On April 9, U.S. President Donald Trump announced to the media at the White House that he had set a final deadline for Iran to reach a new nuclear deal with the U.S. If Iran does not abandon its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. will “definitely” take military action, and Israel will be deeply involved and become a “leader” in this. Clearly, “Trump 2.0” has added more military threat to Iran, but overall, this pressure resembles drawing a bow without fully pulling it—extreme pressure that may reignite the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” set seven years ago.

Trump met with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, after which the U.S. announced it was holding direct negotiations with Iran. Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi confirmed on April 8 that indirect high-level talks would take place on April 12 in Oman, but denied any direct talks as claimed by the U.S.

Analysts believe the summit focused not only on bilateral trade tariffs and the Gaza situation, but also on coordinating a unified stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis. Based on Trump’s statements, Israel is expected to strike Iran if it crosses the nuclear threshold—i.e., acquires actual nuclear weapons—by targeting its nuclear facilities. The U.S. seems to want to keep military action as “Plan B,” exerting heavy pressure through negotiations first and resorting to military means only if talks fail, possibly in coordination with Israel.

Iran, long accustomed to U.S.-Israeli military threats, seems unfazed by this war intimidation. Iranian President Pezeshkian reiterated that Iran “does not seek nuclear weapons,” emphasizing the country’s long-term need for nuclear science and energy. On April 10, Ali Shamkhani, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamenei, stated on platform X that if external threats persist, Iran may suspend cooperation with the IAEA, expel inspectors, and consider relocating enriched materials to secure domestic sites.

Less than 100 days into “Trump 2.0,” the administration is in full attack mode, waging economic war on all trade partners in the name of “Make America Great Again.” By attempting to open the “Pandora’s box”of disrupting the global trade system, he seeks to force all trading partners back into a corner. While global attention is focused on avoiding U.S. economic coercion and “public robbery,” geopolitical conflicts are momentarily overshadowed.

From a geopolitical standpoint, Trump’s return focuses on two major battlefields: the Russia-Ukraine war and the Middle East, with the latter’s key goal being the subjugation of Iran—a goal unfulfilled in his first term. Thus, the new U.S. Iran policy under Trump centers on threats and coercion, supplemented by engagement and negotiation, with gradually increasing pressure and strategic encirclement, avoiding military action unless absolutely necessary.

Currently, the Trump administration is “riding the momentum,” fully cooperating with Israel to weaken and dismantle the “Axis of Resistance.” Following actions against Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, and resistance forces in Iraq, efforts now focus on resolving the Gaza issue, with military strikes targeting Yemen’s Houthis, while maintaining pressure on Iran to achieve “Middle East peace under Trump”: expanding Arab-Israeli normalization and isolating Iran—the region’s long-standing anti-U.S. and anti-Israel force.

For some time, the Trump administration has unconditionally supported Israel, using transactional strategies like promoting “clearing Gaza” or “taking over Gaza” to pressure Arab states into aiding Israel. It aims to usher in a “post-Hamas era” and reshape the political and geopolitical ecology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. At the same time, it strikes Yemen’s Houthis under the pretense of protecting Red Sea routes and portrays Iran not just as a partner but as the master of the Houthis, seeking justification for continued suppression of Iran.

Regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, Trump is displaying a more aggressive war stance than during his first term, publicly declaring “if talks fail, we will strike,” openly supporting Israel in bringing war to the Persian Gulf. The U.S., in collaboration with Israel, is exerting high pressure on Iran, and clearly enjoys three advantages:

First, Iran has suffered major setbacks in over a year of the “Sixth Middle East War,” and its bottom line of avoiding full-scale war has been thoroughly exposed. The “Axis of Resistance” is also scattered and fragmented.

Second, U.S.-Russia relations have drastically reversed. After suffering a strategic diplomatic failure in the Middle East, Russia is now focusing on dividing up Ukraine’s land and mineral resources with the U.S.

Third, although Russia and Iran still maintain good relations, Russia has openly stated that it has no intention of intervening if Iran is attacked.

When Trump first took office in 2017, after half a year of observation and bargaining, he announced the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal. At that time, I wrote that Trump didn’t withdraw just for the sake of it. Unlike other withdrawal actions rooted in isolationism, America-first ideology, and anti-globalization/multilateralism, Trump’s move was strategic — “retreating in order to advance.” By dismantling the nuclear agreement, he aimed to start anew or add terms, in an attempt to solve the broader Middle East issue in one go and serve America’s core interests and Middle East policy.

On May 21, 2018, the U.S. State Department proposed a complete “Plan B,” not only to eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat but also to bury Iran’s painstaking geopolitical achievements in the Middle East and reshape regional dynamics and U.S.-Iran/Israel-Iran relations. This plan was essentially a replica of the U.S. strategy toward North Korea — a typical “carrot and stick” approach. However, compared to U.S. demands on North Korea, this plan was stricter, more comprehensive, and far-reaching — aiming to resolve historical and current contradictions in the Middle East and return the region to a relatively balanced framework.

Therefore, Trump’s renewed focus on Iran’s nuclear issue is merely a rehash of old issues, and hasn’t yet reached the high-pressure levels or demands of seven years ago. At that time, the U.S. policy toward Iran was a well-prepared, strategic combination — probably now forgotten by many — known as the “Pompeo 12 Conditions.” It is thus worthwhile to revisit this list in evaluating today’s Trump-style Iran policy.

Pompeo’ 12 Conditions

 In his speech at the Heritage Foundation, Pompeo emphasized that Iran must meet 12 demands in exchange for the lifting of all U.S. sanctions and a full restoration of bilateral relations. Otherwise, Iran would face “the most severe sanctions in history.” These 12 conditions fall into categories, urging Iran to completely abandon nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, release detained individuals, stop supporting terrorism, and halt interference in the internal affairs and security of regional countries.

The four demands related to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were:

-Iran must declare all military nuclear activities to the IAEA and permanently and verifiably abandon them.

-Cease all uranium enrichment, never pursue plutonium reprocessing, and shut down heavy water reactors.

-Allow unconditional IAEA inspections at any site.

-End the development and launch of ballistic missiles, and halt development of nuclear-capable missile systems.

Even from a nuclear non-proliferation standpoint, these conditions go far beyond those in the Iran nuclear deal and aim to completely strip Iran of its ability to acquire nuclear weapons or deliver them via long-range missiles.

The Remaining Eight of the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” and Their Implications

Three of the conditions relate to non-state actors. They require Iran to:

-Immediately cease support for so-called “terrorist organizations” in the Middle East, including Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad;

-Stop supporting “terrorist forces” such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and surrounding areas, and cease sheltering senior al-Qaeda leaders;

-End the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (especially the Quds Force)’s support for “terrorists” and “armed groups” around the world.

The U.S. believes Iran is the patron or ally of various extremist organizations in the Middle East, especially a stumbling block and root cause preventing Palestinian and Arab concessions to Israel. It sees Iran as a troublemaker hindering peace in the region. Thus, resolving the Middle East issue thoroughly must start with Iran.

Four conditions relate to Iran’s relations with regional states:

-Respect Iraq’s sovereignty, allow Iranian-backed Shia militias to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society;

-End military support for Yemen’s Houthi rebels and work toward a political solution for the Yemen conflict;

-Withdraw all Iranian military forces from Syria;

-Cease threats to destroy Israel, missile launches at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, threats to international shipping, and cyberattacks.

Additionally, the U.S. demanded Iran release all “detained” American citizens and those of its allies and partners.

These eight conditions, unrelated to nuclear weapons or missile programs, go far beyond nuclear issues. They show the U.S.’s intent to comprehensively constrain and curb Iran’s military and diplomatic activities in the Middle East and globally. This is a strategic countermeasure against Iran’s regional expansion, which threatens U.S. allies like Israel and Gulf states and intensifies sectarian and ethnic conflicts. It aims to pressure Iran to halt foreign influence and give up the gains it made during its expansion.

As a “reward” for complying with these 12 conditions, the U.S. promised to sign a new nuclear agreement with Iran if it made real, visible, and sustainable changes. It would also lift all sanctions, gradually restore diplomatic and economic ties, allow Iran access to advanced technologies, and support its economic modernization and integration into the global economy.

Clearly, this is the Trump administration’s new Iran strategy—a roadmap to comprehensively resolve the U.S.-Iran and Iran-Israel hostilities and reshape the geopolitical landscape. It includes both the “spiked club” of pressure and the tempting “carrot” of incentives. The aim is to downgrade Iran from a “regional superpower” back to a normal state, as it was before the Islamic Revolution, to eliminate all of the U.S. and its allies’ security concerns.

Iran completely rejected the “Pompeo 12 Conditions,” seeing them as an ultimatum demanding total surrender. To accept them would mean abandoning the grand vision and sacrifices of the Islamic Revolution and returning to a submissive, ordinary state. The Trump administration followed up with more sanctions. But Iran endured until Biden took office—and now again under Trump’s return.

From “Trump 1.0” to “Trump 2.0,” eight years have passed. The nuclear deal hasn’t been revived, and the nuclear crisis hasn’t escalated into war. But the current geopolitical and security landscape is clearly more unfavorable to Iran: it suffered military defeat in the Eastern Mediterranean, lost the strategic western flank of the “Shia Crescent” due to Hezbollah’s defeat and the fall of the Damascus regime.

In Israel’s large-scale raid in October 2024, it successfully opened an aerial corridor from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, launched warning strikes deep into Iranian territory, and exposed Iran’s weak bottom line of lacking will to retaliate symmetrically. Now, as “Trump 2.0” begins, Iraq—the key node of the “Shia Crescent”—faces diplomatic pressure to break away from Iran and rejoin the Arab world. Overall, Iran’s geopolitical environment is deteriorating, while U.S.-Israeli control of Eastern Mediterranean airspace increases the risk of military escalation. The pressure Iran faces now exceeds that of “Trump 1.0.”

Although Pompeo is no longer on the “Trump 1.0 chariot,” the “Pompeo 12 Conditions” reflect the core thinking of Trump’s national security team regarding the Middle East and remain the foundation of U.S. policy toward Iran. Far from being discarded, these conditions may be gradually revived under “Trump 2.0,” tightening the strategic bowstring to pressure Iran toward compromise.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Following a protracted period of fluctuating relations, negotiations between Iran and the United States commenced on April 12 in Muscat, Oman. While not the first instance of dialogue between Tehran and Washington, the current geopolitical landscape imbues these talks with exceptional significance, as the fate of the Middle East hinges considerably on their outcome. Consequently, the character of these negotiations differs markedly from previous encounters.

Tehran enters this round of negotiations amidst a challenging environment: the legacy of former President Trump’s maximum economic pressure campaign persists, coupled with rhetoric hinting at potential military action against Iran. Israel’s ongoing military operations in Gaza, widely criticized and labeled by some as genocide, continue as it projects an image of success; Hezbollah appears constrained within Lebanon’s internal political dynamics; the political landscape in Damascus has shifted, potentially affecting the established support lines Iran previously relied upon for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups opposing Israel; Iranian-aligned forces in Iraq are preoccupied with internal political strife; and Iran itself confronts a severe currency and economic crisis. Simultaneously, Israeli lobbying efforts reportedly seek to persuade influential US figures to support decisive action against Iran. From Israel’s perspective, Iran purportedly lacks the strategic capacity for a sustained, high-intensity conflict against it.

Despite this assessment, Iran maintains it is not negotiating from a position of weakness. Ali Larijani, advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated that a military attack on Iran would mean “gambling with the lives of American soldiers”. Iran acknowledges the potential for significant damage to its strategic infrastructure from a US or Israeli attack but warns that its retaliation would inflict severe consequences on both nations.

Iran has also articulated a broader retaliatory strategy, threatening not only direct retaliation for an attack but also targeting US troops and interests throughout the Middle East, including in allied Arab nations. Such actions could destabilize key regions, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and potentially impact maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This escalation would place the already delicate security balance in several Arab states under immense strain.

Therefore, while Iran-US negotiations are not unprecedented, the current context imbues them with exceptional significance for regional security.

From Saturday talks to Saturday negotiations!

Following several hours of indirect discussions on Saturday, both delegations reported a positive atmosphere. Accounts from both sides regarding the tenor of the talks were largely consistent, with both the Iranian chief negotiator and the White House offering favorable evaluations. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator, described the discussions with the United States as “constructive”, “promising”, and “mutually respectful”. Araghchi said, “I have explained Iran’s position with determination and a forward-looking approach. Both sides have decided to continue this process in a few days.”

Meanwhile, the White House described the initial indirect talks hosted by Oman as “entirely positive and constructive”. The White House emphasized that the parties agreed to resume negotiations the following Saturday.

A notable point reportedly emerging from the US side emphasized a commitment to resolving disputes through diplomacy and dialogue whenever possible.

Initial reactions from both Tehran and Washington presented a consistent and cautiously optimistic narrative. This convergence has fostered a temporary de-escalation following weeks of heightened tension and raised hopes for short-term easing of friction.

Nevertheless, the path forward remains complex and challenging. While initial signals are promising, preparedness for various outcomes is essential. The willingness to continue talks might suggest, for now, that the US is not immediately demanding Iran’s “red lines” – such as the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program or severe restrictions on its missile industry – be met as preconditions. Conversely, Iran seems prepared to offer more substantial assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, potentially including restoring uranium enrichment levels closer to those stipulated in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Barring unforeseen disruptions, it is plausible that future negotiations could address topics such as the easing of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and reduced pressure on purchasers of Iranian oil.

Upcoming negotiation sessions, potentially scheduled for Saturdays, appear poised to be critical junctures for Iran and the broader Middle East, making the outcomes of these weekend discussions highly anticipated.

Risks

Despite the cautiously optimistic mood following the initial talks, significant risks loom over the negotiation process. Chief among these is potential opposition from Israel. Israel may view these talks as undermining its preferred strategy towards Iran and could take actions to disrupt the process. Potential disruptive actions could range from releasing sensitive intelligence on Iran’s nuclear or missile programs to covert operations or targeted provocations, such as assassinations of Iranian officials. Furthermore, influential pro-Israel lobbying efforts in Washington represent a significant factor, potentially shaping the perspectives of US negotiators—an avenue of influence less available to Iran.

Donald Trump’s potential influence and unpredictable nature also represent a significant variable. His political style often involves projecting strength and seeking public acclaim, sometimes employing confrontational rhetoric. This approach can include language perceived as condescending or insulting by negotiating partners. Given Iran’s sensitivity to perceived disrespect or arrogance from the US, such rhetoric could derail negotiations abruptly. Iran’s preference for indirect talks, while perhaps appearing strategically complex, may stem from deep-seated mistrust rooted in historical grievances concerning perceived US arrogance and past policy shifts. Therefore, alongside potential Israeli actions, the unpredictable nature of US politics, particularly concerning figures like Trump, poses a substantial risk to the sustainability of any diplomatic progress.

Internal Iranian politics present another layer of complexity. Significant diplomatic achievements could bolster the political standing of the current Pezeshkian administration. However, such success might also galvanize domestic political opposition. While the current administration under Pezeshkian and negotiator Araghchi may adopt a more cautious public approach compared to their predecessors (like the Rouhani administration and negotiator Jawad Zarif), the risk of internal efforts aimed at undermining the negotiations to discredit the government remains.

Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, noted in a recent interview, “Strangely enough, in these 40 years, whenever we have wanted to open up with various countries, there has always been some negative event either inside or outside the country.”

This historical pattern highlights the potential for similar disruptive incidents to affect the current talks.

On April 2 (EST), U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 10% “base tariff” on imports from over 180 countries and regions, effectived at midnight on April 5, with only Russia temporarily exempted. Additionally, Trump will impose personalized higher “reciprocal tariffs” on countries with the largest trade deficits with the U.S., effective from midnight on April 9. All other countries will continue under the original 10% base tariff. Trump claimed he holds the “modification authority” to raise or lower tariffs as needed. U.S. Treasury Secretary Besant also warned trade partners not to retaliate. On the same day, U.S. stock markets plummeted, with the three major indexes hitting the largest single-day drop in nearly five years, and the dollar also fell against major currencies.

If trade wars are world wars without gunpowder, then Trump has recklessly initiated an unprecedented one, pushing the U.S. into conflict with the entire world. This war concerns not only national tax revenues but also the global industrial, supply, and value chains, the rules of world trade and economic development, and even public sentiment, international relations, and the global power structure.

The Trump administration truly reflects the Republican Party’s preference for elephants, and his “new tariff policy” is like an elephant barging into the china shop of the world trade system and international relations—rampaging recklessly, ignoring friend or foe, causing massive damage, and successfully turning the U.S. into a “global enemy” and “universal nuisance” for the first time.

From an economic perspective, Trump’s tariff plan aims to force countries into new trade deals to balance trade, bring manufacturing back to the U.S., increase employment, tax revenues, and federal savings, and expand the market share of American products—all in support of “Making America Great Again.”

From a geopolitical perspective, the policy fulfills campaign promises by using economic weapons to enhance the U.S.’s bargaining position in global economics and diplomacy. Tariffs are wielded as strategic tools to coerce and weaken opponents, punish allies and partners that challenge U.S. hegemony, and suppress those with differing worldviews—all in order to maintain U.S. dominance in the international order.

Trump’s “new tariff policy” harms in three ways: harms the U.S., harms others, and harms the world.

Firstly, raising import tariffs across the board may not revive U.S. manufacturing or attract investment back home. Instead, it will raise the prices of imported goods, making American distributors and consumers pay more, especially in automobiles, electronics, and household appliances. Moreover, the policy could trigger stagflation, increase costs in agriculture and industry, weaken U.S. export competitiveness, and even lead to exclusion from global markets. Many U.S. business groups harshly criticized the policy, and more than half of public opinion polls are pessimistic. Goldman Sachs raised the probability of a U.S. recession within 12 months from 20% to 35%, in other words, Trump is, so to speak, “shooting himself in the foot.”

Secondly, imposing heavy tariffs on goods imported from various countries into the U.S. will present enormous industrial, trade, and economic challenges—and even social and political crises—for all targeted nations. The high U.S. tariffs may force many multinational companies to withdraw from traditional low-cost countries and relocate to lower-tariff regions, leading those former hosts to suffer from industrial hollowing-out, trade marginalization, financial bubbles in stock and currency markets, and economic deterioration. This could result in national bankruptcy, social unrest, regime changes, or even armed conflict. Historical experience shows that when major economies like the U.S. shift or export their crises, it can bring disaster to developing nations.

Thirdly, Trump’s “new tariff policy” creates a crushing situation, described as “where the elephant herd tramples, no grass grows,” bringing gluttonous calamity to the world. This tariff weapon not only harms over 180 U.S. trade partners, but also disrupts global pricing, trade, labor division, value, and supply systems. It undermines the global trade loop and supply-demand market that the U.S. painstakingly built post-WWII, causing an “epic-level” disaster for the global economy. The Financial Times predicted that a global trade war triggered by Trump could result in $1.4 trillion in economic losses. If countries retaliate with 25% tariffs, the resulting depression could be on par with the Great Depression of 1930.

Trump’s policy reveals a “triple loss” for the U.S. as the world’s leading power: loss of morality, loss of norms, and loss of friends.

Imposing heavy taxes reflects moral failure—selfishness and profit-seeking at the expense of others’ well-being. It’s a modern version of Louis XV’s “After me, the flood,” and a manifestation of America’s impulsive and reckless hegemony, abandoning its professed values of freedom, equality, and fraternity, as well as its evangelical “messianic mission.”

It’s also a loss of norms. As the inheritor of Western civilization, savior in two world wars, and key architect of the post-war global order, the U.S. once stood as a model. Francis Fukuyama even called the “American dream” the “end of history.” But Trump’s policy has shattered that image—applying high tariffs indiscriminately, even starting with close neighbors like Mexico and Canada, and targeting transatlantic allies and Asia-Pacific military partners. The U.S. now acts not as a leader, but as a tyrant. The Trump administration is dismantling the Western “political idol” that stood for nearly a century.

The result is also a loss of trust and allies. In pursuit of “Making America Great Again,” the U.S. is betraying even its closest friends—be it Mexico and Canada (over fentanyl and immigration), its WWII and Cold War allies in Europe, or Indo-Pacific allies like Japan and South Korea. Even new partners like Vietnam feel betrayed. No wonder European leaders now call America “Europe’s enemy” and see “de-risking” as aimed at the U.S.; no wonder Japan’s former PM Ishiba Shigeru bitterly laments his “extreme disappointment and regret”; no wonder Vietnam feels Trump’s “charm diplomacy” has hit the rocks.

In the end, those who once admired, trusted, and followed America are now disillusioned. The U.S. has become isolated.

As Mao Zedong once said, “The first question of revolution is to distinguish friends from enemies.” In today’s global trade system, it’s clear: the U.S. has made itself the enemy of the world. Applied to today’s international relations, global economic and trade systems, and the game of global circulation, all parties would likely have to acknowledge that in the process of maintaining normal and equitable international relations and ensuring smooth, stable international trade and economic operations, the United States has already positioned itself against the entire world—becoming a “global enemy .” At least when measured by the dimension of tariff wars, America’s comprehensive hostility and antagonism toward all nations, regardless of their social systems, political structures, ideologies, or values, has reached an absurd extreme. It now operates under a doctrine of “tariffs first, money above all, America supreme.” On April 2, Trump called it “Liberation Day,” but in truth, it marks America’s turn toward new conservatism, abandonment of globalization, and potential end as a global economic leader. It is a day of disaster for the world economy—and a day of declaration for global partners preparing to resist America’s trade hegemony.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.