According to analysts, the use of the same standard track gauge as China on the new railway line demonstrates Moscow’s ‘pragmatic’ approach toward strengthening ties with Beijing.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has signed into law an agreement providing for the construction of a second standard-gauge railway line at a key border crossing with China. Moscow aims with this move to accelerate its eastward pivot and bolster relations with Beijing ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit.

According to a document published on Monday on Russia’s official legal information portal, Putin signed the law ratifying the railway agreement reached with Beijing during his visit to China in May.

The two sides agreed to jointly construct a new line along the cross-border railway connecting Zabaykalsk in southeastern Russia with the city of Manzhouli in northern China.

The defining feature of the new line is that it will use the 1,435-millimetre standard gauge, the most widely used track gauge globally and the one adopted by China, rather than the 1,520-millimetre broad gauge predominantly employed across Russia’s national rail network.

Speaking to the South China Morning Post, Li Lifan, a specialist in Russian and Central Asian affairs at the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, said the second standard-gauge line will help ease freight transit capacity constraints at the border crossing. This will reduce waiting times for cargo trains and enhance the speed and reliability of transport services along the eastern corridor.

Freight trains running from China to Russia currently rely on a single 1,435-millimetre gauge track at the Manzhouli-Zabaykalsk border crossing. This transit point handles more than 60% of rail freight trade between China and Russia, as well as a significant share of Europe-bound cargo traffic.

Because trains travelling in opposite directions must take turns using the same track to cross the border, bottlenecks occur periodically.

Zoey Wang, a director covering corporate, infrastructure, and project finance ratings at international credit rating agency Fitch Ratings, said the project is expected to provide more stable transport conditions for two-way shipments of commodities, machinery and electrical goods, consumer products, and cross-border e-commerce cargo.

According to Wang, the project will make corporate shipping schedules more predictable and help reduce costs arising from delays, cargo detention, and supply chain disruptions.

According to Russian media reports, Moscow expects the second line to increase annual transport capacity at the Zabaykalsk border crossing to 39 million tonnes by 2030, an increase of 11 million tonnes over current levels.

With Western sanctions curtailing its access to European markets, Russia has increasingly redirected its trade toward Asia in recent years.

However, experts caution that putting the new line into operation does not necessarily ensure a substantial increase in trade volume. In the view of analysts, the true significance of the decision lies in the strategic calculations underpinning it.

According to Li, despite Russia’s stated target, inadequacies in the country’s domestic railway infrastructure will constrain actual growth. This is because cargo will still need to be transhipped onto 1,520-millimetre gauge rolling stock to move further into Russia.

“This decision does not indicate a shift in the country’s railway gauge system. Rather, it represents a pragmatic choice made at a time when Russia’s pivot to the East is entering its implementation phase,” Li said.

In Li’s assessment, Moscow concluded that the benefits of easing bottlenecks along the trade corridor with China outweighed the costs of preserving existing procedural barriers at the border.

Li also noted that the timing of Putin’s signing was a deliberate choice. The decision came ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit to be held later this month in Shenzhen.

According to Li, Moscow wants to “demonstrate that it can deliver on its commitments to Beijing and set an example that could be replicated elsewhere.”

Zhao Long, director of the Institute of International Strategic and Security Studies at the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, offered the following assessment:

“Although Russia has long adhered to the broad-gauge standard, the depth that strategic trust and coordination between China and Russia have reached today leaves no real reason to resist laying standard-gauge railways on specific connecting sections, particularly across critical border segments.”

Zhao continued:

“This situation also reflects the growing influence and gravitational pull of China’s economic, trade, and transport connectivity networks, not only over Russia, but across the entire Eurasian continent.”

Wang also said the project demonstrates that China’s railway technical standards and associated services are finding increasingly broad application internationally.

However, Wang cautioned that increasing border crossing capacity does not automatically guarantee a corresponding rise in trade volume.

According to Wang, the actual impact of the project will depend on a range of factors, including freight rates, inter-customs coordination, European demand, regulatory policies, and operating conditions along the corridor.

According to Russian media reports, construction on the Russian section of the second line is already under way and is expected to be completed by the end of 2026. The section on the Chinese side is scheduled for completion in early 2027.

In an in-depth geopolitical evaluation broadcast, Turkish academic and international relations specialist Professor Dr Barış Doster, a faculty member at Marmara University, joined Harici YouTube channel to analyze the domestic dynamics and sweeping foreign policy consequences of the US congressional midterm elections.

The comprehensive discussion examined the prospect of a fractured mandate for the administration of US President Donald Trump, assessing the direct ramifications for Washington’s strategic posture across the Middle East, the grinding war in Ukraine, and great-power competition with Beijing and Moscow ahead of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Summit in Shenzhen.

Setting the framework of the broadcast, journalist Elif İlhamoğlu Akkoç noted that voters across the US were heading to the ballot box for the pivotal midterms to determine the composition of the entire 435-seat House of Representatives and 35 seats of the 100-seat Senate. She observed that nationwide survey averages pointed to prospective Democratic leads in both chambers, even as battleground states such as Michigan, Texas, Kansas, Alaska, and Ohio remained decisive in establishing the legislative arithmetic that will govern the remaining two years of Trump’s presidential term.

“A Trump who has fallen into the minority in both wings of Congress”

Addressing the electoral dynamics, Doster pointed out that the volume of early and advance voting across the US had surpassed previous cycles, signaling an elevated level of voter turnout. Doster highlighted that polling and public opinion research organizations indicated a very high likelihood of a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives, alongside the distinct possibility of Democrats securing the Senate leg of Congress as well.

“If these polls, these surveys are correct, and you know I am not someone who has good relations with pollsters, this is highly probable,” Doster said. Evaluating the immediate domestic institutional impact, he explained: “A Trump who has fallen into the minority in both wings of Congress, a Trump who has fallen into a ‘lame duck’ status in US political science terminology, considering the social, cultural, class, political, and ideological divisions, fault lines, separations, and polarizations in the US, will be a Trump whose hand is very weakened.”

Doster maintained that an opposition-controlled legislature would actively seek to constrain executive authority, forcing the administration into constitutional confrontations and unilateral maneuvers. “The Democratic majority in both wings of Congress, if that is the case, we do not know yet because we do not have the election results, will try to restrain and check Trump as much as possible,” Doster said. “And in return, what will Trump do? He will try to get things done with executive orders to the extent that the US system allows. He will use his veto card, and so on and so forth. So, in the coming days, if Trump loses the majority, whether in one wing or both wings, it means bigger tensions and bigger debates await us in US politics. Will this inevitably reflect on US foreign policy as well? Yes, it will reflect.”

“The US voter cares more about their car’s fuel than where their soldiers are occupying”

Responding to questions from İlhamoğlu Akkoç regarding Trump’s campaign pledges to suppress inflation, improve everyday living conditions, and terminate overseas military interventions, Doster stressed that fundamental economic determinants consistently outweigh foreign policy considerations in voter psychology worldwide.

“My dear colleague Elif, you and I, in all the books written about voter behavior in the world, all research conducted, and all articles penned, what always emerges most clearly? This emerges. What is the most important, primary factor influencing voter behavior? It is the economic trend,” Doster said. “It is the cost of living, inflation, unemployment figures, and so on and so forth. This is as valid for our voters as it is for US voters.”

Weighing the political durability of security developments against domestic material welfare, Doster continued: “Does your success in foreign policy affect the voter? It does. But if there is inflation, high cost of living, poverty, and unemployment, that effect remains limited. Does a success in foreign policy or, say, the fight against terrorism affect the voter? Undoubtedly, it does. But is its impact on the voter, its lasting effect in the eyes of the voter, longer, or is the government’s success in the economy longer-lasting? Of course, economic success is longer-lasting.”

Doster observed that empirical voting patterns affirm this persistent reality: “What have we been saying together in our programs from the beginning? The US voter cares more about their car’s fuel, their fuel, their gallons, their gasoline, than where their country or soldiers are occupying. And these polls and other articles written regarding the US elections have confirmed both you and me. It has reaffirmed it once again. So, the voter here is not looking at whether Trump pulls out troops or not, or his success regarding the Russia issue. The voter will cast their vote at the ballot box by considering the money entering or leaving their pocket.”

“Every country has its own unique conditions, realities, and political climate”

The dialogue subsequently reviewed broader international electoral contests, with İlhamoğlu Akkoç noting political reverses for Trump-aligned figures globally, including Viktor Orban in Hungary, Jair Bolsonaro’s political camp in Brazil following Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s presidential triumph, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s inability to capture a governing majority in Israel’s Knesset.

Doster cautioned against conflating disparate national electoral results into a single international verdict on Trump, arguing that every sovereign state operates within its own localized socio-political parameters. “Now, every country’s own social, historical, political, cultural, class-based, and economic reality is different,” Doster stated. “Undoubtedly, voters with very high political consciousness or those who look at life from an anti-imperialist perspective like you and me might be happy that the candidates Trump supported lost. But what is the percentage of these voters? That is what needs to be asked.”

Analyzing the Brazilian presidential election, Doster recalled the structural strengths of Latin America’s largest nation, highlighting its independent defense and civil aviation industries. He underscored the turnaround achieved by Lula da Silva after trailing in the first round: “In the first round of the presidential elections, Lula da Silva was behind. It even caused a bit of pessimism. What happened? He had a very successful term. He operated very powerfully on social media. His fans and supporters ran a very strong campaign, and in the second round of the election, Lula da Silva, who was behind in the first round, caught up, smashed through, and took it.” Referring to former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro, whom Doster recalled labeling the “Tropical Trump,” he remarked on his post-election departure to the US: “As soon as he saw the results, he fled to the US. This should not surprise us.”

Nevertheless, Doster dismissed broad-brush interpretations: “Can one draw the conclusion that voters and citizens in different parts of the world are sending a message to Trump, based on Lula da Silva’s success, Orban’s failure in Hungary, or the fact that the genocidal murderer Netanyahu, despite being the largest party, could not secure enough seats in the Knesset to form a government alone? I do not think that conclusion follows. Because every country has its own, in legal terminology they call it sui generis, right? Its own unique conditions, realities, political climate, priorities, social and political demands, and expectations.”

“I do not see a nuclear option on the table”

Turning to tensions in the Middle East and assertions voiced by figures such as US commentator Tucker Carlson, alongside reporting in publications like The New York Times and The Washington Post suggesting prospective post-election US military strikes against Iran, Doster offered a skeptical assessment regarding the likelihood of an all-out military confrontation.

“As you will remember from our previous programs, I said that there would be some tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, some armed skirmishes, and some airstrikes by US imperialism,” Doster noted. “But, like that 40-day continuous, intense, uninterrupted bombardment we witnessed in recent months; a ruthless, barbaric massacre or a genocidal attack targeting all of Iran’s military targets, civilian targets, infrastructure, energy facilities, and even hospitals and schools in Iran, no, I said I do not expect that.”

Doster argued that domestic legislative gridlock and social polarization within the US would curtail executive militarism abroad. “Especially after the elections, I think a Trump who has lost both wings, both the Senate and the House of Representatives, will not have the same audacity he had before the election and will be more cautious,” Doster said. “Also, this polarization in US politics exists within US society as well; whether in terms of wealth and poverty, between whites, Hispanics, Latinos, and African Americans, or between Republicans and Democrats. As long as this polarization, this division, and this tension, in the sense of states bordering the ocean, more liberal states, and the more interior states, continues, and to the extent that it becomes cemented by these election results, I think Trump’s hand is weaker, will be weaker, and this will inevitably be reflected in Iran policy as well. Especially no matter how much the murderous, genocidal Netanyahu encourages or provokes it, I do not see a nuclear option on the table.”

“Iran has shown it possesses the military capacity, courage, and will to strike”

Weighing domestic political instability in Israel, where Netanyahu’s Likud emerged as the largest party but fell short of the 61-seat threshold in the 120-seat Knesset, İlhamoğlu Akkoç raised whether Netanyahu might initiate an aggressive foreign diversion against Iran to consolidate domestic power ahead of potential early elections, especially against rivals such as former Chief of General Staff Gadi Eizenkot.

Doster acknowledged the risk of political provocations while maintaining that structural strategic factors prohibit an unconstrained assault. Addressing Netanyahu’s domestic maneuvering, Doster remarked: “By pushing security-oriented rhetoric, by pushing the external threat, the Iran threat, to the forefront just as he consolidates his own voters, could he engage in every kind of provocation in the event of a possible election renewal or repetition, just to complete those missing seats? Yes. This genocidal, this murderer can do it. As he has done in the past.”

However, Doster outlined three critical barriers preventing such escalation: “One, a nuclear option means that Iran would also retaliate on the same scale with all its means and capabilities. Two, putting such a madness, such an option into play means further increasing the anti-Israel sentiment that has already risen and damaging the support for Israel, which has already hit rock bottom in global public opinion, including in the West. And a third point is this: Iran has shown repeatedly so far that it possesses the military technological capacity, the courage, and the will to strike Israel, and that it has an inventory and stock of weapons beyond what was estimated.”

Doster observed that Washington’s operational limits restrain Israeli action: “That is why I believe that Israel, while receiving all kinds of support from the US but not receiving it on the field, without receiving support on the field, in the combat zone, in the theater of war, and receiving all other kinds of US support outside of that, I do not think Israel could attempt such a thing from here on out, just as it has not dared to until now. In that case, I foresee that the Iran war will perhaps not flare up but rather dampen, in parallel with the election results.”

“Russia will not withdraw from the field without getting what it wants”

Shifting the discussion to the conflict in Ukraine, İlhamoğlu Akkoç pointed out that Trump’s stated ambition to settle the fighting within a week had stalled amid protracted positional warfare, even as prospective tripartite negotiations involving delegations from the US, Russia, and Ukraine were scheduled for 10-11 November in Abu Dhabi.

Reviewing Moscow’s operational characterization of the conflict, Doster said: “The Russians, in the Ukraine War, stated that they were primarily fighting against NATO, the Atlantic, and the West, and that they understood the military operation towards Ukraine as a special military operation. And they stated it repeatedly. When there was an armed Russian intervention into Ukrainian territory, there was an act of aggression. They said, ‘No friend, this is not like that.’ What did they say in their own terminology? They said this is a special military operation. They said, ‘We are fighting the real war against the West.'”

Assessing the trajectory of the campaign as it passes roughly its fifth year, Doster acknowledged that operational timelines had expanded: “Is there the desired speed from Russia’s perspective? Has the desired military and political result been achieved so far? No, it has not. It is Ukraine’s resilience and resistance, but not Ukraine’s own dynamics alone. You might say factors outside of Ukraine. Call it US support. Call it private military companies. Call it Europe’s support. Call it foreign intelligence. Call it whatever you want.”

Nevertheless, Doster argued that strategic realities ultimately favor Moscow: “At the end of the day, Russia is Russia. Russia will get what it wants. It will not withdraw from the field without getting what it wants. Russia will not walk away from the table. And at the end of the day, no matter how much Ukraine resists, it is the losing side. Well, whether this period will be 5 years, 6 years, 8 years, or 10 years, we cannot estimate that right now. But at the end of the day, Russia is the winner, a winner even if the cost is heavy. Ukraine will be the losing side in the end, even if it resists.”

“Ukraine will appear as a state with shrunk territory and battered industry”

Detailing the structural fallout for Ukraine, Doster outlined four enduring territorial and socioeconomic consequences: “One, Ukraine emerges somewhat smaller. It loses territory. Two, it also loses a portion of the Ukrainian cities and Ukrainian territories that border the Black Sea, that have a coast on the Black Sea. Three, with its industrial infrastructure heavily battered, it will rise from the war table. It will sit at the negotiation table like that. It will sign the peace like that. Four, it is a side that has lost its people very seriously. There is a serious loss of life in both Ukraine and Russia. Plus, in Ukraine, beyond those who died on the front, there is also an intense migration to the West. There is a qualified brain drain taking place.”

Summarizing the future configuration of the Ukrainian state, Doster said: “So, at the end of the day, Ukraine will appear before us as a state with a very weakened industry, its qualified people having left the country, its territory shrunk, and as a mediocre agricultural producer and grain producer. But whether it is 5 years, 7 years, or 8 years from today, I cannot know that right now.”

Regarding the outcome for Moscow, Doster concluded: “Although Russia is also battered, has lost many people, and is economically tired and worn out, at the end of the day, it achieves a great gain even if the cost is high. Ukraine’s NATO membership will be out of the question. Other neighboring countries considering NATO membership will also have to reconsider their decisions.”

“Foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy”

Concluding the interview, İlhamoğlu Akkoç drew attention to the forthcoming APEC Leaders’ Summit scheduled for 18-19 November in Shenzhen, China, where Trump is expected to convene alongside Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin amid ongoing diplomatic talks over Ukraine and Iran.

Asked whether tangible accords could emerge from the tripartite gathering, Doster expressed deep skepticism, tying diplomatic bargaining power directly to electoral legitimacy: “There will not be any concrete outcome. If Trump emerges defeated in today’s elections, Trump will arrive at that table as a, to use the term from US literature, a lame duck. What do we always talk about? We talk about this in our lectures. That foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy. Since there will be a weak Trump at the table, nothing will come out of it.”

Contrasting Trump’s political vulnerability with the institutional positioning of his counterparts, Doster underscored Beijing and Moscow’s consolidation: “Plus, there are two other strong leaders at that table alongside Trump. Okay, Trump is the US president, but who are the leaders beside him? The Chinese leader and the Russian leader. China is currently a great power that knows time is on its side. A strong economy. Russia, yes, it did not get what it wanted in Ukraine in the first year or the first two years. Things dragged on a bit. Things got a bit complicated, as you would put it, but in the end, Russia is still Russia.”

Doster observed that Western forecasts regarding Russia had failed to materialize: “Russia did not take a step back as a result of the expectations and wishes of Western commentators and analysts. It did not collapse either. It did not give up either. What were they saying? They were saying, domestically, the people will revolt. The Putin regime will be toppled. Russia will collapse and fall apart. None of these happened. Russia showed that its military resistance, its political resilience, and even its economic endurance were far stronger than what the Westerners had estimated, expected, or desired.”

“A US president whose hegemony capability is declining has the weakest hand”

Doster summarized the balance of power at the upcoming summit table, emphasizing that structural domestic decline directly diminishes external projection: “So, Putin also has a strong hand at that table. Xi Jinping already has a strong hand. But if the election results today go against Trump, who is the person who will sit at that table with a weak hand? It is the US president.”

Broadening his assessment to Washington’s standing on the global stage, Doster observed: “Let us move from domestic politics to foreign policy. The candidates he supported have lost the election. A US president whose economy is not doing well, whose imperialist capacity, hegemony capability, and global dominance are weakening and declining, is the leader with the weakest hand among the three sitting at that table, not just due to domestic politics, but due to foreign policy as well.”

In the suburb of Petropavlovskaya Borshchagovka near the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv, protesters attempted to storm a building where mobilized conscripts and suspected deserters were allegedly being held.

The incident escalated into scuffles following allegations that soldiers were subjected to torture and denied medical assistance.

Following the developments, senior officials, including Kyrylo Budanov, Head of the Office of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, went to the scene.

Footage circulated on social media and featured in Ukrainian media showed demonstrators forcing the doors of a detached house, brawling with unidentified individuals, and wounded soldiers being brought out of the premises after paramedics gained entry.

The unrest erupted when allegations spread that armed individuals were detaining around 40 people in the building basement, beating them, and barring them from contacting their families.

Initial reports claimed that at least one person had died inside, but police later denied any fatalities.

Dozens of people, including relatives of those detained, gathered outside the premises, alleging that bribes were being demanded in exchange for visitation rights.

The arrival of a private ambulance for medical intervention escalated tensions when medical personnel were initially barred from entering; police also acknowledged that the personnel were not admitted at first.

According to eyewitnesses, individuals inside sprayed gas at the crowd when demonstrators forced the doors. A female paramedic who entered alongside a police officer stated that between 25 and 30 people were inside and that four soldiers in serious condition required hospital treatment.

The four individuals, displaying bruises and wounds on their bodies, were taken for medical treatment. While one of the wounded was reported to have a severe spinal condition, the cause and extent of the injuries remained unclear.

According to on-site videos, a 14-year-old child was also allegedly among those removed from the building, though the child condition and whether they were in detention could not be confirmed.

“We do not torture, we build units”

Kyiv regional police stated that allegations of illegal detention and fatalities did not reflect the truth, urging the public to follow official statements.

Addressing the crowd, Ukrainian National Guard Commander Oleksandr Pivnenko, who arrived at the scene, argued that the facility was a temporary accommodation and reception point for mobilized personnel awaiting transfer to training centres.

Speaking to the UNIAN news agency, Pivnenko said, “We do not torture, we build units.”

Pivnenko noted that the four individuals transferred to hospital had been captured after deserting their units.

The neo-Nazi Azov Battalion within the National Guard confirmed that the facility belonged to one of its units.

Acknowledging that four soldiers had been injured, Azov officials rejected claims of systematic mistreatment and announced that necessary action would be taken should unlawful violence be detected.

Existence of similar facilities acknowledged

Kyrylo Budanov, Zelenskyy’s Head of Office and former Military Intelligence Chief, also arrived in the area and conducted inspections.

Noting that some relatives of patients were permitted inside to meet with detainees, Budanov announced that inspectors were examining the conditions.

Budanov acknowledged that “many similar facilities” exist in Ukraine, stating that an investigation into their operations would be launched.

Tensions persisted despite Budanov’s intervention. Clashes broke out when unidentified individuals in plain clothes attacked demonstrators.

A UNIAN correspondent was reportedly kicked in the stomach, and footage captured an individual with a head injury approaching Budanov, who told the injured man to report to the police. Gunfire was allegedly heard around the premises during the confrontations.

Correspondents from Hromadske reported that fights broke out around a bus brought in to evacuate soldiers.

Scuffles intensified again as authorities sought to transport the remaining soldiers. Budanov stated that 14 soldiers needed transfer to hospital, accusing demonstrators of obstructing the bus and attempting to overturn it.

Describing the demonstration as an illegal street action, Budanov called on the crowd to disperse.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that a formal investigation into the incident had been launched, with the State Bureau of Investigation and the Military Ombudsman’s Office involved in the process.

Military Ombudsman Olha Reshetylova announced that they were conducting a joint inquiry with the National Guard Command and that the soldiers were receiving medical care.

International human rights organizations have documented secret detention centres in Ukraine since the 2014 Maidan events and the outbreak of conflict in Donbass.

A 2016 joint report by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch highlighted cases of extrajudicial detention and torture in secret facilities run by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and nationalist volunteer battalions. Authorities had denied the existence of unauthorized centres.

The latest developments took place amid intensifying debates over compulsory conscription practices and front-line desertion.

Ukrainian lawmaker Oleksandr Fedienko estimated in October that, while the exact figure of soldiers abandoning their units was unknown, it could reach up to 500,000.