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The limits of US power and the stance of Russia and China

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Following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the circulation of the Greater Middle East Project (later renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative) in the 2000s, the United States never ceased to recite the following concepts: Preemptive strike. Controlled instability. Hybrid warfare. Asymmetric warfare. Liberating occupation. Humanitarian imperialism…

In this manner, US imperialism fabricated pretexts to invade nations it could not dismantle through psychological warfare, perception management, social engineering, clandestine warfare tactics, or fifth-column activities. It listed excuses. It claimed that its attacks and occupations were undertaken for the welfare of that country’s people. It asserted that it was delivering human rights, democracy, and freedom to the nations it occupied. While invading its target countries, it naturally had another justification: The global war on terror. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US utilized the conjuncture effectively and efficiently for its own ends. The concrete examples of this were the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.

The US no longer cites human rights, democracy, or freedom when it attacks and occupies. US President Trump feels no need to conceal imperialist barbarism, piracy, banditry, or arrogance. He explicitly states that he has set his sights on the oil. He underscores that he does not care about international law. Indeed, this is what he did in Venezuela. Therefore, one must never forget the phrase widely used in the US: “It is the oil, stupid.”

Soft power vs. hard power

The days when the US deployed its soft power (culture, media, science, academia, art, sports, education, music, cinema, fashion, lifestyle, etc.) to establish hegemony, intending primarily to manufacture consent in the target country and desiring to maintain US leadership in this manner, are long gone. There are several reasons for this.

First, there is an erosion in the US capability to manufacture consent and in its soft power elements, just as there is in its economic and political power. Second, the elements and instruments of soft power are no longer as alluring; they do not yield the same premium as before. Third, a president who places no importance on soft power sits in the White House.

Furthermore, just as the US is not the US of old, the world is not the world of old. Anti-Americanism is very high globally. No one believes the lie of the “global struggle against terror” on the US tongue, nor its promises of democracy and freedom. The days of Pax Americana are behind us. The approach that the rulers of the US attempted to ground—both politically and ideologically, as well as morally and religiously—in the maxim “what is good for the US is good for the world” had already collapsed years ago. This is one of the reasons why Trump, who said during his presidential campaign that he would end wars, withdraw troops from the Middle East, and not send US soldiers to other countries, subsequently attacked Venezuela and committed piracy.

Moreover, Trump is considering the midterm elections in 2026. He is aware of the polarization within US society, the weakening domestic front, the chasm between wealth and destitution, the country’s massive external debt, and the high foreign trade deficit.

The US certainly faces other impasses. For instance, it failed to drive a wedge between China and Russia. For instance, it could not prevent the shift away from the US dollar in foreign trade. It could not stop many countries from trading in their national currencies. For instance, it did not achieve the results it expected from the trade wars it initiated against China.

The two-and-a-half war strategy is left behind

From the US perspective, the two-and-a-half war theory (fighting and occupying in two countries while maintaining a smaller-scale military force in a third, mobilizing other elements to change the regime) has been left behind. In its chosen target regions, it is increasingly mobilizing regional allies, terrorist organizations, and non-state actors.

The US desires to establish an order in the Middle East under the tutelage of Israel. It is pushing Israel to the forefront more than ever before. In Palestine and Lebanon, Israel has largely achieved its desires through genocides. In Syria, Israel is currently far more effective than in the past. Damascus has also accepted the occupation of the Golan Heights. Israel enters Syrian territory, plants flags, interferes in the country’s internal affairs, and bombs military facilities. Israel’s influence over the Barzanis in northern Iraq is also known. Since Iran is a far tougher nut to crack than Syria, the US actively supports Israel regarding Iran as well. It encourages and instigates opposition movements and street demonstrations. The US is satisfied with the Kurdish autonomous administration and the Barzani leadership in northern Iraq. Furthermore, by supporting the PKK–PYD–YPG–SDF terrorist organization, the US exerts pressure on Turkey and Syria.

Against China, which it views as its primary adversary, the US is pushing regional countries, large and small, from Japan to Australia, to the front lines in order to encircle the country from its immediate periphery. It establishes alliances for this purpose. For instance; QUAD (US, Japan, India, Australia) and AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, US) are such alliances. The US is organizing what are essentially “mini-NATOs,” sister alliances to NATO.

Countries of the Global South, those trying to distance themselves from the US in recent years and turning to develop relations with China and Russia, are naturally wary of US banditry. Medium and small-scale states expect, quite understandably from their perspective, China and Russia to be more active against the US. This expectation was not met in Libya or Syria. Nor was it met in Venezuela. In the event that the US attacks Iran once again, the probability of this expectation being met in Iran is also very low.

Confessions in the US strategy document

The national security strategy document released by the US in December 2025 contained significant confessions. In essence, it stated that it is no longer the sole great power in the world, that there are other great powers, though it claimed to be the greatest. It indicated that it would focus on the American continent and implement the Monroe Doctrine (known by the discourse “America for Americans”). It emphasized that it did not care about the European Union at all, and indeed, did not like it. It admitted that it could not be effective everywhere in the world simultaneously. It expressed that because it could not risk competition with China in all corners of the world, from Central Asia to Africa, from the Middle East to Latin America, it would focus on the Western Hemisphere, the New World, its own continent. On January 3, 2026, by attacking Venezuela and kidnapping Maduro and his wife, Trump implemented—in his own words—the “Donroe Doctrine” through banditry, piracy, barbarism, and brigandage.

The fact that Venezuela, the country with the richest oil reserves in the world, sold 80 percent of its produced oil to China had long drawn the ire of the US. The US both usurped Venezuela’s oil and precious metals and exerted pressure on a significant oil supplier of its greatest rival, China. It gained a measure of control over China’s oil imports. Indeed, following his act of piracy, Trump essentially said, “China shouldn’t worry, oil sales to them will continue.”

Will World War III break out?

Under these conditions, the following questions come to the minds of many: Will the US and China fight? Will World War III break out?

Even if there is a very sharp, multidimensional, and comprehensive competition between the US and China, the two countries will not enter into a direct hot conflict. Moreover, there are several reasons for them not to do so.

First, the two countries possess very tight cooperation in commercial and economic terms. There is a large volume of trade between them. There are mutual investments. Second, both countries know that there would be no winner in such a war and that it would be very debilitating for the conflicting parties. Third, both countries possess nuclear weapons, which greatly reduces the probability of direct conflict.

Moreover, proxy wars are already underway between the US and China. There is technological competition, economic competition, scientific competition, and commercial competition. There is competition for influence in different countries. There is competition in cyberspace, in the virtual realm, in patent numbers, in software, in information technologies, and in the field of artificial intelligence—and sharply so.

The Cold War era and today

Another impasse for the US is this: It is waging a struggle against China that is more complex, more dimensional, and more arduous than the one it waged against the USSR during the Cold War. The USSR dissolved in 1991 without firing a single bullet. The Warsaw Pact collapsed the same year. The US, NATO, and capitalism declared victory. Today, China is different. It has drawn the necessary lessons from the USSR experience. It is challenging the US not ideologically, but primarily economically, technologically, and industrially.

Let us refresh our memories while comparing the competition of today with that of the Cold War era.

First, in the Cold War, ideologies, alliances, and the leading countries of those alliances were distinct. The world and Europe were divided accordingly. The Berlin Wall was the symbol of this division. Today, there are no ideological camp-formations in the world. Alliance relations are different. There are contradictions within alliances. There is fluidity between alliances. There are different tensions between alliances. Explaining the world is not as simple or easy as it was during the Cold War years. Neither politically, ideologically, nor geographically can a distinction similar to that of the Cold War era be made today.

Second, from the onset of the Cold War, the US was very powerful. In the years following World War II, it accounted for half of the world’s total production. In the 1960s, it produced 40 percent of global output. Today, its share in the world economy has fallen below 25 percent, to 22 percent. In calculations based on purchasing power parity, China has become the world’s largest economy. In many sectors, in many areas of production, and in investments made in many regions, the EU has fallen behind China. The US knows this. This is one of the reasons for its anger. Because it cannot prevent it.

Third, alongside Cold War institutions like NATO, the US has very strong influence in organizations like the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF. Today, the EU’s influence is very weak. Against structures like the IMF and the World Bank, alternative institutions led by China have emerged. Furthermore, structures like the SCO and BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative, are important. All of these are structures that have been established, developed, and are developing despite the US.

Fourth, during the Cold War, the US had capitalized on the tension between the USSR and China, particularly between 1960 and 1989. Today, however, Russia and China relations are strong. Despite all its desires, the US failed to drive a wedge between the two countries. The US also failed to bring India into line to the extent it desired against China. Even if India experiences significant problems with China, it is too large a country to completely follow in the US’s wake.

Fifth, it appears that the US-China competition will last longer than the Cold War.

Sixth, while saying “America First” and promising to make the US great again, US President Trump prioritizes hard power and economic-political pressures over the construction of hegemony based on soft power and the manufacturing of consent. He views investment in soft power as a waste of money and time. This preference draws a reaction in Europe. In the coming period, the problems Europe experiences with the US may become more pronounced. If the US attempts to acquire Greenland—the territory of Denmark, a member of NATO and the EU—by some means, the contradiction between the US and Europe will increase further.

In conclusion, in a period where the world is transitioning to a multipolar order and the US is prioritizing its own continent, tension will continue to escalate. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, Iran, and Greenland are in the US crosshairs. Reactions against US aggression will also rise in different countries and in different dimensions. Interest in regional alliances will increase.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues

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BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.

Allan Wilson, Journalist

Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.

“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”

Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.

For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.

The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.

“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.

A statue, a warning

The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.

The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.

For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”

Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.

The shrinking window

Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.

This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.

Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.

A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.

The international dimension

The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”

Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.

For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.

“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.

This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.

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