EUROPE
Europe’s ‘illiberal democracies” issue
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Andrzej Duda, president of Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS), made a very harsh statement on the long-debated issue of releasing funds for covid recovery. Duda said he would no longer respond to proposals from the European Commission, taking all the necessary steps for the relevant fund. The Polish leader went even further, claiming that a group of “left-wing liberal” politicians in Brussels wanted a government change in the country.
The recovery fund that Brussels had allocated to Poland was around 36 billion euros, but this money had not been in Warsaw’s hands for a long time on the grounds that it had not follow “supremacy of law”. Poland’s plan was finally approved; European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen again made the provision of money conditional on “reform”.
In November last year, the European Commission froze 100m euros in EU funding to Poland over Warsaw’s refusal to comply with a decision by the EU to end the activities of the Polish Disciplinary Service. On 15 July, the PİS government made amendments to the law on the Supreme Court and terminated the running of the disciplinary board. Established in 2017, the Disciplinary Chamber was presented by the government as a judicial reform. The chamber was viewed by the opposition and the EU as a way of intimidating independent judges that go against the government. The agency had no legal identity, which was approved by both the Polish Constitutional Court and the ECHR. The EU had even started fining Poland 1m euros per day for the chamber. Upon this, Duda decided to close the chamber and establish the “Professional Chamber of Responsibility”. According to the opponents, it was just a variation of the same thing.
Poland as leader of the ‘rebellion‘ against Brussels
Founded in the early 2000s, Poland’s ruling party, PİS, has become one of the most important representatives of the political position in Europe, now called “right-wing populist”, over the years. At first, it was thought that there would be a standard “Christian Democrat” party, and it was also on good terms with the Catholic Church. After the election victory in 2015, criticism rose both inside and outside: PİS was attacking Poland’s “democratic institutions”, acting against the rule of law, interfering with the Constitutional Court, restricting human rights and freedoms and increasing the country’s debt. In summary, the PİS administration was in contradiction with the “Round Table Talks” that emerged in the 1980s and that governments generally attuned with after the dissolution of socialism.
What was that consensus? We can summarize it under four headings: first, democratization and decentralization; second, the “inefficiency” of the socialist economy and, as a remedy, the process of transition to a fast free-market capitalist economy in which private ownership would be central; third, -related to the second one- the acceptance of the “bitter prescription” and austerity policies under IMF and World Bank supervision; and fourth, good relations with the US in foreign policy, integration into EU mechanisms, and NATO membership were the constant principles.
Pre-PİS governments had complied unquestioningly with a harsh privatisation programme and IMF-World Bank-based neoliberal offensive policies. The reform process, initiated in 1997 following the Shock Therapy in the early 1990s, placed the neoliberal agenda and led to a serious decline in the living standards of millions of Poles.
It was under these circumstances that the march of PİS, which started with the coalition in 2005 and ended with power alone in 2015, began. PİS, who was tougher on anti-communism and Russian hostility than its predecessors, appeared before voters in the 2015 elections with the promise of deviation from neoliberal testament under the name of “economic patriotism”. In this context, in addition to reducing the power of banks and multinational companies, a “social transfer” campaign, which had not been seen since 1989, was also put forward: lowering the retirement age, financial support for families with more than one child, tax regulation and hourly minimum wage. This was accompanied by cultural policies such as objection to the law that frees gay marriages, criticism of the EU’s migration and multiculturalism policy, strengthening the nation-state system and protection of Christian values. Not to mention changing the street names that are related to communism from the period of the People’s Republic of Poland, they were such hostile as to change street names from Poland’s socialist traditions.
Indeed, Warsaw’s flag of rebellion against Brussels is marked by an ideological slur that identify with fascism, communism and the LGBT, and underlines the opposition to all of this. At this point, it should be stated that in the overthrow of the first PİS power (2005-2007), the urban-educated professional layers had a significant role, who believed that harsh neoliberalism was still beneficial to them and that they would prosper. The group consisted of people who took out a loan and bought a house, took out private health insurance to get rid of Poland’s poor health system, went to private schools or sent their children there. The eurozone crisis has crashed the hopes of these segments as well. Poland, whose economy has been growing steadily since the fall of communism, reached its peak in the 2000s, was entering the 2010s with an economic slowdown. Those who sent PİS with a tin can tied to its tail were printing two seals on its “national capitalism” in 2015.
This is the source of the tension between the EU and Poland. This is the Poland’s motivation behind the demand of $1.26 trillion in compensation from Germany due to World War II. The Polish leadership is driven by the equation “Germany equals the EU”. This situation, combined with anti-Russianism, gives Warsaw an interesting field of action: the anti-Russian Anglo-American alliance, together with the Baltic countries, assigns a special role to Poland. Moreover, Britain, which has left the EU, wants to consolidate a non-EU Eastern European alliance system that includes Poland.[1] This being the case, Poland can raise its voice against both Russia and Germany.
Raising the voice might be a bit of an understatement: PİS leader Jarosław Kaczyński said last August that there was a German-Russian plan designed to rule Europe, and that Poland did not follow it. Kaczyński argued that the Polish opposition also acted in accordance with this plan and wanted to make the country “obedient to neighbouring powers”. Whereas last year, it was him last year who caused eyebrows to raise, saying that the EU had become the “Fourth German Reich”. Justice Minister Zbigniew Ziobro recently went further and argued that Germany wanted a “colonial government” in Poland.
Hungary seeks reconciliation
Another “illiberal” country that an issue for Brussels is Hungary. Following his 54.13% election victory last April, Fidesz leader Viktor Orban referred to the EU headquarters, saying his victories were visible from the Moon, even from Brussels. Orban also explained who they had won the victory against: the Leftists, the bureaucrats in Brussels, George Soros, the international mainstream media, and even the President of Ukraine.
In 2014, Orban said his goal was “to build an illiberal democracy based on national institutions”. According to Orban, the 2008 global economic crisis showed that liberal democratic states were not globally competitive. The Hungarian leader said he wants to transform “welfare societies” into “employment/working societies” and previously stated that central control should increase in order to cope with energy companies and banks. Orban was struggling to get rid of “debt slavery” and not to make Hungary a “colony of the EU”. What he meant was abandoning the liberal way of looking at the world in order to put society in order.
However, it seems that Orban, who riveted his power, wants to make a fresh start with Germany. Fidesz leader Olaf Scholz, who left for Berlin in October, met with Germany’s new chancellor last year. Afterwards, although Orban described the meeting as “productive”, it was noteworthy that a joint press conference was not held.
Although it is understandable that the traffic light coalition in Germany does not want to side with Orban, it seems that both countries are now sending the message of “unity”. Hungary, like Poland, faces the threat of halting the European Commission’s pandemic recovery funds. The release of funds, which will be decided on November 19th, is of vital importance for Budapest, and it is above all to get Berlin’s approval on this matter.
Orban hoped he could find support for his own anti-sanction position in the German business world, as German industry suffered greatly due to anti-Russian sanctions. Germany is still the largest foreign investor in Hungary and the country’s main trading partner. But Orban doesn’t seem to have found what he hoped for: German industrialists didn’t like Orban, who attended a business forum in Berlin. The German industry as a whole supports anti-Russian sanctions, said Philip Hausmann, president of the German Eastern Trade Association. Hausmann also warned that the German-Hungarian partnership was in danger. According to him, the increasing “illiberal” practices of the Hungarian government were disrupting this partnership. “Whoever cooperates with us wins,” Orban said.
The latest situation in Germany, France, Italy
In the past week, it may not have been felt around here how the tension between Germany and France got to the newspapers. But the hysteria in the French press reached such a point that the country’s oldest financial newspaper, Les Echos, made the headline, “The war between France and Germany has become possible again.”
What happened? The German-French joint cabinet meeting was cancelled, with Scholz and Macron avoiding the cameras. Current contradictions are evident: rising energy prices and Germany’s unilateral subsidy decision, objection to increasing joint debt. All this is causing Paris to raise eyebrows. Moreover, Olaf Scholz’s visit to China was not welcomed by Emmanuel Macron, who reportedly offered to “give the impression that Europe is united” and the German Chancellor declined. France argues that the two countries must develop a special relationship in order to make the EU a geopolitical centre and to create a weight against the US and China. On top of that, France seems to be far behind its oldest rival economically in the last few decades.
It seems that Germany is not very much involved. Germany, which has bowed to the United States militarily and economically, also seems to have paused on joint defence projects with France. From the French point of view, the Germans think: If a European-based defense industry is to be developed, it must be a German industry under American control. Otherwise, there should be no such defense industry at all. It is clear that the two countries have different interpretations of “strategic autonomy”of the EU.
In Italy, another powerful country, the new right-wing power that has aroused “fear” in Brussels, is not thought to be that frightening. Giorgia Meloni, who met Brussels bureaucrats for the first time after his election, described the dialogue as “very sincere and very positive”. Meloni reiterated his pro-EU position on joint fight against rising energy prices and support for Ukraine against Russia. Meloni presents himself to the EU as a pragmatic, moderate and mainstream politician.
[1]. According to an Italian newspaper, the United Kingdom has for some time been eager to establish a “Commonwealth of Europe” consisting of the Baltic countries, Poland and Ukraine. Even more interestingly, according to the newspaper, Turkey will be added to it soon after the community is formed. See the news.
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EUROPE
Operationsplan Deutschland: The debate over ‘planned economy’ in Germany
Published
13 hours agoon
21/11/2024As Ukraine fires U.S.-made long-range missiles at Russia for the first time and Russian leader Vladimir Putin updates his country’s nuclear doctrine, European countries are preparing for an all-out war on the continent.
According to a 1,000-page document drawn up by the German armed forces called ‘Operationsplan Deutschland’, Germany will host hundreds of thousands of troops from NATO countries and act as a logistics hub to send huge amounts of military equipment, food and medicine to the front line.
The German military is also instructing businesses and civilians on how to protect key infrastructure and mobilize for national defense in the event of Russia expanding drone flights, espionage and sabotage across Europe.
Businesses have been advised to draw up contingency plans detailing the responsibilities of employees in the event of an emergency, and told to stockpile diesel generators or install wind turbines to ensure energy independence.
More state intervention in the economy under discussion
In this context, state intervention in the economy and in companies is being discussed more intensively.
The German state has far-reaching rights in crisis situations. The energy crisis showed how quickly the state can intervene: At the time, the German government filled gas storage facilities by law, nationalized the gas importer Uniper and supplied floating LNG terminals.
According to Bertram Brossardt, CEO of the Bavarian Business Association, even a “transition to a planned economy” could be possible in an emergency.
This ‘planned economy’ could involve the state issuing food vouchers or even forcing people to work in certain sectors, such as water or transport companies.
Companies could also benefit if they have employees who volunteer for disaster relief, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) or the fire brigade.
Lieutenant Colonel Jörn Plischke, who conducted the company training in Hamburg, said: “It costs you a few days a year to support this. But in a crisis, you have a direct link to the people who protect people and infrastructure,” he said.
Hamburg: The intersection of civil and military economy
Hamburg, where Lieutenant Colonel Plischke attended the event, is a central hub for the transport of goods and troops.
“If our infrastructure is used for military purposes, the risk of cyber-attacks and sabotage increases significantly,” the mayor of the Hanseatic city, Peter Tschentscher, told the Faz newspaper.
The Hamburg Senate has therefore created additional staff to strengthen civil defense. A third ‘home defense corps’ has been introduced, made up of volunteers who do not fight in the troops but work to ensure protection and security.
Exercises are currently being held in the Hanseatic city with the German armed forces and civilian forces.
According to the report, this exercise, called ‘Red Storm Alpha’, is training in the protection of port facilities.
The next exercise, ‘Red Storm Bravo’, will start soon and will be on a larger scale.
The lessons learnt from these exercises will then be incorporated into the ‘Operationsplan Deutschland’. This plan is intended to be a ‘living document’, constantly evolving and adapting to new information and threats.
EUROPE
The era of the ‘right-wing majority’ in the European Parliament
Published
15 hours agoon
21/11/2024Under Ursula von der Leyen’s second presidency, the European Commission will abandon its previous ‘cordon sanitaire’ policy towards the ‘far right’.
Leyen’s new Commission will include two members from the ‘far right’. Raffaele Fitto of Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy – FdI), the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Olivér Várhelyi, who is close to Fidesz, the party of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Fratelli d’Italia is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the EP, while Fidesz is part of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group, which also includes the French National Rally (RN) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).
The conservative European People’s Party (EPP), led by German CSU politician Manfred Weber, has repeatedly cooperated with the ECR in the past legislature and explicitly reserves the right to do so in the future.
The cordon sanitaire against the right is practically non-existent
More recently, it has voted with the PfE and sometimes even with the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), of which the German AfD is a member. The traditional border against the ‘extreme right’ (the so-called ‘security cordon’) is thus continuing to crumble.
The security cordon was systematically relaxed by the EPP in the last legislative period. As early as January 2022, the EPP made it possible for an MEP from the right-wing ECR to be elected as one of the vice-presidents of the EP.
A study by the Greens shows that the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has relied on MEPs from the ECR and even the more right-wing ID (Identity and Democracy) group in around 340 votes to secure a majority.
According to the study, these demands often included a reduction in the CO2 price for the car industry or the approval of subsidies for fossil fuels.
With the votes of the EPP, ECR and ID, the EPP also managed to block a motion in April 2024 proposing measures to prevent parliamentary staff from being harassed by MEPs.
So, one small step after another, the security cordon was broken.
Breaking point: European right united against Maduro
In September, one of the first votes of the newly elected EP attracted more attention. The resolution under discussion would have recognised Edmundo González, the defeated candidate in the presidential elections in Venezuela on 28 July 2024, as the real winner of the elections.
The resolution in favour of González was tabled jointly by the EPP and the ECR, in which the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is the largest group.
The resolution was finally adopted with the votes of Orbán’s Fidez, Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) and PfE, which includes the FPÖ, and the ESN, which includes the AfD.
The ‘Venezuelan majority’ at work in the EP: EPP support for the AfD
The so-called ‘Venezuelan majority’ – the large voting majority of conservative and right-wing parties in the EP – has since come into play on several occasions.
This was the case in October, for example, when the European Parliament decided on the procedure for presenting and voting on future EU commissioners. Also in October, the EPP voted in favour of an AfD budget motion proposing the erection of extensive barriers at the EU’s external borders.
The EPP, ECR and PfE also voted to award this year’s European Parliament Sakharov Prize to González and right-wing Venezuelan opposition politician María Corina Machado.
Finally, last week the EPP joined with other MEPs on the right to amend a bill aimed at halting global deforestation.
Sparking outrage on the left, several rebel MEPs from the ECR, PfE, ESN and the liberal Renew group backed the EPP on key amendments.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was elected in July on the basis of an alliance between the EPP, Liberals, Socialists and Greens.
In its second term, the European Commission is abandoning its previous ‘cordon sanitaire’ policy against the ‘far right’.
Leyen’s new Commission will include two members from the ‘far right’. Raffaele Fitto of Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy – FdI), the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Olivér Várhelyi, who is close to Fidesz, the party of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.
Fratelli d’Italia is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the EP, while Fidesz is part of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group, which also includes the French National Rally (RN) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).
The conservative European People’s Party (EPP), led by German CSU politician Manfred Weber, has repeatedly cooperated with the ECR in the past legislature and explicitly reserves the right to do so in the future.
New Commissioners from the right
Raffaele Fitto, a member of Giorgia Meloni’s FdI party, is known as one of Meloni’s closest friends and will be appointed by Leyen as one of the vice-presidents of the EU Commission ‘responsible for cohesion and reforms’.
Hungary, on the other hand, has appointed former Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi as a commissioner in Brussels, with future responsibility for health. Várhelyi is very close to Prime Minister Orbán’s Fidesz party.
There is strong protest against Fitto and Várhelyi in the Socialist and Green parliamentary groups, which support the Leyen Commission. It is rumoured that both groups will not support the appointment of the two politicians.
The invisible architect of the right-wing alliance: Manfred Weber of the CSU
The row over future commissioners has come to a head in recent days.
EPP President Manfred Weber (CSU), who is seen as the main architect of his group’s alliance with the ECR and the EPP, could theoretically get two right-wing commissioners approved with a “Venezuelan majority”.
However, if CDU or CSU politicians in the EP vote with the AfD on a key decision, this could be seen as an unwelcome signal shortly before the early German elections.
But as former Italian prime ministers Romano Prodi and Mario Monti said on Tuesday, pressure is growing for the EU to act ‘as one’ at a time when it faces ‘major challenges both in the East and in the West’.
We have a responsibility to make sure that something changes after this election… The majority will very often include the ECR,” German EPP MEP Peter Liese of the CSU also told reporters on Monday.
Liese said he had no “firewall” against the ECR and claimed that Fitto’s senior position had been negotiated as part of an agreement between the main political families in the European Council at the beginning of the summer.
Continued support for Ukraine in return for right-wing MEPs
On Wednesday (20 November), however, the leaders of the European Parliament’s political groups, meeting in Brussels, reached an agreement.
According to this, Fitto and Várhelyi will be allowed to take up the positions in the European Commission that Leyen has envisaged for them, and the Socialists will agree to this.
In return, the EPP promises to cooperate only with ‘pro-Ukrainian’ parties that support the EU and the rule of law.
This means that the old ‘cordon sanitaire’, i.e. the border against the ‘extreme right’, has been replaced primarily by foreign policy conditions.
According to the EPP’s interpretation, there are no longer any obstacles to cooperation with the ECR.
Pressure is mounting on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to relinquish leadership of his party, the Social Democrats (SPD), ahead of the upcoming snap elections. This move is seen as a potential lifeline for the party, currently polling in third place, to regain electoral momentum.
The SPD leadership has thus far supported Scholz’s bid for a second term in the federal elections, now rescheduled for 23 February 2025 following the collapse of the three-party coalition on 6 November. However, internal dissent is growing.
In two heated party meetings last week, SPD MPs deliberated over whether Defence Minister Boris Pistorius should replace Scholz as the party’s candidate. According to Der Spiegel and POLITICO, one meeting included the conservative wing of the SPD, while the other involved its left wing. Both groups reportedly had significant support for replacing Scholz with Pistorius.
Calls for Scholz to step aside reached a crescendo on Monday, with prominent SPD politicians from North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state, leading the charge.
Pistorius’ voices rise within the party
Dirk Wiese and Wiebke Esdar stated: “The focus is on finding the best political line-up for this election. We hear a lot of praise for Boris Pistorius. It is clear that the final decision on the chancellor candidacy will rest with the party committees, as it should.”
Markus Töns, a long-time SPD member, echoed this sentiment in Stern: “The chancellor has done a good job in difficult circumstances, but the coalition’s end signals a need for a fresh start. Boris Pistorius would make this easier than Olaf Scholz.”
Former SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel was even more critical. Writing on X (formerly Twitter), Gabriel warned of “growing resistance” within the SPD to Scholz’s leadership. “The SPD leadership’s only response is appeasement and loyalty pledges. What we need is bold political leadership. Without it, the SPD risks falling below 15 percent,” he cautioned.
Scholz confident of ‘support from the leadership’
The SPD leadership had planned to finalize the chancellor candidacy decision at its party conference on 30 November. However, the timeline may accelerate to quell the escalating debate.
Speaking from the G20 Summit in Brazil, Scholz dismissed questions about his candidacy, expressing confidence in party support. “The SPD and I aim to win this election together,” he told Die Welt. Secretary-General Lars Klingbeil reinforced this stance, stating on ARD television: “We are committed to continuing with Olaf Scholz—there’s no wavering.”
Chancellor returns without stopping in Mexico
Despite these reassurances, Scholz abruptly canceled his planned trip to Mexico, returning to Berlin after the G20 Summit amid rumors of party infighting. While the SPD leadership held a conference call on Tuesday to discuss the campaign strategy, no decisions were reached.
Recent opinion polls paint a bleak picture for both Scholz and the SPD. The party is polling at 16 percent, far behind the CDU and the far-right AfD, marking a steep decline of 10 points since the 2021 elections.
Yet, Boris Pistorius remains Germany’s most popular politician, consistently outpacing CDU leader Friedrich Merz in approval ratings. This has fueled hopes within the SPD that Pistorius could revitalize their electoral prospects.
Pistorius’ rising profile is not without controversy. Known for his hawkish stance on military issues, he advocates for making the German military “fit for war” and has pushed for increased defense spending to meet NATO’s 2 percent of GDP target. Critics argue that these positions clash with the SPD’s traditional skepticism toward military intervention and ties with Moscow.
Nonetheless, many within the SPD believe Pistorius offers the best chance to avoid a crushing defeat in February’s elections. Pistorius has championed investments to rebuild the Bundeswehr after decades of neglect and launched initiatives to recruit for Germany’s depleted armed forces. His restructuring of the army earlier this year emphasized regional defense over external missions.
Internationally, Pistorius’ assertive approach has earned respect from Western allies, positioning him as a strong contender for the chancellorship despite his public denials. “We already have a candidate, and he is the sitting chancellor,” Pistorius recently told German state television.
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The era of the ‘right-wing majority’ in the European Parliament
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