The global financial crisis followed by the Eurozone crisis, the imperialist intervention in the Middle East followed by the refugee crisis, the Ukraine crisis, the energy crisis… This compound spiral of crises that has spanned almost 15 years seems to have opened the door to a new era in Europe. There is not a single corner where the “death of neoliberalism” has not been proclaimed. We are witnessing not only the collapse of the old economic order but also the collapse of the world of thought, sometimes quietly, sometimes with a great noise.

But the foundations of the order are solid for now. Those who want a new and different construction may not number in the billions, but they are accumulating. For a European thinking about this, about a new architecture, especially if that architecture is about security and geopolitics, the first thing that comes to mind is Russia. “Russia experts” are breathing new life into European thinking. They think that there should be Russians in the new mortar, more or less.

That’s why we spoke to Thomas Fasbender. Fasbender, the geopolitical chief of the Berliner Zeitung, who stood out as a kind of “outsider voice” in the German mainstream media, which had become “one voice” after the Ukraine war and the Gaza invasion, attracted attention with a biography he wrote about Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Fasbender, like Hauke Ritz, has a background in philosophy, perhaps one of the prerequisites for writing about politics in Germany. Like Ritz, but even earlier, he lived in Russia in the turbulent 90s, from 1992 to 2015. He says he was involved in “business”, meaning he came to journalism relatively late.

In his recently published book Der Eurasienkomplex: Warum und wie dem Westen die Zukunft entgleitet [The Eurasian Complex: Why and how the future slipped away from the West] he calls for unity against “Western arrogance”. Based on his own personal experience, he argues that basically people everywhere are pursuing “the same petty goals” as Western Europeans: Individualism, the pursuit of professional and personal success.

It is therefore calling for a kind of “eye level” from Western Europe towards other worlds, for example the Islamic world, for example China, for example India. The West no longer has the power to impose its will and desires on the world. What needs to be done is to abandon the “this-or-that bloc” mentality of the Cold War and place Europe (and Germany) as a bridge between East and West, North and South.

Given your background in philosophy, I think we can also talk about Kantian eternal peace. Which brings us to your book on Eurasia. Can you start by briefly explaining how the future is moving away from the West? I think you also call this the Eurasian complex. What do you think about this Eurasian complex? Because there is always a lot of talk about the decline of the West or the collapse of the West. Western values don’t work anymore, and so on. What do you mean by that?

The future of the West is slipping away. Basically, when we say that the future is slipping away from the West, we start with the basic economic and demographic data.

Let’s start with demographics. European people, if you include Canada, if you include the United States, people of European descent, 100, 150 years ago made up 30% of the world’s population. Today these countries make up less than 15% of the world population. The so-called West, if we include Europe, Australia and North America, accounted for more than 50% of the gross national product, world income, world total production. More or less until 2010. Since 2010, it has fallen below 50%.

If we look at the BRICS countries today, a few years ago, they reached a total production higher than the G7, which has been the club of western developed industrialized countries since the 1970s.

So we are seeing a numerical decline, a numerical shift from a very influential position that Europe and the countries that are Eurocentric or of European origin used to have until it reached its peak in the mid-20th century after the Allied victory in the Second World War.

So is this the Eurasian complex?

It’s not the Eurasian complex, it’s something else. This is just to indicate the starting point of our thinking, why the West is losing its dominance over the world, and we base it on its demography, its economy.

The Eurasian complex is an additional element, because the Eurasian complex means for Europe, for us Europeans, the challenge of accepting the growing power of countries, of Eurasian countries, of Eurasian regions outside Western Europe (even look at Russia today, for example).

We used to see Russia as an important part of Europe, because most of Russia belonged geographically to Europe, to Europeans. But recently, since the beginning of the war, the European idea of ourselves has increasingly excluded Russia. So Russia becomes part of the concept of Eurasia.

In the book we argue that there are different concepts of Eurasia. You can have the Eurasian landmass, which basically stretches from Portugal to Shanghai and covers the entire spread of Eurasian geography.

You can have a concept of Eurasia that spreads in Russia, for example, and covers the region of the former Soviet Union, Central Asia, Russia and part of the Caucasus. This is another concept of Eurasia.

We look at Eurasia more from a geographical point of view, but mainly we understand it in the sense that Europeans have to deal with the rest of the Eurasian continent in a new way, not in the way they did in the past.

In the past, as colonial masters, we were ruthless. Basically, we produced the goods, we produced the ideas, ideologies. That was the only thing that came from Europe for 100, 200, 300 years.

And that has stopped. It stopped for the reasons I mentioned earlier, with the economy and demography. But it also stopped because after globalization, non-European, non-Western countries have a new self-confidence all over the world.

This self-confidence maybe only came with the last generation, it is actually based on the experiences of previous generations. But it is this power of asserting oneself that makes the real difference, that creates the real challenge, because now we see people simply standing up and saying: It’s all very well for you Europeans to tell us about liberalism, democracy, values and so on, but it doesn’t interest us anymore.

This is very difficult to digest even for the average member of the European elite, that we find ourselves in a completely new situation in relation to non-Western, non-European peoples, countries, traditions and histories in this huge continent.

So in what way does this concept of Eurasia overlap with the BRICS or the “Global South” or other “non-Western” terms?

Of course, at this point Eurasia becomes a kind of cliché word. It does not really cover everything and everyone.

In terms of geopolitical relevance, it is much more accurate to talk about the West and the “Global South”, for example. But then you also have to deal with the problem that China is not really a southern country and China is not really a developing country.

So all these concepts are simplifications to some extent, but they are necessary simplifications. You have to make them. The total world is so complex that it is completely impossible to grasp it unless you simplify it at least in terms.

So when we say Eurasia, of course there is an overlap with the Global South. There is an overlap with BRICS. There is the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. What we see is that underneath these terms, underneath the names that we give, it represents this assertiveness that I just mentioned, transforming itself into new power arrangements.

Because BRICS was a club. They weren’t even a club, it was initially a name, a name given by an American analyst around 1999. And then it transformed. It took on a kind of life of its own and became a conceptual name and then a political reality, and now this economic reality is becoming a political reality, it is gaining traction. It is attracting.

It has already attracted Ethiopia, Iran has been admitted, Egypt and the Emirates, plus now your country, Turkey, has formally requested membership and probably in three weeks, in October in Kazan, Turkey will be admitted. The same goes for Azerbaijan.

And this of course creates a new dynamic, because think of the original BRICS. In 1999, there were no Islamic countries in the original BRICS. Now, the Islamic factor represents an entity in itself, an entity in itself, the Islamic world from Indonesia to Morocco. Now I can say that this Islamic world is also participating in this new distribution of cards.

If we compare geopolitics to a game, there is always a new hand. We always redistribute the cards and one of these cards is of course the Islamic world, whose value is increasing.

Another question is: Can Asia or Eurasia today maintain its strong position in competition with the US or the G7? The US had a very clear position of superiority and even the Soviet Union, for example, could not maintain its superiority. Could Eurasia maintain a position of superiority, not only economically, but also culturally, civilizationally and systemically? Could it at least provide a counterbalance to the Western countries?

We must be careful not to confuse two things here: these are just names. There is no such entity as Eurasia. There is no entity. There is no single entity called the Global South. There is no entity called the West.

We use these labels to describe influences, to describe certain pulls, to describe forces that oppress, compete, antagonize each other.

When we talk about Asia, there is always China, there is always the Sino-Indian conflict as a dividing factor. When we talk about the Islamic world, there will always be competition between Turkey, Iran and the Arab world.

Of course, in the reality of geopolitical gains, each side will take advantage of the rivalries on the other side and try to exploit them. Just like Russia wants to separate the Europeans from us, the Americans or the Israelis will use the rivalries within the Islamic world and try to divide it for their own interests. Everyone will try to pit India and China against each other so that they can keep both of them under control, so that they don’t allow each of them to become too powerful.

So it is very important to see this here. I think the name multipolar world is not a bad name because it simply starts from the fact that there is no single pole that can dominate the world. As you mentioned, of course the US comes from a very strong position. It is still in a very strong position and it will remain in a strong position, a very strong position for a long time to come.

The United States is a young country of 250 years. When we look at the empires in history, they either collapsed very quickly or they were really long-lived, they proved to be long-lived entities.

In this game, the term multipolar allows us to understand a game where there is no single dominant factor, but there are very strong centers of power, centers of power that exert influence, project power, project competitiveness.

Here we have an Islamic world with three centers. The Arab world, the Turkish world and Iran. In Iran, you have Asia with China and India, you have the West with the US and Europe, and you also have Australia.

So what we see is that now the game is being played in a new way. It creates a new, let’s say, interdependent, ever-changing situation, like a puzzle.

That’s what makes this world, the new world, so different from what it was 30 years ago. After the end of the cold war, everything was simple. That’s why a lot of people liked it. Before the end of the cold war it was simple because you had two poles and it was much easier to understand a bipolar world than a multipolar world.

If you think about the possibility of a multipolar world becoming a multipolar world, then it becomes really very difficult.

But my personal view is that the clear and simple structures of 30 years ago are not going to be quickly replaced by something new. So if we say, great, the new world will be bipolar again, the US and China… No, neither the US nor China is strong enough like the Soviet Union and the US were 50, 70, 80 years ago.

So you are pointing to a kind of interregnum.

Geopolitical interregnum is probably the right word: Kingless interregnum. Because even if we assume that the US will remain the dominant power militarily and economically for decades to come, which I think we can assume, at least economically, there is strong competition from China, there is strong competition from India, and militarily the US, despite its 700 or 800 military bases, no longer has the power or the manpower, the willingness, but also the material power to really be everywhere.

Because because of globalization in the world, there are countries that 50 years ago, 70, 80 years ago were quite new when it comes to exerting power in real geopolitics. Africa was colonized and much of Africa and Asia was just dumb, happy to survive, but not claiming any political importance, any political ambition on their own.

This situation has now changed. Countries have started re-entering the international arena. China re-entered; China was the most powerful nation until the first half of the 19th century. India has re-entered in the same way, Iran has re-entered in the same way, Turkey has re-entered in the same way. So these countries have re-entered the international arena and they are reclaiming their historical rights. This adds an additional color to geopolitics. Until the 20th century, geopolitics was quite complex and simple. Now they have evolved into something completely different.

But in this case, could your description, multipolarity, mean more wars? Because you said it could be a kingless interregnum. So if we go into a kingless interregnum, isn’t it more likely that we will have more wars than in past decades?

We already have so many wars. I think you are right that we will have more wars. But the likelihood of a big all-out world war, the so-called Third World War, will probably decrease.

It will be less likely than if we have a world dominated by two or at most three very powerful powers.

This is how the world used to live. The world has always been used to living with a series of regional conflicts, some of them escalating into war, and this is probably a solution or a description of the future situation.

Let’s talk a little bit about your expertise on Russia. In one of your interviews on Vladimir Putin’s autobiography, you said that the state, the concept of the state is the main element that determines the worldview of the Russian leader Vladimir Putin. I would like to ask you, is it just pragmatism or Machiavellianism, or does Putin have deeper ideological beliefs? And I would also like to ask at this point: if Europe, and especially Germany, starts to learn from Putin and Russia about this concept of the state, is it possible to predict the consequences? Because the glorification of the state has not led to good results in Europe before.

Russia, unlike the European nation-states, even though it has been cut off from Central Asia, even though it has been cut off from the Caucasus, it is still, in their view, an empire, an imperial sovereign state, not a nation-state.

Russians make up about 80% of Russia’s population. This is, of course, a majority, a large majority, but nevertheless, Russia does not see itself as a nation-state of Russians because of their historical understanding, because of their own views.

Russia has historically had a fragile government, a fragile power, because it has huge territories, it is also sparsely populated, it has traditionally very high disparities, strong differences between rich and poor, and it is very difficult to protect the country, because Russian borders are very big and very few of them are natural borders like rivers or mountain ranges.

So there is always the possibility that the Russian state, as it sees itself, is a threatened entity. That is why Russia is moving very strongly to the west, but not only to the west, but also to the south.

This high degree of distrust, at least potential distrust, is very strong because of the memory of the French occupation in 1812, the memory of the German occupation in 1941. On the one hand, these are artificially cultivated by the state, as part of the state’s cult of history and cult of historical victories. But they also reflect something real, which is a feeling, and this feeling is real, a real sense of insecurity.

This is what many people in the West find difficult to understand, because people in the West start from themselves: They don’t have aggressive feelings towards Russia, they don’t have expansionist feelings… So they say that there is no threat from them to Russia, even if it is NATO or the West. So any insecurity, any perception of threat on the Russian side is just a fantasy, it is not real.

But here we get into psychology. The important thing is to understand that any Russian leader, anybody sitting in the Kremlin, will insist on having a strong and vertically organized state structure, because this has always been the case. This is a tradition that is inherent in the Russian people and in Russian history.

And to expect something like European liberal democracy to work in Russia is a fantasy, it is completely illogical and unrealistic, because in different countries, in Germany, in England, in Russia and other countries, you can have different traditions of self-government. The tradition of self-government in Russia has always been top-down and at the same time vertical and combined with a strong element of power, an element of power only in the sense of being able to implement your own will.

For example, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, [then German Chancellor] Helmut Kohl thought that Gorbachev was willing to decentralize the Soviet Union and that this would be a good, wonderful democratic experience for the Russian people. Many political elites in the West, especially in Germany and the US, thought so. Do you think this is not true?

I think Mikhail Gorbachev himself believed that there could be something like a liberal and more or less democratically organized Russia. But in the end it didn’t happen. Of course, books have been written and will be written about why it couldn’t happen. But the fact is that the security apparatus, the apparatus of power, the state in its purest form, embodied by Vladimir Putin, has regained control.

So I wouldn’t say that everything that Gorbachev tried to achieve and that Yeltsin somehow continued in the 1990s didn’t work at all, because I lived in Russia in the 1990s and there was a lot going on. There was always a great deal of democracy and debate.

But it ended de facto, it ended with the old security power, the Siloviki as the Russians call them, the old KGB structures taking over.

We can regret that. We can speculate whether it was necessary or not. We can try to explain it, but the reality is that the Russian state is run by this mentality and these people, this part of Russian traditional history and this is what Europe has to live with.

So, what is Germany’s reaction or can we learn something from this in Germany? I don’t think Germany will or should learn anything from what is happening in Russia because the two countries are very different. It has a completely different history than Western Europe, Central Europe, the rest of Eurasia. It’s not just Russia, it’s history and history shapes our future.

This is what is sometimes difficult to understand or not fully understood by people: How much our collective history determines our collective future. Because we think we are autonomous and strategically free, “We are free people. We can change our systems.”

Theoretically we can, but it will never work. Russia is an example of why it doesn’t work. Even if you compare it with Germany in 1945, for example, some people tell us that democracy was brought by the allied powers, by the Americans. This is not true. It happened in 1945, but it was re-established from our own democratic traditions going back thousands of years, going back to the self-government of independent German towns.

So we are like the rest of Western Europe. We have 1,500 years of strong democratic tradition. Unless you have this tradition of democracy, you cannot invent democracy. You cannot really create democracy out of nothing in any state. Something has to happen first.

I think the challenge for Germany is first of all to realize that our way of thinking, the way we want to have, with words like liberal, democratic, etc., is something that we can only be happy with if we achieve it in our own country.

But we should never want or expect the rest of the world to follow us in the way we see ourselves. We see an ideal world. This is also true for Russia because when we talk about European values we must always keep in mind that Russia, even today’s Russia, is part of Europe.

When we talk about European values, sometimes I ask people, what are these European values? They say, rule of law, democracy, human rights… And I say, European values are God, family and homeland. These are European values. God, family and homeland are actually the values that governed Europe during the rise of Europe, during the rise of Europe to world power. So what we have in terms of democracy, human rights and the rule of law is a very late development in our European history.

Europeans see these concepts as fixed ideas, not historical ideas, but fixed concepts…

You are right. I don’t know about other European countries, but in Germany we are stuck in a set of ideologies, a set of values that we think are universal. But in fact they are not universal. They are just an expression of our own historical experience, our own historical formation.

And there is no guarantee that in, say, 200 or 300 years time, people will value human rights the way we value them today. Even in other parts of the world, there is no guarantee that people will value human rights the way we value human rights. When you talk to very educated Muslim people, for example. There were a series of conferences on Islamic human rights and these are highly educated and highly intellectual people who will argue that the so-called universal rights of Europeans do not necessarily apply to different cultures and religious traditions; we simply have to accept that as a fact.

The mistake we make is that we say, yes, this is all there, this is what people think, but we are still right. And this is where our own misery begins. Because even if we are right, as the West we are no longer in a position to impose our opinion and impose our will on the rest of the world.

This is the dilemma in which we find ourselves at this very point, in the third century, in the third decade of the 21st century.

And this brings me to a question about German-Russian relations. Let’s talk about that. Can Germany, at odds with Russia, build healthy relations with Eurasia, Asia or the “Global” South? Relations with Russia are unlikely to improve in the short or medium term. And the question arises. What does Germany have to lose by picking a fight with Russia in this context?

Germany is at a crossroads, as I said, we have certain ideas about which values should be universally applicable to everyone. We have certain ideas about the rule of law in international relations. We have certain ideas about international law, the dogmas of international law, territorial integrity, the right of nations to self-determination, and we are very firm in our belief, in our understanding that this should apply to everybody.

Now, Russia feels that it is being attacked, so to speak, on its southwestern front. This approach of the West, from the Russian point of view, trying to cut Ukraine off from the so-called East Slavic world, from the so-called Russian world, whether we accept it or not, is a reality.

Russia violated international law with its invasion on February 24, 2022. There is no doubt about that. It violated its own obligations towards Ukraine, towards the international order. So in many ways it has violated the order that governs Europe and from a German point of view should govern Europe.

So how do we deal with this? We are still trying to secure the victory of the Ukrainians. By securing victory we mean restoring the status quo, the European order as we understand it.

If that doesn’t work, if we are not in a position to secure the victory of the Ukrainians, to restore order, if the conflict ends with, let’s say, a territorial concession that goes completely against all our beliefs in international law… That’s the dilemma I’m talking about. Then we will find ourselves in a situation where we will have to rethink our whole relationship with the world, with the outside world.

How do we deal with Russia if we still hold on to our beliefs in the international order? We cannot talk to the perpetrator. Russia will become a taboo country for us. But not only Russia, China, for example, because of human rights violations; you will find it in Iran, you will find it in many countries; you will find it in Saudi Arabia, even our ally, violates human rights.

So if you really take the intellectual basis of our current policy to the end, we will end up isolated, we will isolate ourselves. We will definitely isolate ourselves. Of course we are not going to isolate ourselves absolutely, because even in Germany there are not only ideologues, there are very rational people. We rely on exports, our economy is more than 50% or around 50% based on exports. So we have to deal with the outside world.

But here you are pointing to something very important, a dilemma, the crossroads I was talking about. We will probably not have the power to impose our ideas of order on the whole world. We will probably not even be in a position to restore the European order in Eastern Europe, in Ukraine, and we will have to accept that. This means that we will have to rethink and rebuild our relations with the outside world on a new set of ideas that will be governed in more realistic terms, moving away, for example, from the idea of universal values.

Apart from the Ukraine and Eastern Europe problem, the situation in the Middle East is also heating up these days. The Israeli invasion of Gaza and now the invasion of southern Lebanon. Even in countries like the UK or the US, there are different voices, different opinions about their country’s support for Israel. But when we look at the German government, when we look at the German state structure, there is even a term for Germany’s support for the state of Israel: Staatsräson [state wisdom]. What do you think Germany is trying to achieve by supporting Israel against the Palestinian people and the Lebanese people, what is the geopolitical reason for this support?

Don’t think that Germany expects to get something. This is not about getting something in exchange for something else. Germany’s commitment to Israel as a state is based entirely on the Holocaust. Not just fundamentally, it is entirely based on the Holocaust, on the fact that we are responsible for it, that Germany is responsible for the extermination of a people as a whole in the only industrially organized way ever in the history of the world.

It is a violation of culture, it is a violation of civilization, it is a violation of all values and rules of all countries and all religions, all cultures, and in that sense it is truly unique. It is genocide in its own singular order, and this of course binds Germany and will bind Germany for generations to come. The great dilemma in which we find ourselves.

So, yes, the great dilemma in which we find ourselves has to do with the question of the extent to which this happened. To what extent does this guilt, this responsibility, compel us to position ourselves in any conflict in which Israel is involved today and in the future? The word Staatsräson was coined by Angela Merkel, who was our chancellor until 2021, I think it was around 2010. This term was coined in a very prosperous, calm, peaceful, relatively calm period of German history. It probably has too much in it, in the sense of linking us as a state to Israel, in the sense of going too far in this regard. I understand very well what Merkel wants to say, I completely agree with her about this special responsibility, this special commitment that we have. The question is: does it limit us to take certain positions? Do we limit ourselves to only taking certain positions, or do we commit ourselves to taking certain actions?

For example, does Staatsräson mean that we should send the Bundeswehr to the Middle East if Israel’s existence is threatened? Israel’s existence can be threatened at any time.

As we are seeing now, we are dealing with a very victorious, confident Israel, which has largely destroyed Hamas, which has destroyed a large part of Hezbollah and its leadership. This will probably show Iran the limits of its power. So you have an Israel that has militarily reestablished, revitalized its power in the region.

The question, and this is a question that Germany cannot answer, is how Israel sees its future surrounded by hostile populations. Was there any other country in the world that for a long time, for decades, for centuries, based its relations with all its neighbors on military superiority? It is a big question mark.

So I think we have to come back to this question when we talk about the fundamental issues that we Germans have to deal with. To what extent do we have to support an Israeli state that focuses itself exclusively or almost exclusively on the use of military force?

I don’t believe that Israel will behave in this way under any government. The current government under Binyamin Netanyahu is responsible for leading Israeli society in this direction. But we have to deal with this democratically elected government, so according to our rules and norms this government is the legitimate government. This legitimate government is behaving in a way that we as Germans feel morally distant from.

Some Germans may say that what was done to the Israeli people, to the Jews on October 7, 2023, justifies or legitimizes any reaction. But the vast majority of the German people will ask the same question: OK, Hamas terrorists killed 1,200 people and took hostages on October 7. But does that justify the deaths of 30,000, 40,000, 50,000 people? Where will this end? What is the equivalent of 1,200 Israeli citizens?

I always try to think things through to the end and get to the bottom of things. And the bottom line here is that Germany cannot be obliged to support an uncompromising eye for an eye, ear for an ear policy on Israel’s side. This is a question that our politicians have to answer.

But as you can see, when you talk to Germans, it doesn’t matter if they are from below or from above, everybody feels this dilemma and there are very few people who have a clear position.

I would say, “I tell you: Israel is a disturbing factor. I don’t think there are many Germans who would say, “I’m telling you: Israel is a disturbing factor. It should be eliminated.” No, there may be Arabs in Germany who say that, not Germans, but there are very few Germans who say that everything Israel does is legitimate and justified because of our own German background.

But there is a greater hypocrisy on the part of the German government. Germany can morally separate itself from Russia and Vladimir Putin, but it cannot do the same with the Netanyahu government and what Israel is doing now in Gaza and Lebanon.

I wouldn’t use the word hypocrisy, there are hypocrites, no doubt. But I don’t think they sit in the German government. I accuse our Chancellor Olaf Scholz of being a hypocrite, neither on Israel nor on Ukraine. There are hypocrites in the media, absolutely. There are double standards in the media. Many politicians have double standards.

I think our current government is trying to stay on an equal footing with regard to these two major conflicts. I would say that. And of course, again, we have two commitments. When we look at Ukraine, we have a commitment to the European peace order, to restore the principles of the European peace order. And when we look at the Middle East, there is a commitment to the existence of Israel as a state, and these are constraints that create a framework within which we have to operate.

I wouldn’t say that the German government has actually done a bad job in this regard. Yes, in every conflict there are doves and there are hawks, and sometimes we have hawks in politics and in the media who go too far in saying that everything Israel does is justified, or that Ukraine must win in all circumstances.

These are really double standards that emerge very quickly. For example, I was just wondering these days, because the Russian invasion of Ukraine has always been described by the Russians as a special military operation. The Israeli invasion of South Lebanon was also described, not in those words, but as a limited operation. As far as Russia is concerned, the German media always portrays it as a lie, clearly untrue, because it is a full-scale invasion. Here it is called a full-scale occupation. Nobody is talking about a full-scale invasion of South Lebanon by Israeli forces of the IDF. Maybe there is no full-scale occupation in south Lebanon yet, but even if there is, I don’t think the German media would talk about full-scale occupations.

One last question. Let’s go back to the problem of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus. I think you have visited both countries recently. I was in Azerbaijan but I did not go to Armenia, I had a meeting with the Armenian Ambassador.

If we include Iran and Turkey, is the situation in the South Caucasus closer to peace or war?

In the South Caucasus, it should be clearly stated that we are talking about the end of 2024, for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union there is a real chance for peace.

It is necessary to say it again and again, because many people don’t like to hear it, that a year ago, in September 2023, Azerbaijan militarily restored its territorial integrity and sovereignty over all its territory, as internationally recognized at the end of 1991.

So what Azerbaijan achieved in the one-day war in 2023, which was preceded by a war in the fall of 2020, is exactly the same as the weapons and billions of dollars that we sent to Ukraine to ensure the restoration of the full sovereignty of the Ukrainian state on the territory of Ukraine from the last day of 1991.

The problem here, of course, is that this part of Nagorno-Karabakh, the disputed part, or the part of Azerbaijan that is being fought over, is inhabited by about 120,000 Armenians. On the other hand, we all know that there are another 100,000 people in Donbass, which is also being fought. There are millions of people living there, identifying themselves as Russians, sympathizing with them.

Therefore, we are facing a more or less similar situation where the borders of the Soviet Union, the internal borders of the Soviet Union, which became the external borders of sovereign states in 1991, in no way reflect or reflect the population, ethnic origins.

So yes, Nagorno-Karabakh became part of Azerbaijan after 1991. This is how history worked, first of all, after 1991 there was a big Armenian-Azeri war. Armenia won the war, or let’s say the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh won the war. They occupied a big part of Azerbaijani territory. People were forced to leave Azerbaijani lands. Azerbaijan regained this country after 30 years.

There is an endless spiral of conflict here. There are atrocities on both sides. There are refugees on both sides. This is a terrible conflict that could theoretically go on forever. The only great chance we have now is that we have a situation where peace is possible internationally, with the restoration of internationally recognized borders between both countries, because the status quo again corresponds to internationally recognized territories. This is the most important difference that has emerged for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union. So peace is possible again.

There are big challenges for both sides. Can Armenia live with this defeat? Yes, it was a defeat for the Armenian sides. The exodus of Karabakh Armenians after the one-day war last September was a defeat, a terrible cultural defeat. Basically, Armenia as a people gave up, not a state territory, but a cultural territory that it has had for millennia. So the question again is: can Armenia live with this defeat and transform itself into a more promising future?

And, equally importantly, can Azerbaijan be humble in victory? In both cases, the victorious side needs to show humility. The defeated side also depends on the magnanimity of both sides. If both sides, if both leaders, Mr. Pashinyan on one side and Mr. Aliyev on the other side, if both leaders are historically good, if they realize their potential, they can become historical figures. There is a chance for peace. If they go back to the spiral, the spiral of endless war, they will squander this chance.

On the other hand, we have more regional and bigger actors like Turkey and Iran. You know, Iran does not want the Zangezur corridor against its will. And Turkey is supporting Azerbaijan both militarily and economically. So, if there is a new war in the future, it is likely to be bigger than the previous previous war.

A new war should be avoided. There is no question about it because there will be no chance to reach peace again. And it is very difficult to imagine that a single actor will develop as a dominant winner in this region. Who could this be? This is a very old issue.

This is a region where there has never been one dominant power, or very rarely. Now when we look at the opportunity for peace, I think it is in everybody’s interest. Elements on the Armenian side and elements on the Azeri side may not be able to live with this status quo for emotional reasons. For the Turks, it is a very attractive prospect to have the Armenian border open for the economy, just for trade. The possibility that they can build this Azeri exclave through Nakhchivan, through Nakhchivan and then south through the Zangezur corridor, or some other way through Azerbaijan to Baku and then to China, the middle corridor, is a tremendous opportunity for trade, because today it all has to go north through Georgia to Azerbaijan.

It is the same for the Iranians. Because if Azerbaijan and Armenia live in peace, it will be much easier to realize the idea of a north-south corridor from Russia through Iran to India, through Azerbaijan to Iran.

And the Zangezur corridor that you also mentioned. The problem with the Zangezur corridor is not the Iranians. The Iranians are building a link between Nakhshavan and mainland Azerbaijan on their territory south of the Armenia-Iran border. Therefore, they have no problem with the Zangezur corridor. The problem with the Zangezur corridor is that the Azerbaijanis want to have an uncontrolled and duty-free connection between the mainland and their exclave for their goods and their people. For understandable reasons, Armenia is not in a position to commit to this because it would mean voluntarily giving up its sovereign rights. So this is a point where both countries are still a stepping stone for a possible prolongation of the conflict.

But I don’t think that Turkey or Iran has any negative impact on peace. It depends on Armenia and Azerbaijan. I am sure that both sides understand this, because most of the negotiations are now done bilaterally, without Turkey, Iran, the EU or the US.

You can think geopolitically here, you can expect that there might be some opposition from the US, because the US does not want to give China the opportunity to develop the Belt and Road Initiative, the so-called New Silk Road. Because a peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan would mean an opportunity to build the middle corridor in completely new dimensions. The south, east and west of the Caucasus will be connected through the Caucasus to Central Asia via the Caspian Sea. I don’t know if there are forces, geostrategic thinkers or conspirators in the US who would welcome this about Turkey and its geopolitical role in the multipolar world.

I think you have some thoughts about what Turkey can do in this emerging new league of nations and what Turkey can do in this emerging multipolar world. What do you think about that?

I think Turkey is definitely realizing its potential and its goals right now. As far as I understand, Turkey has said goodbye to the idea of being tied to Western Europe. I would say that EU membership is a fanciful idea. There will be some kind of relationship with the EU and of course Turkey has a strong interest to integrate economically with the Europeans. There is no doubt about that, but without giving up any foreign policy autonomy, foreign policy rights…

Looking at the current perspective of BRICS membership for Turkey, it is clear that Turkey will lead a 360-degree foreign policy. The challenge, which will not make Turkey’s job easier in the meantime, is that on the one hand, Turkey is returning to its traditional high dominance in the geopolitical theater. On the other hand, it is returning to the old rivalries that have made life unbearable for Turkey time and time again. Because the biggest challenge for Turkey is to maximize the number of enemies. The Christian Balkans are a kind of potential enemy. The two countries that have fought the most wars in Europe in the last 400 years are Russia and Turkey, I think eleven or more. Turkish-Iranian rivalry, Turkish-Arab rivalry, Turkish-Egyptian rivalry…

Therefore, for Turkey, the ambition to set a rule in this geopolitical theater and to assert and reassert its sovereignty is logical, necessary and understandable. Otherwise there will be a vacuum in Anatolia around the straits. But this opportunity also brings with it many potential problems and challenges for the Turkish leadership.

I think the biggest threat at the moment, though, is to rediscover old rivalries, for example with Greece. Turkey does not need such a rivalry. That would be foolish.

Another threat is of course Islamism, fundamentalism. This is a threat to the whole Islamic world. Because every step towards fundamentalism leads to deeper rivalries within the Islamic world and deeper enmity with non-Islamic powers.

And perhaps the biggest challenge is for Turkey to navigate its position in relation to the growing West-East, West-Russia hostilities, the growing divide between Western Europe and the NATO world and Russia and China as representatives of the so-called autocrats.

So the more these blocs become hostile blocs, really hostile blocs, the more difficult it will be for Turkey to remain here as a NATO member and there as a BRICS member. And this will always bring with it the danger of unduly straining Turkey’s position.

The Istanbul Energy Forum, organized by the Ministry of Energy of Türkiye in collaboration with Anadolu Agency, brought together global leaders, policymakers, and industry experts to address the critical challenges and opportunities in the energy sector. Among the notable participants was the 1st Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation, a key figure in shaping Russia’s energy policy and international collaborations.

In this exclusive interview, the Deputy Minister shared insights into Russia’s perspective on regional energy cooperation, its approach to energy security, and the evolving dynamics of global energy markets to Dr. Esra Karahindiba from Harici. The conversation also delves into Russia’s participation in Türkiye’s energy initiatives and the broader implications for energy transition and geopolitical stability.

Let’s start with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s much-spoken statement on Turkey as being an energy hub. What are the steps taken for this initiative? What are the works which you can tell us until now? Was it just a statement, or was it really an initiative that you were working on?

Yes, thank you very much for the question. Indeed, Turkey enjoys a position of privilege in the sense that it is a bridge between two worlds, between Europe and Asia. Through centuries, Turkey has been playing that role, that very important role, and rather successfully. So previously, that was the Bosporus, you know, and the trade routes. Now, it is, to the same extent, an energy pathway. Gas pipelines and the same energy flows of oil through the Bosporus again help Turkey retain this role. Thanks to their very pragmatic and economically oriented approach, Turkey has been able to navigate this path very successfully despite all the political turbulence we’re seeing in the world.

So, that is definitely a feat by itself and an accomplishment. The initiative by our president to discuss and to work on making Turkey a gas hub as well is a continuation of this path and continuation of this work.

So now, already, Turkey receives gas from a number of sources, with the biggest being Russia, but also we’re seeing gas flows from Azerbaijan, some from Iran. Turkey imports LNG from various different sources. So, already, in many ways, it is a gas hub. Of course, predominantly, this comes for domestic consumption, which is growing, but also a significant portion of it is re-exported to Europe, adjusted for, of course, infrastructure bottlenecks, which always exist, but they take time to be lifted. There’s work being done on that.

There’s also potential to work on becoming a trading hub, also, with so many sources. Trading and the financial aspects of this trade are also quite a big potential, which is currently being discussed and worked on. So this definitely is a very prospective area and a very prospective pathway for our countries to continue working on.

There is still work in progress, of course, but this is a very major step forward, and it needs time to prepare and a lot of work to be done to make it actually beneficial for all sides, for the consumers and for the producers as well.

Do you have any numbers? What is the expected capacity or volume?

It’s a much broader concept than just volumes or just pipelines because, as I said, it’s a complex issue. So, at this point, I think it’s best to actually get all the pieces in place, get all the pieces of the puzzle in place because it requires a lot of discussion, and it requires a lot of work to coordinate this.

Especially, as I said, with all the obstacles and pitfalls that exist in today’s world, a lot of questions and topics need to be worked around to make it work for all the potential users of the system.

So, it’s not just about pipelines and numbers of volume supply, but it’s more about creating the whole ecosystem and making it accessible for everyone who wants to have access to it.

You just mentioned some steps. Which steps need to be taken? What is the outline of the 

04:03

In all those areas that I mentioned, we need the legal foundation for that. We need, basically, the contract foundation. We need to make sure that all the suppliers who take part in it, there is also sufficient additional supply.

So, as I said, it’s not one concrete step that, at this moment, we could talk about, but it’s rather a complex of things and a whole big list of things that need to be done, which are all being worked on at the moment.

That’s a big package. So, another topic was energy trade with local currencies. Is it possible for Turkey and Russia to take new steps towards conducting energy transitions in national currencies, and what conditions would need to be met for this to succeed?

Well, there already is quite a lot of trade in national currencies. And once again, as our president has been saying for quite a number of years now, that all countries, the global South, and our partners should consider increasing the share of trade in local currencies because that would give us significantly more financial freedom and room to maneuver.

As the recent three years have shown, this is a very solid foundation for future growth. Of course, there is volatility in exchange rates for local currencies. But the more we actually trade in them, the more we utilize them, the more predictable exchange rates would become, and the stronger these currencies would be as a global means of payment and global means of exchange.

So, we do already have quite a lot of trade in local currencies, not just in energy but in industry and agriculture, and the share would be growing. But, you know, because of some inherent disbalances in trade, in bilateral trade between countries—and this does not just concern Russia and Turkey; it’s true for almost any bilateral trade—either exports are higher, or imports are higher.

So this disbalance, of course, leads to an impact and effect on exchange rates, which would be used in such bilateral trade. So we need to work on actually getting more countries into this national currency trade circle so that we do get a balance, if not between two countries on a bilateral basis, but rather on a multilateral basis in trade.

And if that can be done—when I won’t say if, when, because we’re definitely moving towards that—then we can have a much more balanced scene for local currency trading. And that’s what we need to work on: to bring more countries with which both Russia and Turkey trade, to bring more of them into this game, because then that would help us eliminate arbitrage and that will help us eliminate many of the negative factors currently affecting this process.

I.e., exchange rates imperfections because, I mean, of course, when you trade against a global currency such as the dollar, there is much more liquidity, and this task of balance is already solved because a lot of countries trade in dollars, you know, and so you have a universal means of payment. But with local currencies, we need to work on that system.

That’s the area for development, but our central banks are heavily engaged in this, just as our foreign ministries and, of course, all the industrial ministries—the Ministry of Energy, the Ministry of Industry—to actually make this work. So, I see huge potential there.

Which countries are you negotiating with for making energy trade with national currencies? What are the potential countries?

With all our partners. We’re talking about probably with the countries which constitute up to 80% of the global population, which are not part of the non-friendly countries, or so as we call it. Because everybody is interested in this.

Everybody is interested in making their currency a universal means of payment, at least for their goods. So we are engaged in this process with everyone, and our president has openly and vocally stated this—that he’s inviting all our partners to do more work on this.

But I can say that this is a positive process and one which is developing.

I guess you were referring to China or India.

Everybody, including them, including those countries, yes.

Let’s talk about European energy security. With sanctions, Europe actually, in a way, has fallen into an energy trap. The lack of access to Russian energy has created challenges, especially for Germany and its industrial sector. If European countries request to resume gas supplies, how would Russia evaluate such a demand?

You know, in Russia, we have a proverb which you can directly translate as “don’t dig a hole for somebody else, because you’ll most likely be the person who falls into that hole.” And unfortunately, we’ve seen that with, as you said, the sanction policy.

The toll, the toll which the global economy paid, was huge. And we’re talking, as I said, about hundreds of billions of dollars just in 2022 and 2023. But a big chunk of that toll was paid by the Western countries themselves, which imposed those sanctions.

As a country, we have always been on the pragmatic path. We have, and we are continuing to do that—putting economy first and pragmatism first. But unfortunately, that’s not the approach of everyone, and today’s world does see quite a lot of hypocrisy and quite a lot of politicizing around various issues.

In the end, unfortunately, it’s the consumer who suffers. The consumer, both in the retail space—meaning people—and also in the corporate space. And as you’ve said, we have seen quite a lot of impact on the European economy from losing competitive energy sources.

What we have to keep in mind is that most of the traditional economies are very quickly losing their competitive appeal. Population is aging, welfare is high, and interest rates are not zero anymore. Yes, they’ve been declining over the past two quarters, but they’re not zero anymore.

So, this financial aspect and the monopoly on access to cheap funding have been deteriorating. Plus, technological competitiveness is also something that is deteriorating because we see many countries in Asia-Pacific especially making these technological leaps forward and becoming real competitors in the technology space.

With a lot of competitive factors being lost, energy was one of the major competitive factors that Europe had, and they deprived themselves of this factor, which has led to the consequences you spoke about.

Our president has said on numerous occasions that we were not the ones to impose sanctions; we were not the ones who started this process. So, we, as we have been, remain open to proposals, and we remain open to a pragmatic approach. Unfortunately, we don’t yet see that from some of the countries on the global scene.

But as I said, we remain pragmatic, and the president has made this very vocal and very open—that we are above politics.

Honestly speaking, this energy trade lack with Europe also impacts Russia’s economy. How did the sanctions impact Russia’s energy sector? Is Russia able to compensate for the loss of the European market, because you also lost a big market?

Of course. When I said there’s a toll on the global economy, everybody pays it. It’s not just the countries which impose sanctions that pay the toll. It’s not just the global South that pays for it. And that is one of the most disappointing things because countries that are struggling to find financing for social projects, for projects needed for development, are instead forced to pay this extra toll because of somebody else’s politics. That’s very disappointing and definitely does not help build a just and sustainable economy.

But Russia, of course, also pays a price for this. We’re realistic about it, but we have managed over the past few years to more or less mitigate most of the risks and negative effects we’ve seen.

We are very well on the path to achieving technological sovereignty in the sense that we’re covering most of the critical technologies that are needed. I’m talking mostly about the energy sector but also about other segments of the economy as well.

In the energy sector, we are pretty much covered in most of the critical technologies we need to generate electricity, produce oil, gas, and coal, and transport it. Of course, it comes at a bit of a higher price, but that’s the cost that we have to pay to achieve technological sovereignty, which is very important for our country—and I believe, for any other country as well.

Talking about the price—once again, as I said, we cannot do anything about the longer transportation routes because that’s just physics and geography. So, of course, we’ll be paying more. But most of that has led to the market being distorted and consumers paying a higher price.

In the end, all these costs get transitioned and transferred to the global economy. So, it’s very unfortunate. But once again, we were not the ones who started politicizing energy.

We remain committed to continuing working within whatever the market gives us. So, we currently are well in the market. We can sustain this and will continue working on lowering our costs to the maximum so that we can give energy to the markets at the most competitive price. We’ve solved most of those problems, and we’ll continue working on them.

Let’s also talk about the Istanbul Energy Forum. What are the expected outcomes of the forum for Russia and Turkey? I guess you had some bilateral talks with the Turkish Energy Minister, and there are also ministers from other countries like Hungary and Libya. What is this forum going to bring to your energy policies?

Well, the forum, as it turns out, we’re actually glad to see very good attendance, which shows significant interest, not just in Turkey but in Turkey’s role as one of the key players in the region in terms of energy.

The countries you’ve mentioned are all partners or neighbors that are interconnected in a good way, in terms of energy trade. So, we, as the Russian Federation, have relations with all those countries as well. We have projects in those countries and long-term, longstanding partner relationships.

We methodically continue working on developing those. And once again, especially in a world with significant political volatility, we need to stick together in building alternatives for everyone.

Diversification, not just in terms of energy supply but also in terms of technological cooperation and financial cooperation, is key to the well-being of any country today. This forum provides just such a platform because we are able to discuss our regional or bilateral issues and topics together.

With His Excellency Mr. Alparslan Bayraktar, we have a very big agenda. The Ministry of Energy of Russia and the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of Turkey have been longstanding partners. A lot of the projects we talked about today—the Turkish Stream, the Blue Stream, the transit routes, the energy hub—they are all being developed under the patronage of the respective ministries.

That’s why there’s always a very big agenda to discuss. What I can say, and for which we are very grateful, is that once again, pragmatism, economic pragmatism, common sense, and good neighborly relationships have always been the key pillars and the foundation of our relationship.

No matter what the volatility and no matter how things look from the outside, we have always been able to find solutions that benefit both sides. Mutually beneficial resolution of any dispute or any topic was always the cornerstone of our relationship, and it continues to be so.

This forum once again underscores this—that in any global situation, we are able to come together and discuss what our countries need.

Thank you very much. My questions are finished. Is there anything you’d like to tell us that I didn’t ask you?

I think we’ve covered the most important topics related to this industry.

Thank you very much. This interview was exclusive, and you spared your time for us. 

Thank you very much.

The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, which is expected to end 14 months of fighting, began this morning. It is not clear when the Israeli army will withdraw from the villages it has occupied, but those who were forced to leave their homes due to the attacks in southern Lebanon are returning to their homes.

Assoc. Prof. Yasin Atlıoğlu answered Harici’s questions about what the ceasefire means for Israel and Hezbollah, whether it will be successful and how it will affect Gaza.

Atlıoğlu summarised the process leading up to the ceasefire announcement as follows: “In September, rumours and initiatives about a ceasefire started for the first time. This continued in October. But nothing was finalised until the American elections. In the meantime, the conflict intensified. In particular, the air strikes organised by Israel caused great destruction in the cities, especially in Beirut. The situation was similar in southern Lebanon. However, Israel did not make much progress in its ground operation. Under these circumstances, many people were uncertain whether there would be a ceasefire.”

Atlıoğlu explained that a strange situation had indeed arisen with the announcement of the ceasefire in the evening, saying: “As far as we understand, a ceasefire has been reached between Israel and the Lebanese government under the mediation of America and France. It is still unclear where Hezbollah stands in this process. Atlıoğlu recalled that there has been propaganda that Hezbollah has accepted the ceasefire, but Hezbollah has not yet made a clear statement: ‘In fact, an MP said last night that there are some differences between the text that came before us and this latest text, so it is still unclear whether Hezbollah will fulfil the conditions of the ceasefire.

Atlıoğlu said that the parties had adapted to the ceasefire, which came into force in the morning despite the uncertainty, and said: “With the rapid start of the return of the Lebanese to the south, propaganda is being made that this is not a defeat. On the other hand, the Israeli side is declaring this agreement as a great victory’.

Atlıoğlu recalled that the text of the ceasefire has not yet been published and pointed out that according to Biden’s statement and media reports, there are some points in the agreement that Hezbollah has always objected to: “Especially the issue that Biden said last night that Israel can organise counter-attacks in the framework of the right of self-defence in case of an attack. Moreover, this issue of withdrawal is very complicated. There is the deployment of the Lebanese army in the region, and as of this evening some units of the Lebanese army have come out of hibernation and have been mobilised. But, of course, Israel says that I will not leave the narrow strip of the border that I occupy until Hezbollah withdraws north of the Litani River. So it is unclear when and how the withdrawal will take place.”

“There is talk of an American-led mechanism to monitor the ceasefire. How will this be set up? How will there be communication? More importantly, how will the Lebanese army be deployed? Is the ceasefire sustainable? Can the Lebanese army establish authority in the region in such a fragile environment? These are all question marks. The possibility of a resumption of the conflict is also quite high.”

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Atlıoğlu said the following about whether the ceasefire was a victory or a defeat for Hezbollah: “The war has led to some changes in Hezbollah’s stance since last year. The organisation has been seriously weakened by the losses it has suffered in terms of military capacity and leadership. We do not know the extent of this. But in September, in his last speech before he was killed, Hassan Nasrallah said something he had repeated many times before: The only condition for the return of Israeli settlers to the north is a ceasefire in Gaza. Now, with this ceasefire, it seems that Hezbollah has abandoned this objective.”

“This could cause some problems within Hezbollah. Because the reason why Hezbollah went to war was to support Gaza. So the fact that Hezbollah has abandoned that could create problems for the organisation. There is a situation where the organisation cannot stand behind the words of Hassan Nasrallah.”

“One of the reasons, of course, is that the domestic political situation is different from a year ago. Hezbollah’s rivals can now make their voices heard. So there could be some serious battles in domestic politics.”

Atlıoğlu also commented on whether the ceasefire could mean a victory for Israel, given the Israeli army’s unwillingness to fight in Lebanon and the losses it has suffered:

“The Israeli side had air superiority, but Hezbollah showed good resistance in the land attack. The Israeli army could not advance. In terms of the sustainability of the war, some of the weaknesses of the Israeli land army were exposed. Israel, which occupied the whole of southern Lebanon in 2-3 days in the 1970s, could barely capture a few places on the border this time. At the same time, there is a lack of population and human resources in Israel. Add to this the issue of drafting ultra-Orthodox Jews into the army and the domestic political turmoil that this could cause, and victory seems out of the question. After all, Israel had originally planned to remove the settlers from the north militarily, but in the end the deal had to be done.”

“All this is true, but if we look at it from a broader perspective, if someone had said 2-3 years ago that Israel would kill the entire leadership of Hezbollah, including Nasrallah, and cause such serious destruction in Lebanon, no one would have believed it. So Hezbollah has certainly suffered serious damage. But is this compatible with Israel’s extreme goals or not? We will have to wait and see.”

“Netanyahu has already declared victory as the man behind this. He even went a little further. He said that after the Lebanon chapter is closed, Iran is their target. He warned Assad. At the moment, Israel seems to be in an advantageous position. There is criticism from within, but the general opinion is that Hezbollah has been seriously damaged.”

Atlıoğlu responded to our question about the impact of a Trump presidency on Gaza, if the ceasefire succeeds and the Lebanese front is closed to Israel, as follows:

“The fact that Trump is a leader who is more sympathetic to Israel creates a picture in which Israel can do something at a higher level in Gaza. However, Trump, who is an unpredictable leader, may have other plans. When he comes to power, he will either try to find a middle ground or further pave the way for Netanyahu, who already wanted Trump to be elected president. So if he paves the way, the situation in Gaza will get worse. Perhaps Gaza will be completely dehumanised. At the same time, a similar situation could arise in the West Bank. So there is a possibility that Trump will allow this, at least Netanyahu thinks so.”