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What to know about Russia’s upcoming State Duma elections?

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The State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation forms one of the two chambers of the Russian parliament. Operating alongside the Federation Council, the other chamber, the Duma is conventionally referred to in everyday parlance as parliament’s lower house, although no such distinction exists in law.

Under a decree signed by President Vladimir Putin on 16 June, regular elections for deputies to the State Duma will take place on 20 September 2026. The Central Election Commission (CEC) of Russia approved a three-day voting period spanning 18 to 20 September by a decision adopted on 17 June. Consequently, citizens may cast ballots on any of these three days, though 20 September is designated as the official election day, known as the Single Voting Day (EDG).

Legislation governing deputy elections is rooted in the Constitution of Russia and comprises basic guarantees of electoral rights and laws on parliamentary elections.

Who calls the State Duma elections?

State Duma elections are called by presidential decree, which officially launches the election campaign upon signing. The law establishes strict deadlines for setting the voting day: the decision must be taken between 90 and 110 days prior to the election date. If the president fails to publish the decree within this timeframe, the authority to call the election transfers to the Central Election Commission. In all circumstances, the voting date falls on the third Sunday of the month in which the term of the previous convocation expires.

The powers of the sitting convocation of the lower house terminate the moment the new convocation convenes.

How often are Duma deputies elected?

The composition of the Duma is elected every five years. The chamber’s term of office was four years until 2008, when a constitutional amendment extended it to five years. The Duma was first elected for a five-year term in 2011. The current eighth convocation of the State Duma was elected in 2021. Accordingly, the ninth convocation will be elected in September 2026.

The Constitution outlines several scenarios under which the State Duma may (though is not required to) be dissolved and snap elections called. These include the three-time rejection of candidates for prime minister, the three-time rejection of candidates for deputy prime ministers and federal ministers (provided that one-third of government posts remain vacant), and two votes of no confidence in the government within three months. In the event of dissolution, the president schedules a new election date.

In practice, the constitutional provisions concerning dissolution have never been applied since the State Duma was first elected in 1993.

When were the last State Duma elections held?

The eighth convocation of the State Duma concluded its work on 27 July 2026. This legislature was formed on the basis of the 2021 election results. Voting lasted three days, from 17 to 19 September. Compared with the preceding convocation, the number of parties represented in parliament increased from four to five: alongside United Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF), the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), and A Just Russia, the New People party—established roughly eighteen months before the vote—entered the lower house. United Russia retained a constitutional majority with 324 seats. The CPRF secured 57 seats, A Just Russia 27, the LDPR 21, and New People 13. All of these political forces formed their own parliamentary factions. Additionally, five independent candidates and three representatives from other parties entered parliament, most of whom subsequently joined party factions.

How do State Duma elections work?

The State Duma comprises 450 deputies. Over the course of a parliamentary term, this figure may decrease due to deputies transferring to other posts, passing away, or facing early termination of their mandates. Depending on how a deputy was elected, the seat may be reassigned to another person on the list or filled via a by-election.

Duma deputies are elected under a mixed proportional-majoritarian system: 225 deputies from party lists and 225 from single-member constituencies.

Each party’s federal list consists of a general federal section and regional groups covering one or more regions. The entire list must contain between 200 and 400 candidates.

A maximum of 15 individuals may be included in the general federal section. Parties typically place their leaders and most recognisable, high-profile figures in this section to maximise voter turnout. Following the elections, candidates on the list can renounce their acquired mandates and transfer them to other party colleagues (the “locomotive” tactic). In practice, the general federal section may consist of as few as three candidates (as on the New People party list for the September elections) or be filled to the statutory maximum (as with the CPRF).

The regional section must comprise at least 35 groups covering all regions of Russia.

Because top rankings in the general federal section and regional groups provide an almost certain guarantee of election, parties seek to position their highest-priority candidates in these slots.

The remaining 225 deputies are elected from single-member constituencies, into which the country’s entire territory is divided. Each constituency elects one deputy. The boundary drawing of constituencies depends on regional populations and registered voter numbers. New constituency boundaries were approved in the spring of 2025. This adjustment was necessitated by demographic shifts and the enactment of laws on the accession of the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR), Lugansk People’s Republic (LPR), Kherson, and Zaporozhye regions to Russia.

Consequently, certain regions, such as Moscow and Moscow Oblast, gained an additional constituency, while others lost one. Furthermore, the four new regions participating in Duma elections for the first time were divided into constituencies. A candidate may concurrently run on a party list and contest a single-member constituency.

Voters receive two ballots: one containing party lists, where the vote is cast for a party as a whole, and another listing individual candidates in their single-member constituency, where they must select one candidate. The order of party emblems on the ballot is decided by a CEC draw. Constituency candidates appear on the ballot in alphabetical order.

To secure representation in the State Duma, a party must obtain at least 5% of the total votes cast.

How are seats allocated in the State Duma?

Deputies in single-member constituencies are elected by a simple majority, with the candidate winning the highest number of votes entering the State Duma.

The remaining 225 seats are distributed proportionally following the counting of party list votes. To determine this, the total vote count for all parties clearing the 5% threshold is divided by 225. The result represents the electoral quota—the number of votes required to win a single seat. Each party’s vote total is then divided by this quota. Consequently, the more votes a party’s list receives, the more seats it obtains in addition to its single-member constituency victories. Each seat corresponds to one parliamentary mandate.

Which parties can contest the elections?

The Ministry of Justice registered 20 political parties this year, 17 of which hold the right to contest the State Duma elections: 11 without the requirement to collect voter signatures to nominate candidates, and six subject to mandatory signature collection.

Official registration is a mandatory prerequisite for a party to conduct full-scale legal operations. Upon registration, the party is recorded in the Unified State Register of Legal Entities (EGRYUL). However, this does not automatically confer the right to run in State Duma elections. To qualify, parties must hold seats in the Duma or regional parliaments, have secured at least 3% of the vote in the preceding Duma elections, or collect at least 200,000 voter signatures supporting their nomination (with a cap of 7,000 from any single region).

The parties qualifying for ballot access without collecting signatures and the legal grounds for their exemption are:

United Russia (holds seats in the Duma)

CPRF (holds seats in the Duma)

LDPR (holds seats in the Duma)

A Just Russia (holds seats in the Duma)

New People (holds seats in the Duma)

Party of Pensioners (holds seats in a regional parliament)

The Greens (holds seats in a regional parliament)

Rodina (holds seats in a regional parliament)

Communists of Russia (holds seats in a regional parliament)

Yabloko (holds seats in a regional parliament)

Party of Direct Democracy (holds seats in a regional parliament)

None of the six parties required to collect signatures submitted the documentation required to register candidate lists to the CEC within the statutory deadline. These parties are: Democratic Party of Russia, Cossack Party of the Russian Federation, Party of Russia’s Rebirth, Party of Progress, Party for Justice!, and Russian Party of Freedom and Justice.

Among the remaining three parties ineligible to participate, Green Alternative adopted a formal liquidation decision and will effectively merge with The Greens, the other party with an ecological platform. The activities of the Civic Platform party were suspended by a Supreme Court ruling. In June, a court accepted an administrative lawsuit from the Ministry of Justice seeking the liquidation of the Social Security Party.

How does the candidate nomination process work?

Any Russian citizen aged 21 or older who resides permanently in the country is eligible to run for the State Duma. Individuals stripped of legal capacity by a court, those serving prison sentences, holders of foreign citizenship or residence permits, and persons convicted of specific crimes are ineligible.

A candidate may be nominated by a political party or run as an independent, though independents may contest only single-member constituencies.

Parties finalise their nominations prior to the formal campaign launch. The nomination phase, during which parties formally approved list compositions and single-member candidates, took place at party congresses in June and July. Balloting on candidates was conducted by secret vote. Under the timetable approved by the CEC, candidate nominations were permitted up to and including 11 July.

United Russia nominated more than 600 candidates for the upcoming elections. Five individuals were named to its general federal section: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, Presidential Commissioner for Children’s Rights Maria Lvova-Belova, war correspondent Yevgeny Poddubny, and head of the Yunarmia main headquarters Vladislav Golovin.

The CPRF list is led by party chairman Gennady Zyuganov. The top five also includes State Duma deputies and CPRF Central Committee Presidium members Yury Afonin, Dmitry Novikov, and Ivan Melnikov, alongside Head of Khakassia Valentin Konovalov.

The LDPR top five consists of party chairman Leonid Slutsky, volunteer brigade commander Aleksey Vereshchagin, former chairwoman of the State Duma Youth Parliament Maria Voropayeva, deputy Andrey Lugovoy, and businessman Viktor Bout, who served a prison sentence in the US on illegal arms trafficking charges.

A Just Russia placed four figures in its general federal section: party leader Sergey Mironov, State Duma Deputy Chairman Aleksandr Babakov, deputy and television presenter Marina Kim, and military operation participant Oleg Chernyshev.

The New People party federal list contains three names: party chairman Aleksey Nechayev, Duma Deputy Chairman Vladislav Davankov, and deputy Sardana Avksentyeva.

Yabloko party registration and disqualification

On 29 July, the Central Election Commission registered Yabloko’s federal list. The list was headed by Yaroslav Shcherbakov, leader of the party’s Chelyabinsk branch. The top seven also included St. Petersburg legislative assembly deputy Dmitry Anisimov and Moscow Yabloko chairman Kirill Goncharov.

The party entered the State Duma race under the slogan “For peace and freedom! For a life without fear!” Its core platform focused on securing a ceasefire and peace.

Following a ballot draw on 5 August, the CEC approved the placement order of registered parties, with Yabloko drawing the second position.

On 7 August, the Rodina party filed a lawsuit with the Supreme Court seeking the cancellation of Yabloko’s registration. Rodina Chairman, State Duma deputy, and LDPR faction member Aleksey Zhuravlev argued three potential grounds existed to disqualify their rivals: campaign financing on social networks, copyright infringement in campaign visuals, and extremism in the party’s pre-election appeals for peace and an end to military hostilities.

On 10 August, the Supreme Court revoked Yabloko’s registration for the State Duma elections. The party appealed, but the Supreme Court Appeals Board rejected the challenge on 17 August.

In June, former State Duma deputy Boris Nadezhdin declared his intention to contest the Mytishchi single-member constituency. On 10 July, the Ministry of Justice added him to the register of foreign agents. Amendments to electoral legislation enacted in 2024 bar individuals designated as foreign agents from running in elections at any level. One week later, the Dolgoprudny City Court convicted Nadezhdin of displaying extremist symbols, imposing a fine of 1,000 roubles.

Final decisions regarding candidate registration or rejection are due by 16 August, after which definitive ballot lists will be compiled.

Relevant information will be published by the CEC, regional election commissions, and the parties.

Which slogans are parties campaigning on?

United Russia relies on what it terms the “people’s programme” and enters the race with the stated goal of “continuing work to implement the national development agenda.”

The LDPR outlined programmatic targets including easing the tax burden on families with multiple children, indexing pensions and social benefits by at least 20% annually, raising student stipends to the minimum wage, and introducing a 3% “People’s Mortgage” programme for young specialists, public sector employees, and families requiring improved housing.

The Party of Direct Democracy presented 12 theses centred on human dignity, a fair society, a strong state, and an open world.

The Greens’ programme features seven core steps: public ecological oversight, state regulation of energy prices, affordable housing, fair tax policy, modern technology-driven healthcare accessible to all, support for Russian agriculture, and strict monitoring of food quality.

A Just Russia set 10 programmatic goals: “Protecting defenders”, “Passing Russian culture to future generations”, “Halting price increases”, “Raising salaries, making retirement dignified”, “Protecting Russian families”, “Accessible housing, freezing utility and communal tariffs”, “Returning free and accessible healthcare to the people”, “High-quality, free modern education”, “Strict control over migration”, and “Guaranteeing citizens’ digital rights”.

Rodina’s platform contains 12 points emphasising the primacy of the state-forming people, strict migration controls, economic sovereignty, eradicating poverty among workers, promoting the family and large households, and the reunification of Transnistria with Russia.

The CPRF campaigns on slogans such as “End price, debt, and tariff hikes”, “Healthcare for the people”, “Tribute-free education”, “Returning national wealth to the people”, “Putting the banking system at the service of the country”, “Shifting the tax burden to the wealthy”, and “Clean politics”. According to Zyuganov, the party’s entire platform is oriented towards reconstructing socialism.

The Party of Pensioners campaigns on its Programme for a Normal Life, leading with three proposals: a basic pension income, free quality prosthetics, and a legislative measure restricting a deputy’s tenure in the State Duma to a single term. Its main priorities span healthcare, pensions and the economy, families, education, youth policy, ensuring governmental accountability, and supporting veterans and service personnel.

Communists of Russia defines its strategic objective as “building communism as the future of humanity.” To this end, the party calls for “revolutionary transformations” after liberating the country from the influence of transnational capital and removing oligarchs and “the bureaucracy fused with them” from power.

New People outlined 12 steps towards a “normal Russia,” phrased in its manifesto as: “Trust and dignity are the country’s main capital”, “Internet regulation should be smart, not broad”, “AI court – justice at the speed of technology”, “The self-employed, freelancers, entrepreneurs: you are the economy”, “Strong regions make a strong country”, “Housing is not a luxury, but a starting point”, “Education means skills, not diplomas”, “Family is about people, not demographics”, “Social assistance must be prompt and free of humiliation”, “Prices – competition instead of monopolies”, “Stable rules form the foundation of development”, and “A Russia one wants to live in”.

Who is eligible to vote?

The right to vote is termed active suffrage, while the right to stand for election is passive suffrage. All Russian citizens who are at least 18 years old, have not been stripped of legal capacity by a court, and are not serving prison sentences are eligible to exercise active voting rights in the Duma elections.

All Russian citizens may vote for federal party lists, whereas only voters registered within a specific constituency may cast ballots for single-member constituency candidates.

Voting via paper ballots and DEG

Multiple voting options are available for the 2026 State Duma elections. One is the traditional in-person visit to a polling station. Voters must confirm their assigned polling station address beforehand (via the CEC website or their Gosuslugi public services account) and present their passport during opening hours, which run from 8:00 to 20:00. Balloting is also permitted at any convenient polling station at one’s actual location, provided an application is submitted in advance via Gosuslugi, Multifunctional Public Services Centres (MFC), or an election commission.

Under specific circumstances (such as illness or caring for an ailing relative), home voting is available upon request through the Precinct Election Commission (UIK) or Gosuslugi. Election officials then visit the voter’s residence with ballots and requisite voting materials.

Early voting will be arranged for residents in remote areas, with commission members travelling to collect ballots prior to the official polling window. Polling stations will also be established abroad for citizens residing outside Russia.

Remote Electronic Voting (DEG) will be accessible in 33 regions this year. According to CEC Chairwoman Ella Pamfilova, DEG was approved only for regions where it had previously been used, in order “not to escalate the situation.” These include Moscow and Moscow Oblast. However, DEG will not be deployed in St. Petersburg or Leningrad Oblast.

The availability of DEG does not restrict traditional paper voting. CEC Deputy Chairman Nikolay Bulayev emphasised on 13 August that the right to vote using paper ballots is guaranteed by federal law. “Within the boundaries of their electoral district, voters may receive their ballot in paper format,” Bulayev said.

In Moscow (unlike the 2024 Moscow City Duma elections where paper ballots required prior application), paper voting will be available without additional procedures. Moscow City Election Commission Chairwoman Olga Kirillova stated: “There is no need for any application or prior submission. We have provided for a 100% print run of paper ballots.”

Election Commission outlines legal details of vote

A “large-scale” campaign is anticipated on the 2026 Single Voting Day (EDG), with 20,700 mandates to be contested. Direct gubernatorial elections will take place in eight regions, though CEC Chairwoman Ella Pamfilova indicated in meetings with party representatives that this number could increase by late June.

According to Pamfilova, State Duma elections will be called between 1 and 21 June, regional elections between 11 and 21 June, and local government elections between 21 June and 1 July. Pamfilova noted that voting will most likely span three days (18-20 September), citing voter “demand”.

What is new?

Oleg Lisitsin, head of the CEC Legal Department, outlined changes awaiting candidates. Under legislative revisions, campaign materials are explicitly prohibited from using an individual’s image (including deceased or fictional persons) or AI-generated voice likenesses.

Ballot delivery deadlines have also been shifted by one day; previously delivered to polling stations on Wednesdays for Friday voting, ballots must now arrive by Thursday. Lisitsin explained: “Undoubtedly, this innovation is tied first and foremost to the difficult situation our country currently faces. You are aware of the heavy burden on law enforcement agencies and police, whose duties include securing ballots transported under guard to commissions.”

Mandatory publication of financial reports on paper was also abolished this year. The CEC representative noted that internet users significantly outnumber newspaper subscribers.

Parties also raised questions regarding digital signature collection via Gosuslugi and whether it could be used in federal elections. CEC Deputy Chairman Nikolay Bulayev stated that since the option was introduced in 2020, only three candidates had fully utilised it, all of whom were incumbent governors running as independents.

Pamfilova explained that online signature collection has not yet been rolled out for federal elections: “Let me explain why. We are waiting for regional lawmakers across all regions to adopt [the relevant amendments]; we will analyse the experience, and only then proceed with a draft law for federal implementation.”

New software

Another agenda item was the introduction of specialised software designed to assist parties, constituency candidates, and independent contenders in preparing nomination filings. Following the presentation, CEC member Yevgeny Kolyushin asked whether the program identifies erroneous or deliberately falsified data entered by candidates, such as failing to input Russian citizenship. A debate ensued.

Pamfilova remarked that she sensed an underlying motive: “I am grateful to you for asking, but right now I see not just Yevgeny Ivanovich’s question, but—pardon me—a series of scenarios where we could be worn down.” Warning that such a mechanism could be used for provocations, she added: “A person holds single citizenship, such as Russian, but enters citizenship of ‘404’ countries for certain purposes. The software automatically filters out this option. That person then files a complaint against us [alleging improper rejection]. Imagine, colleagues: let us not receive a slap in the face for our efforts to help parties.”

Kolyushin insisted the issue was not provocation, but whether the software flags the field as erroneous. Pamfilova replied: “It should only display it, not filter it out. Because this could be a pure provocation that works against us later.”

CEC member Yevgeny Shevchenko joined the discussion: “Yevgeny Ivanovich, I would like to refer you to the law on State Duma deputy elections.” The Communist member retorted: “There is no need to refer me to the law!”

Shevchenko recounted an incident where a candidate with a criminal record for “hooliganism” mistakenly entered “sabotage” in the relevant box, stressing the need for complete accuracy when completing documents.

Pamfilova said: “We calculate and [try to anticipate] how blows could be struck against us during elections to discredit and derail the process. But we hope our law-abiding parties will not participate in this.”

Pamfilova recalled that on 27 May, the CEC decided to decommission 2010-model electronic ballot processing systems (KOIB) due to an inability to procure technical components following sanctions. Reiterating that this was a source of “great regret” and occurred through no fault of the commission, she noted that 2017-model KOIBs are next in line for testing. If functional, the CEC will redeploy them. In this context, Pamfilova urged parties to take the deployment of election observers “very seriously” to ensure the campaign remains “as clean, transparent, and legitimate as possible,” calling it a “matter of honour.”

The CEC chairwoman also announced plans to develop proprietary electronic voting terminals (similar to Moscow’s TEG terminals) and deploy them nationwide in the coming years. She clarified that this refers to in-person digital terminals at polling stations where voters press a screen button rather than using paper ballots, rather than Remote Electronic Voting (DEG). Pamfilova recalled that during the 2025 Single Voting Day, a pilot in Moscow enabled voters from regions holding gubernatorial elections to cast ballots in Moscow using TEGs.

Russia

Russia warns NATO over Arctic militarisation and conflict risks

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has penned an article titled “International Cooperation in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities” on the Arctic.ru platform.

Lavrov opened his article by recalling that a container ship departing China on 19 August arrived at the Port of Murmansk for the first time via the Northern Sea Route, a vital component of the Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor. Stating that a new phase has begun in the development of a region that accounts for at least 10% of Russia’s gross domestic product and is home to more than 2.5 million Russian citizens, Lavrov said: “This cooperation carried out with our international partners represents the beginning of a new era in the development of Russia’s Arctic region.”

Referring to the document “Foundations of the Russian Federation State Policy in the Arctic to 2035”, approved by President Vladimir Putin, Lavrov stated that their objectives are to improve the quality of life of the regional population, accelerate economic growth, protect the environment, and strengthen mutually beneficial international partnerships. Pointing to the Foreign Ministry’s coordinating role in this process and the activities of the Maritime Board of the Russian Federation, Lavrov assessed: “In accordance with the Foreign Policy Concept of 31 March 2023, Russia aims to preserve peace and stability in the Arctic, reduce the level of threats to national security, and create favourable external conditions for socio-economic development.”

Strategic cooperation with China and India deepens

Emphasising that China and India are at the forefront of the actors with whom they maintain close cooperation in the Arctic, Lavrov noted that regular discussions are held with Beijing at the level of heads of government, a bilateral subcommittee on the Northern Sea Route is operational, and concrete gains have been achieved in polar research. Lavrov said: “The results speak for themselves: regular container shipments via Russia’s northern seas have begun, and plans are underway to increase the frequency of these voyages.”

Addressing the meeting of the Intergovernmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Cultural Cooperation held with India at the end of August, Lavrov noted: “Indian companies are participating in the development of the resource potential of Russia’s Arctic region. According to experts, the Arctic could become one of the main areas of cooperation between Russia and India over the next 20 years.”

Lavrov stated that contacts are also continuing with Brazil, Indonesia, Iran, and other BRICS countries, as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States and Belarus. Noting that South Korea and Singapore remain interested in certain projects despite joining the Western sanctions campaign, the Russian minister recorded that they expect foreign delegations at the 11th Eastern Economic Forum, which begins in Vladivostok on 1 September, and at the “Arctic: Territory of Dialogue” forum to be held in Murmansk in March.

NATO is militarising the region and raising the risk of conflict

Holding Western actors responsible for the deterioration of the security environment in the Arctic, Lavrov said: “NATO countries and the Alliance as a whole are driving the region into militarisation and creating focal points of international tension.”

Recalling Operation Arctic Sentry launched by NATO in February 2026, Lavrov warned: “Intensive military preparations are being conducted right near our northern borders. NATO is organising large-scale exercises involving non-regional countries and adding new elements to its command-and-control system. Such military activities in the Far North pose a direct threat to Russia’s security; they also increase the risk of incidents that could trigger a potentially catastrophic armed conflict.”

Lavrov argued that the West is imposing illegitimate sanctions on legal entities and individuals from Global Majority countries involved in Arctic projects, saying: “NATO members and other Western countries clearly demonstrate their intention to transform the Arctic into a new front to counter the development of Russia and its like-minded partners.”

The Arctic Council is in crisis

Noting that the Arctic Council, established on 19 September 1996, is approaching its 30th anniversary in a state of severe crisis, Lavrov stated that its work has been frozen since March 2022 due to the stance of Western members. Reporting that ministerial meetings and sessions of Senior Arctic Officials have been suspended, Lavrov announced: “Russia is ready to resume the full-fledged work of the Arctic Council on the condition that all parties act in good faith and respect the legitimate interests of every participant.”

Addressing attempts by NATO countries to operate the council without Russia, Lavrov said: “Even if this scenario materialises, Russia possesses the territory, logistics, technology, and reliable partners required to carry out mutually beneficial projects and confidently implement its objectives.”

Russia will remain a leading Arctic state

Emphasising that the region’s strategic importance in global trade and access to resources will increase alongside climate change and melting glaciers, Lavrov assessed: “A look at the world map clearly shows that Russia is, has been, and will remain a leading Arctic state.”

Lavrov noted that the provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration retain their validity, adding that there is no need for a new international legal instrument at this stage.

Issuing warnings to Western countries, Lavrov said: “Our current interlocutors must learn the lessons of history and understand the futility of attempts to speak to Russia in the language of sanctions and threats. The necessary response to unfriendly and hostile actions has been and will be given, including asymmetric measures. Russia favours constructive dialogue; however, when necessary, it will defend its national interests by all available means.”

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Putin circle weighs tactical nuclear risk as Ukraine talks stall

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Western media reports indicate that Russia is preparing to escalate hostilities. According to a Bloomberg report citing sources close to the Kremlin, concerns are mounting within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s circle that he may ultimately resort to tactical nuclear weapons.

Sources speaking to the agency said Russia plans in the near future to intensify ballistic missile strikes against Kyiv, particularly targeting the city centre, as well as infrastructure facilities in other Ukrainian cities.

The sources said negotiations conducted over approximately a year and a half under the mediation of Donald Trump’s administration have effectively collapsed, with both sides remaining entrenched in their initial positions.

Moscow views Ukrainian strikes inside Russian territory targeting dozens of oil refineries, ports, and market warehouses as direct attacks by NATO, given that the alliance supplies weapons and intelligence to Kyiv.

Officials speaking to Bloomberg stressed that despite economic pressure, the petrol crisis, and strikes against logistical hubs, Putin has no plans to end the war.

According to the sources, the current phase of reciprocal attacks does not yet represent the peak of military tension.

Within circles close to the Kremlin, an increasing number of Russian officials are concluding that Putin may use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine as a last resort.

While calls in this direction from the pro-war hawk faction have reportedly grown louder recently, it is emphasised that losing the war remains a completely unacceptable scenario for Putin.

Four sources close to the Kremlin stated that with diplomacy over Ukraine exhausted, Moscow sees few alternatives other than escalating tensions.

Officials noted that although expectations of a breakthrough are very low, there is still hope in the Kremlin that Donald Trump’s special envoys Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner will bring new proposals to Moscow.

Bloomberg noted that there is currently no concrete indication that Putin is preparing to use nuclear weapons.

Russia’s partners firmly oppose such a step, with China reportedly issuing a stern warning to the Kremlin to refrain from such a move.

Fiona Hill, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former adviser to three US presidents, recalled that the Joe Biden administration had previously warned Putin about the consequences of a potential nuclear strike.

Hill said that under the Biden administration, the US conveyed to Putin that such a step would be met with a conventional strike by the American armed forces against Russia.

Hill stated that Putin is testing how far he can push until his interlocutors back down.

Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin, evaluated the risk of Putin using tactical nuclear weapons as “extremely low”.

Emphasising that the effectiveness of such an attack on today’s battlefield would be limited and the political cost of breaking the nuclear taboo would be high, Gabuev offered the following assessment:

“As long as Moscow has room to escalate with conventional weapons, including intensifying missile strikes, it has very little reason to cross the nuclear threshold.”

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CIA Director John Ratcliffe travels to Moscow for official talks

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director John Ratcliffe has travelled to the Russian capital, Moscow, to hold talks with Russian officials, according to reports.

The development was reported by CBS correspondent Jennifer Jacobs and Axios reporter Barak Ravid, citing sources familiar with the matter. Two US officials also confirmed that Ratcliffe would visit Moscow. Jacobs reported that the CIA director travelled to Russia aboard a US Air Force C-17 military transport aircraft and that the purpose of the visit was “talks in Moscow”.

According to data from the flight-tracking service Flightradar24, a Boeing C-17A Globemaster III military transport aircraft with the tail number “RCH4555” took off from Riga, the capital of Latvia, at approximately 08:50 Moscow time and landed at Vnukovo Airport in Moscow at around 10:04. It was noted that the aircraft had earlier, on 23 August, arrived in Riga from Joint Base Andrews in Camp Springs, Maryland, where the US presidential aircraft Air Force One is also based. The CBS network reported that a US diplomatic convoy was seen at the airport alongside the US military aircraft.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that he had no information regarding the American plane that landed in Moscow. No further response has yet been provided by Peskov or the CIA to a request for information from the RBC news organisation.

US asked Ukraine to halt strikes

Another notable development during the visit was reported by Financial Times (FT) correspondent Christopher Miller. According to the report, which cited sources, officials from the administration of US President Donald Trump approached Kyiv to request that it refrain from carrying out attacks against Moscow, St Petersburg, and northern regions of Russia between 24 and 26 August. Axios also confirmed that a similar request had been conveyed.

Washington reportedly justified the request on the grounds that a plane carrying a senior US official would be travelling to the capital, whilst Axios reported that the suspension of attacks was requested due to the visit of a high-level delegation until talks were completed and the departure had taken place. It was noted that the Ukrainian side accepted the request.

Trump administration’s highest-level visit since January

John Ratcliffe, who took office as CIA Director on 23 January 2025, previously served as US Director of National Intelligence between May 2020 and January 2021, becoming the first person to lead both agencies.

Ratcliffe holds the National Security Medal and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.

Axios emphasised that this trip marked Ratcliffe’s first visit to Moscow since taking office and represented the highest-level contact the Donald Trump administration has conducted with Russia since January.

The previous CIA Director, William Burns, last visited Russia in November 2021. At the time, Burns held in-person talks with the then Secretary of the Russian Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, and the Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Sergei Naryshkin, as well as a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin. CNN reported that those contacts focused on military movements along the Ukrainian border.

CBS recalled that the CIA has recently played a direct role in prisoner swaps between Russia and the US. The agency took part in the April 2025 release of dual US-Russian citizen Ksenia Karelina, whose case Ratcliffe personally monitored, as well as the major prisoner exchange in 2024 that secured the return to the US of Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich and former Marine Paul Whelan.

Meanwhile, Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin had earlier stated that the capital’s air defence systems were extremely effective against unmanned aerial vehicles and that the proportion of UAVs capable of penetrating defence lines remained below one-tenth of 1%.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking in early July, stated that strikes on Russian territory would be met with retaliation many times stronger, remarking: “Wherever they try to strike on the territory of the Russian Federation, we will respond in kind, but several times stronger. The enemy will feel it.”

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