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Europe heading for a ‘military Schengen’

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The long-proposed plan for a ‘military Schengen’ zone in Europe is already being implemented, according to an assessment in Foreign Policy (FP).

At the end of January, Germany, the Netherlands and Poland signed an agreement to create a military transport corridor between them. Siemtje Möller, Parliamentary State Secretary at the German Ministry of Defence, said the corridor would increase military mobility ‘on the way to a real military Schengen’.

It is not the first time that European politicians have floated the idea of adapting the existing visa-free movement of people and goods in the Schengen area to the movement of troops and military equipment throughout Europe, but the idea is now clearly gaining momentum.

The idea of a military Schengen first emerged after Russia’s annexation of Crimea. European military authorities are exploring the lessons of the Cold War, including military mobility.

But several experts, diplomats and military sources told FP that progress has been much slower than desired. “The liberalisation of the rules is agreed by everyone. But the problem is that we have been talking about it since 2015,” Tomasz Szatkowski, Poland’s permanent representative to NATO said.

Officials acknowledged that European countries have ‘a long way to go’ to effectively move their personnel and materiel.

The transition of anything related to a military mission in Europe is beset by obstacles ranging from bureaucratic hurdles to infrastructure gaps.

Baltic states fear no help in case of war

Urmas Paet, an Estonian MEP and vice-chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, rated military mobilisation ‘3 out of 10’ and suggested that it could currently take ‘weeks or at least more than a week’ to send supplies to the Baltic states.

The FP stresses that the ‘paperwork’ is cumbersome. Different permits have to be obtained from different ministries in different countries, and sometimes from different regions within a country, it said, adding that most roads and bridges are built for civilian use and are unlikely to withstand the weight of heavy military equipment.

As the central European fuel pipeline does not extend to the eastern countries, longer delays in fuel supplies could also be a decisive factor. In addition, track gauges in the former Soviet states are different from European gauges, and transferring thousands of troops and equipment from one train to another in a wartime situation could add to the time required.

Mini-military Schengen for the Balkans planned

“Now I hear ministers in various organisations talking about it,” Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, a former NATO commander who was the first to advocate military Schengen and is believed to have coined the term, told FP at the recent Munich Security Conference.

The ability to act quickly in a crisis is a crucial part of military deterrence doctrine, Hodges stressed. “We need to have not just equipment and troops, but the ability to move quickly, to get spare parts in, to store fuel and ammunition, and the Russians need to see that we have that,” the officer said, noting that a force’s ability to mobilise and move quickly must be visible to the enemy and deter them from attacking in the first place.

While welcoming the agreement between Germany, the Netherlands and Poland as a ‘great start’, Hodges points out that many more such corridors are under discussion.

Bulgaria’s chief of staff, Emil Eftimov, for example, said the allies should prioritise a corridor from Alexandroupoli in Greece to Romania and across the Adriatic to Albania and northern Macedonia.

“They want corridors from Greece to Bulgaria to Romania. The aim of all these corridors is to have a smooth route in terms of infrastructure, but also to get customs and all the legal obstacles out of the way,” Hodges said.

Germany-Netherlands-Poland corridor as a model

The Germany-Netherlands-Poland corridor is the first of many planned to identify and resolve bottlenecks and possibly provide a template for future corridors.

A senior military source, who spoke to FP on condition of anonymity, said the corridor would address a number of issues.In peacetime, he said, it would also allow authorities to smooth federal processes, as each state in Germany has its own laws for troops or dangerous equipment passing through its territory. In wartime, he added, the corridor would be ‘much more than a road’.Explaining that a hundred thousand or more soldiers would be on the move in a crisis, the military source said: “They would need a place to stop, rest, access spare parts depots and fuel depots.In such a scenario, we would also need arrangements to deal with war refugees,” the military source said.

This is a daunting task even for the three nations. Paet added that defence is a ‘national capability’ and ‘countries share as much as they want to share’. Countries do not easily share details of critical infrastructure, such as the location and number of bridges that have a military load classification and can support the weight of heavy tanks.

The EU’s roads and railways – not fit for war

There is also a lack of accurate data on infrastructure. According to a 2021 report by the Centre for European Policy Analysis (CEPA), 90 per cent of European roads, 75 per cent of national roads and 40 per cent of bridges can carry vehicles classified as military, with a maximum load of 50 tonnes.

The Leopard and Abrams tanks, both of which have been used against Russia on the Ukrainian battlefield, are significantly heavier.

“The Leopard tank weighs about 75 tonnes, I think, and the Abrams is a bit heavier. Most of these tanks will be transported behind HETs (heavy equipment transporters) and each HET weighs about 15 to 20 tonnes. There won’t be just one tank on the road,” he said.

CEPA also notes that the combination of trucks, trailers and heavy tanks could be well in excess of 120 tonnes and considers the existing infrastructure to be largely unsuitable for military movements.

The EU recognises the need to fund dual-use infrastructure – civil and military – and has already approved funding for 95 such projects.

But the Polish ambassador and Hodges said they were concerned that funding for the EU’s infrastructure financing instrument, the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), had been cut from €6.5 billion to €1.7 billion.

German and French opposition to ‘investment in the East’

Rail Baltica, a transnational railway project funded by the CEF, plans to extend Europe’s rail network to the Baltic countries of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, and is due to be operational by 2030. But local news organisations are reporting concerns about funding.

Moreover, countries such as France, Belgium and even Germany are resisting the idea of investing in Eastern Europe to extend the Central European pipeline and using it for more general EU defence.

The European Defence Agency, which coordinates EU defence cooperation, is working on a common format for land and air mobility to standardise bureaucratic processes and simplify paperwork. But although it has been adopted by 25 member states, there is still reluctance among those that have not yet integrated these ‘technical rules’ into their national processes.

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German defense minister clears way for Scholz to lead SPD into elections

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Defense Minister Boris Pistorius has officially withdrawn as the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) top candidate for the upcoming election, ending weeks of speculation about his potential to replace Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

In a video message released by the SPD on Thursday evening, Pistorius stated that the ongoing public debate had harmed the party’s unity. He informed the party leadership that he was unsuitable for the chancellorship.

“Olaf Scholz is a strong chancellor and the right candidate for the chancellorship,” Pistorius said, emphasizing that the party leader embodies “reason and common sense.” He further urged, “We now have a joint responsibility to bring this debate to an end because there is a lot at stake.”

When Scholz triggered early elections two weeks ago, many assumed he would automatically serve as the SPD’s candidate, given his role as the incumbent chancellor. However, polls revealed that Pistorius, who has been defense minister since early 2023, had become Germany’s most popular politician, sparking a de facto leadership race.

Scholz faces declining approval ratings

In contrast to Pistorius’ popularity, Scholz suffered from one of the lowest approval ratings among German politicians. Voters blamed him for months of political infighting that crippled the three-way “traffic light” coalition, which ultimately collapsed earlier this month.

Despite this, the SPD central leadership continued to back Scholz. Meanwhile, Pistorius faced increasing criticism for failing to address the leadership speculation. In his video message, Pistorius denied initiating the controversy but acknowledged that it had caused “growing uncertainty” within the party and “resentment” among voters.

He emphasized that the decision to step aside was his own and pledged his full support to Scholz, whom he described as an “extraordinary” chancellor. Pistorius also affirmed his commitment to campaigning for the SPD’s re-election.

Supporters react with disappointment

Pistorius’ withdrawal left many of his supporters disheartened. “I regret this development. The aim now must be to work together and achieve the best possible election result for the SPD,” said Joe Weingarten, an SPD member of parliament, in an interview with Der Spiegel.

Another MP, Johannes Arlt, remarked, “I would have preferred a different decision, but now we have one. It is good for the party and the country. We will now go into the federal election campaign united.”

A two-way race for the chancellorship

With Pistorius stepping down, the race for the chancellorship is now expected to be between Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz, leader of the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU). Merz, a millionaire and former BlackRock Germany executive, has been polling ahead of Scholz since taking over the CDU leadership in 2022. Scholz’s supporters, however, remain optimistic that he can close the gap and outperform Merz in the upcoming election.

Pistorius: A proponent of German remilitarization

Known for his pragmatic approach to military affairs, Pistorius, 64, earned respect for his tough stance on Russia and advocacy for Germany’s rearmament. Following his appointment as defense minister in 2023, he made clear his opposition to the SPD’s historical reluctance to increase military spending.

Describing Vladimir Putin as “the despot in the Kremlin,” Pistorius warned that Germany must boost defense investments and ensure it is “combat ready.” His hardline approach on security and defense issues distinguished him within the SPD and cemented his popularity among voters.

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Poland urges EU to increase spending on eastern defence

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Poland, NATO’s largest defence spender, has urged its EU partners to bolster border defences with Russia and Belarus. The move aims to demonstrate a firm commitment to European security, particularly in light of Donald Trump’s influence on global defence policies.

Magdalena Sobkowiak-Czarnecka, the deputy minister responsible for preparations for Poland’s EU presidency, set to begin in January, told The Financial Times (FT) that the EU should invest in strengthening border fortifications and air surveillance systems under the Eastern Shield initiative.

“I think solidarity on the Eastern Shield could help show Trump that, as the EU, we understand what needs to be done for defence. If Trump says he will only work with countries that invest in defence, that’s fine for Poland, because we already spend 4% of GDP on defence. But what about the others? Funding the Eastern Shield would demonstrate the shared commitment of European countries,” Sobkowiak-Czarnecka explained.

The Eastern Shield, announced in May, comprises advanced fortifications and air surveillance systems along Poland’s borders with Belarus and the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. This initiative is central to Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s strategy to counter what he describes as “Russian aggression”, including the “hybrid war” linked to facilitating illegal migration from Belarus into Poland.

The Tusk government has allocated PLN 10 billion (€2.3 billion) for the Eastern Shield as part of broader defence expenditures. These investments will increase Poland’s defence spending from 4.1% of GDP in 2023 to 4.7% by 2025, the highest in NATO and more than double the alliance’s 2% GDP target. In contrast, some EU nations, such as Italy and Spain, have yet to meet this benchmark.

“All our partners must understand that the Eastern Shield is not solely about Poland but also about safeguarding the EU’s borders,” said Sobkowiak-Czarnecka.

Trump’s potential return to the presidency has heightened concerns across EU capitals, given his promises to impose tariffs on the bloc and signals of a potential resolution to the Ukraine conflict that could favor Russia.

Sobkowiak-Czarnecka underscored Poland’s commitment to enhancing EU security on multiple fronts, from increasing military equipment production to countering disinformation and securing energy supplies.

“This Polish presidency comes at a critical juncture. As an expert on Ukraine and one of the strongest U.S. allies in Europe, Poland will be a guiding light in these challenging times,” she concluded.

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European energy market in turmoil: Gas prices reach one-year high

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The European energy market faces significant challenges as natural gas prices soar to their highest levels in a year. A combination of escalating tensions between Russia and Ukraine, Gazprom’s suspension of natural gas supplies to Austria, and colder-than-expected weather has placed substantial pressure on the market.

Industry representatives acknowledge that while sufficient gas supplies exist, the supply-demand balance remains fragile. Negative developments or geopolitical news could quickly trigger additional price surges.

On Thursday, Dutch TTF futures—a key European natural gas benchmark—rose to €48.8 per megawatt-hour (MWh) (equivalent to $538 per 1,000 cubic meters), a level last observed in November 2023. Since the end of the heating season on 31 March, prices have climbed by more than 150%.

The price surge accelerated on Wednesday after Ukraine targeted Russian territory using British-made Storm Shadow missiles. By the close of the trading day, prices had increased by 2.5%, reaching €46.8/MWh.

On the same day, the United States issued a warning based on intelligence reports, predicting a major air strike in the region. Following this warning, many Western countries evacuated their embassies in Kyiv.

Adding to the tensions, the Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russia test-fired an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capable of carrying nuclear payloads. This event aligns with speculation about changes in Russia’s nuclear doctrine and the US’s authorization for Ukraine to target Russian territory with long-range missiles.

While liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand in Asia remains low, traders are turning their focus to Europe to capitalize on surging prices, according to Bloomberg.

Despite the increased volatility, Gas Infrastructure Europe reports that gas storage facilities across Europe are 90% full. However, the heating season, combined with freezing temperatures in Northern Europe, has amplified concerns about market stability.

Torgrim Reitan, Equinor’s Chief Financial Officer, emphasized that the market’s fragile balance increases the influence of external factors on pricing dynamics.

The state of pipeline gas supplies from Russia is another major concern. On 16 November, Gazprom halted deliveries to Austria’s OMV, citing unresolved payment issues. The company is attempting to recover part of a €230 million arbitration judgment through this suspension.

Despite this, Gazprom continues to supply 42.4 million cubic meters of gas daily to Europe via Ukraine. However, OMV cannot access these supplies and must turn to other sources, such as Slovakia, to meet Austria’s energy needs. According to OMV officials, Austria’s energy requirements are fully covered by alternative suppliers.

Jon Treacy, editor of the investment newsletter Fuller Treacy Money, noted that although Austria maintains official neutrality, most of OMV’s customers are NATO members. Treacy added that Russia’s “long, cold winter” strategy aims to exert pressure on regions beyond Ukraine over the long term.

Market analysts warn that transit through Ukraine—a minor contributor to the European Union’s total gas imports—could be entirely cut off by January 2024. Such a development would further strain an already delicate market, potentially driving prices even higher.

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