On 11 September, the Pentagon announced the return of the aircraft carrier USS Roosevelt, signalling the end of the US operation to keep two groups of warships in the Middle East and signalling an easing of the situation in the Middle East. On the same day, Israel offered Yahya Sinwar, leader of the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), to leave the Gaza Strip with his family in order to reach a ceasefire agreement, signalling that Israel was considering ending the siege of Gaza. However, it is unclear whether Netanyahu’s right-wing government will move from one battlefield to another, ending its offensive in Gaza in the south and turning north towards Lebanon.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has entered its 12th month and there are no winners. The biggest losers are, of course, the Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip, ‘hell on earth’ and ‘the biggest open-air prison’, where more than 41,000 people, mostly civilians, half of them women and children, have lost their lives. The humanitarian crisis, in which dozens or even hundreds of Gazan civilians die every day as a result of various Israeli attacks or bombardments, has turned the suffering of 2.3 million Palestinians into hell. However, the third ‘national catastrophe’ since 1948, and the highest cost of living in 76 years, has not led to an end to Israel’s illegal occupation, and the six Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organisation that have normalised relations with Israel have not returned to the principle of ‘peace in exchange for land’ – the peace price paid has not returned the occupied territories.

Israel’s overwhelming superiority over the Palestinians is by no means a victory: the country has been plunged into a rare state of war, foreign investment has been withdrawn, flights have been disrupted, credit ratings have been downgraded, the international image has been shattered and internal contradictions have come to the fore, with political elites blaming each other. Israel, the world’s military power, lost at least 500 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, at least 670 soldiers were killed in action, 11. 000 soldiers in need of psychiatric treatment, atrocities committed by soldiers who cannot control their behaviour or violate the laws of war or humanity continue to come to light, the entire Israeli army is depleted as a result of ongoing military operations, there is a clear shortage of soldiers and religious students have been forced to enlist, and delays in reaching a ceasefire have led to a situation where 251 people who lost their freedom at the outbreak of the conflict were forced to join the Israeli armed forces. The delay in reaching a ceasefire, which led to the deaths of 251 detainees who had lost their freedom at the outbreak of hostilities, triggered waves of protests and demonstrations in Israel.

Israel’s biggest problem is that it faces condemnation, accusations and prosecution for ‘ethnic cleansing’ and ‘war crimes’ and even ‘crimes against humanity’ for exceeding its right to self-defence and using excessive force. It has also stirred up a hornet’s nest of geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, leading to a number of State and non-State actors joining forces to directly or indirectly engage in conflict with Israel in support of Palestine, notably Iran and Syria and four major factions forming a coalition between hard-line forces, including the Palestinian Hamas, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces, the Iraqi Popular Mobilisation Forces, the Yemeni Houthi forces and the Palestinian National Liberation Front. The formation of an ‘axis of resistance’ by Iran and Syria, together with four major groups (Hamas and other Palestinian hardliners, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen), plunged Israel into its greatest security dilemma since the Fifth Middle East War in 1982, and even into the unconventional mode of the Sixth Middle East War, in which it had to fight on five or six fronts in three directions: south, north and east. Even the natural barrier of the Mediterranean Sea in the west is no longer a reliable security depth for Israel and it is forced to rely on the naval and air forces of the United States and other Western allies for collective defence.

Netanyahu can’t think with certainty about putting the brakes on the Gaza war because he has to please his far-right party members, otherwise his weak coalition government would collapse. Moreover, by maximising the consequences of the war, he is trying to alleviate his political, legal and security responsibilities for the great ‘national catastrophe’ and ‘national shame’ that has been dubbed ‘Israel’s 911’. But the war cannot go on forever; Israel must be a country with an army, not just an army in the name of the country. Netanyahu and his government, on the brink of a major struggle for the fate of the country and his personal future, are really at a ‘strategic crossroads’: to continue or to end? If he continues the war, will he end the Gaza war and start the third Lebanon war? This is because Israel is constantly exposed to Hezbollah attacks, which are increasing in intensity.

In recent days, senior Israeli officials have signalled an end to the Gaza war. On 9 November, Defence Minister Galant said that after 11 months of liquidation, Hamas’ “military organisation” in Gaza no longer existed and that conditions were ripe for a temporary ceasefire, but that the window had closed. Earlier, the Israeli military said it had essentially eliminated some 20,000 Hamas militants and ‘targeted’ a number of Hamas leaders, including the deliberate choice of the Iranian capital Tehran to get rid of Ismail Haniyeh. Objectively speaking, Hamas has indeed suffered a major disaster and is now forced to resort to guerrilla warfare.

Over the past few months, accusations from US political and military circles about the escalation and expansion of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and war have become more and more explicit and focused on Netanyahu, in particular his continued obstruction and sabotage of the ceasefire negotiations and his proposal to take control of the Philadelphia Corridor between Gaza and Egypt and the ‘Nechalim Corridor’ separating the north and south of Gaza, which is the only way for the US military and political establishment to control the ceasefire talks and ceasefire negotiations. The question is whether such accusations and pressure should be made public. The Israeli negotiating team also warned Netanyahu that he could ‘destroy the agreement and thus bring about the end of the hostages’.

Netanyahu’s first and public demand for war on Gaza was clearly an impossible task: ‘de-Hamasisation, de-militarisation and de-radicalisation’. The so-called ‘trinity’ is not water without a source or a tree without roots, but a national liberation movement based on the long-standing illegal Israeli occupation, blended with Palestinian national hatred, legitimate rejection and even violent resistance. Unless the Palestinians are killed and expelled and the occupied territories are zeroed out or ‘Israelised’, Israel, like Sisyphus, will push the huge rolling stone of occupation up and down the mountainside, up and down, and the cycle will repeat itself, generation after generation paying an infinite price for expansion and occupation.

Netanyahu and many Israeli leaders know what the problem is, but due to a lack of strategic courage and historical responsibility, they do not act to end the illegal occupation and end the suffering and great evil it inflicts on Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and their peoples. Instead, by focusing on realistic short-term gains and the status quo, they seek to legitimise the occupation and, over time, to make it permanent. Through illegal occupation, social Darwinism and the application of the law of the jungle, they seek to create a fait accompli and, ultimately, to make themselves the rightful owners by permanently plundering the land of others.

After King David captured the capital of the Jebusites some 3,000 years ago, the Israelites renamed it Jerusalem and described it as the nation’s ancient capital and spiritual home forever, making no mention of the previous 1,000 to 2,000 years of the Jebusites’ founding history and ignoring a series of indelible facts of history: Some 2,000 years after the Romans destroyed the Jewish Temple and expelled the Israelites in 135 AD, Israel is no longer the dominant indigenous people of Palestine; since 638 AD, when the expeditionary forces of Omar, the second caliph of the Arab empire, captured Jerusalem from Eastern Rome, Jerusalem has been controlled and ruled by Palestinian Arabs or Muslims throughout its long 1329-year history, except for the Christian crusaders of the 11th-12th centuries, who controlled it for nearly a hundred years, until it was captured from the Jordanians by Israel in 1967.

The root causes of this widespread outbreak of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are Israel’s unending occupation and ‘de-Palestinianisation’, the continued blockade of the Gaza Strip with the connivance of the bipartisan US government, the continued encroachment on Palestinian lands in the West Bank, and even the intensification of its claim to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in East Jerusalem. The rise of the ‘axis of resistance’ and the multiple attacks on Israel are also a consequence of the Gaza conflict and the suffering of the Palestinian people.

It is clear that the logical choice is to address the symptoms and root causes or to stop the boil or put out the fire. The only way out of Israel’s national crisis is to end the military siege of Gaza as soon as possible so that the attacks of the ‘axis of resistance’ will stop. However, if a long-term solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to be found and if Israel’s peace, security, development and prosperity are to be maintained, the principle of ‘land for peace’ must be applied without compromise and the issue of the return of the occupied Arab territories must be resolved as a single package, including the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as the Syrian and Lebanese Golan Heights. This includes the Syrian and Lebanese Golan Heights.

If the Israeli government, headed by Netanyahu, launches a large-scale invasion of the north and a new war in Lebanon for its own selfish purposes, Israel will be plunged into a catastrophe of unspeakable proportions and it will be difficult for the current government to give an honourable account to the history of the country and the nation.

The three-day “The 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)” ended on 6 September in Beijing. China and the leaders of 53 African countries and the African Union jointly released two important documents, the ‘Beijing Declaration on Jointly Building an All-Weather China-Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era’ and the ‘Beijing Declaration and Action Plan for strengthening China-Africa cooperation (2025-2027)’. These two documents brought an excellent end to the summit themed ‘Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future’.

This summit is of great significance and attracts the world’s attention as it is the largest major diplomatic event organised by China in recent years with the largest number of foreign leaders attending, the fourth summit in 24 years since the establishment of the FOCAC and the third summit held in Beijing, as well as the first time in six years that more than 50 China-Africa leaders and 400 China-Africa entrepreneurs have gathered in Beijing.

The summit also marks the 70th anniversary of China’s formulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the 60th anniversary of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s first visit to Africa and his proposal of the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid, the 50th anniversary of President Mao Zedong’s formulation of the ‘Three Worlds’ theory, and at the critical stage of serious changes in the world landscape, the impasse in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the prolongation of the China-US game, the general depression of the global economy, and the collective awakening and rise of the Global South. Therefore, it is certainly an important global event and a turning point that the bilateral leaders of China, the world’s largest developing country, and Africa, the continent with the largest concentration of developing countries, once again come face to face and jointly discuss the development and progress of 2.8 billion people in China and Africa and one-third of the world’s population.

During the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced that China has upgraded its diplomatic relations with all African countries to the level of strategic relations and upgraded the overall description of China-Africa relations to ‘China-Africa Partnership with a Shared Future for the New Era’. Xi Jinping stressed that China and Africa will jointly build modernisation with six key characteristics: ‘just and reasonable, open and profitable, people-oriented, multicultural, ecology-friendly and peaceful’, and announced the ‘Ten Major Partnership Actions’. These include civilisation exchange, trade development, industrial chain cooperation, connectivity, development cooperation, health, agriculture and welfare, cultural exchange, green development and security cooperation.

Xi Jinping announced that in the next three years, China will provide 360 billion RMB (about 50 billion US dollars) to support the ‘Ten Major Partnership Actions’ and provide food aid and zero taxation to African countries, implement 30 infrastructure connectivity projects, 1000 small but effective life projects and 500 public benefit projects. It also pledged to send 2000 medical personnel and 500 agricultural experts to Africa, create 60,000 training opportunities in China for African women and youth, and create 1 million jobs in Africa.

During the summit, the Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres, President Ghazouani of Mauritania, Head of the African Union, and President Macky Sall of Senegal, co-chairman of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, highly appreciated the development of China-Africa relations and emphasised the great changes that China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative has brought about in Africa. They also believed that the new definition of China-Africa relations and the ‘Ten Major Partnership Actions’ will lead the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to a new stage.

The achievements made during the 24 years of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation have set a model in international relations, exemplifying win-win relations with mutual respect, mutual benefit and co-operation. These 24 years represent a quarter of a century of Africa’s self-development and united progress, regardless of periods of ‘despair’ and ‘Far East sick man’, and a historical period in which the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation has transformed from a ‘street gang meeting’ to a cornerstone of the Global South.

According to official data, in 24 years, China-Africa trade has increased nearly 26-fold to $282.1 billion. China’s investment in Africa has increased 80-fold to more than $40 billion. China has been Africa’s number one trading partner for 15 years, and its trade volume with almost half of African countries has increased by more than 10 per cent annually, with trade volume consistently breaking records. Over the past 10 years, Chinese companies have signed RMB 700 billion worth of contracted projects in Africa, achieving a turnover of RMB 400 billion, and investment co-operations have spread to many fields such as agriculture, processing, manufacturing, trade and logistics, with projects covering various fields such as transport, energy, electricity, housing and social services, promoting Africa’s economic and social development. China’s share of Africa’s debt is only one tenth.

More than half a century of Sino-African relations have achieved remarkable successes, although it has been quite a difficult journey, and the experiences need to be reviewed and summarised. Because this is a great story, a successful story and a unique example of China establishing friendly relations with a great continent. The 54 member countries of the African Union, except for Eswatini, all other African countries have diplomatic relations with China and maintain friendly relations. Almost all African country leaders visit Beijing regularly or irregularly, which is a major event in the history of international relations. It has become a standard pattern for the Chinese Foreign Minister to make his first visit to African countries every year, and Chinese President Xi Jinping has visited Africa five times, showing China’s deep interest in Africa.

The successful development and stability of China-Africa relations confirm the four general rules of country relations, and can even be regarded as a new textbook model of country relations to correct, supplement or overthrow the traditional international relations theories, experiences and practices of Western countries.

First, same or smilar historical experiences build empathy and loyalty. China and African countries, colonised and occupied by Western powers and having lived the lesson that ‘to be left behind is to be beaten’, are clear against foreign intervention.

Second, same or smilar political goals ensure cohesion and support. China and African countries seek independence, autonomy and empowerment and work towards the goals of development, prosperity and comprehensive modernisation.

Third, same or smilar understanding of relations strengthens common values. China and African countries value friendship and trustworthiness, believe in the principle of ‘going fast alone, going long together’, and adhere to the principles of mutual assistance and mutual benefit.

Fourth, same or smilar development conditions bring a common future and long-term commitment. China and African countries used to be economically backward, poor in basic infrastructure and backward in education and training. However, they both agree that ‘development is a difficult path’ and ‘people’s well-being is the greatest human right’ and respect their chosen development paths.

The successful and remarkable development of China-Africa relations also embodies the unique charm and exemplary significance of contemporary Chinese diplomacy, a Chinese experience and contribution that has evolved from diplomatic ideas and concepts to diplomatic principles and practices, and from these principles and practices to innovations in the theory and paradigm of international relations.

First of all, different civilisations and cultures can fully coexist and co-develop. China and Africa belong to different civilisations, but China has never used the differences between civilisations as a basis for judging friend and foe or for determining distance and proximity, and has emphasised the principles of ‘Each is beautiful in its own way, all people are beautiful; the beauty of people is beautiful in its own way, the whole world is the same’ and ‘Long live the unity of all the people of the world’. We resolutely oppose the theory of the clash of civilisations or the theory of the superiority of civilisations.

Secondly, even if we are thousands of kilometres away from each other, we can be as close as neighbours. Distance produces not only beauty, but also friendship and love. China’s traditional concepts of friendship such as ‘it is always a pleasure to make friends from afar’ and ‘all brothers and sisters in the four seas’ have ensured that China-Africa friendship transcends geography and space and remains constant.

Third, there are large and small countries that can get along with each other on an equal footing. Objectively speaking, China’s population, area and economic volume are indeed far beyond any African country, and even comparable to the entire African continent, but China has never practised jungle law and bullying policies, not to mention emphasising the so-called ‘power determines status’ distortion, on the contrary, in line with the principle of equality among countries regardless of their size, strength and weakness, wealth and poverty, we have made friends all over the world, including a large number of ‘big and small’ African countries. On the contrary, on the basis of the principle of equality between countries regardless of their size, strength, weakness, wealth and poverty, we have made friends all over the world, including many African countries that are ‘natural friends’.

Fourth, it is entirely possible for rich and poor to make progress together. In the half-century of China-Africa relations, especially in the quarter-century since the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the world and Africa have witnessed China’s rapid transformation from standing still to prospering and then to strengthening, and China’s assistance to other developing countries in making progress. Moreover, China emphasises that it will always belong to developing countries and will always share the same destiny and make progress hand in hand with developing countries, including African countries, and countries of the global South.

The China-Africa Summit was once again triumphantly concluded in Beijing, but it is only a summit but not a climax. Because China-Africa friendship and co-operation is a journey, and it is a long walk with no end in sight. The result is not the best, it is only on the way to getting better and better.

*Prof. Ma, Dean of the Institute of Studies for the Mediterranean Rim (ISMR ), Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He knows the world affairs well, especially the Islamic and Middle East politics. He has worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.

Dr. Serhat Süha Çubukçuoğlu
Director of Türkiye Program at TRENDS Research & Advisory, Abu Dhabi-UAE
serhat_suha@trendsresearch.org

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi’s long-awaited visit to Türkiye on 4 September 2024 marks a major cornerstone in the evolving regional complex. El Sisi’s first visit to Ankara to meet with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan holds a symbolic meaning amidst the ongoing war in Gaza and sends a clear signal of rapprochement between the former adversaries. The meeting comes on the heels of President Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo earlier in March, leaving a decade of political tensions between the two capitals behind.

Managing their differences over a range of geopolitical flashpoints from Libya to East Africa with occasional frictions, Türkiye and Egypt sides pursued a policy of de-escalation and fence mending for the past few years based on a mutual understanding of shared interests, reassessment of geopolitical risks, and economic pragmatism. After many rounds of negotiations, they appointed ambassadors to each other’s capitals in August 2023 as a clear indication of the normalization of diplomatic relations, even if not a realignment on all issues of contention.

This was not a straightforward outcome. Since the so-called “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, Cairo and Ankara have supported rival factions in Libya, the Gulf, and the Eastern Mediterranean, vying for regional influence to further their political and economic interests. The tide began to turn in 2020 with initial signs of a thaw in relations as both countries signaled their willingness to engage in dialogue. The Turkish government approved Egypt’s development of partnership with the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and made public statements suggesting that they were open to restoring ties with Egypt, particularly in the context of regional issues like the Eastern Mediterranean.

Türkiye’s steps to marginalize the Muslim Brotherhood and limit its presence in the country were a major catalyst in revitalizing the bilateral relationship with Egypt. In addition to a mutual desire to enhance economic cooperation amid shifting geopolitical currents in the region, Ankara’s strategic motive aimed to neutralize perceived threats against its core interests in the Mediterranean and draw Cairo closer in the regional standoff in the face of a then-growing energy-defense alliance around Athens and Nicosia.

As steady efforts by both Türkiye and Egypt to move past their differences and restore their ties progressed, Presidents Erdoğan and El Sisi put aside their personal feuds and prioritized economic practicalities and prudence over dead-end geopolitical gambits. Initial rounds of exploratory talks between respective intelligence agencies and foreign ministries paved the way for a breakthrough under Qatari mediation at the FIFA World Cup in Doha in November 2022, with a symbolic handshake between the two leaders.

The pace of normalization increased after El Sisi’s phone call to Erdoğan to offer his condolences for the earthquakes that hit Türkiye’s southeast in February 2023, followed by the-then Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu’s visit to Cairo in March to meet his counterpart, Sameh Shokry. The two presidents had last met at the G20 Summit in New Delhi, India, in September 2023 before Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Cairo in August 2024 to finalize the agenda for the “High Level Strategic Cooperation Council” in Ankara.

Moreover, the Turkish Navy’s ADA-class corvette TCG Kınalıada (F-514) made a port call at Alexandria and participated in a joint exercise with the Egyptian Navy’s Gowind-class corvette ENS El Fateh (971) last month to highlight growing bilateral military ties. Finally, Türkiye’s first indigenous training and light combat aircraft, Hürjet, flew to El Alamein airport near Alexandria on 2 September 2024 to participate in the Egypt International Airshow, a rare event in the history of bilateral relations. While Türkiye sees an opportunity to showcase its abilities and access the regional market, Egypt is known to be interested in Turkish defense products to diversify its supplier base and hedge against political risks.

The mutually hurting stalemate of the previous era was unsustainable for several reasons, but most conspicuously due to the worst economic crises for both countries in their recent history. Türkiye, for its part, needs closer cooperation with its largest trade partner in Africa to find areas for partnership in energy, defense, and tourism. Turkish businesses look for export opportunities as tax rises, high interest rates, and eye-watering inflation bite deeper into pockets of low-wage earners and dampen domestic demand. High-tech defense sector exports are on the rise to partially fill in the gap. Turkish firm Baykar’s potential sale of battle-proven TB2 Bayraktars to Egypt is a case in point that offers a viable, cheaper alternative over Western systems but without the conditionalities or political strings attached.

Similarly, Egypt needs to diversify its trade partners and draw direct investment to overcome high indebtedness and the foreign currency crunch. Revenues from the Suez Canal fell by US$2.2 billion, or by 25%, over the last year as attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea forced shipping companies to divert vessels around Africa. This gives a stronger rationale for Cairo to build on Turkish investments in Egypt that have reached US$3 billion and to increase the volume of bilateral trade from US$8 billion to US$15 billion in the next five years.

Both Erdoğan and El Sisi are interested in maintaining stability against criticism and popular unrest. To gain more supporters among their people also requires finding political solutions to conflicts in Gaza, Libya, and East Africa, and mitigating the risk of a wider war in the Middle East through closer cooperation via intelligence sharing, mediation, and shuttle diplomacy. As the U.S.-led unipolar world order evolves into multipolarity, middle powers like Türkiye and Egypt have more autonomy and maneuverability to influence outcomes in their neighborhood. The meeting in Ankara is an opportunity to re-emphasize the importance of regional interdependence, shared interests, and mutual respect for sovereignty against divisive currents of religious sectarianism and micro-nationalism. It coincides with Türkiye’s frustration with the lack of progress in its bid for EU membership and aspirations to join the BRICS, an ascendant economic group that counts Egypt among its members.

At a time of war fatigue and deteriorating political stability in the Middle East, the historic meeting between Presidents Erdoğan and El Sisi signifies a profound interest toward collaborative problem-solving amid ongoing conflicts and economic challenges. This renewed partnership not only strengthens their respective national interests but also enhances their influence in shaping a more balanced and multipolar international order.