INTERVIEW
‘The US doesn’t have a policy on Gaza, does not have a peace plan…’
Published
on
Vali Nasr, former senior adviser to the US State Department, spoke to Harici: “The US does not have a policy on Gaza. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region…”
Vali Nasr is the Majid Khadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies at Johns Hopkins-SAIS. Nasr, an Iranian-American, is one of the most prominent figures in the field of US-Iranian relations and US policies in the Middle East.
A former member of the US State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, Nasr served as Senior Advisor to Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan between 2009 and 2011.
A nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council and a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations CFR, Nasr is the author of several books including, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat, The Shia Revival and How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare.
Vali Nasr answered journalist Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the Biden administration’s position on the Gaza conflict, US Middle East policy, the role of Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the future of Gaza.
‘If Iran and the US escalation happens, Iran will go back to a more aggressive nuclear policy’
Before the Gaza war, there was news about an unofficial nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States. Is that agreement still in place or has Iran accelerated its nuclear work because of the Gaza war?
I don’t think the Gaza War has yet has a direct impact on the change of policy in Iran. But what the Gaza war did was to escalate tensions between the United States and Iran. So as soon as the Gaza War happened, the United States put a new freeze on the money that had gone from South Korea to Iran, the $6 billion in exchange for the release of American prisoners in Iran. And so, both countries have now are seeing an escalation of tensions between them. There have been attacks by Iranian backed forces in Syria and Iraq on American positions. And there have been American bombing of those same targets. Iran has said that it might sell advanced ballistic missiles to Russia. So, what we’re seeing is that is a gradual escalation of tensions between Iran and the US. If that escalation happens, then inevitably, it translates into Iran basically going back to a more aggressive nuclear policy.
‘If there’s population expulsion, the US would confront a much wider war in the region’
Although Iran is not in favor of the expansion of the war, the Houthis and Iranian-backed militias continue to attack US forces in the region. Do you think Iran will increase its influence in the region after the Gaza war? How will this affect the US policy in the region?
Three things here: One is that, yes, I don’t think Iran or Hezbollah or any other force in the region wants an expansion of the war but at the same time this access of resistance that includes Iran, Hezbollah militias in Iraq, in Syria and the Houthis and Hamas, they want to show support for the Palestinians. And they want to show that they are doing something while many other Arab countries are right now not doing anything militarily. They might be doing some things diplomatically but not militarily. So, partly they are making these attacks as a way of showing support for Hamas. But I also think it’s warning shots at the US. It’s not so much escalation as I think they want to sort of tell the United States that if Israel attacks without any kind of a restraint if it tries to completely finish off Hamas and Gaza, if too many Palestinians die, if there’s population expulsion that the US would, then, confront a much wider war in the region. So, I think we’re at that stage that both sides are sending signals. The Americans hit Iranian or militia positions in the region as a way of suggesting that they are prepared to counterattack. But I think the Houthis, Hezbollah militias in Iraq are also sending their own signals.
Secondly, I do think Iran’s position has become stronger because when the Palestinian issue becomes front and center for people across the region that’s an issue that Iran has always tried to rely on and has always championed. I think whereas other countries in the region, saw their interests best served by call and even having either secret or open relations with Israel. Abraham Accords, maybe normalization between Saudi and Israel, relations between Türkiye and Israel… These are all now jeopardized. So, the country that actually benefits most from this shift is actually Iran. And in the short run also Israel is now busy with Gaza as opposed to be being busy with Iran. The United States is now also busy with the Palestinian issue which until October 6, it thought that the Palestinian issue was over. I think Iran is been the big beneficiary of the region and some of the issues. That maybe people in the Sunni world, in the Arab world had anger towards Iran because of its support for the Assad regime in Syria. I think all of that’s forgotten. Now that everybody’s thinking and crying for the Palestinians, Iran or Hezbollah is seem to be on the right side for them. So, it’s a big success for Iran. Now, whether this translates into longer term benefit for Iran, it all depends. I’m not sure about that. Also, the future of us Iran relations in the region, I think, is it all depends on how this war ends, what kind of a vision the United States has for the end of the war, and what comes after this war. If after this war we see more escalation on the nuclear issue between Iran and the US, if we see increasing tensions between Iran and Israel attacks, semi-attacks and etc., then I think the region could be for a prolonged period of instability.
‘The only US policy of Gaza is to let Israel conduct the war’
The US allies in the Middle East did not support it on Ukraine. OPEC countries continue to cut oil prices. Now the US’s unlimited support for Israel has led to a further loss of credibility in the region. Do you think Washington has started to lose its political weight in the Middle East after the crises in Ukraine and Israel?
I think Ukraine was never central to the Middle East. It was a war somewhere else. So, people in the Middle East may have had opinions about it but it was never important to average Arabs, it was maybe more for Turks because Turks sit on the Black Sea and maybe for them is more important. But people, I would say, in Egypt or Jordan or or the Persian Gulf region, they didn’t sleep at night and wake up in the morning thinking about Ukraine. The governments were looking at basically what’s their interest. Saudi Arabia has oil interests with Russia. Türkiye has a balancing relationship, it has relations with Russia it also has relations with Europe. So, I think the Middle East basically reacted to Ukraine not based on what America wants but based on how to protect their own interests, how to basically be supportive of Europe but also be supportive of Russia. I think nobody wanted to be sucked into the Ukraine war in a direct way
I think Gaza is different. Yes, there is a lot of anger towards America’s moral stance on the Palestinian issue that the US basically has supported Israeli policy wholeheartedly and has not been critical on the number of people died in Gaza. But I think the larger issue is not the US’s moral credibility because I never thought that was very strong in the Middle East. I think people of the Middle East always thought that the US is biased towards Israel. They always thought that the US is Islamophobic. They were angry at the Iraq War. There were many reasons why the middle easterners had anger towards the US’ double standards in the Middle East. I think the critical credibility issue is lack of a US policy, because even the times when the United States was very unpopular for its moral stances, nevertheless it had a very clear sense of what it wanted to do and ability to deliver. But what we are actually seeing is that the US does not have a policy on Gaza. Its only policy is that they’re going to sit back and let Israel conduct this War based on it’s own objectives and however it wants to conduct the War. The US doesn’t have a peace plan, does not have a ceasefire plan, does not have a long-term stability plan for the region. That is where the credibility issue is because with a superpower its credibility doesn’t come from its moral position. It comes from its ability to construct policy and to implement policy. I think those are the issues that are now in doubt so if you asked any country and I don’t mean people in the street but you asked any government in the region what is American policy for how to end this war and how to make sure that the war doesn’t start and how to make things better bring stability back to the region, I don’t think they can answer.
‘Beijing visit of Arab leaders mean; we will invite China into the Middle East issues’
What that the reason why the ministers of the Arab countries visited China as the first stop on their trip to find a solution for Gaza. What do you think this means? Has the US failed in its policy of balancing China in the Middle East?
I think it was important. I think the more important issue is when Saudi Arabia decided to invite all the leaders of the Islamic and Arab countries together, and so for the first time, leaders of countries that don’t usually talk to each other like we’re all in the same place, in the same photograph, Iran and Egypt, Assad and Erdoğan. That was very significant. In other words, the first time that basically the region said “you know what, there is no American policy, we’re going to get together, and see how we can solve this.” So, I think that was the most important statement that they were not happy with where the US was going. Now they made the decision that they were going to visit the capitals of all of the five members of the security Council. But the significance was that they decided to start with Beijing, not end with Beijing. So, I think it was the significant part is that. But, and yes, I do think that not that they think that China can bring solution, but I think they want to signal their displeasure for lack of US policy by basically saying “we’re not only not going to cut ties with China, we’re actually going to try to invite China into the Middle East issues”.
‘The right candidate for the mediation is Saudi Arabia’
In your article for Foreign Affairs, you wrote that the United States could manage its relations in the Middle East through Riyadh, thereby easing its responsibility in the region. Is the model you propose compatible with the current Saudi foreign policy perspective, which is based on a multilateral win-win approach. How do you convince a country that has joined BRICS to return to a US-oriented model again?
I don’t think the Saudis can have to choose between this and that. In fact, that they have chosen BRICS. The fact that they have relations with Iran, they have relations with China, is exactly what makes Saudi Arabia the sort of the right candidate because a country that is very close to the United States only, then is not able to bring in Türkiye and Iran and other actors also into the picture which are very important for the stability of the Middle East. But Saudi Arabia increasingly has very close ties with America, but also has close ties with China, has close ties with Russia, has now built it relationship with Türkiye after many years of relationships being very cold and frosty, has rebuild its relations with Iran, has repaired its relations with Qatar and so. And also, it has some leverage on Israel because the Israelis still want normalization with Saudi Arabia so they sit in a right position to exercise this influence if the United States is willing to support that role and where the United States has greatest leverage is actually on Israel. When you want to cut a deal that would bring stability in the region, every actor in the region has to agree to it. Americans don’t talk to Iranians right now, so they cannot discuss this with Iran. The Chinese talks to Iranians. And the Saudis talk to Iranians. And the Chinese and the Saudis depend on one another at the same time. The Russians have to support this and not undermine it. Tehran and Ankara have the best relationship with Russia right now of getting it to beave. The Americans have the best relationship with Israelis. So, as a result, the US’s policy right now is only supporting an Israeli War. But if you actually want stability in the region, the stability will not come with just supporting Israel conducting the war. The stability will come by supporting a broader sort of a regional security agreement that everybody has to accept and agree to. And there is no single actor who speaks to everybody basically and also has leverage with Israelis as well. And Saudis can play that role.
‘None of the regional countries will want to take part in the Gaza’s reconstruction unless there is an agreement for a final settlement’
The Biden administration wants a revitalized Palestinian Authority to administer post-war Gaza, but Netanyahu said they would not accept that. “After the war, Gaza must be demilitarized under Israeli responsibility,” he said. What does this mean? What kind of political situation do you think awaits Gaza after the war? Can regional countries play an effective role in the reconstruction of Gaza?
It all depends on how and when the most of the war ends. If we thought about Ukraine, when the Russians went into Ukraine, they thought they’re going to take all of Ukraine. Then the Ukrainians thought, they’re going to win the war themselves and push Russia all the way out of Ukraine. Where we are is that neither side is winning. It’s a new reality. Right now, we’re in the middle of a war that where Israel thinks it can have everything. It can destroy Hamas, take over large parts of Gaza. So, it all depends on whether does it get its way or does the war stop somewhere else. So, it all depends on when and how this war stops. When does it end? Does it end in total victory by Israel or Israel is forced to stop the war at some point without winning total victory? Once the war stops, then there’s a question of what’s the order that can be negotiated for postwar. I think that’s where we don’t know what the case is going to be. I do think the countries in the region have a role in the future security of Gaza but also in reconstruction of Gaza. But it all again their involvement in Gaza will depend on what is the final scenario in Gaza. I don’t think anybody wants to go in to own a disastrous territory. Everybody wants to go in believing that there is an agreement between United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Türkiye, even Iran quietly from afar about a situation. Then, say, “okay, we can support that”. But if there is no internationally agreed situation for Gaza, then I don’t think any Arab country or Türkiye would want to go in a situation where there’s no international or regional support for. It’s a recipe for disaster. It’s similar to the situation in Syria. Because there is no agreement about the final end to the war in Syria. Countries are in Syria basically protecting their own military positions but there’s no agreement about reconstruction. So, I think you have to first have an agreement political agreement over what happens to Gaza when the war stops. That itself depends on how the war stops. And then, countries in the region would come in to support a final settlement of Gaza. They won’t come in before there is an agreement on a final settlement for Gaza.
‘YPG involves Americans more than Syrians’
Can you also comment about the frozen normalization initiative of Türkiye towards Syria? It’s now for a year and a half that we were discussing a lot if whether Bashar Assad and President Erdoğan will meet or not, whether the normalization will be fully applicable. But we see that now it’s frozen…
Repairing relations is going to take time because these two were on the opposite sides of the war and the war hasn’t even concluded completely. There is again much like we discuss about Gaza, there is no other final settlement, internationally recognized final settlement for the for the war in Syria. There is basically a de facto situation on the ground. “So, the fighting has stopped”, “Assad controls here”, “Turkish troops are there”, “Americans control this piece”, “Iranians control that piece”. But there is no sort of an agreement about the future. I think there are some big issues for Türkiye on the table. One is the future of Idlib, the other one is the future of YPG group which actually involves the Americans more than it involves the Syrians. Of course, Assad would want to see Turkish troops leave Syrian land. I mean any leader of an Arab country would say the same thing. But on the other hand, Türkiye also wants no more refugees to come to Türkiye. So, if they leave Idlib, and you know Syrian troops go into Idlib, and another million Syrians are pushed into Syria. That’s an issue. On the other hand, they actually want Assad to provide security guarantees that would allow many of the Syrian refugees in Türkiye to return home. Then, the question is also about the Kurdish movement in Northeast Syria, it’s military capabilities etc. So, I think we’re far apart on those things.
And then the other thing that’s happened is that the Gaza War has taken the attention off of the Syria issue. I think we were reaching a point where in a different kind of a Middle East setting, different kind of an American relations with the Middle East, it was possible to sort of imagine that there was a political space for even Americans to think differently about Syria, let alone Türkiye and Syria. So, we saw that the Arab world was getting closer to Assad in the sense of accepting him in the Arab League. But still the issue of returning; the Assad will not agree to the return of refugees until economic sanctions on are lifted so that they can actually feed the people who come back. The sanctions will not be going to be lifted it because of the United States will not lift them. So, everything is sort of in a way is tied together. So, things may move ever so slightly, but I think it’s going to be very difficult to untangle this in the short-term period.
‘Ukrainians don’t care about the motivations of the West as long as they get the support’
I want to ask you about the statements of David Cameron, the British Foreign Secretary. He was in Washington and he said “You spend an extra 10% of your defense budget, and with the courage of the Ukrainians, you destroy 50 percent of Russia’s pre-war defense equipment and people. Without losing the lives of the Americans and the British. This is a great investment.” Is this a type of confession that what is going on in Ukrainian land is a semi-proxy war?
I think for Ukrainians this is a real war. It’s about their territory. It’s no different for them than it was for Turks in 1921 when their country was being divided up and given to different European powers, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk rallied the Turkish military to unite the Turkish Republic. For them, it’s an act of nationalism. But I think that what David Cameron said, unfortunately is exactly the way Putin thinks. He thinks that the Ukraine war is really a western proxy war. I think what David Cameron meant to say is to encourage the US Congress to continue to support the war by saying it’s a very small price to pay to keep Russia weak and prevent it from becoming a great power by keeping it busy in Ukraine. But it’s going to be read the wrong way to mean that the Ukraine war is a proxy war. But I don’t think that’s the reality. I think for the Ukrainians the war is real. They’re defending their territory. They need the Western support. I don’t think Ukrainians care about what motivates the West as long as they get the support. So, I mean how Ukrainians see the war is very different from somebody sitting in London or in Madrid or in Amsterdam or in Washington may see the war. For them it might very well be about keeping Russia weak. But for the Ukrainians it’s about protecting their country.
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INTERVIEW
“The current interests of German capital coincide with the CDU-SPD coalition”
Published
20 hours agoon
14/11/2024Germany’s long-swinging SPD-Greens-FDP coalition government (“traffic light”) has collapsed. The collapse seems to have started when the FDP raised the flag to its coalition partners over the budget and the constitutional debt brake. But the German economy’s problems, which began before the Ukraine war and the anti-Russian sanctions, combined with high inflation, energy costs and a declining export market in China, have once again led to Europe’s largest economy being labeled a “sick man”.
Arnold Schölzel, a member of the editorial board of Junge Welt, Germany’s daily left-wing newspaper, argues that Germany’s growth, the war in Ukraine and the simultaneous financing of social expenditures have come to an end and that the FDP’s demand for sharp social cuts is in fact the program of the next federal government.
Schölzel points out that the CDU/CSU, which seems to be opposed to loosening the constitutional debt brake, is preparing to back down in a new government. Schölzel believes that there are still nuances between the parties and that this will be one of the issues of the upcoming election campaign.
Noting that German capital has interests in Eastern Europe and Ukraine, the journalist reminds that Eastern Europe in particular is a “reserve of cheap labor” for German industry and underlines that capital supports pro-war policies. Therefore, it is highly likely that the German economy will go along with the militarization of society from now on.
Schölzel sees the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as a “continuation of the CDU/CSU” and believes that the interests of German capital lie in a CDU-SPD coalition.
‘FDP ANNOUNCES PROGRAM FOR THE NEXT GOVERNMENT’
As it turns out, the collapse of the traffic light coalition in Germany was in fact long overdue. An economic crisis “invented” by the Ukraine war and anti-Russian sanctions, and defeats in this year’s European Parliament and East German state elections, had shown that the government’s time had come. Does the collapse lie simply in the difference in economic programs between the FDP and the SPD-Greens? How far do the parliamentary parties differ in their proposed solutions to the economic and political crisis in Germany?
This government was a wartime government from the start. It entered the USA’s proxy war in Ukraine with considerable financial resources and waged an economic war against Russia – with devastating consequences not for Russia, but for German industry. She accepted the blowing up of the Nord Stream 2 Baltic Sea pipeline, presumably by the US-government. As a result, the German economy has been in recession for two years and is at the bottom of the list in terms of growth among the industrialized countries. This pushed the state budget to its limits. The simultaneous financing of growth impulses, war and social benefits is no longer possible. The FDP wanted sharp social cuts. In doing so, it announces the policies of the next federal government.
‘EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES A RESERVE OF CHEAP LABOR FOR GERMAN INDUSTRY’
The reactions to Chancellor Scholz and his government from the German business community are also striking. All the spokespeople of capital, especially the industrialists, align themselves with the CDU/CSU and demand immediate elections, citing the return of Donald Trump and the Ukrainian War as justification. But when it comes to the debate on the constitutional debt brake, there seems to be no unity. Is the debt brake really that important? Is it possible to support Ukraine, fight against Trump’s potential tariffs and at the same time reduce the German national debt?
The German capital was and is in agreement with Scholz’s war course. It has sharply reduced economic ties with Russia and also supports a hostile policy towards China, albeit more cautiously. Both industry and the CDU/CSU have now declared their willingness to reform the debt brake. They demand subsidies for industry and arms deliveries to Ukraine. The German economy has long-term interests there – as in all of Eastern Europe. The Eastern European countries serve as a workbench for German industry and as a reservoir for cheap labor. German industry sees it as Germany’s backyard. There are still differences on the question of how deep the social cuts should be. This will probably be the focus of the election campaign.
Does the German state see the economic restructuring program and the militarization of the state, the economy and society as one and the same? The new conscription law, the debate on conscription and the modernization of the Bundeswehr seem to be propagandized as a way out of the crisis. Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces Eva Högl said last summer that young people learn “structure, comradeship, a sense of duty” in the Bundeswehr, “all qualities from which the economy also benefits”. Are we facing a plan to militarize the economy?
Yes, those in power are concerned with the militarization of society as a whole. They say this quite openly: The Bundeswehr should advertise in schools – there is a new law for this in Bavaria. The healthcare system is gearing up to treat large numbers of injured people. The German War Minister Boris Pistorius (SPD) summarized this in the term “war capability”. It would have to be produced in four to five years because Russia would then probably attack NATO. Overall, it is a reactionary-militaristic restructuring of the state in which, above all, civil rights are restricted.
‘FASCISM IN GERMANY WAS REHABILITATED BY THE UKRAINE WAR’
When it comes to the Israeli aggression in Gaza, the AfD and the Greens support the same parliamentary bill. Similarly, when it comes to the “fight against irregular migration”, the CDU/CSU almost matches the AfD. Although all parties refuse to cooperate with the AfD, is it possible to say that AfD policies have already become “mainstream” in German politics? In any case, the AfD is likely to play a role in Germany’s future.
The AfD is a continuation of the politics of the CDU/CSU. The difference: It allows open fascists in the party. The CDU and CSU have been fighting racist incitement against migrants and asylum seekers for 40 years. The AfD has taken this over and expanded it: it has increased racism and consciously encourages violence. The AfD has always been on Israel’s side because of the oppression and murder of Muslims. This has increased further with the current genocide in Gaza. The Greens are the most bellicose German party today. They use racist clichés against Russia in the Ukraine war and completely agree with the racist position of the Netanyahu government. The Greens denounce any criticism of Israel’s policies as anti-Semitism and are successful in doing so. Because of the fascists in the AfD, there are still reservations among other parties at the federal level about working with the AfD. Things are different at the state level; cooperation works in the municipalities. Since fascism there was rehabilitated in Germany, particularly with the war in Ukraine, it may well be that the AfD will also be accepted at the federal level in a few years. As long as it still pretends to strive for peace with Russia, this is unlikely.
‘CONDITIONS ARE BEING CREATED FOR GREATER INDEPENDENCE FOR GERMAN IMPERIALISM’
It can also be linked to the question above: The cry for a “strong and decisive government” has an important place among the voices rising from within the ruling class. The polls indicate that the CDU/CSU would be the winning party in a possible federal snap election. Can the CDU/CSU alone meet this demand for a “strong and stable government”? Will German politics be forced to turn to “non-political” actors or institutions?
The date of the next federal election was negotiated between the CDU/CSU and SPD. This is symptomatic: they communicate despite all the rhetoric. As things currently stand, only a coalition of both parties can form the next government. In my opinion, this also corresponds to the current interests of the German capital. The ruling class is not yet committed to an authoritarian regime domestically, but is preparing the conditions for it. In terms of foreign policy, it cannot yet break away from the USA, but is striving for a stronger leadership role in the EU and perhaps in NATO. This also creates the conditions for greater independence for German imperialism in the future.
The Turkic Investment Fund, the first international financial institution of the Turkic world, is preparing to announce its policy document on January 1, 2025. Ambassador Baghdad Amreyev, President of the Turkic Investment Fund answered our questions.
You are quite new to the financial international cooperation institution. And you had your first Board of Directors meeting in May. Could you tell us what the outcomes of that meeting were, and what is the roadmap for implementing the strategies and resolutions that were discussed there?
As you know, the decision to establish the Turkic Investment Fund was made by the leaders of the Turkic world at their summit in Samarkand in 2022. In November 2022, they signed a special agreement for the establishment of the Turkic Investment Fund, which is the first financial mechanism and institution of the Turkic world. I was appointed as the founding president there.
We then began preparing the establishment agreement, and in a very short period of time, we finalized the agreement. On March 16, 2023, during an extraordinary summit of Turkic leaders in Ankara, the finance and economy ministers of our countries signed this establishment agreement in the presence of our leaders. It was a truly historic moment.
By the end of 2023, the ratification process was completed in our parliament, and as per the agreement, the Fund officially came into force on February 24, 2024. This is what we consider the “birthday” of the Fund.
A lot of organizational work has been completed since then. On May 18, as the President of the Turkic Investment Fund, I convened the inaugural meeting of the Board of Governors, which is the highest governing body of the Fund.
Cevdet Yılmaz, The Vice President of Türkiye also participated in that meeting, right?
Yes, The Vice President of Türkiye, His Excellency Mr. Cevdet Yılmaz, also participated in and chaired this meeting. It was a great honor for us.
The meeting was highly successful, and the Governors made several key decisions, including the completion of the institutionalization of the Fund. They also established the Board of Directors and gave them instructions to prepare key procedural documents and other necessary actions.
Since then, in June and August, I convened two meetings with the Board of Directors, during which we made crucial decisions for the commencement of the Fund’s operational activities. Establishing the operational structure and preparing the investment policy are ongoing tasks.
Our investment policy, in particular, is still being drafted.
The investment policy is still underway, then.
Yes, it is still underway. This is an essential document, as it will outline the priorities of the Fund, specify which projects we will focus on, and what our role will be.
During the first meeting of the Board of Governors, Mr. Ramil Babayev from Azerbaijan was appointed as Director General of the Turkic Investment Fund, responsible for managing the Fund’s operations.
Once the investment policy is finalized and the management structure is fully in place, we will be ready to commence operational activities.
I understand that your policy preparations are still in progress, but can you give us a sense of which key sectors or industries the Turkic Investment Fund will support?
Yes, our priorities are quite clear, and I have spoken about them on many occasions. First of all, it’s important to note that the Turkic Investment Fund serves multiple purposes. If we only needed to finance projects within our own countries, there would have been no need to establish a new fund. We already have numerous funds and banks for that.
However, the Turkic Investment Fund was established not only for financing projects within our countries but also to contribute to the economic integration of our nations. The Fund’s main focus will be to finance joint projects that promote integration and cooperation among our countries. This is vital for the unity and economic strength of the Turkic world.
Could you elaborate on the concept of economic integration for the Turkic world?
Any political or economic block has its final causes. Our goal is to bring together our economies to unite the potential to serve the Turkic world. Economic integration means working together to strengthen our economies and unite our economic potential. We are seven countries. By encouraging trade, facilitating investments, and supporting joint ventures in areas such as infrastructure, energy, and transportation, we aim to build a stronger and more united Turkic world.
What do you mean by “economic integration”? Are you talking about a common Turkic currency or infrastructure as part of this integration?
Economic integration doesn’t necessarily mean having a single currency or unified infrastructure, at least not initially. It’s more about deeper engagement in each other’s economies through joint projects, especially in key sectors such as energy, transportation, and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).
Our goal is to create an economic and political bloc that can work towards common objectives, much like the European Union or other regional groups. We need to support each other’s economies and collaborate on joint projects that benefit all our countries. This is a key condition for the unity of the Turkic world.
I understand the Fund was the missing part in the Turkic world. Now, you believe that you filled this gap.
The Turkic unity has been very fresh. The Organization of Turkic States and other related cooperation organizations were established 10-15 years ago only. It is very short period. Of course, we need time. I am sure the Turkic Investment Fund will accelerate this process.
We need to work together to make our economies more competitive and resilient. Over time, the Turkic Investment Fund aims to become the primary financial tool for promoting economic integration within the Turkic world.
One of the Fund’s key priorities is to attract foreign investments into our countries. There are two ways to do this: First, by supporting national projects and encouraging foreign partners to participate, and second, by collaborating with other international financial institutions, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian Development Bank, and Islamic Development Bank, among others.
Of course, we are not able to finance ourselves for huge projects but those financial institutions are so eager to contribute to our projects.
Well, Ambassador Amreyev, I understand that you have a positive cooperative perspective regarding other powers in Asia in terms of both institutions and countries. But at the same time, they bring some kind of geopolitical challenges. China, Russia, some other neighbouring European countries… How would Turkic Investment Fund navigate these geopolitical challenges? Following this, another question could be that: If the Turkic block rising as a global power and Turkic Investment Fund wants to be an active player in finance sector, how would you sustain your strategies given those facts?
The investment fund is a financial institution, not a political organization. This is why the Turkic Investment Fund is not involved in the geopolitical competition or challenges of today’s troubled world. Yes, we recognize the dramatic challenges facing the global community, but addressing those is the job of politicians. As financiers, our role is to contribute to cooperation rather than competition. By focusing on cooperation, we can help mitigate some of these global challenges and reduce the intensity of international competition.
Our role, therefore, is a positive one, working with other economic and financial institutions. Through constructive cooperation and joint projects, we aim to support and promote collaborative efforts in our complex world.
On the other hand, we also recognize that globalization has significantly increased competition worldwide. Consequently, our countries face challenges in attracting investments. This competition is real, and our goal is to help our countries navigate these challenges and become more competitive. By successfully supporting the growth of our economies, we can play a crucial role in enhancing the competitiveness of our nations.
Currently, six countries are full members of the Turkic Investment Fund—Türkiye, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Hungary. We also expect that Turkmenistan will join as the seventh full member soon. Additionally, the Turkic Investment Fund is open to cooperation with non-member institutions. Our establishment agreement allows other countries to join if they meet the required conditions and agree to the terms. This allows for constructive cooperation with external partners as well.
Regarding international financial institutions, we are open to working with all of them. We are already in negotiations and have observed a growing interest from various financial institutions in collaborating with us. By working with large financial funds, banks, and institutions, we can participate in significant development and infrastructure projects within our member countries.
These large financial institutions recognize the need for cooperation, and this implies substantial investments in major infrastructure projects. For example, there is growing interest in expanding energy infrastructure in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, particularly in light of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has increased the importance of the Turkic world for Europe. We know that the European Union plans to invest billions of euros in energy projects within the Turkic region. Can you give more information about the projects?
Large infrastructure projects are costly and require the participation of multiple financial institutions. As I mentioned, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as several Asian banks, are keen on establishing such cooperation. We already have several projects in the pipeline, particularly in the energy sector to be financed. While Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are oil and gas producers, what we need now is more cross-border energy infrastructure such as pipelines and powerlines to transport these resources efficiently.
Building the transportation network is important, not just for production but also for consumers. That’s why we see growing interest from other international financial institutions. Our national governments have plans, and I know Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan are involved in initiatives to build gas pipelines from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan, Türkiye, and Europe. Our countries and our European partners are paying great attention to these projects.
There are also other energy projects in the Turkic world. For example, there are major plans to build an energy plant in Kyrgyzstan that will serve Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These huge infrastructure projects are already being studied by various financial institutions, and there are numerous areas for cooperation. Of course, we are closely working with our governments, monitoring their priorities, plans, and programs. We also consider the decisions made by national governments and at our summits and intergovernmental commissions, ensuring that we align with the priorities of our member states, which are our shareholders.
We know that Hungary, for example, has been highly appreciated by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) for its contributions, especially during its EU presidency. Hungary’s role in connecting Europe and the Turkic world is considered very important. At the same time, Hungary has officially stated that it is contributing a significant amount of money to the Turkic Investment Fund. Can you give more information on this?
Yes, this is not a secret. The fund was initially established by five member states, and then Hungary joined with an equal share. Each country contributed $100 million, making the initial capital of the fund $600 million. As I’ve mentioned, this starting capital will be significantly increased in the coming years to make the fund more competitive and attractive for cooperation with other international financial institutions.
Will the shares always remain equal?
Not necessarily. The initial capital was contributed in equal shares, but additional capital may be decided later and won’t necessarily follow the same distribution. As for Hungary, it has joined as a full member with the same share as other members. I must say that Hungary has played a very constructive role in Turkic cooperation since they joined the Organization of Turkic States in 2018. Hungary actively participates in all cooperation mechanisms alongside other OTS member states. Recently, I was in Budapest, where we finalized Hungary’s accession to the fund, making them a full member. Hungary truly plays an indispensable role in connecting the Turkic world to Europe, and between the European Union and the Organization of Turkic States. We appreciate Hungary’s role, and I believe it will continue to grow in the future, contributing not only to the integration of the Turkic world but also to its global integration into the world economy through closer cooperation with the EU.
Just to clarify about the contributions to the fund—how much will be each country paying? For instance, in Türkiye, there is discussion about whether Türkiye is contributing state funds for projects like energy infrastructure and pipelines in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. People are curious about the exact figures to be transferred from treasury to the investments in other countries.
As with any international financial institution, all decisions regarding project financing and prioritization will be made by the Board of Directors. The interests and contributions of each country will be considered, and there won’t be any “losers”—only winners.
Thank you very much for this great interview, Ambassador. It sounds like many things are still in progress, but can you give us one headline for now? Which region of the world is most likely to cooperate with you on large-scale projects in the near future? Will it be Europe, Asia, Russia, or the Gulf countries? What will be the biggest surprise regarding Turkic Investment Fund cooperation?
First of all, the Turkic Investment Fund is a newly established financial institution, and we will commence our operational activities on January 1, 2025. We are in close contact and negotiations with financial institutions in Europe, Asia, the Islamic world, and the Arab world. We see strong interest from their side, and we are equally eager to develop relationships with them.
I think the biggest surprise will be our success in the Turkic region, within our member states. We are seriously committed to contributing to the economic development of our countries and supporting entrepreneurs who are working together on joint projects. We are here to support them and encourage more joint ventures among the Turkic countries and their companies.
As I mentioned, the ultimate goal is to contribute to greater economic integration among the Turkic countries, which will serve as the foundation for a more united Turkic world. This is our main purpose.
Thank you, Ambassador Baghdad Amreyev, for this diplomatic interview. We look forward to hearing more after January 1, when the policies, investments, and projects of the Turkic Investment Fund are officially launched.
INTERVIEW
We asked experts about BRICS – 3: What are the challenges facing the member countries?
Published
3 weeks agoon
28/10/2024As the fallout from the BRICS Summit in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation, continues, we put questions about the agenda to Dr. Nina Ladygina-Glazounova, the General director of the BRICS & SCO Innovative Diplomacy Centre.
Ilber Vasfi Sel: Mrs Nina, you also attended the summit in Kazan. You are already continuing your work as a “professional “bricsologist” in the institution of which you are the General director and co-founder. For Vladimir Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, the summit is seen as both symbolic and practical. What do you think? How do you assess the significance of this summit for Russia? How will this summit affect Russia’s global agenda? There are also competing countries within BRICS. Given the rivalries and conflicts among the member countries, how do you see the BRICS goal of deepening cooperation in various fields?
Nina Ladygina-Glazounova: The significance of the BRICS Summit in Kazan for Russia lies primarily in the complete failure of the West’s policy of isolating Russia, demonstrating recognition of Russia’s long-term importance on the world stage, despite the general tensions. The BRICS Summit in Kazan has become the event of the century, bringing together heads of delegation’s from Azerbaijan, Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Congo, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Palestine, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam and Republika Srpska (an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina).23 of them were at the level of Heads of State and Government not only from the BRICS member countries (Russia, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, South Africa and Saudi Arabia as an invited country), but also from the countries of the Global South, which showed great interest in the Summit, as well as the heads of five international organisation’s: the United Nations (Secretary-General – Antonio Guterres), the Eurasian Economic Commission (Chairman – Bakytjan Abdiruli Sagittayev), the Commonwealth of Independent States (Secretary General – Sergei Lebedev), the State of the Union of Russia and Belarus (State Secretary – Dmitry Mezentsev), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (Secretary General – Zhang Ming) and the BRICS New Development Bank (Bank President – Dilma Rousseff).
We asked experts about BRICS – 1: Can the independent BRICS payment system succeed?
The declaration issued on the 23 of October, after the meetings of the Sherpas and heads of delegations of the BRICS countries, the way to promote the institutional development of BRICS adopted by consensus, and for the first time in history of BRICS, the countries included in the union are not specified in the first paragraph of the declaration.
What could this mean?
It can be assumed that the main reason is primarily due to the expansion and uncertain status of Saudi Arabia, which is still in the process of accepting its status as a full member, although it participated as an equal in most BRICS formats and meetings.
Particular attention was also paid to the media, ICT and the dangers of fake news and the dissemination of unverified information about our countries.
Thanks to the summit and the whole range of horizontal formats of this year, Russia was able to expand its opportunities to enter new markets during its year of its Chairmanship in the BRICS, which is certainly a positive moment, and the country should have followed this direction from the very beginning, from the moment of its formation, and not look only at Western countries as the main direction. Now, if we look at it as a “puzzle”, the process of diversifying the economy and moving away from production focused exclusively on components from abroad has begun, and the influence of foreign component manufacturers on us has gradually diminished. Russia has agreed to sign a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with Iran.
Also, thanks to the summit, Russia was able to once again to discuss the main points and reach an agreement with Iran on signing a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement.
Today we can confidently say that the most powerful BRICS countries are Russia, China, India and Iran. In other words, countries that have become the antipode of the unipolar Western world… We can talk about a global union of BRICS countries that surpasses the G7 in its parameters, and this is about the economic future of our planet.
Despite their common objectives and their focus on a multipolar world, and despite the preservation of their own identities, the BRICS countries face various forms of competition and territorial challenges, especially with their neighbours.
China and India are both large emerging economies competing for the influence in global markets and the developing world, and have territorial disputes with each other. At the same time, India and China announced progress in resolving long-standing border issues with the help of Russia’s diplomatic efforts, and this was a significant achievement at the summit. We see geopolitical tensions between Russia and South Africa have emerged since the start of the special military operation. Russia and China are close partners in all areas, but there are areas in the individual political agendas of both countries where they may clash, such as in Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan.
During the summit, BRICS countries and their future partners drew attention to Palestine and the Middle East region as a whole, while nearly two billion Muslims around the world watched the events in Kazan. Many heads of delegation’s declared their position in support of Palestine, a very sensitive and fragile region that requires rapid peaceful coexistence and compliance with UN conventions. Accordingly, the Summit adopted a strong final declaration that underlined the importance of the Palestinian issue for the world Muslim community.
We see how Brazil is not very happy with Venezuela’s rapprochement with the BRICS and this is one of the main reasons why we do not see it in the list of partner countries (13 countries have been granted BRICS partner country status: Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda and Vietnam), like Pakistan is not on the list because of the position of India. But BRICS will not be a platform for confrontation in relation to the G7 due to different ideas about the world order in different states and civilizations. We have Narendra Modi, who builds his policy on resolving all conflicts in the world peacefully and through negotiations, but he very rarely touches on issues related to Pakistan… Because there has been a conflict between them for many years and at the same time we see how China and Russia are promoting Pakistan as a BRICS partner now.
Therefore, I believe that BRICS should promote mutually beneficial areas of cooperation, such as increasing trade turnover, mutual investment to avoid conflicts, it is necessary to resolve issues of demarcation of spheres of influence in certain regions “on the shore”, socio-humanitarian exchanges to allow us to get to know each other better and perhaps “bury the hatche” in the case of some countries, as well as regulate possible interventions in cultural expansion, like the Republic of Turkey is doing through “soft power”.
On the other hand, we have South America, that is very unstable in every sense, socially, politically, economically, and under the strong influence of the United States. But it is important to remember that when you come to the BRICS as a platform, you have to forget all this (competition and territorial challenges), because you have to think about the big picture and the global agenda. And the Kazan Summit, which can be called truly peaceful, was the event that brought together some of the participants in the BRICS+ format, for example, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, to discuss advancing the bilateral peace agenda, including a peace treaty, border demarcation and other issues of mutual interest, and encouraged them to negotiate to resolve mutual issues that had previously stalled.
Summit declaration also describes the mechanisms already in place for foreign exchange reserves in national currencies. Although they are not yet as large and comprehensive as existing institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, but they already pose a serious threat to them. The BRICS Pay mechanism has also been launched – a payment system project similar to the Chinese CIPS system and the international SWIFT system, to which you can link international payment cards Visa and Mastercard or national bank cards such as MIR, RuPay, China UnionPay and use it in the BRICS+ countries. A direct, clear and effective way to find collective solutions with the participation of developing countries is de-dollarization through the ever-wider use of national currencies and it is time for us to have what we call a new reserve currency.
The convergence of representatives of numerous civilisations and cultures, who unconsciously want to promote their own agendas for the good of their own countries, makes it difficult to take decisions towards something united on issues that are only open to the countries of the Global South, such as the reform of the UN Security Council or climate change (recall that Vladimir Putin also carefully hinted at this in his statement about using the green agenda to harm society).
It is clear that the role of the BRICS will increase, and the BRICS countries are already driving global economic growth, shifting the geopolitical landscape towards Eurasia and the South as a whole. According to the results of the current year, the average economic growth rate of the BRICS is estimated at 4 per cent. This is higher than the G7’s rate of just 1.7 per cent. With such a difference in economic growth rates, most of the increase in global GDP in the foreseeable future will be generated in the BRICS. OPEC Plus is actually part of the BRICS, and Russia and Saudi Arabia are actually the leaders there. They set global oil prices. But it is worth remembering that most of the trading platforms are owned by Western companies that lobby their interests to fight this, and it is necessary to unite for a common and prosperous future.
BRICS is different from the UN in that everyone sits at the same table and has an equal voice with a more equitable representation of member states. Perhaps BRICS can be an alternative to the UN in the future, the reform of which is advocated by all BRICS countries. But it will be a long process.
Aware of their problems and territorial disputes, the BRICS countries want to focus on a common agenda of global cooperation. From 1 January 2024, with the accession of new countries to the Union, strong ties and dialogue should be established in the name of a common goal, not just “a priori”, since such a format should not be based as an association on the Anglo-Saxon ideology with the primacy of the United States and European colonial powers. The Union has enormous potential to promote common interests and to foster multipolar global governance based on equality and respect.
BRICS as an association has enormous potential to advance common interests and promote multipolar global governance based on equality and respect. Consensus is also, on the one hand, a guarantee that the national interests of any participant are guaranteed, but also a factor that does not simplify the introduction of negotiations.
Ilber Vasfi Sel: Dr. Ladygina-Glazounova, Harici thank you for your comprehensive and insightful responses.
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