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European defense autonomy and Germany’s military role enter a turning point

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On May 27, the 27 EU countries approved a massive plan to strengthen the European defense industry, signaling a shift in Europe’s defense policy from relying on the U.S.-led NATO system to pursuing independent self-reliance. This major shift will also be partially endorsed at the NATO summit to be held at the end of the month, where a significant increase in defense spending is expected to be approved. Meanwhile, Germany—holding dual status as both the EU’s political leader and economic engine—is, for the first time since World War II, deploying permanent troops overseas on a large scale. This marks its departure from a long-standing homeland defense stance to a role as a vanguard of European defense. These three major developments symbolize the disintegration of the Western bloc as the world has known it, indicate a restructuring of Europe’s security landscape, and raise long-term public concerns about Germany and Russia entering direct conflict and Europe falling into another large-scale war.

At the Brussels meeting on May 27, the European Council formally approved one of the EU’s most ambitious defense plans ever—”European Security Action”—which will officially take effect on May 29. According to the plan, the EU will raise €150 billion from financial markets and lend it to member states to support defense industry development, boost military equipment production, and improve and optimize overall EU military and strategic capabilities.

The €150 billion investment is only the first step and just part of a much broader rearmament strategy for the continent. The European Commission plans to eventually raise €800 billion over the next decade. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described this as a “once-in-a-generation moment” and a decisive step toward Europe’s strategic autonomy.

Under the plan, member states can receive loan support when purchasing weapons through joint procurement procedures. To qualify, at least 65% of the project’s components must come from the EU, EU candidate or potential candidate countries, or countries with EU security defense agreements, including Norway, the UK, Moldova, Ukraine, Iceland, Switzerland, North Macedonia, Albania, and even Asian countries like Japan and South Korea.

This means non-EU manufacturers like the U.S., Turkey, and the UK can only participate to a limited extent—capped at 15% per project, or 35% under stricter conditions such as prior collaboration with EU contractors or pledging to switch to EU contractors within two years.

To reinforce EU technological sovereignty, a central agency will ensure that no third country can remotely control equipment produced in Europe. This restricts U.S. software firms from participating in EU drone programs developed under the plan. Additionally, to ensure economies of scale, interoperability, and prevent fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, member states must generally procure jointly with at least one other state to be eligible for loans—though exceptions exist for solo procurement.

The first tranche of €150 billion will prioritize artillery ammunition, missiles, drones, air defense systems, military transport aircraft, cyber defense, and AI. Analysts believe this focus addresses shortages and depletion in conventional weapons stockpiles caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, and supports Ukraine’s ongoing war effort.

The massive EU defense budget is seen as a necessary response to historic global upheaval—a major step toward strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. It also reflects the widening rift between Europe and a U.S. increasingly driven by Trump-era isolationism. EU leaders believe the U.S. has abandoned Ukraine and even Europe through rapprochement with Russia. They no longer rely on America as a security umbrella, nor expect the U.S. to rescue Europe in the event of war as it did in WWI and WWII.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Rutte hopes that at the June 24–25 summit, members will agree to raise military spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2032, with another 1.5% for related expenditures—totaling 5% of GDP, twice the long-standing U.S. target of 2%. Excluding the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, the other 29 NATO members are in Europe—so this means Europe must significantly boost its defense budgets, preparing for a future where the U.S. may fully abandon NATO.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S. pressured some EU nations to hit 2% spending by threatening to dissolve NATO. Now, Trump 2.0 demands even more—doubling the ratio to 5%. After mediation by new Secretary-General Rutte, NATO foreign ministers on May 14 discussed and compromised on the “3.5% + 1.5%” plan: 3.5% for armed forces, 1.5% for war-related infrastructure. This would increase NATO Europe’s military spending from $476 billion in 2024 to $1.15 trillion in seven years. Germany alone would quadruple its defense budget from €52 billion to €215 billion.

The doubling of NATO military spending is clearly not solely the result of direct pressure from the Trump administration, but rather a consequence of the “European panic” triggered by the U.S. shifting the burden and working off its job. Although unwilling, NATO’s European partners are forced to face a chaotic reality and an uncertain future. Major changes in the world order are an undeniable historical process, the decline of American power and its waning willingness to lead are growing trends, and Russia’s geopolitical pressure is both immediate and enduring. These three factors have gradually turned Europe’s strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance from ideals and slogans into conscious and voluntary strategic choices.

As the third barometer of Europe’s strengthening defense power, Germany—the strongest EU member and NATO European partner—has taken new historic steps in military construction, autonomy, and posture. It has boldly carried out the post-World War II breakthrough move of deploying a restructured armored unit permanently abroad for the first time.

On May 22, Germany’s Bundeswehr 45th Armored Brigade was officially deployed to Lithuania, a NATO ally on the Baltic Sea and one of the “frontline countries.” This brigade, specially formed for overseas combat, is a mechanized unit with a full strength of about 5,000 troops, expected to be fully deployed by 2027. It will be stationed at the Rukla Military Base near Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius—only 20 km from Belarus, a Russian ally. Lithuania borders Belarus and Russia’s Baltic exclave Kaliningrad, and the Suwałki Gap connecting Lithuania and Poland is considered the weakest point of NATO’s eastern defense.

German Chancellor Merz stated at the brigade’s inauguration ceremony that this step signifies the Bundeswehr “entering a new era” and that “we are taking NATO’s eastern flank defense into our own hands.” He reiterated Germany’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense and promised that Germany would assume responsibility and “not let European allies down.” Lithuanian President Nausėda called the move a “milestone” for NATO’s security architecture and for Europe. On the 26th, Merz publicly emphasized that Germany and its allies will no longer limit the range of weapons supplied to Ukraine. On the 28th, Merz promised visiting Ukrainian President Zelensky to help develop long-range missile systems.

In response to Germany stationing armored troops near its border, lifting missile range restrictions in line with the U.S., UK, and France, and assisting Ukraine in developing long-range missiles, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned Germany on the 28th not to repeat the mistakes of the two World Wars. He stressed that “Germany’s direct involvement in the war is obvious; it is sliding down the same slope that led to its collapse twice in the last century.” Dmitry Medvedev, Vice Chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated that Germany’s equipment and experts are directly involved in operations against Russia. Therefore, Germany is effectively a participant in the Ukraine conflict and has once again become an enemy of Russia.

On March 21, Germany’s Federal Council approved a €500 billion fiscal package, marking a departure from its long-held “debt brake”-centered fiscal conservatism, allowing large-scale government borrowing to invest in defense and infrastructure. The German parliament amended the Basic Law to remove limits on defense and cybersecurity spending. The 2025 defense budget will increase by €100 billion, and total defense spending over the next decade may reach €1 trillion. This is aimed at modernizing the under-equipped Bundeswehr and significantly boosting Germany’s defense strength and combat readiness. According to Reuters, NATO will also ask Germany to add seven more brigades—about 40,000 troops—to its NATO contribution, aiming to raise the total force defending against Russia to 35 to 50 brigades. This alone will require Germany to quadruple its current air defense capacity.

After Taking Office, Merz Quickly Deployed Troops to NATO-Russia Confrontation Zones, Raising Historic Concerns

After taking office, Merz swiftly decided to station troops in the frontline areas where NATO confronts Russia and made bold statements such as allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to attack Russian territory. These actions not only escalate the military confrontation between Germany, Europe, and even the NATO bloc with Russia, but also easily evoke painful memories of the two world wars—especially the tragic lessons of Germany and Russia waging war over control of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea.

Germany was the source of both World Wars. After World War II, its territory was fragmented, militarism and Nazi ideology were thoroughly eradicated, and the U.S. stationed heavy troops there for strategic containment. Germany was integrated into NATO’s collective defense system, which maintained European peace and security for decades. Based on the lessons and reflections from the two world wars, post-war Germany maintained a low level of armament, lacked an independent military-industrial production system, and pursued a pacifist foreign policy for a long time.

After the Cold War, as the U.S. continued its strategic retrenchment and shifted its military focus to the Asia-Pacific, and the UK exited the EU, Germany—growing stronger—became one of the EU’s dual political engines alongside France and the bloc’s unmatched economic powerhouse. Its status as a great power has continued to rise, as has its determination and role in promoting European strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance. While Germany is unlikely to start another European war on its own, its increasing will to lead Europe toward defense independence by supporting Ukraine adds more tension and volatility to its relationship with Russia. If Merz’s government continues down this path, it could lead to open conflict with Russia. A German-Russian war would inevitably invoke NATO’s Article 5, dragging the entire alliance into a world war with Russia.

Professor Jiang Feng, a well-known expert on European and German issues, once said: “The concept of ‘reason through culture’ that emerged a few years ago was Europe’s contribution to international political thought, but it has now been nearly forgotten—replaced by the militarization of diplomacy and security policy. This militarization has become a central topic in European and German political debate… German diplomacy needs the courage to give Kant’s vision of ‘perpetual peace’ a new space in today’s era. Trying to create more security and peace through more weapons and larger military exercises may backfire.”

Facing the massive shocks brought by “Trump 2.0,” a desperate Europe appears to be resolutely marching toward a “post-American” era—toward a “European path” of strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. Europe is preparing to give up the dividends of the long-enjoyed “peace under American rule,” aiming instead to shape a “New Continent” formed by a Europe-Russia bipolarity and restore a shattered Ukraine as part of a “New West.” However, this ambition is far from realistic, and a new, balanced solution must be sought.

Germany, the country that launched two world wars and suffered two national catastrophes, now stands at a new crossroads: should it insist on expanding NATO and maintain long-term strategic confrontation with Russia, or cut its losses and reach a comprehensive peace with Russia to jointly build a Europe of lasting peace, comprehensive security, and shared prosperity? This question not only tests the Merz government’s political will and strategic calculation but also its historical judgment and wisdom.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France

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The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.

In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.

Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.

Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.

The shadow of 17 October 1961

It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.

Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.

This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.

To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?

Looters on the streets, where are the police?

Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.

While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.

It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.

To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?

The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.

A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges

The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.

The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.

The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.

These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.

The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.

In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.

An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands

Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.

Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.

To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.

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What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?

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By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.

The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.

There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.

For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.

Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.

Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.

There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.

For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.

Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?

Let us give another example from the Turkic world.

On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?

We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?

Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.

In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?

In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?

Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?

How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?

Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?

How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?

Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?

These questions can certainly be multiplied.

Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.

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The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East

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In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.

In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.

Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.

Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.

A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East

On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.

These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.

If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.

Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.

The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.

Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.

For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.

The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again

The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.

Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.

The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.

Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.

Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.

Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.

Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.

In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.

In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.

Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.

A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.

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