Middle East
India’s foreign policy and relations with the Taliban
Indian diplomat J.P Singh, who is in charge of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan affairs in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, visited Kabul recently and held enormous meetings and discussions with senior Taliban officials, including Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. Although many details of these meetings have not been published, the Times of India in a report on this trip called it a “fundamental progress” in the relations between India and the Taliban.
The Ministry of Defense of the Taliban also said that the two sides emphasized their common desire to expand bilateral relations, especially in the fields of humanitarian cooperation and other issues, and expressed their interest in strengthening more interactions between Afghanistan and India.
The Times of India has evaluated this meeting as a “strategic change in India’s approach to Afghanistan”; in the sense that the Taliban’s repeated assurances that Afghanistan’s soil will not be used against India, probably influenced India’s decision to increase its interactions with Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban.
This shows that the Taliban, after taking control of Afghanistan, do not shy away from any attempt for international and regional recognition as well as interaction with the regional and world powers, that is just for the purpose of legitimizing their ruling.
India’s relations with the Taliban and its challenges for the country’s regional strategies is a complex and multifaceted issue that requires a more detailed analysis.
After the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan and the fundamental change in the political and security equations of the region, India also sought to review its policies towards Afghanistan and the Taliban. This relationship, although designed to protect India’s immediate interests in the region, is undoubtedly not without significant strategic concerns.
India’s instrumental policy in Afghanistan
India’s foreign policy in Afghanistan was not originally based on the values of the Non-Aligned Movement and its historical relations with Afghanistan. This has become more intense especially after the coming to power of the Hindu Nationalist Party led by Narendra Modi. Since Modi’s party came to power, India’s policy towards Afghanistan has become more of a political game focused on short-term interests. In this policy, the element of enmity with Islam and negation of cultural and historical relations with the Muslim countries of the region has become a decisive element.

Joint secretary of India’s Ministry of External Affairs, J.P. Singh, meets with acting Afghanistan defense minister of Taliban Muhammad Yaqoob Mujahid.
As tensions escalate between Pakistan and the Taliban, known as Pakistan’s former proxies, India is once again considering using Afghanistan as a tool to counter Pakistan. In this framework, while establishing relations with the Taliban on the one hand, on the other hand, India seeks to create more tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in order to somehow achieve its goals against Pakistan.
India’s policies in this regard have not only led to the consolidation of the Taliban’s power in Afghanistan, but have also indirectly fueled the expansion of tensions and instability in the region. The instrumental use of Afghanistan and the escalation of differences between Afghanistan and Pakistan have generally been the defining element of India’s foreign policy.
India has always tried to use every opportunity to weaken Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan, even if this leads to the strengthening of extremist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This approach is not only harmful for India in the long run, but it can turn the region into a clash of strategic and security interests, which will not benefit any of the countries in the region.
India’s transactional and dual policy in Afghanistan
India has always abandoned its allies in Afghanistan and has never acted as a strategic partner during difficult times, especially after the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in 15 August 2021 at least.
This is evident from India’s behavior towards Dawood Khan’s government, Dr. Najibullah and his government members and even Hamid Karzai and his government members who had close relations with India and considered India as their natural ally. After the Taliban came to power, India cut ties with these people, which shows the instability and lack of loyalty in India’s foreign policy. Even when Afghanistan needed vital and strategic help, India did not stand by the people of Afghanistan as a strategic ally.
This fact can be seen in India’s severance of relations with Hamid Karzai and members of his government who strongly trusted India. This move of India even shows lack of commitment to strategic cooperation and disloyalty to diplomatic principles.
India prevented Afghan students from entering the country even in critical situations when Afghan youth needed support, and many Afghan students who were studying in Indian universities were not allowed to finish their studies.
Unlike Pakistan, India has never been loyal to its allies in Afghanistan as strategic partners. Even when many Afghans were trying to escape from Taliban rule, India closed its gates to them and many people who took refuge in India did not have their visas extended.
Security challenges and threats
Strengthening India’s relations with the Taliban can bring new security threats to Afghanistan in the long run. One of the most important risks arising from these relations is the strengthening of (TTP), which has now become one of the serious threats to the security of Pakistan and the region.
TTP has had influence in the border areas of Afghanistan since the past, and even in some areas, it is difficult to separate them from the Afghan Taliban. This influence and links have made the Pakistani Taliban to enjoy a powerful position and, regardless of the official relations between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan, they have organized themselves and organized complex attacks inside Pakistan.
India must understand that this situation could even be considered as a serious threat to India itself, because TTP can become a symbol of inspiration for Islamic extremist forces inside India and endanger India’s security by expanding the scope of violence and instability in the region.
Long-term consequences and strategic problems
In the long term, strengthening India’s relationship with the Taliban will lead to other regional actors, including Pakistan, taking advantage of this situation to weaken India’s position. This approach can strengthen extremist ideologies and asymmetry in India’s policies towards Afghanistan.
The Taliban, who present themselves as a “legitimate” government, will use these relationships to strengthen their international standing. While this can introduce India as an unstable actor without a clear policy in the region.
Already, Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif said that instability in Pakistan was fueled by an “Indian proxy war”, pointing to regional rivalries as a key factor. Asif also described the use of Afghanistan’s territory for attacks on Pakistan as an “action of aggression” following a deadly explosion in Quetta of Pakistan that killed at least 26 people, including 16 soldiers and 61 others received injuries.
Middle East
Israeli envoy warns red line crossed over Turkish moves in Syria
Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Yechiel Leiter, stated that Tel Aviv received clear intelligence showing Türkiye planned to expand its military presence in Syria significantly, an action Israel deemed the crossing of a “red line.”
Speaking to The Jerusalem Post, Leiter said: “We are not looking for an escalation or a war with either Türkiye or Syria. But a red line was crossed.”
His remarks follow an Israeli air strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Idlib, Syria, which drew swift criticism from both the Syrian and Turkish governments.
Leiter continued:
“This was seen as a blatant Turkish violation of the understandings. Those who needed access to the intelligence received it. Those who needed to know what was going to happen knew. We made it clear that this was contrary to our understandings, and that is why Israel acted as it did.”
According to Leiter, the failure to heed these warnings led Israel on Tuesday to strike the Abu al-Duhur airbase, where Turkish forces were allegedly expected to arrive.
Syrian officials stated that the airbase was targeted by at least eight strikes, whilst subsequently released satellite imagery revealed damage to the runways.
Leiter stated that the Turkish move contradicted understandings reached during the Biden administration between Israel and the administration of Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, which “froze the existing situation” in the country.
According to Leiter, these understandings were reaffirmed during a meeting held in Paris in January 2026, attended by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, Leiter, then-National Security Council head Gil Reich, and Netanyahu’s military secretary Roman Gofman (now director of Mossad).
Leiter continued:
“This freeze means we do not act as long as the Turks do not act, and they do not force us to withdraw. It is also important to understand: whilst we maintain a security zone of only 78 square miles [approximately 202 square kilometres] in Syria, the Turks have, over the past few years, slowly annexed 3,500 square miles in northern Syria—roughly 5% of the country’s territory.”
According to The Jerusalem Post, with the exception of Tom Barrack, the US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Türkiye, senior US officials did not condemn the Israeli strike in Syria.
“The administration’s policy is that the previously agreed freeze should continue; that is why even Trump did not condemn the strike,” Leiter said.
Despite the tensions, Leiter emphasised Israel’s understanding that Syria is not seeking an escalation or war.
“It is clear to us that the Syrians do not want a confrontation with us. That is why we tell the Turks not to create conflict. There are multiple indications that the move planned by Türkiye was imposed on the Syrians,” the ambassador said.
Leiter argued that this apparent discord was also evident in the conflicting statements issued by Türkiye and Syria following the strike:
“Whilst Syrian Foreign Minister Shaibani acknowledged that a Turkish delegation was in Syria a few days before the strike, the Turks denied this. They need to resolve this matter between themselves.”
Leiter did not rule out a return to direct talks with Syria, as conducted in the past, but said conditions must be suitable.
“Negotiations can be resumed. We want to continue the face-to-face dialogue we previously conducted with the Syrians,” Leiter said.
Leiter added that Israel is not seeking a conflict with Türkiye and remains open to dialogue with Ankara.
“We are certainly open to dialogue with them, but judging by statements from senior officials in the country, they would prefer to wipe Israel off the map,” the Israeli diplomat said.
Alleging that Türkiye hosts Hamas leaders and “channels funds” to Hezbollah and Hamas, Leiter argued that it was inappropriate at this juncture for “Türkiye to begin expanding its influence in Lebanon and Syria.”
Leiter continued:
“Under current conditions, Türkiye cannot be a force that helps bring calm to the region. If only we could return to the state of relations between Jerusalem and Ankara from several decades ago. Back then, we would have been open to Türkiye’s influence in the region. But in an environment where Türkiye funds terrorist organisations, an increase in its regional influence makes no sense.”
Middle East
UAE halts trade with Iran after reported ballistic missile attack
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has suspended commercial and economic relations with Iran after announcing that Tehran launched two ballistic missiles towards the Gulf state on Tuesday.
The UAE Ministry of Defence stated that air defence systems detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards its territory.
The incident is considered Tehran’s first direct attack targeting the Gulf country since May.
The event prompted emergency telephone alerts to be sent to residents across the UAE.
The Ministry of Defence stated that assessments indicated the missiles targeted maritime traffic, adding that one missile fell into the sea outside UAE territorial waters and the other landed within territorial waters.
The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs later announced that “in light of regional tensions that undermine regional and international peace and security, all trade, commercial relations, and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.”
Iran denied any involvement in the missile attacks. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness and undermines ongoing efforts to strengthen trust among regional countries.”
The missile strikes occurred after a period in which the UAE and Tehran had sought to reduce tensions between the two countries.
The bulk of Tehran’s military retaliation targeted neighbouring Gulf states, which Iran accused of facilitating US-Israeli attacks.
The UAE bore the heaviest brunt of Iran’s attacks against US allies in the Gulf, sustaining nearly 3,000 missile and drone strikes.
Exhibiting the most hawkish stance against Tehran among its Gulf neighbours, the UAE responded with dozens of strikes against Iran.
However, tensions between the UAE and Iran eased following a memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran in June.
After the agreement began to unravel in early July, Iran largely redirected its attacks towards Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.
In recent months, the UAE reactivated diplomatic and economic channels with Iran while simultaneously strengthening its military ties with Israel and the US.
Tuesday’s missile strikes threaten to disrupt the atmosphere of normalisation that had returned to the UAE.
While Dubai’s financial district was once again filling with bankers, certain commercial activities between the emirate and Iranian ports had resumed.
Furthermore, several Iranian flights to the UAE had quietly resumed.
UAE authorities had also begun permitting the return of approximately 20,000 Iranians holding UAE residency permits who were outside the country when the war began.
UAE officials have repeatedly emphasised that the country seeks to avoid being drawn further into a broader regional war.
Nevertheless, efforts to de-escalate tensions between the UAE and Iran have come under increasing strain in recent weeks.
This month, the UAE accused Iran of attacking vessels belonging to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company in the Strait of Hormuz.
Middle East
US considers land blockade on Iran involving Türkiye and neighbours
To date, the US has imposed sanctions on thousands of Iranian individuals and legal entities; however, the Tehran administration continues to bypass these restrictions by rapidly establishing new structures to replace those that have been blocked.
In an assessment citing expert opinions published by the Reuters news agency, the current situation was likened to a game of whack-a-mole.
Whack-a-mole is known as a game of agility and reflexes based on the concept of hitting plastic figures with a mallet as they pop up unexpectedly from their holes.
Speaking to the agency, experts outlined other options that Washington could deploy to increase pressure on Tehran and raise the efficacy of sanctions.
Potential measures include restrictions targeting independent Chinese refineries, known as “teapots,” which account for a quarter of China’s oil refining capacity.
China purchases more than 80% of the oil exported by Iran, and these refineries process the vast majority of those shipments. Nevertheless, these facilities have limited ties to the US financial system, rendering them partially protected against secondary sanctions.
Another option on the table is increasing pressure on major Chinese banks. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has applied secondary sanctions to small firms based in China and Hong Kong accused of executing billions of dollars in transactions for Iranian oil.
The agency has also warned two large banks, though it has not yet included them on its sanctions list.
While taking steps against major banks could deter other financial institutions, such actions carry the risk of Beijing enacting retaliatory measures. Washington seeks to avoid such tension ahead of a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in September.
Experts are also evaluating the possibility of enforcing a land blockade with the participation of Iran’s neighbours: Iraq, Türkiye, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia.
The Trump administration holds various leverage mechanisms against such nations, including Pakistan, which is requesting a $10 billion swap line, and Türkiye, which seeks to rejoin the F-35 program. Analysts express, however, that implementing such a blockade on the ground and generating the expected pressure inside Iran would be difficult.
Trump has repeatedly voiced threats to impose secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran; however, the US Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for such measures.
On the other hand, a anti-Russia “crushing” sanctions bill passed by the Senate includes new restrictions on Iran and grants Trump tariff authority.
This bill must also pass a vote in the House of Representatives; however, the text faces opposition from both Democrats and certain Republican lawmakers.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in mid-August that Trump would disclose new measures designed to raise Iran’s economic isolation to an unprecedented level.
Stating that the US President had instructed the re-establishment of the maximum economic pressure policy against Tehran, Bessent said, “We have moved from Epic Fury to Economic Fury.”
Following Bessent’s statements, Bloomberg noted that Tehran has learned to manage the consequences of a naval blockade and thousands of restrictions. According to the agency’s analysts, the principal obstacle facing Washington is the close economic relationship between Iran and China; indeed, Beijing secures more than 90% of Iranian oil exports. Sanctioning the entities facilitating these purchases would directly reduce Tehran’s oil revenues, yet the US is avoiding this step for now.
Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains restricted. On August 11, Iran conveyed its conditions for lifting the blockade in the strait to the US through intermediaries.
Tehran’s conditions included an end to threats and military actions, the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, compensation for damages, and the release of frozen assets.
On August 14, Trump claimed that following the end of the war with Iran, he would declare the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory. Responding to these statements, the Iranian Foreign Ministry warned that the Strait of Hormuz could not be seized “by a tweet, an aircraft carrier, an executive order, or a campaign speech.”
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