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Belarusian influence on the course of the Russian-Ukrainian war

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Alexander Lukashenko, dubbed Europe’s last dictator, has been in power in Belarus for almost 30 years. Lukashenko, who came to power in Belarus in the 1994 elections, was elected for the fifth time in 2020. The Lukashenko government in Belarus has good relations with the Russian Federation rather than Europe. In geopolitical terms, this creates the profile of a country that is in Europe but maintains Soviet ties in its relations with Russia.

This should not come as a surprise, as there is a certain space that Russia provides for Belarus. Russia is also the main supporter of Lukashenko, who has been in power since the 1994 elections. In this context, it is inevitable that the more Europe’s ties with Russia weaken, the more pro-Russian Belarus will become. This was also the case during the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the aftermath of the Western sanctions against Russia, Russia’s attempt to expand its economic relations with Belarus in alternative areas was reflected in the growing strategic partnership and economic relations with Belarus. Of course, the deployment of troops and the supply of ammunition to Belarus should also be taken into account. But could these good relations between the two countries lead to Belarus’ involvement in the Ukrainian war? The importance of Belarus for Russia in the Ukrainian war is that it acts as a bridgehead. But is Belarus’ approach to the Ukrainian war at the expected level?

Belarusian influence in the Ukrainian war

The relations between Belarus and Russia are explained on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Belarus with an emphasis on geography as well as “close historical and cultural ties between the peoples”[1]. Of course, Russia’s Tsarist period and the subsequent history of the region as an important part of Russian history is important, but after the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, we do not see a Europe-oriented Belarus like the Baltic states. In this context, Russia is Belarus’ biggest supporter and strategic partner. Indeed, Belarus’ economic relations with Russia, which account for half of its foreign trade, have grown despite the Russian-Ukrainian war. In 2022, two-way trade between the two countries increased by around 15 per cent. Relations with Ukraine, on the other hand, have stagnated, especially in economic terms. From $6.9 billion in 2021, economic relations fell to $1.6 billion in 2022 and $13.8 million in the first seven months of 2023[2].

Belarus’ policy has become important, especially in the context of the “special military operation” launched by Russia in Ukraine in February 2022. As part of this process, Lukashenko welcomed thousands of Russian soldiers into his country. He even acted as a mediator between the Wagner leader Evgeny Prigozhin and Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially when the Wagner Uprising of 2023 is remembered. As a result, Wagner soldiers were stationed on Belarusian territory. In addition, from 2023, some of Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons were also deployed on Belarusian territory. After this move, Putin declared that it was “a reminder to those who think of inflicting a strategic defeat”[3] on Russia. It should not be forgotten, however, that Belarus did not take a direct part in the conflict. It continues to play an instrumental role in the region through its alliance with Russia as a deterrent.

In addition to being an important ally for Russia, Belarus is also seen as an important instrument of hybrid warfare in foreign policy, especially in its relations with Europe. This is not a new situation. Russia and Belarus have previously pursued policies such as reducing energy supplies, repairing pipelines to Europe, etc. during periods of problems in relations with Europe. In this respect, the relations between the two countries also reflect their common policy of deterrence.

On the other hand, there are dissenting voices in Belarus regarding the war with Ukraine. The fact that Belarus shares a 1,000-kilometre border with Ukraine makes it necessary to consider the dimension of relations. The reason for this should be seen in the context of Ukraine’s invasion of Russian territory with a sudden attack on 6 August and the opening of the Kursk front. The war that has been going on in Ukraine for almost three years has now expanded with the opening of a new front on Russian territory. The possibility of Belarus being the next stage should also be considered. Zelenski’s decision to go to Kursk was reportedly motivated by dwindling support from the EU and the US and the aim of strengthening his hand against Russia. But it is also a reflection of the territorial scope of the spreading war. In other words, with Ukraine’s problems in the ongoing war on its own territory, Russia is now experiencing the war on its own territory. Therefore, new fronts may bring new problems and new instrumentalisations.

Cracks in Belarus’s support for Russia?

The influence of Belarus should be reconsidered at this point. This is due to the growing fear of war in Belarus, as reported by PBS[4] in 2023. It is known that Russia has been sending arms and ammunition to Belarus, but the rhetoric of tactical nuclear war has been in the background. However, the possibility has also been raised that the Belarusian army of some 45,000 soldiers would disobey orders if sent into Ukraine. Indeed, according to a Chatham House poll in 2022, 25% of Belarusians supported Russia’s actions, while 97% of respondents opposed the deployment of Belarusian troops[5], indicating that public and government support in Belarus are at very different poles. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Lukashenko has not yet taken any direct aggressive steps.

During the war, Ukraine did not take any direct steps against violations by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on Belarusian territory. Similarly, Belarus has begun to deploy mines and troops on the Ukrainian border in response to possible threats. As I mentioned earlier, this indicates that they are also considering the possibility of targeting Belarusian territory as a new front.

Indeed, the Kursk front changed the course of the Ukrainian-Russian war. For Belarus, there is a war going on right next door that requires constant vigilance. That is why Lukashenko has warned that this war could escalate into World War III as a result of developments in the Kursk region. He has also called on Russia and Ukraine to begin peace negotiations. Although it is not clear whether these calls will be heeded in the near future, the possibility of opening new fronts and a nuclear threat should not be forgotten behind Belarus’s calls for restraint. Although Russia may deploy tactical nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory or use them in case of danger in the context of its own nuclear doctrine, the reality of a possible nuclear threat from two nuclear power plants (Kursk and Zaparoye) should not be forgotten.

* Assoc. Prof. Dr. Merve Suna Özel Özcan, Kırıkkale University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations. e-mail: mervesuna@kku.edu.tr

[1]https://www.mfa.gov.by/en/bilateral/russia/#:~:text=Traditionally%2C%20Russia%20is%20both%20our,of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Belarus.

[2] https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/ukraine-belarus-relations-context-russo-ukrainian-war

[3] https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/cn42re7ldeeo

[4] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/belarusians-wary-of-being-drawn-into-russias-war-in-ukraine

[5] https://en.belaruspolls.org/wave-11

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Can China Do More Than Condemn Israel?

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Iran suffered a heavy blow from Israel. During the first 12 hours of the attack, it even couldn’t fight back. In the wake of the sudden raid, there is increasing global discussion about potential mediators who might help de-escalate the situation. Some voices suggest that China, having played a key role in reconciling Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023 and organizing a dialogue between Palestine fractions in 2024, could step into this new crisis as a peacemaker.

However, while China’s diplomatic achievements in the Middle East deserve recognition, it is a serious overestimation to assume that Beijing can—or should—be expected to resolve every conflict in the region. At least, not now. The Israel-Iran conflict is fundamentally different in scope, depth, and international entanglement. To understand why, it is crucial to examine both the capabilities and limitations of China’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.

The US Can’t Be Bypassed

China’s mediation in 2023 that led to the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was heralded as a diplomatic breakthrough. It showcased Beijing’s growing influence in a region long dominated by U.S. security interests. The agreement was emblematic of China’s preferred diplomatic style—low-key, pragmatic, and built on economic incentives and mutual respect for sovereignty.

However, the success of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement was made possible by a unique alignment of interests. Both Tehran and Riyadh had compelling internal reasons to reduce tensions. Saudi Arabia wanted a calm environment for Vision 2030 and economic transformation, while Iran was under pressure from domestic unrest and economic sanctions by the West. In this case, China acted more as a facilitator than an enforcer.

This experience cannot simply be applied to the current Israel-Iran conflict. First, the conflict between Israel and Iran is not just a bilateral rivalry but a multi-dimensional standoff involving proxy forces, ideological opposition, nuclear tensions, and deep historical hostility. Second, Israel is closely aligned with the United States, a global competitor to China, complicating Beijing’s ability to act as a neutral intermediary.

For decades, Israel has been a central pillar of U.S. policy in the Middle East—not just as a security partner, but as a forward position against the rise of any rival or “non-rival” regional powers such as Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and even Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In this context, any attempt by China to mediate would be interpreted in Washington not as a neutral peace initiative, but as a geopolitical maneuver that challenges American primacy in the region.

Even if China were to act with genuine impartiality, its growing involvement would inevitably be seen through the lens of great-power competition. A meaningful intervention cannot bypass the United States, and would likely trigger strong diplomatic push back. This turns the crisis from a bilateral issue or trilateral dialogue with China in it, into a four-party interaction—China, the U.S., Israel, and Iran—each with distinct agendas and red lines, further reducing the space for effective mediation.

Moreover, the domestic political situation within Israel adds another layer of complexity that China—or any external actor—must contend with. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has faced significant political turmoil in recent years, including corruption trials, mass protests over judicial reform and his Gaza policy, and divisions within his governing coalition. Many of his foreign policy decisions, including this attack on Iran, are widely seen as being driven more by short-term political calculations than by coherent national strategy. Even Washington post said so, too. This level of internal political instability makes it extremely difficult for external powers like China to engage in sustained, high-level diplomacy with reliable counterparts or long-term commitments.

Iran’s Willingness: A Prerequisite

Another factor that limits China’s potential role is Iran’s own willingness—or lack thereof—to accept Chinese mediation in a conflict where national survival and regional dominance are at stake. While Iran appreciates China as a strategic partner in trade, energy, and diplomatic support at the United Nations, it does not necessarily see Beijing as a military or security guarantor.

When mediating between Saudi Arabia and Iran, security guarantees were not necessary, as neither side truly believed the other would launch a direct attack. Moreover, Iran-backed forces in Yemen had even gained some advantage in their asymmetric conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies. However, in the face of an increasingly unrestrained Israel, effective mediation is likely to require real security guarantees. Yet for China—already facing direct military pressure from the United States—offering such guarantees abroad would be an unaffordable luxury.

Moreover, the types of support China can offer—diplomatic pressure, economic aid, or even military technology—are only valuable if Iran sees them as credible and effective. In the future, what China can provide is not the security guarantee but a package of advanced defence system. This is where a critical reality intrudes: Iran may not have sufficient confidence in the practical utility of China’s military systems.

Although Iran’s air force has engaged in multiple overseas operations, its air fleet is outdated. Years of involvement in counter-terrorism campaigns against ISIS have also diverted its development focus away from achieving air superiority. Iran’s air defense systems, while more advanced and numerous than those of most countries—and supported by a domestic capacity to produce air-defense radars and missiles—still fall short when facing top-tier adversaries. The division of these systems between the Iranian Army and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps further complicates coordination and effectiveness.

Modern warfare has evolved rapidly. Effective defense now requires advanced stealth fighters, advanced radar integration, electronic warfare, satellite data, and real-time coordination with air superiority assets—capabilities that Iran has not yet fully developed.

The recent aerial conflict between Pakistan and India demonstrated the effectiveness of China’s fighters, long-range air-to-air missiles, and integrated air defense and warning systems. Although the J-10CE is not China’s most advanced fighter, within a well-coordinated system, it successfully engaged and shot down India’s French-made Dassault Rafale using PL-15 missiles.

Of course, the Israeli Air Force is far more advanced and experienced than India’s, and this time it is authorized by the U.S. to deploy stealth F-35s. However, the reality remains that the People’s Liberation Army is preparing for the possibility of U.S. intervention in a future conflict over Taiwan. Countering the U.S.’s F-22s and F-35s is one of the central considerations in this scenario. If Iran aspires to effectively counter Israeli F-35s in the future, it will have very limited options other than China.

However, even Pakistan, a longtime Chinese ally with deep military cooperation ties, has shown caution in relying solely on Chinese defence system not many years ago. The fact should give pause to those who believe Iran will immediately trust Beijing to reshape its military-building decisions.

Regional Perceptions and Misconceptions

Another dimension often overlooked is how China is perceived by other regional actors. In much of the Middle East, China is respected as an economic power but not necessarily trusted as a security actor. It has no military alliances in the region, no history of enforcing peace, and only limited experience managing wartime diplomacy. Its military base in Djibouti remains its only overseas installation, and while it participates in joint exercises, China generally avoids entanglements in conflicts.

This low-profile strategy aligns with China’s broader foreign policy principles: non-interference, strategic patience, and economic focus. But these same principles limit its leverage in crises that demand rapid response, force projection, or hard security guarantees.

All of the perceptions are right. But the foundational idea of it is always misconceived. First, China itself suffered deeply under Western imperial powers for over a century. As a result, it harbors no desire to become a new hegemony in the Western mold—a stance that also aligns with its foundational communist ideology.

Second, China’s leadership draws lessons not only from its own long and turbulent history, but also from global historical patterns, particularly the rise and decline of Western powers. Perhaps the most important insight is that nearly every great empire ultimately collapsed due to overreach.

Providing security guarantees in regions thousands of kilometers away could mark a dangerous first step toward such overextension. In contrast, selling military systems—while somewhat strategic if including stealth fighters J-35 and the most advanced surface-air missiles—is far less risky and remains within the bounds of manageable influence.

This is not to say that China should remain entirely passive. Beijing can and should use its diplomatic weight to call for restraint, support ceasefire initiatives through the UN, and maintain backchannel communications with Tehran and potentially with Israel. It can also support reconstruction efforts, offer humanitarian aid if necessary, and promote regional economic integration as a long-term peace strategy.

But none of these measures should be mistaken for the kind of high-stakes crisis diplomacy needed to stop an active military confrontation. That type of intervention requires somewhat coercive tools that China currently lacks and even if it has, it could be unwilling to use.

In sum, the idea that China should intervene decisively in the Israel-Iran conflict overlooks the structural realities of modern geopolitics. While China’s growing presence in the Middle East gives it more diplomatic clout than ever before, it should not be overestimated.

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Trump’s Iron-Fist Crackdown on Illegal Immigration Further Tears Apart American Society

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As of June 13 (Pacific Time), one week had passed since a conflict erupted following a raid on illegal immigration sites in California by federal agencies such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This conflict not only showed no signs of abating but rather spread like wildfire from Los Angeles, the capital of California, to 24 cities across the United States, including San Francisco, Dallas, Austin, New York, and Washington. Although protesters strongly oppose the federal government’s forced deportation of illegal immigrants, President Trump, who has already deployed the National Guard and some Marine units, has threatened to invoke the Insurrection Act, authorizing armed forces to suppress protesters more forcefully.

That same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals suspended a federal judge’s previous night ruling requiring Trump to return control of the National Guard. This undoubtedly gave Trump’s iron-fisted action a legal umbrella. The “alternative civil war” sparked by immigration policy reveals the complex realities and interest struggles of American society and puts Trump and the Republican Party’s governance prospects to the test. Although this unrest is unlikely to lead to a real American civil war as depicted in the 2024 Hollywood political prophecy film Civil War, it will undoubtedly further tear American society apart.

On June 6, federal law enforcement officers carried out a raid in Los Angeles County targeting illegal immigrants, storming at least seven locations and arresting 44 people. That evening, 500 protesters gathered in downtown Los Angeles, where law enforcement used tear gas, flashbangs, and rubber bullets to suppress them. On June 7, violent clashes erupted between federal law enforcement and protesters in the city of Paramount, California. As the crackdown on illegal immigration met resistance, Trump signed a presidential memorandum to “liberate Los Angeles,” bypassing California Governor Newsom and deploying 2,000 state National Guard troops to Los Angeles.

This marked the first time since 1965 that a U.S. president activated a state’s National Guard without a request from the state’s executive authority. On June 8, Trump further threatened to deploy 700 Marines to California to “protect federal property.” Trump’s administrative pressure campaign against California ignited the fuse of this “domestic unrest” and triggered a new constitutional crisis.

On June 9, Governor Newsom and California Attorney General Rob Bonta filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to prevent the federal government from using the state’s National Guard and Defense Forces for law enforcement, but a federal judge in California rejected the motion and scheduled a hearing three days later. On June 10, due to ongoing arrests, Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass announced a curfew in a one-square-mile area of downtown. Shortly after, Spokane, the second-largest city in Washington State, also declared a curfew in response to protests against ICE…

A review of public statements and public opinion over the past week shows that this national dispute over the handling of illegal immigration reflects deep-rooted contradictions and power struggles, directly illustrating America’s political polarization and social fragmentation.

First, this is a clash of beliefs about the rights and wrongs and merits of immigration. The United States is a multiethnic federal nation built through immigration and sustained by continuous immigration that supports its development, prosperity, innovation, and vitality. Without massive immigration waves, America wouldn’t have come into being. Without long-term immigrant contributions, America wouldn’t be strong. Trump himself is a descendant of German immigrants. On June 5, when new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz made his first visit to the U.S., he gave Trump a symbolic gift: a framed German birth certificate of his grandfather Friedrich Trump from Karlstadt.

Neither Merz’s subtle persuasion nor Trump’s own immigrant heritage can mitigate the serious rift in U.S. society over immigration. Trump and other conservatives, represented by the Republican Party, who adhere to market economy principles and social Darwinism, believe that the U.S. has too low an immigration threshold, allowing large numbers of low-quality or illegal immigrants to enter. They argue this not only takes away Americans’ jobs and dilutes welfare benefits but also erodes loyalty to America and causes the continued decline of the social status and influence of white Americans. Therefore, in his second presidential campaign, Trump promised to expel all illegal immigrants if elected, to reclaim the jobs and benefits lost by Americans—especially white Americans.

However, opponents—especially Democrats who advocate for cultural diversity and universal human rights—argue that immigrants revitalize the U.S. economy. They provide abundant cheap labor that supports the service, transportation, construction, and manufacturing industries. Thus, immigrants should not be discriminated against, let alone expelled. Moreover, even if some immigrants entered illegally, many have since settled down, abide by the law, work hard, and even build families, becoming an inseparable part of American society. Forcibly deporting them harms not only the economy and industries but also causes humanitarian crises like broken families and displaced children.

Secondly, this is a partial game in the overall struggle between federal and local interests. The crisis first broke out in California, reflecting the misalignment and differing calculations between the federal government and this economically powerful state. Previously, trade-dependent California had clearly opposed Trump’s tariff policy; the immigration dispute is merely a continuation of existing conflicts and has intensified past antagonisms. California is the largest economic state in the U.S., contributing 14% of national GDP. Its economic development has long relied on various types of immigration, making it a stronghold long seen as a sanctuary for illegal immigrants. According to unofficial statistics, California has up to 2.3 million illegal immigrants—around 20% of the U.S. total and 5.9% of the state’s population, higher than the national average—with 74% of them being of working age. If large numbers of illegal immigrants are expelled, California businesses will face skyrocketing labor costs or labor shortages, potentially leading to economic stagnation or even decline. Therefore, California’s political and business elites have consistently resisted federal immigration enforcement measures. The trade war has already cost California over $40 billion and intensified conflicts between immigrant laborers and native workers. Expelling immigrants would undoubtedly worsen California’s economy.

California is both a major contributor of federal taxes and a major recipient of central fiscal transfers—mutual dependence is high. Yet, to break this “sanctuary fortress” of illegal immigrants and promote new immigration policies nationwide, the Trump administration plans to sharply cut federal funding to California starting June 13, citing its “anti-energy, criminal-coddling, and illegal immigrant-sheltering” policies. Governor Newsom emphasized that California pays over $80 billion annually to the federal government—much more than it receives—and threatened to stop sending federal taxes. Long-standing tensions between the federal government and California were further inflamed by Trump’s radical immigration policy and ultimately exploded due to federal agents’ forced arrests.

Thirdly, this is a power dispute between federal law enforcement and local autonomy. The United States is a federal state with a clear division of powers between central and local governments. In principle, the federal government is responsible for foreign affairs and national defense, and controls borders and ports, thus holding absolute jurisdiction over immigration. However, as the largest immigration-receiving state, California is known for emphasizing independence and autonomy, particularly opposing federal interference in immigration, environmental, and educational matters. In 2017, California passed the California Values Act, refusing to share immigration data with federal authorities and resisting federal deportation cooperation.

This conflict also represents a clash between sentiment and law, power and legality. Californians emotionally and logically reject the federal government’s inhumane, ahistorical, and rights-violating deportations. They further question the incomplete procedures, rough tactics, and broad targeting during enforcement. Notably, Newsom accused Trump of unconstitutionally deploying the National Guard without his request. The deployment of Marines was also considered a violation of the constitutional principle barring military involvement in civilian affairs. The California Attorney General’s office stated that using military force was “illegal,” stripped the state’s authority over its National Guard, and escalated tensions.

Fourthly, this is a contest of power between strongmen—Trump and Newsom. Both are charismatic leaders in this democratic society, though Trump is Republican and President, while Newsom is a Democratic heavyweight. Newsom comes from a prominent family, was twice mayor of San Francisco, and has served two terms as governor of California since 2018. He is a rising radical within the Democratic Party with vast experience and connections, and a strong contender for the 2028 presidential election. For the ambitious and relatively young Newsom, the White House is his next and only step. His confrontation with Trump is seen as a preview of the next presidential race.

Trump’s hardline style is well-known, and some analysts suggest Newsom is using Trump’s own methods to become “the next Trump.” The rivalry between these strongmen didn’t start today—it began during Trump’s first term. Since Trump returned to the White House, Newsom, representing a powerful autonomous state, has opposed him repeatedly. In January, when wildfires broke out in California, Trump blamed Newsom and threatened to cut federal disaster aid. Newsom retorted that Trump politicized climate issues. In April, Trump launched a tariff war; Newsom strongly condemned it and instructed the state attorney general to sue the federal government—launching the first legal salvo among U.S. states. In response to Trump’s threats of arrests, Newsom loudly challenged him, seemingly daring Trump to act—knowing that if arrested, he and the Democratic Party would gain widespread sympathy.

Fifthly, this is a prelude to the midterm election battle between Democrats and Republicans. Trump’s crackdown on illegal immigrants drew heavy criticism from Democratic lawmakers, as expected. California has long been a Democratic stronghold and key vote base—also the toughest challenge for Republicans. Trump ordered a crackdown on California to fulfill campaign promises, assert authority, suppress Democratic momentum, weaken their vote base, and build on his previous electoral dominance. This aims to secure Republican victories in the 2026 midterms and clear obstacles for the next presidential election.

Border security was one of Trump’s most popular issues in the 2024 election. His overwhelming victory suggests both he and the Republicans enjoy broad public support, and now must take decisive immigration action to keep campaign promises. They also need to give voters a reason to support the GOP again in the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential race.

Whether bypassing the governor to deploy troops is legal will be debated along political lines. Observers will recall the 1957 Little Rock incident: when a segregationist governor used the National Guard to block Black students from entering school, President Eisenhower federalized the Guard and sent in the 101st Airborne Division to protect those students.

That moment became iconic in the U.S. civil rights movement; photos were once hung in American embassies as both reminder and boast. Over half a century later, the role of the National Guard and federal troops has again become central to America’s domestic crisis response—but political and societal divisions are arguably worse now than in the 1950s. America’s inclusiveness and confidence, openness and progress, now appear to have reversed course.

California’s sharp backlash made it the epicenter of this round of conflict, but that doesn’t mean all U.S. states share its immigration stance. Still, it is clearly a microcosm of American society. Trump’s aggressive immigration policy is a systematic project serving his “Make America Great Again” agenda. How it ends—only time will tell.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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European defense autonomy and Germany’s military role enter a turning point

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On May 27, the 27 EU countries approved a massive plan to strengthen the European defense industry, signaling a shift in Europe’s defense policy from relying on the U.S.-led NATO system to pursuing independent self-reliance. This major shift will also be partially endorsed at the NATO summit to be held at the end of the month, where a significant increase in defense spending is expected to be approved. Meanwhile, Germany—holding dual status as both the EU’s political leader and economic engine—is, for the first time since World War II, deploying permanent troops overseas on a large scale. This marks its departure from a long-standing homeland defense stance to a role as a vanguard of European defense. These three major developments symbolize the disintegration of the Western bloc as the world has known it, indicate a restructuring of Europe’s security landscape, and raise long-term public concerns about Germany and Russia entering direct conflict and Europe falling into another large-scale war.

At the Brussels meeting on May 27, the European Council formally approved one of the EU’s most ambitious defense plans ever—”European Security Action”—which will officially take effect on May 29. According to the plan, the EU will raise €150 billion from financial markets and lend it to member states to support defense industry development, boost military equipment production, and improve and optimize overall EU military and strategic capabilities.

The €150 billion investment is only the first step and just part of a much broader rearmament strategy for the continent. The European Commission plans to eventually raise €800 billion over the next decade. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described this as a “once-in-a-generation moment” and a decisive step toward Europe’s strategic autonomy.

Under the plan, member states can receive loan support when purchasing weapons through joint procurement procedures. To qualify, at least 65% of the project’s components must come from the EU, EU candidate or potential candidate countries, or countries with EU security defense agreements, including Norway, the UK, Moldova, Ukraine, Iceland, Switzerland, North Macedonia, Albania, and even Asian countries like Japan and South Korea.

This means non-EU manufacturers like the U.S., Turkey, and the UK can only participate to a limited extent—capped at 15% per project, or 35% under stricter conditions such as prior collaboration with EU contractors or pledging to switch to EU contractors within two years.

To reinforce EU technological sovereignty, a central agency will ensure that no third country can remotely control equipment produced in Europe. This restricts U.S. software firms from participating in EU drone programs developed under the plan. Additionally, to ensure economies of scale, interoperability, and prevent fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, member states must generally procure jointly with at least one other state to be eligible for loans—though exceptions exist for solo procurement.

The first tranche of €150 billion will prioritize artillery ammunition, missiles, drones, air defense systems, military transport aircraft, cyber defense, and AI. Analysts believe this focus addresses shortages and depletion in conventional weapons stockpiles caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, and supports Ukraine’s ongoing war effort.

The massive EU defense budget is seen as a necessary response to historic global upheaval—a major step toward strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. It also reflects the widening rift between Europe and a U.S. increasingly driven by Trump-era isolationism. EU leaders believe the U.S. has abandoned Ukraine and even Europe through rapprochement with Russia. They no longer rely on America as a security umbrella, nor expect the U.S. to rescue Europe in the event of war as it did in WWI and WWII.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Rutte hopes that at the June 24–25 summit, members will agree to raise military spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2032, with another 1.5% for related expenditures—totaling 5% of GDP, twice the long-standing U.S. target of 2%. Excluding the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, the other 29 NATO members are in Europe—so this means Europe must significantly boost its defense budgets, preparing for a future where the U.S. may fully abandon NATO.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S. pressured some EU nations to hit 2% spending by threatening to dissolve NATO. Now, Trump 2.0 demands even more—doubling the ratio to 5%. After mediation by new Secretary-General Rutte, NATO foreign ministers on May 14 discussed and compromised on the “3.5% + 1.5%” plan: 3.5% for armed forces, 1.5% for war-related infrastructure. This would increase NATO Europe’s military spending from $476 billion in 2024 to $1.15 trillion in seven years. Germany alone would quadruple its defense budget from €52 billion to €215 billion.

The doubling of NATO military spending is clearly not solely the result of direct pressure from the Trump administration, but rather a consequence of the “European panic” triggered by the U.S. shifting the burden and working off its job. Although unwilling, NATO’s European partners are forced to face a chaotic reality and an uncertain future. Major changes in the world order are an undeniable historical process, the decline of American power and its waning willingness to lead are growing trends, and Russia’s geopolitical pressure is both immediate and enduring. These three factors have gradually turned Europe’s strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance from ideals and slogans into conscious and voluntary strategic choices.

As the third barometer of Europe’s strengthening defense power, Germany—the strongest EU member and NATO European partner—has taken new historic steps in military construction, autonomy, and posture. It has boldly carried out the post-World War II breakthrough move of deploying a restructured armored unit permanently abroad for the first time.

On May 22, Germany’s Bundeswehr 45th Armored Brigade was officially deployed to Lithuania, a NATO ally on the Baltic Sea and one of the “frontline countries.” This brigade, specially formed for overseas combat, is a mechanized unit with a full strength of about 5,000 troops, expected to be fully deployed by 2027. It will be stationed at the Rukla Military Base near Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius—only 20 km from Belarus, a Russian ally. Lithuania borders Belarus and Russia’s Baltic exclave Kaliningrad, and the Suwałki Gap connecting Lithuania and Poland is considered the weakest point of NATO’s eastern defense.

German Chancellor Merz stated at the brigade’s inauguration ceremony that this step signifies the Bundeswehr “entering a new era” and that “we are taking NATO’s eastern flank defense into our own hands.” He reiterated Germany’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense and promised that Germany would assume responsibility and “not let European allies down.” Lithuanian President Nausėda called the move a “milestone” for NATO’s security architecture and for Europe. On the 26th, Merz publicly emphasized that Germany and its allies will no longer limit the range of weapons supplied to Ukraine. On the 28th, Merz promised visiting Ukrainian President Zelensky to help develop long-range missile systems.

In response to Germany stationing armored troops near its border, lifting missile range restrictions in line with the U.S., UK, and France, and assisting Ukraine in developing long-range missiles, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned Germany on the 28th not to repeat the mistakes of the two World Wars. He stressed that “Germany’s direct involvement in the war is obvious; it is sliding down the same slope that led to its collapse twice in the last century.” Dmitry Medvedev, Vice Chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated that Germany’s equipment and experts are directly involved in operations against Russia. Therefore, Germany is effectively a participant in the Ukraine conflict and has once again become an enemy of Russia.

On March 21, Germany’s Federal Council approved a €500 billion fiscal package, marking a departure from its long-held “debt brake”-centered fiscal conservatism, allowing large-scale government borrowing to invest in defense and infrastructure. The German parliament amended the Basic Law to remove limits on defense and cybersecurity spending. The 2025 defense budget will increase by €100 billion, and total defense spending over the next decade may reach €1 trillion. This is aimed at modernizing the under-equipped Bundeswehr and significantly boosting Germany’s defense strength and combat readiness. According to Reuters, NATO will also ask Germany to add seven more brigades—about 40,000 troops—to its NATO contribution, aiming to raise the total force defending against Russia to 35 to 50 brigades. This alone will require Germany to quadruple its current air defense capacity.

After Taking Office, Merz Quickly Deployed Troops to NATO-Russia Confrontation Zones, Raising Historic Concerns

After taking office, Merz swiftly decided to station troops in the frontline areas where NATO confronts Russia and made bold statements such as allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to attack Russian territory. These actions not only escalate the military confrontation between Germany, Europe, and even the NATO bloc with Russia, but also easily evoke painful memories of the two world wars—especially the tragic lessons of Germany and Russia waging war over control of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea.

Germany was the source of both World Wars. After World War II, its territory was fragmented, militarism and Nazi ideology were thoroughly eradicated, and the U.S. stationed heavy troops there for strategic containment. Germany was integrated into NATO’s collective defense system, which maintained European peace and security for decades. Based on the lessons and reflections from the two world wars, post-war Germany maintained a low level of armament, lacked an independent military-industrial production system, and pursued a pacifist foreign policy for a long time.

After the Cold War, as the U.S. continued its strategic retrenchment and shifted its military focus to the Asia-Pacific, and the UK exited the EU, Germany—growing stronger—became one of the EU’s dual political engines alongside France and the bloc’s unmatched economic powerhouse. Its status as a great power has continued to rise, as has its determination and role in promoting European strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance. While Germany is unlikely to start another European war on its own, its increasing will to lead Europe toward defense independence by supporting Ukraine adds more tension and volatility to its relationship with Russia. If Merz’s government continues down this path, it could lead to open conflict with Russia. A German-Russian war would inevitably invoke NATO’s Article 5, dragging the entire alliance into a world war with Russia.

Professor Jiang Feng, a well-known expert on European and German issues, once said: “The concept of ‘reason through culture’ that emerged a few years ago was Europe’s contribution to international political thought, but it has now been nearly forgotten—replaced by the militarization of diplomacy and security policy. This militarization has become a central topic in European and German political debate… German diplomacy needs the courage to give Kant’s vision of ‘perpetual peace’ a new space in today’s era. Trying to create more security and peace through more weapons and larger military exercises may backfire.”

Facing the massive shocks brought by “Trump 2.0,” a desperate Europe appears to be resolutely marching toward a “post-American” era—toward a “European path” of strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. Europe is preparing to give up the dividends of the long-enjoyed “peace under American rule,” aiming instead to shape a “New Continent” formed by a Europe-Russia bipolarity and restore a shattered Ukraine as part of a “New West.” However, this ambition is far from realistic, and a new, balanced solution must be sought.

Germany, the country that launched two world wars and suffered two national catastrophes, now stands at a new crossroads: should it insist on expanding NATO and maintain long-term strategic confrontation with Russia, or cut its losses and reach a comprehensive peace with Russia to jointly build a Europe of lasting peace, comprehensive security, and shared prosperity? This question not only tests the Merz government’s political will and strategic calculation but also its historical judgment and wisdom.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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