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Israel on the brink

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Israel’s nearly year-long operation in Gaza to oust Hamas and rescue hostages has yet to produce its full results, but it appears to have started a war with Hezbollah. At the time of writing (in the early hours of Wednesday 25 September) it had not yet launched a ground operation. Indeed, it did not seem certain that it would, as Hezbollah continued to respond to the intense air strikes on southern Lebanon over the weekend as if it had not been affected.

Although not fully reported in the mainstream media, there were reports that Hezbollah had intensively shelled northern Israel, particularly military targets and the city of Haifa, forcing Israel to evacuate (or shelter) civilians from a significant part of the northern region. In addition, Tel Aviv was also attacked with rockets in response to Israeli air strikes, all without the effectiveness of Israel’s much-vaunted Iron Dome air defence system.

Hezbollah is no pushover

In short, Hezbollah is no pushover, as it has proved in every armed conflict with Israel, and is unlikely to be this time. This organisation, which was born/strengthened in the early 1980s when Israel invaded Lebanon and has repeatedly clashed with Israel, is neither a regular army nor an ordinary guerrilla organisation. Hezbollah, which can use both methods depending on the course of the war, has always forced Israel to retreat by inflicting heavy losses on it, and did so again in the last war in 2006.

If Israel were to launch a full-scale ground operation now, the result would probably be similar. But we see that it is avoiding this as much as possible. In the last clashes between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, which lasted 33 days, Israel started its operation with an intense aerial bombardment, without paying any attention to civilians, children and infants, as it is doing now; but as soon as it started a ground operation, it withdrew with great losses.

So much so that Hezbollah destroyed many Israeli tanks, shot down Israeli helicopters, made it difficult for the helicopters to operate, and was rumoured to have shot down some of the F-16s. On one occasion, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah even went on live television and announced that ‘right now our resistance forces are going to hit an Israeli warship’, at which point a Hezbollah missile quickly neutralised the Israeli warship. As Israel continued its intensive aerial bombardment of civilian settlements despite all warnings, Hezbollah began to attack Israeli settlements, and Hezbollah attacks, first on towns/cities near the Lebanese border, eventually reached Tel Aviv, which Israel never expected. Meanwhile, many of its soldiers were captured by Hezbollah and Israel was forced to withdraw from the war in silence.

The current military-political situation is even more in Hezbollah’s favour

What is the military and political situation now compared to 2006? Hezbollah seems to be in a better position in a war that is starting now than it was in 2006. First of all, it cannot be said that Israel achieved the desired results from its operation against Hamas, which turned into a genocide in Gaza. Genocide against civilians does not necessarily mean achieving the political-diplomatic results of using military force. For example, none of the stated aims of the war, such as rescuing hostages or eradicating Hamas, have been achieved. It is clear that a terrible genocide has taken place, but Hamas is still operational in Gaza and will and will try to harm Israel through ambushes and other methods, taking advantage of a ground operation that Israel will launch against Hezbollah.

On the other hand, another event/development that the Turkish media has almost persistently ignored provides other clues. A few days before Israel remotely detonated the pagers and radios used by some Hezbollah members, the Houthis in Yemen, who have become an important part of the axis of resistance forces, managed to hit Tel Aviv with a hypersonic missile from two thousand kilometres away.

This was particularly important because hypersonic missiles are not even in the West’s inventory. The most advanced missiles in the world are in the inventories of Russia and China, but Iran has also managed to build one. This missile, fired from Yemen, travelled more than two thousand kilometres across the Red Sea, probably passing through or close to the American navy, and hit Tel Aviv in eleven minutes. The reason for the ineffectiveness of Israel’s air defence system, Iron Dome, is that such missiles are virtually invisible on radar and/or the West does not have missiles fast enough to counter them. In the event of a ground war with Hezbollah, it is highly likely that the Yemeni Houthis will launch more of these missiles, putting Israel in a difficult position. We know that the Western naval force deployed against the Houthis is hardly effective.

It should also be noted that there are elements of the Axis of Resistance in Iraq and Syria. We must expect them to take part in the war to some extent, with drones in their hands, and to side with Hezbollah against Israel. From a political point of view, the conditions are much less favourable for Israel than they were in 2006. First of all, Israel, and especially Netanyahu’s government, has become a pariah in the eyes of world public opinion and many governments. Even in the United States, both public opinion and a significant part of the American elite are highly critical of Israel.

At first glance, this would not have much impact in a land war between Hezbollah and Israel, but it would undoubtedly have a negative psychological impact on Israeli citizens. It should be noted that since the Hamas attack of 7 October and the subsequent operations in Gaza, a significant number of Israeli citizens, many of them also citizens of other countries, have left the country. This process must have been accelerated by the rockets fired by Hamas and the ease with which Hezbollah can fire rockets at Israel, especially in low-intensity conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel. Regionally, perhaps the only change in Israel’s favour since 2006 is that the Syrian state has been weakened by a dirty war that Turkey has supported against its own interests. And in the coming days we will have a better idea of how this will affect a war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Multipolarity and the stabilisation of the collective West

The inevitable emergence of multipolarity as the new world order will have important consequences for the region and for Israel, because multipolarity means balancing the superiority of the collective West, primarily in the military sphere, but also in the economic and technological spheres, the first signs of which we are already seeing. Particularly at a time when the United States is engaged in a power struggle with Russia on the one hand and China on the other, its aid and support for Israel may not be as extensive as it is during election periods. In fact, as some Jewish organisations have noted, issues such as the rapid change in the profile of the American electorate and the focus of voters on the economy, which is not doing well, may have a serious impact on Israeli-American relations in the near future.

It may not be possible for Israel to continue its current policies of genocide, massacre, ethnic cleansing, war, etc. in the medium term if it is squeezed between the forces that define themselves as the Axis of Resistance, led by Hezbollah, on the one hand, and the Arab states that are waging a political/diplomatic struggle against the current Israeli government, which rejects a two-state solution, on the other. In short, Israel is moving rapidly towards its own demise.

There is no doubt that in order to reverse this process, a complete ceasefire in Gaza is needed, followed by serious and comprehensive steps towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. For example, if Israel had fully implemented the two-state model in the Oslo peace process, the Hamas issue would have remained an internal matter for the Palestinian state and the Palestinian political leadership. And Hezbollah and the other Axis of Resistance forces and Iran would have lost legitimacy, which is the most important element in the struggle against Israel. But the question is: can a forward-looking, visionary government in Israel, with the support of the people, initiate such a peace process? At the moment, unfortunately, we are going through a period in which hopes are very low.

Opinion

The UAE’s Bold Leap into the Global LLM Race

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Shamma Al Qutbah – Researcher at Trends Research & Advisory

Jointly released by Harici and Trends Research & Advisory

The UAE’s homegrown AI model, Falcon, is making waves across the global tech landscape, challenging industry giants like OpenAI’s ChatGPT and China’s DeepSeek. But Falcon isn’t just another competitor in the AI race; it’s a bold testament to the UAE’s ambition to lead the future of artificial intelligence with security, reliability, and innovation at its core.

First unveiled in March 2023, Falcon was developed in the heart of Abu Dhabi, within the cutting-edge labs of the city’s leading global scientific research center, known as the Technology Innovation Institute (TII), as one of the most advanced open-source large language models (LLMs) not bound by the limitations of others but one that proudly stands among the world’s greatest models.[1]

With a strategic goal and ambition, drawing on a highly skilled team of 25 computer scientists, researchers, and AI specialists from various parts of the world,[2] Falcon was designed to push the boundaries and propel the UAE to the forefront of global innovation.

Through long hours of rigorous development, relentless work, and dedicated research, these experts worked on turning the goal into reality. They trained the model on vast amounts of data, ensuring that it could speak not just in the language of algorithms but in the language of culture, diplomacy, and progress.[3]

With every line of code, parameter, and test, these experts combined their knowledge of machine learning, neural networks, and computational efficiency to craft something truly exceptional that would position the UAE as a leader in AI, not just a consumer of technology. By pushing the boundaries of what was thought feasible, they crafted Falcon to be smarter, quicker, and more adaptive than anything that came before.

Thankfully, their tireless efforts paid off.

When Falcon was first released, it was nothing short of groundbreaking. AI researchers, engineers, developers, and specialists worldwide were enthralled with Falcon the minute it was released.

With its sophisticated design and outstanding performance, Falcon not only entered the scene but also swiftly established itself as a significant contender, ascending to the forefront of Hugging Face’s Large language model leaderboard.[4] This benchmarking platform evaluates and ranks AI models based on their performance in natural language understanding, generation, and efficiency.

But beyond the technical mastery, what really sets Falcon apart from its peers in the realm of large language models (LLMs) attracting the attention of industry experts from San Francisco to Beijing? What makes it stand out in the ever-evolving landscape of AI? And why should the world pay attention to the UAE’s approach to AI development?

Well, what gives Falcon its distinct edge is pretty simple: it’s the revolutionary shift it represents in AI accessibility, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, along with the UAE’s unique vision and ambition behind it. At a time when cutting-edge AI models are becoming increasingly expensive and exclusive, the UAE set Falcon to take a different approach, one that is open, adaptable, and well-positioned to challenge the dominance of AI giants.

Perhaps the most dominant and outstanding feature of Falcon, which sets it apart from its competitors, is its open-source nature. While DeepSeek has been celebrated for its cost efficiency and ChatGPT for its advanced conversational abilities, Falcon came to prominence for its open-source framework, reflecting the UAE’s strategic intent to foster global collaboration while asserting its own technological leadership.

Unlike most advanced LLMs, which are locked behind corporate walls and accessible only to a select few, Falcon challenged the norm by making its capabilities accessible to all. This is because it’s rooted in the UAE’s belief that AI should be a shared asset that drives global innovation and progress rather than a privileged resource controlled by a few.

Yet, being an open-source model is not Falcon’s only strength. The model is also known for its cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Operating and training AI models can often be an expensive endeavor, with some models demanding large sums of money and massive computing resources. However, that is not the case with Falcon.

Consisting of just 680 million parameters, the model is designed to do more with less, exhibiting exceptional performance while employing less resources at a fraction of the cost.[5] This in fact not only makes Falcon more reasonably priced but also helps the UAE to uphold its commitment to accessible and sustainable AI.

The model’s distinctiveness does not end here. Falcon’s multilingual capabilities especially its strong focus on Arabic natural language processing stands as another outstanding feature. Unlike its peers in the realm of LLMs, Falcon was developed with a profound comprehension of Arabic, understanding and generating Arabic text in different dialects, with high accuracy, making it one of the few AI systems capable of really bridging cultures.[6]

But perhaps the most compelling reason the world should pay attention to Falcon is because of the UAE’s forward-thinking vision and ambition put behind it. The UAE’s advancement in AI has illustrated that success in this domain relies not just on financial assets or technical legacy but on vision, strategy, and inclusivity.

However, the question that lingers in the minds of many is how a nation renowned for its oil reserves carved out a new identity and emerged as a powerhouse in cutting-edge AI technology, let alone surpassing AI giants in performance.

The answer lies not in coincidence but in the UAE’s forward-thinking leadership. Unlike many rich-resource economies, the UAE leaders recognized early on that a country’s future and true power would not be built on oil alone but on innovation, knowledge, intellectual capital, and technological advancement.

They understood that to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving world, they had to invest in the industries of tomorrow, and AI was at the heart of this future and transformation. With this vision in mind the country took bold steps to position itself as a leader in the global AI landscape rather than just adopting AI technologies.

In 2017, it made history by becoming the world’s first country to establish a Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and appoint its first AI minister.[7] This move was not symbolic but deeply strategic, signaling that AI would be central to its long-term vision.

Shortly after, the country unveiled its national AI strategy for 2031, a comprehensive roadmap which it designed to integrate AI across key sectors from healthcare and education to security and economic development.[8] Within this strategy, the UAE ensured that AI governance was incorporated into the highest levels of decision-making, providing a cohesive and strategic approach to implementing AI, unlike other countries where policies on the matter surface from several departments.

To further position the UAE as a global leader in AI applications, turn the vision into reality, and ensure that the AI adoption was not just a policy on paper, the country created the role of Chief Executive Officer for Artificial Intelligence in the ministers and federal entities, an uncommon yet highly effective approach.[9] This meant AI wouldn’t just be talked about or confined to the private sector; it would be integrated into the government, actively shaping how government services and policies are designed.

In order to stay ahead and harness the AI’s transformative potential the country also formed the UAE Council for Artificial Intelligence (AI) where its mandate includes developing AI policy, encouraging research, and establishing collaborations among public and commercial entities as well as foreign organizations.[10]

Unlocking the full potential of AI is no easy feat. Though many nations depend on outside specialists, the UAE went in a different direction. Recognizing that genuine leadership needs a strong foundation of native talent, the UAE has made strategic investments in AI education and research, something even AI powerhouses like the U.S. and China often struggle with, relying heavily on imported talent.

In 2019, the country established the world’s first university dedicated to AI and named it after His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZUAI), aiming to drive the development of transformative AI technologies, empower the next generation of AI leaders and position the UAE as a global center for AI research and thought leadership.[11]

Complementing this vision is G42, a homegrown AI development holding company based in Abu Dhabi. In 2018, the UAE founded G42 as part of its vision to lead in AI and turn AI research into real-world applications in healthcare, energy, and national security.[12] This public-private collaboration gave the UAE an edge, allowing it to rapidly develop and deploy AI solutions at a pace unmatched by many global counterparts.

The UAE’s efforts to enforce its AI leadership did not stop here. Over the years, the country hosted global AI summits, like the AI Everything Summit and the Global AI Summit, turning these platforms into hubs for knowledge exchange, international collaboration, and shaping global discussions.[13] It seized the opportunity to lead the conversations on ethics, policy, and responsibility, positioning itself as a key player in setting the global AI agenda. While other countries hesitated, the UAE moved forward not with fear of the unknown but with the belief that the future belonged to those who dared to create it,

Hence, the UAE’s ascent in AI is no coincidence; it is the result of a strategic vision, bold investments, and an unwavering commitment to technological leadership. While many countries debated how to integrate AI, the UAE made it a reality.

Today, the country stands at the forefront of the AI revolution. It is one of the leading nations that saw the potential of AI early on and took the necessary steps to turn the ambition into reality, proving that with the right strategy, any nation, regardless of its past, can reinvent itself and lead in the industries of tomorrow.

[1] Ben Wodecki. “Inside Falcon: The UAE’s Open Source Model Challenging AI Giants.” Capacity Media. February 5, 2025. https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/2ednrsm6eglrmfzs429ds/long-reads/article-inside-falcon-the-uaes-open-source-model-challenging-ai-giants.

[2] Billy Perrigo. “The UAE Is on a Mission to Become an AI Power.” Time, March 22, 2024. https://time.com/6958369/artificial-intelligence-united-arab-emirates/.

[3] Saha, Rohit, Angeline Yasodhara, Mariia Ponomarenko, and Kyryl Truskovskyi. 2023. “The Practical Guide to LLMs: Falcon.” Medium. August 31, 2023. https://medium.com/georgian-impact-blog/the-practical-guide-to-llms-falcon-d2d43ecf6d2d.

[4] “Falcon 3: UAE’s Technology Innovation Institute Launches World’s Most Powerful Small AI Models That Can Also Be Run on Light Infrastructures, Including Laptops.” 2024. Technology Innovation Institute. December 17, 2024. https://www.tii.ae/news/falcon-3-uaes-technology-innovation-institute-launches-worlds-most-powerful-small-ai-models.

[5] “Falcon LLM vs. Other Language Models: A Comparative Analysis.” BotPenguin. May 14, 2024. https://botpenguin.com/blogs/falcon-llm-vs-other-language-models.

[6] Hasan, Suha. 2024. “The Middle East Scores Big in Building Arabic AI Models despite Challenges—What’s Next?” Fast Company Middle East. https://fastcompanyme.com. August 8, 2024. https://doi.org/10c3369/b9b7d4cb412ec452dc997a75f

[7] “How Is AI Regulated in the UAE? What Lawyers Need to Know – TR – Legal Insight MENA.” 2024. Thomson Reuters . June 13, 2024. https://insight.thomsonreuters.com/mena/legal/posts/how-is-ai-regulated-in-the-uae-what-lawyers-need-to-know

[8] “The U.A.E.’S Big Bet on Artificial Intelligence.” 2024. U.S. – U.A.E Business Council. https://usuaebusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SectorUpdate_AIReport_Web.pdf

[9] Emirates News Agency WAM. “UAE Cabinet Approves National Youth Agenda 2031; Introduces ‘Blue Residency’ for Sustainability Experts,” May 15, 2024. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/b35yptd-uae-cabinet-approves-national-youth-agenda-2031

[10] “Artificial Intelligence in Government Policies | the Official Portal of the UAE Government.” n.d. The United Arab Emirates’ Government Portal U.AE. https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/digital-uae/digital-technology/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-in-government-policies

[11] “Abu Dhabi Launches First Dedicated AI University (and Consultancy).” Consultancy-Me. October 18, 2019. https://www.consultancy-me.com/news/2413/abu-dhabi-launches-first-dedicated-ai-university-and-consultancy.

[12] Hart, Robert. 2024. “What to Know about G42—the Emirati AI Giant That Just Got a $1.5 Billion Investment from Microsoft.” Forbes, April 16, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2024/04/16/what-to-know-about-g42-the-emirati-ai-giant-that-just-got-a-15-billion-investment-from-microsoft/.

[13] “Abu Dhabi to Host Ai Everything Global 2026.” 2025. The Emirates News Agency WAM. February 4, 2025. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi17ems-abu-dhabi-host-everything-global-2026.

“Abu Dhabi to Host Ai Everything Global 2026”. The Emirates News Agency WAM. February 4, 2025. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi17ems-abu-dhabi-host-everything-global-2026

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The U.S. ultimately betrays Ukraine as its intentions are laid bare

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On April 23, while visiting India, U.S. Vice President Vance declared to the media that Washington had made a “very clear proposal” to Russia and Ukraine to reach a peace agreement, and threatened that “the time has come for either both sides to agree or for the U.S. to withdraw from mediation.”

This so-called “peace plan” actually presupposes that Ukraine would cede large swathes of territory and abandon joining NATO. It can be regarded as a mediation plan resulting in Ukraine suffering heavy failures and losses, and Russia achieving its objectives, ultimately proving that the U.S., with its intentions laid bare, has brazenly and historically betrayed Ukraine and its European partners.

According to reports, Vance emphasized that both Russia and Ukraine must make territorial concessions, giving up parts of the territories they currently control. Although the final borders might not be drawn exactly along the current battle lines, both sides need to lay down their arms, freeze the conflict, and turn to building a better Russia and Ukraine to stop the killing.

The U.S. official in charge of security affairs also expressed optimism about the negotiations, believing that all parties have so far been negotiating sincerely.

Later that evening, following Vance’s “either-or” stance, U.S. President Trump once again publicly slammed Ukrainian President Zelensky’s statements about refusing to give up Crimea, accusing him of fueling the fire and making negotiations more difficult.
Trump warned that Zelensky’s rejection of American terms “would only prolong the killing.”

Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump complained: “Zelensky can have peace, or he can fight another three years and lose the entire country. We are very close to reaching an agreement, but this man, who has no cards in his hand, must now draw a conclusion.”

White House spokesperson Leavitt also chimed in, saying Trump was “frustrated and running out of patience… President Zelensky seems to be going in the wrong direction.”

According to a scoop from Axios News Network on the 22nd, last week the U.S. submitted to Ukrainian officials in Paris a “peace plan” that was only one page long, emphasizing that it was the Trump administration’s “final proposal” to turn the Russia-Ukraine war into peace.

Observers believe that if this proposal is implemented, it would mean a complete victory for Russia’s “special military operation” and permanently exclude Ukraine from NATO; Ukraine would lose about 20% of its territory, Europe’s investments in Ukraine over the past three years would be utterly lost, and the U.S. would profit from it.

Reportedly, this “ultimate” mediation proposal was drafted after U.S. Middle East Envoy Whitcoff held about a four-hour meeting with Russian President Putin last week, highlighting that the U.S. had fully conceded to Russia’s demands.
In other words, this hasty end to the Russia-Ukraine war is little more than a unilateral Russian ceasefire agreement written in English.

According to the plan, Russia emerges as the biggest winner of the Russia-Ukraine war:

  • The U.S. would “legally” recognize Russia’s control of Crimea;
  • It would “de facto” recognize Russia’s control over nearly all of Luhansk, parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia;
  • The U.S. would promise that Ukraine could join the EU but not NATO;
  • It would lift sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014;
  • Russia would strengthen cooperation with the U.S. in areas like energy and industry.

According to this plan, Ukraine becomes the biggest loser of the Russia-Ukraine war:

  • It will receive strong security guarantees through a temporary security mechanism composed of European countries;
  • It will regain a small part of Kharkiv region currently controlled by Russia;
  • The Dnipro River in the southern conflict zone will remain unobstructed;
  • Ukraine will receive compensation and aid needed for reconstruction;
  • The largest nuclear power plant in Europe — the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant — will belong to Ukraine, but it will be operated by the United States and will supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine;
  • Ukraine’s mineral resources will be developed based on agreements signed between the United States and Ukraine.

According to other American media reports, even though the U.S. plan “de facto” recognizes Russian control over most of the four eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, it does not require Russian troops to withdraw.

In addition, a “flexible force” would be established, or a “joint committee” composed of Russia, Ukraine, and a non-NATO country would be set up to supervise the ceasefire and urge implementation of the peace agreement.

The U.S. might participate but would only provide funding, not ground troops.

Russia has publicly opposed the appearance of any NATO troops on Ukrainian soil.

On April 21, Trump revealed that this “peace plan” would be announced within three days. The New York Times reported on the 18th, citing a U.S. official, that Ukraine seemed “willing to give up 20% of its territory,” provided that such territorial concessions are only a “factual acknowledgment” of Russian control, not a permanent “legal recognition.”

A “factual acknowledgment” simply means objectively accepting the reality that Ukraine has lost parts of its territory, while “legal recognition” would signify Ukraine permanently giving up the right to reclaim it.

The one-page proposal exposed by U.S. media and the latest statements from Vance and Trump all indicate that the U.S. is determined to sacrifice Ukraine’s interests to please Russia, while profiting from the situation — this mediation proposal is already a foregone conclusion.

On April 21, Putin told Russian state television that although military operations had resumed after Easter, Russia remained open to any “peace initiatives” and hoped Ukraine would adopt the same position.

If this plan was finalized after U.S.-Russia consultations, Putin has no fundamental reason to oppose it, because it basically fulfills all of Russia’s demands for launching military operations against Ukraine:

  • Seizing large parts of southeastern Ukraine, including Crimea, and
  • Obtaining a Western commitment not to admit Ukraine into NATO.

The only difference is that Russia may eventually give up part of the territories within the “four regions incorporated into Russia.”

Although Ukraine once invaded Russia’s Kursk region and controlled part of it, after a marathon war of attrition, the Russian army has now recaptured 99.5% of the lost territory.

With just about 30 square kilometers remaining, Russia will soon focus on negotiating to secure 20% of Ukraine’s land. However, no matter what, victory belongs to Russia, while defeat falls to Ukraine and its European partners who firmly supported continuing the war.

On September 23, 2022 — seven months after Russian troops invaded Ukraine and controlled large parts of southeastern Ukraine — Russia organized a four-day “referendum” in the occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.

All four regions voted with over 90% support to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, covering an area of 90,000 square kilometers, about 15% of Ukraine’s territory, roughly the size of Portugal and Jordan combined.

Three days later, Putin signed treaties with the leaders of the four regions to formalize their incorporation into Russia.

On October 4, the Federation Council of Russia unanimously approved the treaties, and the legal documents for accepting the four regions into Russia as federal subjects were fully ratified.

On the same day, Putin signed orders completing all legal procedures for the regions to join Russia, and the process immediately came into effect.

The vast majority of sovereign states, including Russia’s friendly countries, refused to openly accept Russia’s illegal annexation of the aforementioned Ukrainian territories.

Subsequently, with NATO informally intervening directly in the war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict evolved into a battle of offense and defense with mutual advances and retreats, a tug-of-war, and a war of attrition.

Ultimately, the balance of the war gradually tilted in favor of Russia, leading to Russia effectively controlling most of the territories of the four aforementioned regions.

On the 22nd, Zelensky made it clear regarding the U.S. peace plan that Ukraine would not recognize Russia’s occupation of Crimea.

After a ceasefire, Ukraine is willing to sit at the negotiation table “in any form,” but it will never recognize the occupied territories as belonging to Russia.

According to reports, due to Ukraine’s firm stance, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio boycotted the originally scheduled U.S.-U.K.-etc. ministerial meeting on Ukraine to be held in London on the 23rd, forcing the meeting to be postponed and downgraded to a lower-level meeting.

The media reported that Russia is willing to relinquish part of the Ukrainian territory it controls in exchange for U.S. recognition of its control over Crimea.

Analysts believe that the Trump administration is eager to extricate itself from the quagmire of the Russia-Ukraine war and rapidly restore U.S.-Russia relations.

Therefore, it exerted strong pressure and even open coercion on the Ukrainian government, even accusing Zelensky of having lost the legitimacy of the presidency, demanding that Ukraine quickly hold new presidential elections to force Zelensky to accept this humiliating peace agreement or to replace him through elections so that the newly elected president could sign the document.

Although Ukraine and other European countries generally oppose the Trump administration’s imposed peace plan and are trying to persuade it to change its position, the Trump administration’s bullying style, arrogance, and the adverse prospect of the U.S. abandoning the Russia-Ukraine conflict have placed Ukraine and its European partners in a highly passive situation.

While the Trump administration’s peace plan will undoubtedly experience twists and turns from proposal to implementation, the three-year-long Russia-Ukraine war, regardless of the exact outcome, will result — due to the U.S., this “weak teammate,” betraying and undercutting its allies — in Russia ultimately becoming the big winner.

The only suspense is how much Russia wins and how soon.

The United States, as the instigator of the Ukraine crisis, from long manipulating and deceiving Russia, which wholeheartedly sought to embrace the West, to encouraging NATO’s continuous eastward expansion and intensifying Russia-Europe tensions, to finally at the last moment making it clear it would not militarily intervene against Russia’s deployment of forces, enticed or incited Russia to decisively launch a “special military operation,” dragging both sides into a “European version of the Afghan war” and eroding mutual trust.

Eventually, it abandoned Ukraine and its European partners.

The U.S., as the leader of the West and NATO, has shattered its political integrity, allowing the East, West, and even the entire world to witness the selfishness, ruthlessness, and injustice of American politicians.

This latest reality also reconfirms the new iron rule: the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy, and undependable.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Hamas between the necessities of transformation and the requirements of national partnership

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Hamas stands at a pivotal juncture in Palestinian history—one that goes beyond the devastation of aggression and genocidal war on Gaza. This moment raises existential questions about continuity, Hamas’s role within the Palestinian national landscape, and the redefinition of national action amid significant shifts in regional and international conflict dynamics.

The al-Aqsa Flood operation delivered a profound shock to Israeli consciousness. This shock was exploited by the extreme Zionist right to justify a zero-sum war targeting the entire Palestinian population. At the same time, it laid bare the deep structural and political challenges threatening the Palestinian national project. These include a deepening political division that now transcends elite circles and touches the core of Palestinian society—fueled by the comprehensive nature of the war on Gaza and the geopolitical constraints that weigh heavily on grassroots movements.

Compounding this crisis is the institutional deterioration affecting Palestinian factions—possibly even preceding the weakening of official Palestinian institutions. This has led to the absence of a collective political vision capable of forging a unified national strategy that integrates both political efforts and resistance, thereby bridging the harmful divide between legitimacy and armed struggle.

The current events can no longer be framed simply as a war to uproot Hamas or a campaign to degrade its military capacity. The limitations of military means in shifting the broader conflict dynamics or in restraining Israeli aggression have become clear. These means have proven ineffective in halting Israeli efforts to force a decisive resolution that threatens to erase the Palestinian people and their cause.

Today, the war is increasingly used as a pretext to prolong hostilities and to implement Israeli plans to fragment Palestinian geography, dissolve demographic unity, and undermine national identity. This is especially evident in the manipulation of negotiations surrounding the prisoner exchange file, which has exposed Israel’s deceptive tactics.

Moreover, it is no longer acceptable to view this moment as “just another chapter” in a long-standing struggle. The immense human and political costs borne by the Palestinian people, combined with the absence of any clear end to the war, make this an unprecedented and defining moment. It demands a comprehensive national reassessment of all available strategies and tools.

From solo resistance to comprehensive national partnership

Experience has shown that while resistance is both legitimate and necessary, it cannot replace a comprehensive national project. Nor can it be effectively carried out outside the framework of national partnership or through unilateral decision-making. This principle applies equally to political processes dominated by a single faction that excludes other national forces.

What is required is a unified approach—one that addresses the complexity of the conflict across cultural, regional, and international dimensions. This demands full national partnership in decision-making, with careful consideration of regional realities, international contexts, and a precise assessment of the balance of power and resources.

Given its significant influence on the ground and its popular support, Hamas must embrace a multi-level strategic transformation that includes:

1) Transition to collective leadership

Hamas must shift from an individualistic resistance model to collective leadership within a unified national framework. This would re-establish Palestinian politics on a foundation of integration and partnership. Hamas should commit to national legitimacy, align with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and contribute directly to policy formulation—either through its representation in the PLO’s Executive Committee or by supporting consensus-based figures in a transitional phase leading to democratic elections for the Palestinian National Council.

2) Political and organizational renewal

Hamas needs to reposition itself politically through a balanced foreign policy that enhances regional relationships based on constructive neutrality. This includes a commitment to Arab national security in service of the Palestinian cause and a clear rejection of external dependency.

3) Adoption of international law

International law should serve as the political reference point for advancing Palestinian national interests. This principle was clearly stated in Hamas’s 2017 political document, which endorsed an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. This represents the minimum consensus among Palestinians and identifies Israeli occupation as the fundamental obstacle to peace.

4) Transparency and accountability

Hamas must adopt a more transparent and participatory political approach and demonstrate readiness to take responsibility for any past misjudgments or unintended violations.

The continued depletion of Palestinian resilience in a prolonged, aimless struggle—with no political horizon in sight—risks weakening the Palestinian cause both regionally and globally. This diminishes opportunities for real national achievements, especially amid the growing danger of regional and international escalation and foreign efforts to shape Gaza’s future while sidelining Palestinian national decision-making.

This reality necessitates an expansion of resistance tools, strengthening Palestinian influence in regional and international arenas, enhancing institutional capacity, and diversifying resistance methods to include popular, legal, and diplomatic strategies. It also calls for internationalizing the issue of Gaza and maintaining political and media pressure.

At the same time, it is essential to activate political confrontation with the occupation through a comprehensive national approach that builds momentum, limits losses, and revitalizes the Palestinian national project at this critical juncture.

Options and pathways for exiting the war

In light of these challenges, four interconnected pathways can help Hamas—and the broader Palestinian national movement—navigate a path out of the current war and toward a renewed national horizon:

1) Initiate an inclusive, unconditional national dialogue

All national and Islamic forces must be brought together in a dialogue that transcends factional divides. The goal is to build a new national consensus, which includes:

— Developing an immediate, unified Palestinian plan to end the unilateral war.

— Addressing the challenges of “the day after” with cohesive national responses.

— Considering initiatives such as Beijing’s proposed emergency technocratic government or the societal support committee proposals discussed in Cairo.

— Preceding these steps with a declaration from Hamas withdrawing from Gaza’s administrative responsibilities.

— Agreeing on the nature and mechanisms of the Palestinian national project, explicitly defining the role of armed resistance as supportive—an integral part, but not a political alternative.

2) Empower the PLO as the sole negotiating body

The PLO should be reaffirmed as the sole legitimate and comprehensive political framework for Palestinians. It must lead negotiations with a clear vision that demands:

— An immediate end to the war.

— Lifting the blockade on Gaza.

—A permanent ceasefire.

— International guarantees for reconstruction.

—A genuine political process based on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.

3) Engage regional and international efforts

Hamas and the broader Palestinian leadership should engage with regional and international efforts aimed at halting the war. These include:

— Rejection of displacement plans proposed under the Trump administration.

— Active participation in the Egyptian-Arab initiative.

— Alignment with Saudi-led international coalitions supporting the two-state solution.

— Engagement with the Arab-Islamic summit’s seven-member committee to ensure Palestinians have a unified, balanced, and internationally supported negotiating position.

Ultimately, this moment allows no room for hesitation or political maneuvering. It either becomes a turning point for a meaningful transformation of the Palestinian national project—rebuilt from the wounded heart of Gaza—or it will perpetuate the flawed structures that have led to the current impasse.

Given its field strength and political capacity, Hamas now faces a historic opportunity to redefine its role—not just as a resistance group, but as a vital part of a collective national leadership committed to achieving the historical and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

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