Opinion
What does a new Trump era mean for Iran?

The very poor performance of Biden, the sick man of the White House, in the electoral debates, the uncertainties on the Democratic front and the assassination of Trump have led the world to prepare for the return of Trump to the White House as the US presidential elections approach. Instead of assessing the prospects of the two candidates, political analysts around the world are now analysing possible scenarios in various dossiers on the future of international relations in the event of a Trump return. This situation shows the seriousness of the issue of Trump’s return.
Of course, this issue has also attracted the attention of Iran and its new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, and the possible effects of Trump’s return on the political future of the Pezeshkian government, Iran’s national security, the course of the country’s economy and regional security are now being discussed in Tehran.
The importance of these discussions for the current government in Tehran was evident in the election debates. Trump’s name was frequently mentioned by various parties, and indeed his actions, the reactions to them and the possibility of his return to power was one of the issues that attracted the attention of the candidates and their supporters in the Iranian presidential election a few weeks ago.
Before discussing Trump’s impact on Iran and the Pezeshkian government, it is worth mentioning the history of Tehran and Trump’s opposition to each other and their place in the collective memory. In Iranian public opinion, Trump represents the revival of memories of maximum pressure and full-scale economic warfare aimed at harming the Iranian people and pressuring the Iranian government. (This is also reflected in Iranian cinema. For example, the film Leila’s Brothers reflects the impact of Trump’s policy of economic repression on the lives of ordinary Iranian people).
During his first presidential term (2017-2021), Trump labelled the Islamic Republic of Iran as a ‘rogue regime’, despite stating that he did not want regime change.RAN has repeatedly criticised the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was negotiated and concluded in 2015 between the US and five other world powers, and finally announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018. The US action came as an incredible shock and blow to the government of Hassan Rouhani, which had based its entire economic and political strategy on the resolution of the nuclear issue and the lifting of related sanctions. After withdrawing from the nuclear deal, the Trump administration implemented a policy of ‘maximum pressure’ through economic sanctions against Iran. Trump had previously imposed a number of new sanctions on Iran by signing the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in August 2017, but the policy of maximum pressure imposed an unprecedented number of economic sanctions on the Iranian government and people, numbering in the thousands.
In addition to economic pressure, the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani at Baghdad International Airport in January 2020 on Trump’s orders is another tragic event that the Iranian people remember about Trump. This terrorist act was carried out by the official government of the United States against an official security and military official of the Islamic Republic of Iran who was on an official visit to a third country, and beyond its legal aspects, it created the highest level of tension between the United States and Iran. In response to this American terrorist act, Iran launched a missile attack on the Ain al-Asad airbase in Iraq, a significant action in the history of international relations since the Second World War.
Hopefully, these events have created a very negative perception of Trump in Iranian public opinion and illustrate the ‘Trump phobia’ that exists in Iranian politics. he anti-Iranian statements of Trump and his deputy, J. D. Vance, in recent weeks have attracted renewed attention in the Iranian media. The main question in Tehran, and perhaps in all countries in the Middle East that could be affected by the mutual policies of Trump and Iran, is what are the possible scenarios for future relations between Iran and Trump?
First of all, despite the dark and unpleasant aspects of the past relations between Iran and Trump, developments such as the change of government in Iran, the changing geopolitical situation in the Middle East, the changing security order in Europe, the changing economic and security behaviour of China in the world and, most importantly, the internal situation in the United States, make it difficult to make a definitive judgement based on the past.
Optimistic scenario: a crisis freeze
If we prefer to take an optimistic view of future relations between Trump and Tehran, we can point to the following: the presence of a reformist president who is open to the West is an important factor that can positively influence developments. In this context, it is noteworthy that one of Pezeshkian’s first actions was to publish an article in English in which he declared his readiness to establish relations with all countries of the world on the basis of mutual respect. Indeed, Pezeshkian’s outspokenness will call into question the legitimacy of Trump’s anti-Iranian actions. rump’s disagreements with the European Union over Russia and the war in Ukraine will make Iran another bone of contention between them. Moreover, key Middle Eastern countries that supported Trump’s anti-Iran policies during his first term in the hope of limiting Iran’s regional power are now taking a different approach to Iran and trying to de-escalate tensions in the region. This may lead Trump to reconsider his anti-Iran policy.
Trump has exhausted everything except the military option against Iran, which has made Iran more prepared. In fact, Trump has implemented all his plans to cripple the Iranian economy and now has no other means to deal a serious blow to Iran, except for actions such as physical attacks on Iranian tankers in international waters. Meanwhile, Iran has developed effective alternatives to all sanctions mechanisms, has become more adept at creating conditions for sanctions evasion, and has increased its economic resilience. This is not to ignore the fact that sanctions have weakened Iran’s economic infrastructure, but it shows that America’s economic blows cannot cripple Iran and that Iran is now in a stronger position to withstand possible blows.
Today, Iran is also at an irreversible stage on the nuclear front. In 2018, Iran had a limited nuclear programme and was only allowed to enrich uranium to 3.67% and have 300 kilograms of uranium reserves under the JCPOA, but now Iran has increased its uranium enrichment rate to 60% with domestically developed centrifuges and could achieve a nuclear weapon within weeks if it so wished.
In addition to completing the cycle of nuclear deterrence, Iran has also achieved deterrence in the missile and drone fields, demonstrating to Trump that it is capable of delivering a direct blow to any threat. Iran’s missile attack on Israel on 13 April 2024 demonstrated Iran’s ability to overcome the most formidable defensive systems, significantly increasing Iran’s deterrent capability.
It is likely that Iran will take steps to soften its stance towards the West in order to deny legitimacy to possible pressure from Trump. Accepting the few remaining conditions of the FATF and being removed from the blacklist or continuing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency could be among Iran’s pre-emptive measures against Trump. The Pezeshkian government’s foreign policy can be expected to be pragmatic and Tehran will take various steps towards détente without undermining Iran’s military deterrence. By sticking to its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA – as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency’s reports – Iran has gained political and ethical legitimacy while demonstrating that it will not give up its red lines and accept bullying by the other side.
Given these shifting balances, some in Tehran argue that Trump will behave differently towards Iran than in the past, following the rule of measuring profit and loss, and that a period of low tensions with Trump is likely if Iran moves in the direction of playing the political game. In an interview with the Arab media, Ali Abdolalizadeh, Pezeshkian’s campaign manager, said of the possibility of new sanctions if Trump returns to power: ‘In fact, Trump’s presence increases the likelihood of sanctions being lifted because Trump is a trader and we understand the language of trade well’.
Although the words of this Iranian politician may seem somewhat optimistic, the ups and downs of political relations between Tehran and Washington over the past two decades show that the two countries’ relationship is broader than the nuclear issue and that limited negotiations will always remain fruitless due to the unfavourable general political environment between the two sides. Therefore, although the two countries need comprehensive and long-term negotiations, the Iranian side cannot be expected to have hope and confidence based on America’s political behaviour over the past four decades. Therefore, at best, the political situation in Iran and the United States in the Trump era may move towards a crisis freeze.
Pessimistic scenario: The Israeli factor
Faced with such a perspective, it is important not to lose hope, based on the strategic changes of the last four years, that Trump will be able to pursue a policy of de-escalation in Iranian-American relations, but not to lose sight of the fact that Israel is a serious variable in Iranian-American relations. Netanyahu is in the worst political situation after the Gaza crisis and needs the continuation of the conflict and Washington’s support to survive. Playing the victim to gain Washington’s support is an old policy in Israel’s history, but it is still effective, and the only country against which Israel can play the victim is Iran. Therefore, in a bad but very likely scenario, Israel could continue the genocide in Gaza, attack southern Lebanon, strike Iranian strategic targets and force Tehran to intervene militarily against it, raising the level of tension between Tehran and Washington.
It is impossible to analyse American behaviour in the Middle East without taking into account the Israeli variable and its function of compensating for the strategic weakness of the Zionist regime, which makes the situation between Trump and Tehran more complicated.
Opinion
The UAE’s Bold Leap into the Global LLM Race

Shamma Al Qutbah – Researcher at Trends Research & Advisory
Jointly released by Harici and Trends Research & Advisory
The UAE’s homegrown AI model, Falcon, is making waves across the global tech landscape, challenging industry giants like OpenAI’s ChatGPT and China’s DeepSeek. But Falcon isn’t just another competitor in the AI race; it’s a bold testament to the UAE’s ambition to lead the future of artificial intelligence with security, reliability, and innovation at its core.
First unveiled in March 2023, Falcon was developed in the heart of Abu Dhabi, within the cutting-edge labs of the city’s leading global scientific research center, known as the Technology Innovation Institute (TII), as one of the most advanced open-source large language models (LLMs) not bound by the limitations of others but one that proudly stands among the world’s greatest models.[1]
With a strategic goal and ambition, drawing on a highly skilled team of 25 computer scientists, researchers, and AI specialists from various parts of the world,[2] Falcon was designed to push the boundaries and propel the UAE to the forefront of global innovation.
Through long hours of rigorous development, relentless work, and dedicated research, these experts worked on turning the goal into reality. They trained the model on vast amounts of data, ensuring that it could speak not just in the language of algorithms but in the language of culture, diplomacy, and progress.[3]
With every line of code, parameter, and test, these experts combined their knowledge of machine learning, neural networks, and computational efficiency to craft something truly exceptional that would position the UAE as a leader in AI, not just a consumer of technology. By pushing the boundaries of what was thought feasible, they crafted Falcon to be smarter, quicker, and more adaptive than anything that came before.
Thankfully, their tireless efforts paid off.
When Falcon was first released, it was nothing short of groundbreaking. AI researchers, engineers, developers, and specialists worldwide were enthralled with Falcon the minute it was released.
With its sophisticated design and outstanding performance, Falcon not only entered the scene but also swiftly established itself as a significant contender, ascending to the forefront of Hugging Face’s Large language model leaderboard.[4] This benchmarking platform evaluates and ranks AI models based on their performance in natural language understanding, generation, and efficiency.
But beyond the technical mastery, what really sets Falcon apart from its peers in the realm of large language models (LLMs) attracting the attention of industry experts from San Francisco to Beijing? What makes it stand out in the ever-evolving landscape of AI? And why should the world pay attention to the UAE’s approach to AI development?
Well, what gives Falcon its distinct edge is pretty simple: it’s the revolutionary shift it represents in AI accessibility, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness, along with the UAE’s unique vision and ambition behind it. At a time when cutting-edge AI models are becoming increasingly expensive and exclusive, the UAE set Falcon to take a different approach, one that is open, adaptable, and well-positioned to challenge the dominance of AI giants.
Perhaps the most dominant and outstanding feature of Falcon, which sets it apart from its competitors, is its open-source nature. While DeepSeek has been celebrated for its cost efficiency and ChatGPT for its advanced conversational abilities, Falcon came to prominence for its open-source framework, reflecting the UAE’s strategic intent to foster global collaboration while asserting its own technological leadership.
Unlike most advanced LLMs, which are locked behind corporate walls and accessible only to a select few, Falcon challenged the norm by making its capabilities accessible to all. This is because it’s rooted in the UAE’s belief that AI should be a shared asset that drives global innovation and progress rather than a privileged resource controlled by a few.
Yet, being an open-source model is not Falcon’s only strength. The model is also known for its cost-effectiveness and efficiency. Operating and training AI models can often be an expensive endeavor, with some models demanding large sums of money and massive computing resources. However, that is not the case with Falcon.
Consisting of just 680 million parameters, the model is designed to do more with less, exhibiting exceptional performance while employing less resources at a fraction of the cost.[5] This in fact not only makes Falcon more reasonably priced but also helps the UAE to uphold its commitment to accessible and sustainable AI.
The model’s distinctiveness does not end here. Falcon’s multilingual capabilities especially its strong focus on Arabic natural language processing stands as another outstanding feature. Unlike its peers in the realm of LLMs, Falcon was developed with a profound comprehension of Arabic, understanding and generating Arabic text in different dialects, with high accuracy, making it one of the few AI systems capable of really bridging cultures.[6]
But perhaps the most compelling reason the world should pay attention to Falcon is because of the UAE’s forward-thinking vision and ambition put behind it. The UAE’s advancement in AI has illustrated that success in this domain relies not just on financial assets or technical legacy but on vision, strategy, and inclusivity.
However, the question that lingers in the minds of many is how a nation renowned for its oil reserves carved out a new identity and emerged as a powerhouse in cutting-edge AI technology, let alone surpassing AI giants in performance.
The answer lies not in coincidence but in the UAE’s forward-thinking leadership. Unlike many rich-resource economies, the UAE leaders recognized early on that a country’s future and true power would not be built on oil alone but on innovation, knowledge, intellectual capital, and technological advancement.
They understood that to remain competitive in a rapidly evolving world, they had to invest in the industries of tomorrow, and AI was at the heart of this future and transformation. With this vision in mind the country took bold steps to position itself as a leader in the global AI landscape rather than just adopting AI technologies.
In 2017, it made history by becoming the world’s first country to establish a Ministry of Artificial Intelligence and appoint its first AI minister.[7] This move was not symbolic but deeply strategic, signaling that AI would be central to its long-term vision.
Shortly after, the country unveiled its national AI strategy for 2031, a comprehensive roadmap which it designed to integrate AI across key sectors from healthcare and education to security and economic development.[8] Within this strategy, the UAE ensured that AI governance was incorporated into the highest levels of decision-making, providing a cohesive and strategic approach to implementing AI, unlike other countries where policies on the matter surface from several departments.
To further position the UAE as a global leader in AI applications, turn the vision into reality, and ensure that the AI adoption was not just a policy on paper, the country created the role of Chief Executive Officer for Artificial Intelligence in the ministers and federal entities, an uncommon yet highly effective approach.[9] This meant AI wouldn’t just be talked about or confined to the private sector; it would be integrated into the government, actively shaping how government services and policies are designed.
In order to stay ahead and harness the AI’s transformative potential the country also formed the UAE Council for Artificial Intelligence (AI) where its mandate includes developing AI policy, encouraging research, and establishing collaborations among public and commercial entities as well as foreign organizations.[10]
Unlocking the full potential of AI is no easy feat. Though many nations depend on outside specialists, the UAE went in a different direction. Recognizing that genuine leadership needs a strong foundation of native talent, the UAE has made strategic investments in AI education and research, something even AI powerhouses like the U.S. and China often struggle with, relying heavily on imported talent.
In 2019, the country established the world’s first university dedicated to AI and named it after His Highness Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZUAI), aiming to drive the development of transformative AI technologies, empower the next generation of AI leaders and position the UAE as a global center for AI research and thought leadership.[11]
Complementing this vision is G42, a homegrown AI development holding company based in Abu Dhabi. In 2018, the UAE founded G42 as part of its vision to lead in AI and turn AI research into real-world applications in healthcare, energy, and national security.[12] This public-private collaboration gave the UAE an edge, allowing it to rapidly develop and deploy AI solutions at a pace unmatched by many global counterparts.
The UAE’s efforts to enforce its AI leadership did not stop here. Over the years, the country hosted global AI summits, like the AI Everything Summit and the Global AI Summit, turning these platforms into hubs for knowledge exchange, international collaboration, and shaping global discussions.[13] It seized the opportunity to lead the conversations on ethics, policy, and responsibility, positioning itself as a key player in setting the global AI agenda. While other countries hesitated, the UAE moved forward not with fear of the unknown but with the belief that the future belonged to those who dared to create it,
Hence, the UAE’s ascent in AI is no coincidence; it is the result of a strategic vision, bold investments, and an unwavering commitment to technological leadership. While many countries debated how to integrate AI, the UAE made it a reality.
Today, the country stands at the forefront of the AI revolution. It is one of the leading nations that saw the potential of AI early on and took the necessary steps to turn the ambition into reality, proving that with the right strategy, any nation, regardless of its past, can reinvent itself and lead in the industries of tomorrow.
[1] Ben Wodecki. “Inside Falcon: The UAE’s Open Source Model Challenging AI Giants.” Capacity Media. February 5, 2025. https://www.capacitymedia.com/article/2ednrsm6eglrmfzs429ds/long-reads/article-inside-falcon-the-uaes-open-source-model-challenging-ai-giants.
[2] Billy Perrigo. “The UAE Is on a Mission to Become an AI Power.” Time, March 22, 2024. https://time.com/6958369/artificial-intelligence-united-arab-emirates/.
[3] Saha, Rohit, Angeline Yasodhara, Mariia Ponomarenko, and Kyryl Truskovskyi. 2023. “The Practical Guide to LLMs: Falcon.” Medium. August 31, 2023. https://medium.com/georgian-impact-blog/the-practical-guide-to-llms-falcon-d2d43ecf6d2d.
[4] “Falcon 3: UAE’s Technology Innovation Institute Launches World’s Most Powerful Small AI Models That Can Also Be Run on Light Infrastructures, Including Laptops.” 2024. Technology Innovation Institute. December 17, 2024. https://www.tii.ae/news/falcon-3-uaes-technology-innovation-institute-launches-worlds-most-powerful-small-ai-models.
[5] “Falcon LLM vs. Other Language Models: A Comparative Analysis.” BotPenguin. May 14, 2024. https://botpenguin.com/blogs/falcon-llm-vs-other-language-models.
[6] Hasan, Suha. 2024. “The Middle East Scores Big in Building Arabic AI Models despite Challenges—What’s Next?” Fast Company Middle East. https://fastcompanyme.com. August 8, 2024. https://doi.org/10c3369/b9b7d4cb412ec452dc997a75f
[7] “How Is AI Regulated in the UAE? What Lawyers Need to Know – TR – Legal Insight MENA.” 2024. Thomson Reuters . June 13, 2024. https://insight.thomsonreuters.com/mena/legal/posts/how-is-ai-regulated-in-the-uae-what-lawyers-need-to-know
[8] “The U.A.E.’S Big Bet on Artificial Intelligence.” 2024. U.S. – U.A.E Business Council. https://usuaebusiness.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/SectorUpdate_AIReport_Web.pdf
[9] Emirates News Agency WAM. “UAE Cabinet Approves National Youth Agenda 2031; Introduces ‘Blue Residency’ for Sustainability Experts,” May 15, 2024. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/b35yptd-uae-cabinet-approves-national-youth-agenda-2031
[10] “Artificial Intelligence in Government Policies | the Official Portal of the UAE Government.” n.d. The United Arab Emirates’ Government Portal U.AE. https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/digital-uae/digital-technology/artificial-intelligence/artificial-intelligence-in-government-policies
[11] “Abu Dhabi Launches First Dedicated AI University (and Consultancy).” Consultancy-Me. October 18, 2019. https://www.consultancy-me.com/news/2413/abu-dhabi-launches-first-dedicated-ai-university-and-consultancy.
[12] Hart, Robert. 2024. “What to Know about G42—the Emirati AI Giant That Just Got a $1.5 Billion Investment from Microsoft.” Forbes, April 16, 2024. https://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthart/2024/04/16/what-to-know-about-g42-the-emirati-ai-giant-that-just-got-a-15-billion-investment-from-microsoft/.
[13] “Abu Dhabi to Host Ai Everything Global 2026.” 2025. The Emirates News Agency WAM. February 4, 2025. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi17ems-abu-dhabi-host-everything-global-2026.
“Abu Dhabi to Host Ai Everything Global 2026”. The Emirates News Agency WAM. February 4, 2025. https://www.wam.ae/en/article/bi17ems-abu-dhabi-host-everything-global-2026
Opinion
The U.S. ultimately betrays Ukraine as its intentions are laid bare

On April 23, while visiting India, U.S. Vice President Vance declared to the media that Washington had made a “very clear proposal” to Russia and Ukraine to reach a peace agreement, and threatened that “the time has come for either both sides to agree or for the U.S. to withdraw from mediation.”
This so-called “peace plan” actually presupposes that Ukraine would cede large swathes of territory and abandon joining NATO. It can be regarded as a mediation plan resulting in Ukraine suffering heavy failures and losses, and Russia achieving its objectives, ultimately proving that the U.S., with its intentions laid bare, has brazenly and historically betrayed Ukraine and its European partners.
According to reports, Vance emphasized that both Russia and Ukraine must make territorial concessions, giving up parts of the territories they currently control. Although the final borders might not be drawn exactly along the current battle lines, both sides need to lay down their arms, freeze the conflict, and turn to building a better Russia and Ukraine to stop the killing.
The U.S. official in charge of security affairs also expressed optimism about the negotiations, believing that all parties have so far been negotiating sincerely.
Later that evening, following Vance’s “either-or” stance, U.S. President Trump once again publicly slammed Ukrainian President Zelensky’s statements about refusing to give up Crimea, accusing him of fueling the fire and making negotiations more difficult.
Trump warned that Zelensky’s rejection of American terms “would only prolong the killing.”
Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump complained: “Zelensky can have peace, or he can fight another three years and lose the entire country. We are very close to reaching an agreement, but this man, who has no cards in his hand, must now draw a conclusion.”
White House spokesperson Leavitt also chimed in, saying Trump was “frustrated and running out of patience… President Zelensky seems to be going in the wrong direction.”
According to a scoop from Axios News Network on the 22nd, last week the U.S. submitted to Ukrainian officials in Paris a “peace plan” that was only one page long, emphasizing that it was the Trump administration’s “final proposal” to turn the Russia-Ukraine war into peace.
Observers believe that if this proposal is implemented, it would mean a complete victory for Russia’s “special military operation” and permanently exclude Ukraine from NATO; Ukraine would lose about 20% of its territory, Europe’s investments in Ukraine over the past three years would be utterly lost, and the U.S. would profit from it.
Reportedly, this “ultimate” mediation proposal was drafted after U.S. Middle East Envoy Whitcoff held about a four-hour meeting with Russian President Putin last week, highlighting that the U.S. had fully conceded to Russia’s demands.
In other words, this hasty end to the Russia-Ukraine war is little more than a unilateral Russian ceasefire agreement written in English.
According to the plan, Russia emerges as the biggest winner of the Russia-Ukraine war:
- The U.S. would “legally” recognize Russia’s control of Crimea;
- It would “de facto” recognize Russia’s control over nearly all of Luhansk, parts of Donetsk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia;
- The U.S. would promise that Ukraine could join the EU but not NATO;
- It would lift sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014;
- Russia would strengthen cooperation with the U.S. in areas like energy and industry.
According to this plan, Ukraine becomes the biggest loser of the Russia-Ukraine war:
- It will receive strong security guarantees through a temporary security mechanism composed of European countries;
- It will regain a small part of Kharkiv region currently controlled by Russia;
- The Dnipro River in the southern conflict zone will remain unobstructed;
- Ukraine will receive compensation and aid needed for reconstruction;
- The largest nuclear power plant in Europe — the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant — will belong to Ukraine, but it will be operated by the United States and will supply electricity to both Russia and Ukraine;
- Ukraine’s mineral resources will be developed based on agreements signed between the United States and Ukraine.
According to other American media reports, even though the U.S. plan “de facto” recognizes Russian control over most of the four eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, it does not require Russian troops to withdraw.
In addition, a “flexible force” would be established, or a “joint committee” composed of Russia, Ukraine, and a non-NATO country would be set up to supervise the ceasefire and urge implementation of the peace agreement.
The U.S. might participate but would only provide funding, not ground troops.
Russia has publicly opposed the appearance of any NATO troops on Ukrainian soil.
On April 21, Trump revealed that this “peace plan” would be announced within three days. The New York Times reported on the 18th, citing a U.S. official, that Ukraine seemed “willing to give up 20% of its territory,” provided that such territorial concessions are only a “factual acknowledgment” of Russian control, not a permanent “legal recognition.”
A “factual acknowledgment” simply means objectively accepting the reality that Ukraine has lost parts of its territory, while “legal recognition” would signify Ukraine permanently giving up the right to reclaim it.
The one-page proposal exposed by U.S. media and the latest statements from Vance and Trump all indicate that the U.S. is determined to sacrifice Ukraine’s interests to please Russia, while profiting from the situation — this mediation proposal is already a foregone conclusion.
On April 21, Putin told Russian state television that although military operations had resumed after Easter, Russia remained open to any “peace initiatives” and hoped Ukraine would adopt the same position.
If this plan was finalized after U.S.-Russia consultations, Putin has no fundamental reason to oppose it, because it basically fulfills all of Russia’s demands for launching military operations against Ukraine:
- Seizing large parts of southeastern Ukraine, including Crimea, and
- Obtaining a Western commitment not to admit Ukraine into NATO.
The only difference is that Russia may eventually give up part of the territories within the “four regions incorporated into Russia.”
Although Ukraine once invaded Russia’s Kursk region and controlled part of it, after a marathon war of attrition, the Russian army has now recaptured 99.5% of the lost territory.
With just about 30 square kilometers remaining, Russia will soon focus on negotiating to secure 20% of Ukraine’s land. However, no matter what, victory belongs to Russia, while defeat falls to Ukraine and its European partners who firmly supported continuing the war.
On September 23, 2022 — seven months after Russian troops invaded Ukraine and controlled large parts of southeastern Ukraine — Russia organized a four-day “referendum” in the occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson.
All four regions voted with over 90% support to secede from Ukraine and join the Russian Federation, covering an area of 90,000 square kilometers, about 15% of Ukraine’s territory, roughly the size of Portugal and Jordan combined.
Three days later, Putin signed treaties with the leaders of the four regions to formalize their incorporation into Russia.
On October 4, the Federation Council of Russia unanimously approved the treaties, and the legal documents for accepting the four regions into Russia as federal subjects were fully ratified.
On the same day, Putin signed orders completing all legal procedures for the regions to join Russia, and the process immediately came into effect.
The vast majority of sovereign states, including Russia’s friendly countries, refused to openly accept Russia’s illegal annexation of the aforementioned Ukrainian territories.
Subsequently, with NATO informally intervening directly in the war, the Russia-Ukraine conflict evolved into a battle of offense and defense with mutual advances and retreats, a tug-of-war, and a war of attrition.
Ultimately, the balance of the war gradually tilted in favor of Russia, leading to Russia effectively controlling most of the territories of the four aforementioned regions.
On the 22nd, Zelensky made it clear regarding the U.S. peace plan that Ukraine would not recognize Russia’s occupation of Crimea.
After a ceasefire, Ukraine is willing to sit at the negotiation table “in any form,” but it will never recognize the occupied territories as belonging to Russia.
According to reports, due to Ukraine’s firm stance, U.S. Secretary of State Rubio boycotted the originally scheduled U.S.-U.K.-etc. ministerial meeting on Ukraine to be held in London on the 23rd, forcing the meeting to be postponed and downgraded to a lower-level meeting.
The media reported that Russia is willing to relinquish part of the Ukrainian territory it controls in exchange for U.S. recognition of its control over Crimea.
Analysts believe that the Trump administration is eager to extricate itself from the quagmire of the Russia-Ukraine war and rapidly restore U.S.-Russia relations.
Therefore, it exerted strong pressure and even open coercion on the Ukrainian government, even accusing Zelensky of having lost the legitimacy of the presidency, demanding that Ukraine quickly hold new presidential elections to force Zelensky to accept this humiliating peace agreement or to replace him through elections so that the newly elected president could sign the document.
Although Ukraine and other European countries generally oppose the Trump administration’s imposed peace plan and are trying to persuade it to change its position, the Trump administration’s bullying style, arrogance, and the adverse prospect of the U.S. abandoning the Russia-Ukraine conflict have placed Ukraine and its European partners in a highly passive situation.
While the Trump administration’s peace plan will undoubtedly experience twists and turns from proposal to implementation, the three-year-long Russia-Ukraine war, regardless of the exact outcome, will result — due to the U.S., this “weak teammate,” betraying and undercutting its allies — in Russia ultimately becoming the big winner.
The only suspense is how much Russia wins and how soon.
The United States, as the instigator of the Ukraine crisis, from long manipulating and deceiving Russia, which wholeheartedly sought to embrace the West, to encouraging NATO’s continuous eastward expansion and intensifying Russia-Europe tensions, to finally at the last moment making it clear it would not militarily intervene against Russia’s deployment of forces, enticed or incited Russia to decisively launch a “special military operation,” dragging both sides into a “European version of the Afghan war” and eroding mutual trust.
Eventually, it abandoned Ukraine and its European partners.
The U.S., as the leader of the West and NATO, has shattered its political integrity, allowing the East, West, and even the entire world to witness the selfishness, ruthlessness, and injustice of American politicians.
This latest reality also reconfirms the new iron rule: the United States is unreliable, untrustworthy, and undependable.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Hamas between the necessities of transformation and the requirements of national partnership

Hamas stands at a pivotal juncture in Palestinian history—one that goes beyond the devastation of aggression and genocidal war on Gaza. This moment raises existential questions about continuity, Hamas’s role within the Palestinian national landscape, and the redefinition of national action amid significant shifts in regional and international conflict dynamics.
The al-Aqsa Flood operation delivered a profound shock to Israeli consciousness. This shock was exploited by the extreme Zionist right to justify a zero-sum war targeting the entire Palestinian population. At the same time, it laid bare the deep structural and political challenges threatening the Palestinian national project. These include a deepening political division that now transcends elite circles and touches the core of Palestinian society—fueled by the comprehensive nature of the war on Gaza and the geopolitical constraints that weigh heavily on grassroots movements.
Compounding this crisis is the institutional deterioration affecting Palestinian factions—possibly even preceding the weakening of official Palestinian institutions. This has led to the absence of a collective political vision capable of forging a unified national strategy that integrates both political efforts and resistance, thereby bridging the harmful divide between legitimacy and armed struggle.
The current events can no longer be framed simply as a war to uproot Hamas or a campaign to degrade its military capacity. The limitations of military means in shifting the broader conflict dynamics or in restraining Israeli aggression have become clear. These means have proven ineffective in halting Israeli efforts to force a decisive resolution that threatens to erase the Palestinian people and their cause.
Today, the war is increasingly used as a pretext to prolong hostilities and to implement Israeli plans to fragment Palestinian geography, dissolve demographic unity, and undermine national identity. This is especially evident in the manipulation of negotiations surrounding the prisoner exchange file, which has exposed Israel’s deceptive tactics.
Moreover, it is no longer acceptable to view this moment as “just another chapter” in a long-standing struggle. The immense human and political costs borne by the Palestinian people, combined with the absence of any clear end to the war, make this an unprecedented and defining moment. It demands a comprehensive national reassessment of all available strategies and tools.
From solo resistance to comprehensive national partnership
Experience has shown that while resistance is both legitimate and necessary, it cannot replace a comprehensive national project. Nor can it be effectively carried out outside the framework of national partnership or through unilateral decision-making. This principle applies equally to political processes dominated by a single faction that excludes other national forces.
What is required is a unified approach—one that addresses the complexity of the conflict across cultural, regional, and international dimensions. This demands full national partnership in decision-making, with careful consideration of regional realities, international contexts, and a precise assessment of the balance of power and resources.
Given its significant influence on the ground and its popular support, Hamas must embrace a multi-level strategic transformation that includes:
1) Transition to collective leadership
Hamas must shift from an individualistic resistance model to collective leadership within a unified national framework. This would re-establish Palestinian politics on a foundation of integration and partnership. Hamas should commit to national legitimacy, align with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and contribute directly to policy formulation—either through its representation in the PLO’s Executive Committee or by supporting consensus-based figures in a transitional phase leading to democratic elections for the Palestinian National Council.
2) Political and organizational renewal
Hamas needs to reposition itself politically through a balanced foreign policy that enhances regional relationships based on constructive neutrality. This includes a commitment to Arab national security in service of the Palestinian cause and a clear rejection of external dependency.
3) Adoption of international law
International law should serve as the political reference point for advancing Palestinian national interests. This principle was clearly stated in Hamas’s 2017 political document, which endorsed an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 borders, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. This represents the minimum consensus among Palestinians and identifies Israeli occupation as the fundamental obstacle to peace.
4) Transparency and accountability
Hamas must adopt a more transparent and participatory political approach and demonstrate readiness to take responsibility for any past misjudgments or unintended violations.
The continued depletion of Palestinian resilience in a prolonged, aimless struggle—with no political horizon in sight—risks weakening the Palestinian cause both regionally and globally. This diminishes opportunities for real national achievements, especially amid the growing danger of regional and international escalation and foreign efforts to shape Gaza’s future while sidelining Palestinian national decision-making.
This reality necessitates an expansion of resistance tools, strengthening Palestinian influence in regional and international arenas, enhancing institutional capacity, and diversifying resistance methods to include popular, legal, and diplomatic strategies. It also calls for internationalizing the issue of Gaza and maintaining political and media pressure.
At the same time, it is essential to activate political confrontation with the occupation through a comprehensive national approach that builds momentum, limits losses, and revitalizes the Palestinian national project at this critical juncture.
Options and pathways for exiting the war
In light of these challenges, four interconnected pathways can help Hamas—and the broader Palestinian national movement—navigate a path out of the current war and toward a renewed national horizon:
1) Initiate an inclusive, unconditional national dialogue
All national and Islamic forces must be brought together in a dialogue that transcends factional divides. The goal is to build a new national consensus, which includes:
— Developing an immediate, unified Palestinian plan to end the unilateral war.
— Addressing the challenges of “the day after” with cohesive national responses.
— Considering initiatives such as Beijing’s proposed emergency technocratic government or the societal support committee proposals discussed in Cairo.
— Preceding these steps with a declaration from Hamas withdrawing from Gaza’s administrative responsibilities.
— Agreeing on the nature and mechanisms of the Palestinian national project, explicitly defining the role of armed resistance as supportive—an integral part, but not a political alternative.
2) Empower the PLO as the sole negotiating body
The PLO should be reaffirmed as the sole legitimate and comprehensive political framework for Palestinians. It must lead negotiations with a clear vision that demands:
— An immediate end to the war.
— Lifting the blockade on Gaza.
—A permanent ceasefire.
— International guarantees for reconstruction.
—A genuine political process based on the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people.
3) Engage regional and international efforts
Hamas and the broader Palestinian leadership should engage with regional and international efforts aimed at halting the war. These include:
— Rejection of displacement plans proposed under the Trump administration.
— Active participation in the Egyptian-Arab initiative.
— Alignment with Saudi-led international coalitions supporting the two-state solution.
— Engagement with the Arab-Islamic summit’s seven-member committee to ensure Palestinians have a unified, balanced, and internationally supported negotiating position.
Ultimately, this moment allows no room for hesitation or political maneuvering. It either becomes a turning point for a meaningful transformation of the Palestinian national project—rebuilt from the wounded heart of Gaza—or it will perpetuate the flawed structures that have led to the current impasse.
Given its field strength and political capacity, Hamas now faces a historic opportunity to redefine its role—not just as a resistance group, but as a vital part of a collective national leadership committed to achieving the historical and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.
-
Asia2 weeks ago
Japanese investors sell $20 billion in bonds amid tariff turmoil
-
Middle East2 weeks ago
Seven-year Gaza ceasefire proposal emerges
-
America2 weeks ago
OpenAI eyes Google’s Chrome browser amid antitrust trial
-
Opinion2 weeks ago
Notes from Antalya: At least there’s dialogue!
-
Asia2 weeks ago
New Russia-China payment network cuts trade costs
-
America2 weeks ago
Three prosecutors resign in New York Mayor Adams case
-
Europe2 weeks ago
From Camerlengo to Conclave: The steps after a Pope’s passing
-
Opinion2 weeks ago
Can India be a winner in the trade war?