Opinion
The limits of US power and the stance of Russia and China
Following the conclusion of the Cold War in 1991 and the circulation of the Greater Middle East Project (later renamed the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative) in the 2000s, the United States never ceased to recite the following concepts: Preemptive strike. Controlled instability. Hybrid warfare. Asymmetric warfare. Liberating occupation. Humanitarian imperialism…
In this manner, US imperialism fabricated pretexts to invade nations it could not dismantle through psychological warfare, perception management, social engineering, clandestine warfare tactics, or fifth-column activities. It listed excuses. It claimed that its attacks and occupations were undertaken for the welfare of that country’s people. It asserted that it was delivering human rights, democracy, and freedom to the nations it occupied. While invading its target countries, it naturally had another justification: The global war on terror. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the US utilized the conjuncture effectively and efficiently for its own ends. The concrete examples of this were the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003.
The US no longer cites human rights, democracy, or freedom when it attacks and occupies. US President Trump feels no need to conceal imperialist barbarism, piracy, banditry, or arrogance. He explicitly states that he has set his sights on the oil. He underscores that he does not care about international law. Indeed, this is what he did in Venezuela. Therefore, one must never forget the phrase widely used in the US: “It is the oil, stupid.”
Soft power vs. hard power
The days when the US deployed its soft power (culture, media, science, academia, art, sports, education, music, cinema, fashion, lifestyle, etc.) to establish hegemony, intending primarily to manufacture consent in the target country and desiring to maintain US leadership in this manner, are long gone. There are several reasons for this.
First, there is an erosion in the US capability to manufacture consent and in its soft power elements, just as there is in its economic and political power. Second, the elements and instruments of soft power are no longer as alluring; they do not yield the same premium as before. Third, a president who places no importance on soft power sits in the White House.
Furthermore, just as the US is not the US of old, the world is not the world of old. Anti-Americanism is very high globally. No one believes the lie of the “global struggle against terror” on the US tongue, nor its promises of democracy and freedom. The days of Pax Americana are behind us. The approach that the rulers of the US attempted to ground—both politically and ideologically, as well as morally and religiously—in the maxim “what is good for the US is good for the world” had already collapsed years ago. This is one of the reasons why Trump, who said during his presidential campaign that he would end wars, withdraw troops from the Middle East, and not send US soldiers to other countries, subsequently attacked Venezuela and committed piracy.
Moreover, Trump is considering the midterm elections in 2026. He is aware of the polarization within US society, the weakening domestic front, the chasm between wealth and destitution, the country’s massive external debt, and the high foreign trade deficit.
The US certainly faces other impasses. For instance, it failed to drive a wedge between China and Russia. For instance, it could not prevent the shift away from the US dollar in foreign trade. It could not stop many countries from trading in their national currencies. For instance, it did not achieve the results it expected from the trade wars it initiated against China.
The two-and-a-half war strategy is left behind
From the US perspective, the two-and-a-half war theory (fighting and occupying in two countries while maintaining a smaller-scale military force in a third, mobilizing other elements to change the regime) has been left behind. In its chosen target regions, it is increasingly mobilizing regional allies, terrorist organizations, and non-state actors.
The US desires to establish an order in the Middle East under the tutelage of Israel. It is pushing Israel to the forefront more than ever before. In Palestine and Lebanon, Israel has largely achieved its desires through genocides. In Syria, Israel is currently far more effective than in the past. Damascus has also accepted the occupation of the Golan Heights. Israel enters Syrian territory, plants flags, interferes in the country’s internal affairs, and bombs military facilities. Israel’s influence over the Barzanis in northern Iraq is also known. Since Iran is a far tougher nut to crack than Syria, the US actively supports Israel regarding Iran as well. It encourages and instigates opposition movements and street demonstrations. The US is satisfied with the Kurdish autonomous administration and the Barzani leadership in northern Iraq. Furthermore, by supporting the PKK–PYD–YPG–SDF terrorist organization, the US exerts pressure on Turkey and Syria.
Against China, which it views as its primary adversary, the US is pushing regional countries, large and small, from Japan to Australia, to the front lines in order to encircle the country from its immediate periphery. It establishes alliances for this purpose. For instance; QUAD (US, Japan, India, Australia) and AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, US) are such alliances. The US is organizing what are essentially “mini-NATOs,” sister alliances to NATO.
Countries of the Global South, those trying to distance themselves from the US in recent years and turning to develop relations with China and Russia, are naturally wary of US banditry. Medium and small-scale states expect, quite understandably from their perspective, China and Russia to be more active against the US. This expectation was not met in Libya or Syria. Nor was it met in Venezuela. In the event that the US attacks Iran once again, the probability of this expectation being met in Iran is also very low.
Confessions in the US strategy document
The national security strategy document released by the US in December 2025 contained significant confessions. In essence, it stated that it is no longer the sole great power in the world, that there are other great powers, though it claimed to be the greatest. It indicated that it would focus on the American continent and implement the Monroe Doctrine (known by the discourse “America for Americans”). It emphasized that it did not care about the European Union at all, and indeed, did not like it. It admitted that it could not be effective everywhere in the world simultaneously. It expressed that because it could not risk competition with China in all corners of the world, from Central Asia to Africa, from the Middle East to Latin America, it would focus on the Western Hemisphere, the New World, its own continent. On January 3, 2026, by attacking Venezuela and kidnapping Maduro and his wife, Trump implemented—in his own words—the “Donroe Doctrine” through banditry, piracy, barbarism, and brigandage.
The fact that Venezuela, the country with the richest oil reserves in the world, sold 80 percent of its produced oil to China had long drawn the ire of the US. The US both usurped Venezuela’s oil and precious metals and exerted pressure on a significant oil supplier of its greatest rival, China. It gained a measure of control over China’s oil imports. Indeed, following his act of piracy, Trump essentially said, “China shouldn’t worry, oil sales to them will continue.”
Will World War III break out?
Under these conditions, the following questions come to the minds of many: Will the US and China fight? Will World War III break out?
Even if there is a very sharp, multidimensional, and comprehensive competition between the US and China, the two countries will not enter into a direct hot conflict. Moreover, there are several reasons for them not to do so.
First, the two countries possess very tight cooperation in commercial and economic terms. There is a large volume of trade between them. There are mutual investments. Second, both countries know that there would be no winner in such a war and that it would be very debilitating for the conflicting parties. Third, both countries possess nuclear weapons, which greatly reduces the probability of direct conflict.
Moreover, proxy wars are already underway between the US and China. There is technological competition, economic competition, scientific competition, and commercial competition. There is competition for influence in different countries. There is competition in cyberspace, in the virtual realm, in patent numbers, in software, in information technologies, and in the field of artificial intelligence—and sharply so.
The Cold War era and today
Another impasse for the US is this: It is waging a struggle against China that is more complex, more dimensional, and more arduous than the one it waged against the USSR during the Cold War. The USSR dissolved in 1991 without firing a single bullet. The Warsaw Pact collapsed the same year. The US, NATO, and capitalism declared victory. Today, China is different. It has drawn the necessary lessons from the USSR experience. It is challenging the US not ideologically, but primarily economically, technologically, and industrially.
Let us refresh our memories while comparing the competition of today with that of the Cold War era.
First, in the Cold War, ideologies, alliances, and the leading countries of those alliances were distinct. The world and Europe were divided accordingly. The Berlin Wall was the symbol of this division. Today, there are no ideological camp-formations in the world. Alliance relations are different. There are contradictions within alliances. There is fluidity between alliances. There are different tensions between alliances. Explaining the world is not as simple or easy as it was during the Cold War years. Neither politically, ideologically, nor geographically can a distinction similar to that of the Cold War era be made today.
Second, from the onset of the Cold War, the US was very powerful. In the years following World War II, it accounted for half of the world’s total production. In the 1960s, it produced 40 percent of global output. Today, its share in the world economy has fallen below 25 percent, to 22 percent. In calculations based on purchasing power parity, China has become the world’s largest economy. In many sectors, in many areas of production, and in investments made in many regions, the EU has fallen behind China. The US knows this. This is one of the reasons for its anger. Because it cannot prevent it.
Third, alongside Cold War institutions like NATO, the US has very strong influence in organizations like the EU, the World Bank, and the IMF. Today, the EU’s influence is very weak. Against structures like the IMF and the World Bank, alternative institutions led by China have emerged. Furthermore, structures like the SCO and BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative, are important. All of these are structures that have been established, developed, and are developing despite the US.
Fourth, during the Cold War, the US had capitalized on the tension between the USSR and China, particularly between 1960 and 1989. Today, however, Russia and China relations are strong. Despite all its desires, the US failed to drive a wedge between the two countries. The US also failed to bring India into line to the extent it desired against China. Even if India experiences significant problems with China, it is too large a country to completely follow in the US’s wake.
Fifth, it appears that the US-China competition will last longer than the Cold War.
Sixth, while saying “America First” and promising to make the US great again, US President Trump prioritizes hard power and economic-political pressures over the construction of hegemony based on soft power and the manufacturing of consent. He views investment in soft power as a waste of money and time. This preference draws a reaction in Europe. In the coming period, the problems Europe experiences with the US may become more pronounced. If the US attempts to acquire Greenland—the territory of Denmark, a member of NATO and the EU—by some means, the contradiction between the US and Europe will increase further.
In conclusion, in a period where the world is transitioning to a multipolar order and the US is prioritizing its own continent, tension will continue to escalate. Mexico, Colombia, Cuba, Panama, Iran, and Greenland are in the US crosshairs. Reactions against US aggression will also rise in different countries and in different dimensions. Interest in regional alliances will increase.
Opinion
Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia
Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.
An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.
The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.
Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.
Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.
The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.
Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.
The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.
Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.
In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.
Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.
Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:
- Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
- Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
- Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
- Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.
The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.
Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).
Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.
Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.
Opinion
Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.
In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored
The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.
Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.
At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.
Why Egypt?
Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.
This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.
According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.
This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.
Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios
At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.
The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.
This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.
A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies
This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.
Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”
Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.
A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.
The Messages Behind the Attack
Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.
For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.
For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.
Egypt’s Official Response
The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.
The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”
Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.
President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.
This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.
Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.
The Impact on Global Energy Markets
The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.
Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.
The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.
What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?
First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.
Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.
Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.
Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.
Conclusion
The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.
References:
1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro
4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html
Opinion
Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism
Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.
The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.
Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…
The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.
Why?
Because of this:
Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.
According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.
Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.
In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.
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