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Who are the foreign fighters of IS-K in Afghanistan?

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Islamic State of Khorasan IS-K, also known as the Daesh terrorist group has added a large number of foreign fighters to its organization in addition to local fighters. Pakistanis, who are always considered as the main options for leadership of IS, after two periods of leadership of this branch, now they have a significant role in the Council of Lajneh. This council has the decision-making authority of IS and evaluates and finalizes the decisions of the leader of this branch.

Also, despite a number of Pakistani IS commanders being killed in Afghanistan by the Taliban, some Pakistanis are still acting governors of some provinces, including Kunar and Laghman.

At the same time, the Uzbek fighters of Jundullah have also recently joined the IS. The findings show that the Uzbek members of the Jundallah group pledged loyalty to the IS after the assassination of their leader by the Taliban. It has been said that two thousand fighters of Jundallah have joined the IS.

Meanwhile, the IS has increased its efforts to recruit more Pakistani and Uzbek fighters. The leadership of this branch of IS-K is still trying to include Uzbek fighters who are disaffected with the Taliban.

It should be mentioned that based on the presence of these fighters, the activity of IS has spread to Central Asia states and there was some rocket incident as well.

The IS group launched its branch activity in Afghanistan and the region under the name “IS-K” for the first time in 2015. The geography that IS considered for its caliphate included parts of Afghanistan, Iran and also Pakistan.

IS-K intensified its activates in Afghanistan

Currently, the activity of this group has increased and has expanded its attacks to Central Asia. The latest report of the United Nations shows that the Khorasan branch of IS currently has between four and six thousand fighters in Afghanistan.

Recently, it has been reported that due to the geography of IS-K, most of its members have Afghan citizenship and are also present in the key positions of this group.

Definitely, the key part of IS-K is made up of foreign jihadists; People who pledged allegiance to IS due to dissatisfaction with other jihadist groups, including the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban.

Some of the members of al-Qaeda are also related to IS, but the question is, which groups of fighters are currently members of IS-K and what role do they play in expanding the scope of this group’s activities?

Pakistanis and the founding of IS-K till Council of Lajneh

Despite the presence of a number of Afghan fighters in the composition of IS-K, this branch was founded for the first time by the disgruntled Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan.

Hafiz Saeed Orakzai, the former commander of the Pakistani Taliban, left the TTP in October 2014 due to disappointment with the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban and pledged allegiance to IS-K.

Orakzai worked as the leader of the Khorasan branch of IS for about one and a half years and was finally killed by US forces in August 2016.

After one year of the leadership of this group by Abdul Haseeb Logari, the leadership of IS-K again went to Pakistani fighters. At that time, Abdullah Orakzai, known as Aslam Farooqi, was in charge of the leadership of the group from April 2017 until he was finally arrested and imprisoned by the then Afghan security forces in 2020.

Since then, some resentful Pakistani Taliban fighters have been members of IS-K branch and as commanders, they have played a key role in the current IS insurgency.

Kunar is next target for IS

Even some of the “emirs” of the IS-K branch in Afghanistan are Pakistani fighters. Among these, Qari Fateh was working as the so-called “emir” of IS-K in Kunar province.

In February of this year, the Taliban announced by publishing pictures that they killed Qari Fateh in Kabul.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid said at that time that Fateh was the head of intelligence and operations of IS-K in Afghanistan. The Taliban even named him as a responsible man for attacking mosques and diplomatic places.

The Taliban had once again announced in early June of this year that they killed another commander of the Daesh identified as Tarab Bajauri in Laghman province. This Pakistani commander was active as the “emir” of the Khorasan branch of the IS group in Laghman province. It has said that Bajauri joined IS along with Hafiz Saeed Orakzai.

Bajauri was known for his long history in military affairs and was among those top IS-K members that significantly spread the influence of the group in Kunar province. The Taliban called him an important member of the Khorasan IS branch in Afghanistan. Such positions of the Taliban show that Pakistani fighters are one of the main pillars of IS-K and are actively present in Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.

IS key members arrested and killed

Currently, Asadullah Orakzai is another prominent Pakistani commander of IS-K branch. He works as the leader of Daesh in Laghman and is also a member of the Council of Lajneh. According to the reports, Orakzai is in charge of this IS-K leadership council and its members decide on the activities of this group in “Khorasan region”.

Orakzai, alias Aslam Farooqi, the leader of Daesh’s so-called Khorasan Province affiliate, arrested in Afghanistan

Qari Fateh was also a key member of this council where he had a key say on the future activities of the branch in Afghanistan.

Also, Saifullah Orakzai, as one of the prominent commanders of the IS-K branch, is a member of Lajneh council.

In this way, the findings show that Pakistani fighters are active members of the IS-K branch, who are present in Afghanistan, and at least in addition to the experience of leading this branch twice, they are active as governors in the provinces and also as military and intelligence commanders.

At the same time, IS-K is trying its best to increase the number of its Pakistani fighters. This branch of IS has made the issue of the allegiance of Pakistani fighters a part of its future plan.

In this process, people who are dissatisfied with the conditions of working with the Pakistani Taliban are attracted to IS in order to expand the activities of this group in eastern Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan.

It should be mentioned that most of the Pakistani members of the Khorasan branch of IS have been attracted to this group due to dissatisfaction with their previous groups, and due to the high level of dissatisfaction, the number of Pakistani IS fighters is likely to increase.

Jundullah group joined Daesh with thousands of fighters

The findings show that the Uzbek members of the Jundallah group have also joined IS-K in the north of the country. According to the information, except for a small part of this group, most of its Uzbek commanders and fighters have joined IS in Khorasan.

IS has incorporated a branch of the Jundullah group, which consists of Uzbek fighters in northern Afghanistan. In this way, Mullah Saad, a citizen of Uzbekistan, has started working as the leader of this group in IS-K and Osama Ghazi from Uzbekistan as his deputy.

In addition to these two leaders of the Jundullah group, about two thousand fighters of this group and thousands of their supporters in the provinces of Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan and Faryab have also become part of IS-K.

This fundamental development took place after the Uzbek members of the Jundullah group became distrustful of the Taliban’s intentions. According to the findings, Uzbek fighters played a major role in the fall of the North to the hands of the Taliban, but after the return of the Taliban into the power, the leadership and members of Jundullah faced their indifference.

Besides this, Taliban people even assassinated some of its leaders to control this group. The information shows that Usman Ghazi, one of the Uzbek immigrants who entered Afghanistan with five thousand Uzbek citizens during the rule of Burhanuddin Rabbani almost four decades ago, later became a member of Jundallah based on Abdul Malik Rigi’s request.

At that time, Rigi was one of the leaders of Jundullah, who was active in Iran, and was executed after being arrested by the security forces of Iran.

But after the fall of the first government of the Taliban in 2001, Ghazi went to Pakistan to manage his group’s guerrilla attacks against the previous government along with the Afghan Taliban. According to the order of Mullah Omar, the founder of the Taliban, he returned to Zabul with hundreds of members of this group, and in 2016, he decided to unofficially pledge allegiance to IS in consultation with some Taliban leaders.

Jundallah joins IS to revenge against the Taliban

Apparently, this scenario was part of making a case for his removal, because Usman Ghazi was ambushed by Taliban commanders in the following weeks and was killed along with his wife and several children on the road to Zabul.

According to the findings, this action caused Osama Ghazi, his son, to go to Kandahar and Badakhshan with 150 other Jundallah members from Zabul, where his father was present, and then leave there. But he was waiting to take revenge from the Taliban until he joined IS with all the members of his group after the Taliban regained control.

Meanwhile, Daesh has used the members of Jundallah to expand its activities to Central Asia. For example, a member of this group, who was active in Faryab under the command of Salahuddin Ayubi, launched a rocket attack on Uzbekistan.

On the other hand, IS in Khorasan has increased its efforts to get allegiance from Salahuddin Ayubi, the commander of Uzbek origin and disaffected Taliban. He has a close relationship with the fighters from the north and seems to be able to connect IS with some other armed groups in Tajikistan and other parts of the northern part of the country.

Also, according to its plans to expand its activities to Central Asia, IS is seeking more contact with Uzbek fighters. This effort somehow highlights the connection of this group with some commanders and fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

This is despite the fact that Daesh has previously assigned a team responsible to monitor Tajikistan and get support from there. It should be remembered that this group, in addition to Khorasan, also pays serious attention to the Indian subcontinent.

IS has a wider plan not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan

According to the reports, the IS leadership has ordered its members in the Indian subcontinent to intensify their activities in India and Pakistan in mid-2022. Abul Hasan al-Hashemi Qureshi, the then leader of IS in Iraq, asked Sheikh Zubair Ahmad, the governor of IS in India, for positive changes in that geography.

Following the same order, Sheikh Zubair Ahmed had decided to accelerate its propaganda staff and used Telegram as a social tool to spread its propaganda activities.

IS declared a caliphate in 2014, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was considered the first leader of the group. It should be mentioned that this group has extensive activities in Afghanistan in addition to Iraq and some other Arabic countries.

These terrorist activities have been deepened after the return of the Taliban to power and have included attacks on diplomatic places and rocket attacks on Central Asian countries.

Considering the recent changes of IS and the joining of foreign fighters in the rank of Khorasan, it seems that this group has plans to exert more influence in Khorasan Province. Previously, the information showed that IS-K is also seeking to capture Kunar province, a case that has been delayed after the evaluation of the Council of Lajneh.

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How will Trump’s potential tariffs affect Southeast Asia?

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Southeast Asia is worried about Donald Trump’s threat of universal tariffs and a new trade war with China. Five of the region’s six largest economies run a trade surplus with the United States.

But experts say the situation may not be so bad. The region, which tries to remain geopolitically neutral, saw an increase in gross trade with both China and the U.S. between 2017 and 2020 during Trump’s first presidency. Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have benefited as companies from China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the U.S. have expanded their production bases in Southeast Asia to avoid U.S. tariffs.

Experts say exports and economic growth will take a hit in the short term, but the region could benefit from trade diversion and substitution.

What is Trump’s tariff threat?

The goal of Trump’s trade policy is to bring manufacturing jobs back to the U.S. and decouple supply chains from China. Trump and his advisers claim that China’s trade advantage is due to “currency manipulation, intellectual property theft and forced technology transfer”.

During his first term, Trump used executive powers to impose tariffs of up to 25% on $250bn of electronics, machinery and consumer goods imported from China. Beijing retaliated with similar measures on U.S. agricultural, automotive and technology exports.

Now Trump has proposed a 60 per cent tariff on all Chinese goods entering the U.S. and tariffs of up to 20 per cent on imports from everywhere else.

How bad could it be for Southeast Asia?

According to Oxford Economics, about 40 per cent of Cambodia’s exports go to the U.S., making it the largest exporter in Asean as a percentage of total exports, followed by Vietnam with 27.4 per cent and Thailand with 17 per cent. Thanavath Phonvichai, president of the University of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, said the Thai economy could take a 160.5 billion baht ($4.6 billion) hit if Trump fulfils his promises.

Vietnam has the world’s fourth-largest trade surplus with the United States. This imbalance has been growing rapidly as Chinese, Taiwanese and South Korean companies have used Vietnam to avoid Trump-era tariffs. Vietnam’s fortunes could change just as quickly, especially if the U.S. continues to classify Vietnam as a ‘non-market economy’, which requires higher tariffs.

Uncertainty over Trump’s tariffs could cause companies to pause or halt investment plans in Southeast Asia. U.S. companies accounted for about half of Singapore’s $9.5 billion in fixed-asset investment last year, according to the city-state’s Economic Development Board. In his congratulatory letter to Trump, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong was quick to remind him that the United States enjoys a “consistent trade surplus” with Singapore.

Any blow to the Chinese economy will have repercussions for Asean countries that depend on Chinese consumption, export demand and tourism. A reduced appetite for Chinese goods will also affect Southeast Asian suppliers of inputs to Chinese producers. Indonesia, Southeast Asia’s largest economy, will suffer the most because it exports 24.2 per cent of its goods to China, mainly commodities.

Unable to send their goods to the U.S., Chinese exporters may turn to Southeast Asia, where governments have faced complaints from local producers hurt by dumping in metals, textiles, and consumer goods.

What is Southeast Asia’s advantage?

Southeast Asia’s current manufacturing boom started because of the trade war. Over time, analysts expect trade substitution and diversion to outweigh the hit to growth.

“We think a stronger crackdown on China could lead to more supply chain diversion as Chinese companies trade and invest more in Asia,” said Jayden Vantarakis, head of ASEAN research at Macquarie Capital.

“Electric vehicle factories, which some Southeast Asian governments are aggressively pursuing, could provide an economic buffer. Demand for EVs is also growing outside the U.S., so I think there could be a net benefit for Indonesia. Smaller countries that are trying to be carbon neutral, especially as petrol prices get more expensive, will try to take over the supply and buy more electric cars,” said Sumit Agarwal, a professor at the National University of Singapore’s School of Business.

Trump’s promised tariffs could embolden Asean governments to impose anti-dumping duties on Chinese goods, as Thailand did on rolled steel this year. Stricter U.S. rules of origin could also give governments an opportunity to ensure that more high-value parts are produced and assembled locally.

How will Southeast Asian currencies and markets be affected?

Trump’s tariffs could reduce pressure on Southeast Asian central banks to ease monetary policy further.

“Essentially, Trump’s victory is inflationary for the world because of his planned tariffs, so the global monetary normalization or easing cycle will probably not be as sharp as previously thought, including in the Philippines,” said Miguel Chanco, chief emerging Asia economist at UK-based Pantheon Macroeconomics.

Speaking to Nikkei Asia, Chanco said Southeast Asian currencies will not strengthen as much as previously expected, partly because markets are re-pricing the pace of easing by the U.S. Federal Reserve and thus the dollar will continue to strengthen.

Among Southeast Asia’s six major economies, the Thai baht and Malaysian ringgit have been the worst-performing currencies since Trump’s victory, losing 3.2 per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively against the U.S. dollar through Wednesday.

Thai brokerage InnovestX recommended stocks that would benefit from a strong dollar and weak baht. These include companies with significant export earnings, such as CP Foods and Delta Electronics, or tourism-related companies such as Airports of Thailand, property developers and hoteliers.

Governments are already taking steps to reduce their over-dependence on the U.S. or China by deepening ties with other countries and regions and emphasizing their neutrality.

Southeast Asian economies in particular are also expected to focus on building resilience by strengthening intra-ASEAN trade.

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Japan’s exports rise despite global risks, boosted by China

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Japan’s exports rose more than expected in October, driven by strong demand from China and other parts of Asia, despite growing uncertainties in global markets.

Exports increased by 3.1% year-on-year, led by significant growth in shipments of chip-making equipment, particularly to China, according to the Finance Ministry’s report on Wednesday. This marked a rebound following the first drop in 10 months in September. October’s figures exceeded economists’ forecasts of a 1% rise and were also bolstered by increased shipments of medical products to the United States.

Meanwhile, imports edged up by 0.4%, defying expectations of a 1.9% decline. As a result, the trade deficit widened to 461.2 billion yen ($2.98 billion), compared to 294.1 billion yen in the previous month.

This stronger-than-expected export performance has raised optimism about Japan’s economic recovery. Although the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) expanded for the second consecutive quarter through September, the pace of growth has been tempered by the drag from net exports.

“Today’s data raises hopes that external demand will revive in the October-December quarter,” said Hiroshi Miyazaki, Senior Research Fellow at the Itochu Research Institute. “The Chinese government’s stimulus measures have stabilized its economy and reversed the prior decline.”

Exports to China rose by 1.5% last month, rebounding from a 7.3% drop in September, with semiconductor manufacturing equipment exports surging by nearly a third. These gains align with signs that China’s stimulus policies are beginning to yield results, driving growth in certain sectors and boosting consumer spending.

Notably, Japanese exports grew despite the yen’s strengthening against the dollar, averaging 145.87 yen per dollar in October—2% stronger than the previous year, according to ministry data.

The export rebound occurs against a backdrop of heightened concerns about global trade policies. Business leaders are bracing for the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House, with fears that his proposed tariffs—60% on imports from China and 20% on other nations—could disrupt international commerce.

Some regions are already experiencing a slowdown. Shipments to the United States and Europe declined by 6.2% and 11.3%, respectively, in October.

The Bank of Japan (BoJ) is closely monitoring these developments. BoJ Governor Kazuo Ueda noted on Monday that while the Federal Reserve’s prospects for a soft landing have improved, risks tied to the U.S. economy and their impact on global markets require careful consideration.

The most pressing concern for Japan’s trade outlook is the impact of potential U.S. tariffs. Historical data from the U.S.-China trade war (2018-2019) suggests that a 1% increase in export prices, including tariffs, led to a 0.35 percentage-point reduction in profit margins for Chinese exporters, according to research from Stanford University’s Centre for Chinese Economics and Institutions. A similar scenario could hurt Japanese firms’ profitability, counteracting gains from the yen’s depreciation.

“We are not yet at a stage where Trump’s tariff policy is clearly impacting export volumes or exporters’ behavior,” Miyazaki told The Japan Times. “However, there remains significant uncertainty, and we must continue to monitor the policy stance of the next Trump administration,” he added.

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IMF reviews Pakistan’s $7bn bailout

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An International Monetary Fund (IMF) team conducted an unscheduled visit to Pakistan last week to assess the country’s progress on the terms of its $7 billion bailout package. The surprise visit, coming less than two months after the loan’s approval, has raised questions about the future of the bailout program. IMF staff are expected to present their findings to the Washington-based executive board for review.

What prompted the IMF’s unexpected visit to Pakistan?

Several officials, speaking to Nikkei Asia on condition of anonymity, highlighted key factors prompting the visit. These included a $685 million shortfall in the government’s tax collection target for the first quarter of the current fiscal year and a $2.5 billion deficit in the external financing required under the bailout terms. Compounding these issues was the failed sale of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA), a key component of the IMF-recommended privatisation drive.

While routine IMF program review visits are standard, the timing of this visit—just seven weeks after board approval—has raised concerns. “This suggests significant difficulties in implementing the program,” said Naafey Sardar, an economics professor at St. Olaf College in the United States, speaking to Nikkei Asia.

Ikram ul Haq, a lawyer specializing in economic and tax policy, added, “The reality is that the government’s promises to the IMF have not been fulfilled.”

What were the key issues discussed?

The IMF raised the issue of the tax gap and urged action to ensure that Pakistan meets its annual tax collection target of $46 billion.

Islamabad was also asked to engage with Saudi Arabia and China, the largest investor, to bridge the external financing gap. Promised energy sector reforms and the repayment of billions of dollars of debt owed to mostly Chinese-backed power plants in Pakistan were also discussed.

Another issue was for the IMF to press provincial governments for more funds, such as the Benazir Income Support Programme, which provides a $2.1 billion annual cash transfer for poverty alleviation, currently paid for by the central government.

How does agricultural income tax fit into this picture?

As part of the loan agreement, Pakistan’s provinces missed an end-October deadline to harmonize their agricultural income tax laws with the federal income tax.

The IMF had previously said that Pakistan’s loan agreement would be in jeopardy if agricultural income remained largely untaxed. During the meetings, provincial government officials told the IMF that they would face significant difficulties in implementing a higher tax.

Economist Aqdas Afzal said such a move would face significant opposition from big landowners, who are disproportionately represented in the federal and provincial assemblies.

“Given the weak mandate of the current government, a higher agricultural income tax is unlikely as it could trigger major social and political unrest,” he added.

What assurances has the government given to the IMF?

Pakistan has assured the IMF that it will increase the provincial agricultural income tax rate by up to 45 percent. It has also pledged to meet annual tax collection targets and to continue reforms in the energy sector and state-owned enterprises.

“This is an ongoing dialogue process and there have been discussions [with the IMF] on energy and SOE reforms, the privatization agenda and public finance,” Pakistan’s Finance and Revenue Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb told local media.

Haq, a tax expert, said the government’s primary focus would be on meeting the six-month revenue collection target set by Pakistan’s Federal Board of Revenue, a government agency that regulates and collects taxes.

What are the challenges ahead for Pakistan’s loan agreement?

Meeting tough tax targets and implementing structural reforms are major hurdles for the government to overcome.

The IMF has previously cancelled other loan programmes when conditions were not met. Payments to Pakistan could be suspended or stopped altogether, which would be a serious blow to a country struggling with a sputtering economy.

The IMF is pressing for cuts in government spending.

“Structural reforms are being resisted by vested interests, making efforts to meet IMF conditions even more difficult,” Haq said.

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