete surprise raid. However, it is also clear that this should not be exaggerated. Indeed, the Iranian administration made new appointments within hours and began its first missile attacks on Israel that same evening. No Western air defense system could fully stop Iran’s missile attacks, which were carried out with increasing intensity; the legendary air defense system known as the Iron Dome was largely ineffective. In contrast, the Israeli air force’s strikes had only a limited impact. The limited involvement of the US in the war did not significantly damage Iran’s missile launch capabilities, and ultimately, the parties—likely Israel—requested or agreed to a ceasefire.
The results of the Twelve-Day War
In these clashes, Iran’s subjection of Israeli territory to intense missile fire is an extraordinary achievement; since its establishment in 1948, Israeli residential areas had never been comprehensively bombed by any state. In the 1948-49 war that began immediately after its declaration of independence, Israel fought against three Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan). In contrast, in the Six-Day War, it launched a surprise attack on these three states, inflicting a disastrous defeat on all of them. In the 1973 War, it was the one surprised, but in none of these conflicts were its territories and residential areas subjected to any significant air raids by the air forces of the countries it fought.
However, in the last two of these wars—air forces were not widely used in the first—Israel had subjected the major centers of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, including their capitals, to intense aerial bombardment. While Israel’s superiority in air power was clear in the conflict with Iran, Iran’s undisputed superiority in missiles turned every inch of Israeli territory into a target. The effect this will have on the Israeli public in the short and medium term must be taken seriously. For Israeli citizens, a large majority of whom hold dual passports, the government’s refusal to allow them to leave the country for security reasons during the conflict strengthens this thesis.
The first question after the conflict concerns whether this ceasefire will be permanent. Although Israel has largely adhered to ceasefire processes signed after wars with states, it has not behaved the same way toward actors like Hamas and similar groups—with Hezbollah being a partial exception. How it will act towards a state actor like Iran remains a significant question. On the other hand, even if the ceasefire holds, it would be overly optimistic to think that Israel and the United States have abandoned the idea of regime change.
It is not easy to predict at this moment how Iran’s gaining of considerable sympathy in world public opinion and Israel’s image as a country continuing its aggression after the Gaza genocide will concretely reflect on the field of struggle. In this period, where the limits of what Trump can do for Israel have become clear, it does not appear to be a strong possibility that Israel will change its foreign and security policies by accepting multipolarity as a given.
In this case, one can assume with certainty that Iran will try to fill its gaps by acquiring air defense systems from Russia and advanced fighter jets from China, while Israel, as always, will prepare for the next round with all the systems developed by the American arms industry. It is also among the possibilities that Iran could establish a strong deterrence, dissuading Israel and America from this course. There is no doubt that there are many lessons for Türkiye to draw from this war. Foremost among them would be for Ankara to understand how wrong its Syria policies were, which completely paved the way for Israel, and to act accordingly. The lessons for Türkiye are not the subject of this article and will be addressed in other analyses, so we will leave it at that for now…
Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal
Başkent University
Department of Political Science and International Relations
Opinion
A Controllable Conflict with No Winners

From June 13 to 24, an unprecedented large-scale offensive confrontation took place between Israel and Iran. During this period, the United States directly joined the conflict in support of Israel, launching long-range bombings on three major Iranian nuclear facilities, prompting a symbolic retaliatory response from Iran. Ultimately, under direct U.S. mediation, the conflict transitioned into a ceasefire, with all three parties claiming “victory.” From a joint U.S.-Israeli assault on Iran to a rapid ceasefire just 12 days later, this was a conflict with no winners—a calculated, limited clash filled with theatrical displays that failed to address the fundamental contradictions, and thus risks reigniting at any moment.
There were no winners in this conflict. Israel, Iran, and the United States all paid varying costs at different levels, with far-reaching consequences. Of course, there were clear losers—the people of Israel and Iran caught in the fire, the ever-scarce willingness for reconciliation and strategic mutual trust between Iran, Israel, and the United States, and the reputation of the U.S., which again played both referee and player.
Israel, leveraging its powerful long-range strike capabilities and intelligence networks, adhered to its military tradition of “preemptive strikes” and repelling threats beyond its borders. Under the codename “Lion’s Rise,” it conducted targeted bombings on select Iranian nuclear facilities, government institutions, missile and air force bases. With the help of undercover agents, over 20 senior Iranian military officers and more than 10 nuclear scientists were physically eliminated.
As a “micro-state” in terms of population, land, and resources, Israel dared to proactively challenge Iran—a Middle Eastern power ten times its size in all three aspects. This showcased Israel’s strong national will, sophisticated military strategy, and supreme air dominance. Notably, Israeli air forces operated flamboyantly over Tehran for two hours, even performing aerial refueling. Israeli intelligence’s deep infiltration, information acquisition, local recruitment, and surprise attacks on Iranian soil created a modern myth of both overt and covert warfare.
However, Israel still emerged a loser. In terms of morality and international opinion, Israel once again blatantly trampled on the UN Charter and international law, violating Iran’s sovereignty, airspace, and territorial integrity under the pretext of Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Moreover, Israel used the airspace of Arab countries between it and Iran as if it were its own, turning them into war corridors and violating the sovereignty, airspace, and dignity of these innocent neighbors.
Israel’s undeclared war and surprise attack on Iran—including direct “decapitation” of military leaders and continued assassinations of nuclear scientists—constitute typical acts of state terrorism. Ending the lives of foreign military personnel and civilians without formal charges, defense, or verdicts gravely undermines modern civilization, the rule of law, and humanitarian values, further damaging Israel’s already distorted and negative international image—perhaps even to the point of disgust.
Israel’s blitz on Iran triggered a fierce counterstrike dubbed “Sincere Promise-3.” In just 12 days, Iran launched 22 rounds of long-range airstrikes against Israeli territory, firing at least 534 medium-range missiles and deploying waves of drones. It also achieved a breakthrough in controlling Israeli airspace via missile attacks.
Despite U.S. assistance in joint defense, Israel’s so-called ironclad multilayered long-range interception system was heavily breached. Major cities like Tel Aviv, Haifa, Beersheba, and Eilat endured war-grade bombings for the first time. Key departments, energy facilities, and economic hubs were either destroyed or seriously damaged. For the first time in over half a century, Israeli citizens experienced the horror of “hellfire” raining from the skies, plunging the nation into unprecedented panic.
Israel’s strong offense and weak defense created an imbalance that was not just tactical but a strategic and psychological defeat. This marked the second time in two years that the myth of Israel’s military invincibility was shattered. On October 7, 2023, Israel’s security defenses were unexpectedly breached by Hamas, catching its military off guard and causing heavy civilian casualties. This time, despite meticulous planning and preemptive strikes, its narrow airspace—though protected by the world’s most advanced defense systems—was still riddled by Iran’s far stronger retaliatory “rain of missiles.” The lasting political, social, and psychological trauma of this 12-day conflict on Israel and its people remains to be seen.
Iran was not a winner either. Although Iran was the victim of aggression and earned some international sympathy, and even fought Israel to a military stalemate while achieving a historic breakthrough in striking deep into Israeli territory—something Arab countries had failed to do for half a century—it still fell short in other areas. As a regional power long seeking superpower status, the undisputed leader of the “Shia Crescent” in the Middle East, the cornerstone of the “Axis of Resistance,” and a stronghold against U.S. and Israeli dominance, Iran suffered a disastrous and humiliating initial phase of the war. Despite effectively retaliating against Israeli core cities from afar, it failed to defend its own airspace, critical facilities, military leadership, and nuclear scientists at close range. Authorities fixated on inspecting women’s clothing for compliance while neglecting the detection of thousands of embedded Israeli spies and agents.
From a long-term shadow war and espionage campaign with almost no victories, to the mysterious crash of President Raisi’s plane in 2024, and now to a defenseless state with unprotected security—enemy aircraft roam unimpeded, spies and traitors emerge endlessly and act at will—Iran resembles the Philistine giant Goliath from legend, ambushed and beheaded by a heroic Jewish king: large but hollow, big but not strong.
Faced with Israel’s blitz, Iran’s key figures are unable to protect their lives, critical facilities are left exposed to bombing, Tehran becomes a ghost town, and national defense reveals gaping holes. Especially astonishing are the weakness of Iran’s air defense and its security systems.
This is the first time in 37 years since the end of the Iran–Iraq War in 1988 that Iran has suffered large-scale, sustained airstrikes by a foreign adversary. The memory of two generations of peace and security has thus ended, and the country now faces the risk of nuclear leakage and contamination.
During the Iran–Iraq War, Iran was nearly isolated and unsupported. Yet now, under a combined Israeli-American assault, Iran is still left in “glorious solitude.” Surrounding Arab and Islamic countries merely watch from the sidelines. The so-called “Axis of Resistance” offers only verbal support via Yemen’s Houthi forces. Western governments neither imposed embargoes on Israel nor suspended supplies. German Chancellor Merz even publicly praised and thanked Israel for “doing the dirty work for everyone.” The NATO summit didn’t mention the Israeli-American attack on Iran at all. Instead, it accused Iran of supplying military equipment to Russia…
Iran suffered unprecedented airstrikes and bombings: more than 600 dead, nearly 5,000 injured, and painstakingly developed nuclear facilities widely damaged.
However, the repeated humiliation of Iran’s national and ethnic dignity doesn’t stem entirely from Israel’s or America’s overwhelming military or technological advantage. Rather, it’s due to Iran’s own government’s game-like, performative, even transactional military responses and diplomatic bargaining.
This kind of interaction model has created a new framework of mutual damage control between warring states—but it also renders the sacrifices made by the Iranian people over the past 40 years for the regime utterly meaningless.
The U.S. deployed strategic bombers in the “Midnight Hammer” operation to clean up the aftermath of Israel’s attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. But it first notified the Iranian government, allowing them to take emergency measures to avoid or minimize losses.
When Iran struck back by attacking a U.S. military base in Qatar, it likewise informed the U.S. beforehand, turning what could have been a legitimate act of revenge into a staged military-diplomatic performance—and earning public thanks from President Trump.
Of course, turning geopolitics into a damage-control game didn’t begin now. It started in 2021 with the U.S. assassination of Quds Force Commander Qasem Soleimani in Iraq, followed by Iran’s symbolic retaliation. It continued with the two symbolic tit-for-tat strikes between Iran and Israel in April and October 2024—especially with Iran’s habit of pre-informing adversaries, delaying attack times, and trying to avoid provoking further escalation.
Matters of national sovereignty, questions of war and peace, enmity and alliance—these are solemn and serious issues, closely tied to the people’s safety and emotions.
Iran’s long-standing love-hate flirtation with the “Great and Little Satans” it curses so often, and its behind-the-scenes coordination, makes the outside world feel that the happiness of several generations of Iranians sacrificed for exporting the Islamic Revolution is utterly worthless.
The fact that Iran was able to uncover so many Israeli spies perhaps also indirectly proves that the regime, the system, and the chosen path of the country are increasingly losing their centripetal force and cohesion—or in other words, the state and the regime are beginning to split.
The United States didn’t win either. Trump boasted about his “timely intervention” and claimed victory through the bombing of Iran’s nuclear facilities. Some U.S. lawmakers even sycophantically nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. But America gained little and lost much.
As a superpower, the U.S. used five rounds of nuclear negotiations as a cover, employed strategic deception to support Israel’s surprise attack, and claimed it would decide on military action within two weeks—only to seize the opportunity and strike Iran while it was vulnerable, using surgical strikes.
Its political integrity, national ethics, and international credibility have all collapsed.
As the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons in combat—causing hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths—and as a founding member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the U.S., by bombing Iran’s nuclear facilities, has now led the way in undermining that very treaty.
President Trump, who claims to hate war, bombed Syrian government targets early in his first term and provoked armed clashes with Iran in the Persian Gulf before leaving office. Not even halfway through his second term, he has already deployed strategic bombers and bunker busters against Iranian nuclear sites…
With such an unreliable president in charge, what “virtue” or “credibility” does America even have left?
The United States claimed to have destroyed Iran’s three major nuclear facilities. However, intelligence agencies from both the U.S. and Israel denied this, judging that it only delayed Iran’s restoration of nuclear capabilities by several months or years.
By conspiring with Israel and jointly attacking Iran, the U.S. broke its promises, intensified Iran’s strategic doubts and anxieties, and may have inadvertently pushed Iran to abandon its strategic hesitation and truly embark on the path of nuclear armament for self-preservation.
This conflict is a phase of the “Sixth Middle East War” that began on October 7, 2023, and is also a contest between state actors with the highest levels of equipment and tactics.
Since Islamists, Iran, and the U.S. all did not want the conflict to escalate into a fully uncontrollable situation, and had all preset boundaries and objectives, the conflict showed high intensity but remained controllable.
Of course, the ceasefire does not mean the war has completely ended, because none of the three parties fully achieved their goals.
Israel seeks to completely destroy Iran’s nuclear capabilities and long-range missile systems, and preferably trigger domestic chaos or even regime change in Iran, thereby fundamentally ending Iran’s hostile policies.
Therefore, it focused on striking and eliminating Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, strategic weapons, military leaders, and scientific research personnel, while also trying to create panic to stir up public discontent and provoke a color revolution. But these goals were only partially achieved.
The United States hoped to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program through cooperation with Israel, and force Iran to sign a new agreement renouncing its regional expansion policy. However, it also feared being drawn into another quagmire of war.
Thus, it initially played the role of support aircraft and logistics provider for Israel’s war machine, and once Israel had secured control of Iranian airspace, the U.S. joined in personally to carry out deeper strikes and targeted removals of nuclear facilities—while also informing Iran in advance to prevent misjudgment.
Iran tried to pursue equal nuclear rights, assert its status as a major regional power, and raise the banner of the “Axis of Resistance.”
At the same time, it sought to avoid excessive bloodshed and especially avoid direct war with the U.S.
Therefore, after responding proportionally to Israel and symbolically retaliating against the U.S., Iran actively sought and accepted a ceasefire to prevent escalation of war that could eventually affect domestic stability and regime legitimacy.
At present, Israel has doubled its military operational range, expanding from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Iranian plateau.
However, due to its small population, narrow territory, and scarce resources, it is not well suited for a prolonged war of attrition, and must coordinate with the U.S.—which presents its own strategic limitations.
The United States, strategically reducing its footprint in the Middle East, aims to maintain regional control at minimal cost.
Thus, it must rely on its staunch ally Israel, yet also wishes to preserve the overall balance of power among major regional ethnic groups. For that reason, it seeks a compromise with Iran that serves U.S. interests.
After the overextension following the Arab Spring and facing severe U.S. sanctions, Iran’s government and people have struggled to endure.
This joint attack by Israel and the U.S. inflicted heavy military losses and deepened Iran’s diplomatic isolation and passivity.
Thus, Iran has neither the will nor the capacity for prolonged external entanglement, and instead hopes to return to peace as soon as possible and begin a reconstruction process—including restoring military, political, and diplomatic credibility, rebuilding morale among troops and civilians, and avoiding becoming a second Libya or Iraq.
The truce is merely one episode in the long history of hostility and realpolitik between Iran and Israel.
Since the root and structural contradictions remain unresolved, the confrontation and conflict between Iran and the other two sides may “relapse” at any time.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
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