Officials within the Likud party and Benjamin Netanyahu’s inner circle are analysing a scenario in which the formation of a narrow coalition proves impossible and the political system enters a deadlock.

According to a report in The Jerusalem Post, one option being discussed by Likud officials in such a scenario is a broad coalition government featuring a rotation of the premiership between Netanyahu and Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot.

At this stage, the primary question occupying analysts is what Netanyahu could offer to persuade Eisenkot to establish a rotation government with him, and how he could convince him that the rotation agreement would be honoured this time, following the precedent set during the Netanyahu-Benny Gantz government.

Among the possibilities raised in Likud’s closed-door discussions is nominating Netanyahu for the presidency in the future.

This would create both an agreed political exit route for Netanyahu and a political guarantee that the premiership would ultimately pass to Eisenkot.

At this stage, these discussions represent strategic assessments and scenario analyses surrounding Netanyahu’s “broad coalition” campaign ahead of the elections.

Likud officials believe that Netanyahu could conclude the election without reaching 61 seats, but they also rely on the likelihood that the opposition bloc will lack sufficient seats to form a government.

If neither side can form a coalition, officials anticipate that pressure to avert a new election could bring the possibility of a unity government back to the agenda.

Eisenkot is viewed as one of the primary potential partners for such a move, provided he enters the election at the head of a major force within the anti-Netanyahu bloc.

According to the scenario discussed in Likud, one potential arrangement would involve Netanyahu assuming the premiership first under the rotation framework and subsequently handing the post over to Eisenkot.

However, the most obvious obstacle to such a step is the crisis of confidence caused by the rotation government established with Gantz in 2020.

Eisenkot would require a mechanism ensuring that he does not find himself in the identical position Gantz occupied at that time: namely, becoming a partner in a rotation government agreement that was never implemented.

In this context, the possibility of the presidency is also raised in the discussions. Under this scenario, the date of the leadership handover could be tied to Netanyahu moving to the President’s Residence following the conclusion of Isaac Herzog’s term in office.

Those raising this possibility believe such a step could offer Netanyahu an agreed political destination after the end of his term as prime minister, whilst simultaneously providing Eisenkot with greater confidence that the rotation will take place.

Even within Likud, officials emphasise that the presidency scenario remains far from a finalised plan, with some describing it as a remote possibility.

Nevertheless, the matter is already being discussed as part of efforts to find a mechanism capable of overcoming the trust deficit.

According to an assessment voiced within Likud, if the presidency scenario arises in the future, Netanyahu’s criminal trial would need to be concluded.

From a legal perspective, the argument in these discussions is that no automatic legal barrier prevents an individual standing trial from running for the presidency.

The real complexity would lie in the public and political dimensions.

Proponents of this scenario believe that it would also be possible to present such a step to the public as part of a broader arrangement that would end Netanyahu’s premiership and enable the formation of a stable government.

This discussion also explains the line Netanyahu has advocated in recent weeks regarding the necessity of establishing a “broad government”.

Likud officials assess that Netanyahu understands a 61-seat right-wing government is not a guaranteed outcome, and therefore believes it is important to prepare the public and political ground in advance for the possibility of incorporating figures from the opposition camp into the government after the elections.

If the results show that neither bloc holds a majority, Netanyahu could argue that voters did not deliver a decisive victory to either side, and that under these conditions there is no justification for excluding a large segment of the public from the government.

However, the Gantz precedent will remain at the heart of all future discussions. Likud officials are aware that Netanyahu’s political promise alone will not suffice.

For this reason, alongside the presidency concept, more practical mechanisms are being examined in political discussions: commitments regarding the budget and no-confidence votes, legal mechanisms designed to make breaching the agreement difficult, and even the possibility of depositing a letter of resignation with a trustee that would take effect should Netanyahu fail to fulfil his commitments.

Likud officials also point to a fundamental difference between such a scenario and the Netanyahu-Gantz government.

If election results do not provide Netanyahu with an independent majority and he must rely on Eisenkot to keep the government afloat, this dependency would itself become another component of the guarantee system.

Unlike a situation where the partnership could be dissolved and an alternative coalition formed, a breach of the agreement in this scenario could lead to the collapse of the entire government. The number of seats Likud secures will also prove decisive.

In light of current expectations, Likud officials estimate that winning more than 25 to 26 seats would be presented as a success, allowing Netanyahu to argue that he remains the leader of a major political camp that cannot be ignored when forming a government.

Conversely, a significantly weaker result would undermine his ability to demand the first turn in the rotation and shift the balance of power in future negotiations.

The US administration is beginning to send personnel back to several diplomatic missions in the Middle East that had been evacuated or downsized due to tensions with Iran.

Sources speaking to Reuters stated that posts in Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Baghdad in Iraq are among the locations where staff will return.

They added that family members will also be permitted to return to US missions in Riyadh.

The move indicates that Washington views the near-term risk of escalation in the conflict with Iran as lower.

However, some embassies will initially operate below full capacity.

Sources stated that certain embassies will initially operate without exceeding 85% of their authorised staffing levels.

One source said the return of some personnel is expected to begin this week.

Following the start of joint US-Israeli strikes against Iran on 28 February, the US had withdrawn personnel from its embassies across the Middle East.

Some embassies in Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were targeted by Iranian retaliatory actions, leading to the temporary closure of those embassies.

Since then, although the US naval blockade on Iranian ports remains in place, the Strait of Hormuz—vital for oil and commodities shipping—remains closed, and diplomatic efforts to end the war have stalled, intense fighting has diminished.

A US State Department spokesperson stated in an emailed response to Reuters that the department continuously reviews the security posture of its diplomatic missions worldwide.

“Based on our latest assessment, we are adjusting our staffing posture at select posts in the Middle East to enable us to continue advancing US foreign policy objectives while maintaining the safety and security of our personnel,” the spokesperson said.

The New York Times previously reported, citing an internal document, that diplomats were returning and emergency measures were being eased, noting that embassies in Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar were also expected to restore staffing levels.

The newspaper added that US embassies in Israel, Jordan, and Oman will ultimately return to full staffing levels, while missions in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Lebanon will initially be capped at 85% of their personnel levels.

Missions in Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain will have their staffing levels capped at 75%.

US President Donald Trump has sent a draft civil nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress.

However, a White House official speaking to Reuters emphasised that the pact would take effect only if the kingdom normalises relations with Israel.

The agreement, reached in July to allow US companies to export civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, was sent to Congress on Monday, according to the US official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

It remains unclear how Trump expects submitting the nuclear deal to Congress to advance his objectives.

Congress has 90 continuous session days to review the agreement.

“The president’s position has not changed that the agreement will only move forward if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords,” the US official said in an emailed statement.

Signed in 2020 and 2021, those accords were concluded between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

A few days after agreeing to the Saudi nuclear pact in July, Trump, who had worked on a similar deal during his first presidential term, set the normalisation of ties as a condition for the agreement to enter into force.

Former president Joe Biden had also pushed for a nuclear deal and sought to link it to the accords in question.

Diplomats believed Riyadh was close to normalising relations with Israel in 2023, but the war Israel launched against Gaza in October 2023 altered the situation.

Saudi Arabia demands an “irreversible pathway” to a Palestinian state before recognising Israel.

The 30-year nuclear pact provides for the construction of AP1000 reactors, a project worth tens of billions of dollars that would benefit Westinghouse, co-owned by Canada-based Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management.

According to two congressional sources, the agreement was sent to congressional leaders and is expected to be presented to committees on Wednesday.

If Congress does not object to the agreement within 90 session days, it will take effect.

Should Congress reject the agreement, Trump could veto that decision, which would require a two-thirds majority in Congress to override.

Some Democratic members of Congress and non-proliferation advocates have criticised the nuclear agreement for failing to bar Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.

Those two activities represent two potential pathways to producing nuclear weapons. The UAE, by contrast, accepted such measures, known as the “gold standard”, in its 2009 civil nuclear agreement with Washington.

The Trump administration maintains that the agreement contains the non-proliferation measures required by law.

Henry Sokolski, head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said Trump’s move in initiating the process created the possibility that Congress might allow the deal to proceed without conditions on normalisation and non-proliferation.

“If you are serious about barring enrichment and recognising Israel, this situation is hardly ideal,” Sokolski said.