Chancellor Friedrich Merz and his party, the CDU, are set to fundamentally overhaul the country’s citizenship laws in a bid to counter Alternative for Germany (AfD).

Senior figures in the CDU (Christian Democrats) are debating a ban on dual citizenship and the tightening of language requirements to retain their own voters who are turning towards the AfD.

In an interview with The Telegraph newspaper, senior CDU lawmaker Gunter Krings argued that previous governments had made the process of acquiring German citizenship “too fast and too easy”:

“Naturalisation should be seen as the final stage of integration into our workforce, our society, and the constitutional order. We cannot accept people wanting to become German citizens whilst living in a parallel society.”

Under the proposals, those seeking to become German citizens would have to pass a more demanding language proficiency examination demonstrating that they can discuss highly complex subjects, rather than a simple “B1” level test of everyday spoken German.

They will also be required to renounce the citizenship of their home countries, prove complete financial independence, and renounce “all forms of anti-Semitism”.

Krings spoke to The Telegraph ahead of the Saxony-Anhalt elections, in which the CDU suffered a heavy defeat at the hands of the AfD.

Krings, a deputy leader of the CDU parliamentary group in the German parliament, the Bundestag, pointed to the new citizenship laws as one way to achieve this goal.

These reforms would make financial independence and fluent spoken German mandatory for those applying for citizenship after five years of residence in Germany.

Krings said:

“One of these areas is definitely language skills. Currently, we only require the B1 level, which allows you to participate in only very simple conversations. But if you truly want to participate in the political process, as we expect of German citizens, you need to know German better; therefore, the B1 level is not enough.”

Arguing that the current system, which allows migrants to acquire German citizenship even if they receive social assistance, is “not fair to German taxpayers”, the CDU politician said: “Under current rules, it is sufficient to cover most of your livelihood [from your own income]; therefore, according to many court decisions, 51% is considered enough, but I do not think this is right.”

Krings argued that if nearly half of a person’s income comes from the German welfare state, “this cannot be proof of economic integration when applying for citizenship.”

Another key element of the reform would be the repeal of the legislation enacted in 2024 by the previous government, led by Olaf Scholz, which permitted dual citizenship in Germany.

Speaking on this matter, Krings said:

“I think the rule should be: when you receive German citizenship, you must give up your previous citizenship. If you move from one country to another and plan to live here permanently, I do not understand why keeping the citizenship of your former country should be so important to you.”

Krings argued that the lax citizenship requirements in Germany were primarily a result of reforms carried out by the Scholz government.

However, he also cited decisions taken by previous CDU leaders, such as former German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

Speculation is mounting that Merz could be forced to step down from the chancellorship as he struggles to quell discontent within his own party and from his coalition partner, the Social Democrats (SPD).

The citizenship reforms will require the approval of the SPD, which has previously sought to soften some of the CDU’s core policies.

The SPD is losing support not only to the AfD, but also to Die Linke (The Left Party) and the BSW.

In addition to losing the upcoming elections in Saxony-Anhalt, where it is in power, the CDU is also expected to lose the state elections to be held later this month in Berlin and in another eastern state, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania.

Hendrik Wust, a regional CDU leader who has been compared to Andy Burnham, is widely discussed in CDU circles as a potential successor.

Wust, for his part, sought to damp down these rumours throughout the summer by publicly backing Merz.

Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured a sweeping victory in the Saxony-Anhalt state election on Sunday.

On the other hand, with 43.8%, the party fell just short of an outright majority in its bid to form the country’s first “far-right” state government since the Second World War. The state has a population of 2.1 million people.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party, the CDU, suffered a poor result in the eastern state, securing 17.2%. The CDU was followed by its coalition partner, the SPD, on 9.3%. The Greens won 8.9%, Die Linke (The Left Party) 8.6%, and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) 5.3%, all managing to enter the state parliament.

Voter turnout was notably high at 77.8%. AfD appears to have won over many individuals who did not vote at all five years ago.

Among all voters, the issue of social security played the largest role at 25%. Internal security and migration issues reached a combined total of only 22%.

At the same time, AfD reached 65% among those who assessed their financial circumstances as poor.

In Saxony-Anhalt, GDP per capita stands at 38,452 euros compared with a federal average of 53,516 euros. The unemployment rate is 8.0% in Saxony-Anhalt, whereas the federal average is 6.3%. The pension for men is 1,676 euros in Saxony-Anhalt against a national average of 1,892 euros.

In the pensioner category, the CDU (27%) and AfD (38%) secured relatively close levels of support, whereas AfD led by a wide margin among workers, civil servants, and the self-employed, winning 61%, 46%, and 52% respectively.

AfD’s candidate for state premier said “we made history” and stated that the party received a clear mandate to govern.

Speaking to public broadcaster ARD, 35-year-old Ulrich Siegmund said that voters sent the message that “things cannot continue this way.”

“Friedrich Merz was a very good campaigner for us in this election campaign,” Siegmund said.

AfD federal co-leader Alice Weidel described the result as “sensational” and said her party “extends its hand to anyone who wants to make Saxony-Anhalt better and move Germany forward.”

AfD was seeking an absolute majority in the state parliament to govern alone and breach the “firewall” created by mainstream parties’ refusal to cooperate with AfD.

Final results revealed that AfD fell three seats short, securing 39 lawmakers in the 83-seat parliament.

Siegmund said they would not enter into “games” such as a minority government, but it remains unclear how the divided opposition could form a stable government without AfD.

BSW, which announced that it would support neither Siegmund nor incumbent CDU leader Sven Schulze as state premier, nevertheless criticises the “firewall” erected against AfD. BSW took five seats in the state parliament.

Schulze congratulated AfD on becoming the state’s strongest political force and said, “As the CDU, we will also have to face this result.”

The federal general secretary of Merz’s party, Franziska Hoppermann, refused to back down from the commitment not to engage with AfD.

Hopermann said:

“AfD is a far-right party. It wants to exit the euro; this means economic collapse… It works in close cooperation with Russia and wants a completely different social model. We will not cooperate with them.”

AfD’s regional branch in Saxony-Anhalt is one of several classified as a “far-right group” by the domestic intelligence agency.

In its election programme, the party refers to “remigration”, meaning the deportation of immigrants.

AfD previously won the Thuringia state election but was unable to assume power. There, a CDU leader formed a minority government to take office.

Schulze’s attempt to form an alliance against AfD will be a sensitive issue, as it will require at least some tacit support from the “far-left” Left Party, with which the CDU refuses to form a coalition.

Germany’s 16 states hold broad powers in areas such as supervising security matters and managing the education system.

Siegmund had listed a “deportation drive” and the elimination of incentives for people to come to Germany and “exploit our social system” among his top priorities. Citing concerns over “disinformation”, he wants to launch a lengthy process to withdraw Saxony-Anhalt from the regional public broadcaster.

AfD in Saxony-Anhalt also wants to legalise homeschooling, which has not been permitted in Germany thus far.

The party pledges to ban the official flying of the rainbow flag at schools, claiming it “devalues the family”, and to ensure schools fly the national flag.

The party opposes taxpayer money being “gifted” to Ukraine and states it will push for the lifting of sanctions on Russia. However, this is not a matter state governments can decide.

The 16 state governments are also represented in Germany’s upper house (Bundesrat), where certain government bills must be approved. As one of the smallest states in a nation of 83.5 million, Saxony-Anhalt’s influence there is limited: it holds four of 69 votes.

The mounting diplomatic and political friction between Germany and the Russian Federation has reached a critical juncture following allegations concerning a drone incident at Leipzig airport, exposing acute institutional fractures within Berlin and broader European divisions. In an extensive interview on the Strategic Compass programme broadcast by the Turkish digital outlet Harici, Dr Ulrike Guérot, a prominent German political scientist, international relations specialist, and director of the European Transcontinental Initiative, joined host Professor Hasan Unal to assess Berlin’s aggressive diplomatic posture, impending state and national elections, and parallel political volatility in France.

Professor Unal opened the exchange by questioning the strategic logic behind the German government’s escalation, drawing a direct comparison with regional military posturing elsewhere: “The Turkish planes and the Greek planes harass each other over the Aegean on a daily basis, and sometimes they do not even get to the news. So why did the Russians, or why might they have, attacked Germany with one single drone in Leipzig?”

Dr Guérot framed the incident within a calculated chronology of escalation orchestrated by German authorities. Recasting the events that began on 1 September, she noted that the German government asserted an immediate Russian threat without offering substantiating evidence to the public. In swift retaliation, authorities moved to shutter the Russian Consulate in Bonn by 18 September and ordered the closure of the Russian House, the major cultural centre situated on Friedrichstrasse in Berlin.

“It is a little bit repeating history”

“First, just to notice, it all happened and then was notified on the first of September,” Guérot stated. “That was the day when the government basically said that we are threatened by Russia, that the drone has been coming. The drone in the Leipzig airport came from Russia, without any proofs, by the way. And then they ordered to close the Russian consulate in Bonn for the 18th of September and also to close the Russian House, which is in Friedrichstrasse in Berlin.”

Emphasising the symbolic resonance of the calendar, Guérot recalled: “The first of September, as everybody knows, is the day that World War II started. It was this famous sentence from 5:45 am onwards: ‘We are going to shoot back.’ And that was the Polish beginning of World War II. So there is a lot of despair from the critical community in Germany to just notify that it is a little bit repeating history when you scale up a war and you take, by coincidence, the date of the first of September.”

Turning to the physical reality of the Leipzig occurrence, Guérot highlighted the absence of tangible casualties or infrastructural devastation. “There was no one killed, no one injured, no nothing. It was just, say, a harmless drone on the airport of Leipzig, no proofs whatsoever that it really came from Russia.” She recalled that Peter Gauweiler, a veteran Bavarian politician and former Christian Social Union (CSU) Bundestag deputy, had proposed that “the most intelligent thing to do would be to have a common commission, a Russian and German commission, to pursue and go for the reasons where this drone really came from.” However, Guérot observed that “this neutral undertaking to really clarify the origin is not taken up by the German government.”

Professor Unal concurred, noting that Moscow has routinely tendered similar joint investigative proposals: “The Russians keep offering that joint committee to investigate what has actually happened.”

Guérot contextualised Berlin’s intransigence within a broader three-year diplomatic pattern, pointing to earlier sabotaged negotiations. She recalled that in April 2022, potential peace talks were derailed following interventions associated with then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who reportedly expressed that the West was not yet ready for peace. She also cited subsequent diplomatic dialogues, including discussions involving Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska, along with mediation efforts initiated by former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, all of which were marginalised or rebuffed by European capitals. “You can say that for three years at least, any attempt to go for negotiation or peaceful settlement has not been taken on by the European side,” she said.

Tracing the immediate escalation cycle back to March, Guérot referenced cross-border drone strikes deep inside Russian territory, including attacks on domestic oil refineries in Perm. She specifically cited bellicose rhetoric from Christian Democratic Union (CDU) Bundestag deputy and foreign policy hardliner Roderich Kiesewetter, who asserted that Germany needed to carry the war towards Russia.

“The backdrop is obviously that everybody who is closely observing what is happening at the Ukrainian-Russian frontline knows that the war is lost for Ukraine, and that there is no possibility to win it,” Guérot argued. “And so the only possibility to basically prolong it, to not settle peace, to really push further, was to do drone attacks.”

“Stand pretty alone when he wants to escalate this”

Evaluating the geopolitical reception of Berlin’s rhetoric, Guérot stressed the striking absence of broad European solidarity behind CDU leader Friedrich Merz and the federal establishment. Statements of support following the Leipzig announcements were confined to a narrow geographic and institutional band: European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, incoming EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, and Finnish Prime Minister Alexander Stubb.

“Solidarity statements for Friedrich Merz interestingly only came from Kaja Kallas, not surprisingly, came from Ursula von der Leyen, came from Alexander Stubb, the Finnish Prime Minister, but not much more,” Guérot observed. “Germany, in basically scaling up this more or less ridiculous drone towards a super serious NATO conflict vis-a-vis Russia, is not apparently currently supported by many of the other EU countries. We had no solidarity statements from Giorgia Meloni, or from France, or from Ireland, or from Greece. So you see that there is a Finnish, Estonian, German alignment here, and it is important to realise that Mr Merz is standing pretty alone when he wants to escalate this.”

Addressing the notable restraint displayed by Warsaw, Professor Unal highlighted the tactical distance Poland has maintained despite its proximity to the conflict theatre: “Poland seems to be basically keeping away from the conflict for a while, particularly over the last year or so when the Russians kept talking about retaliation against countries supplying Ukraine with weapons. There is also tension between Ukraine and Poland, and as a result, the Poles actually keep a low profile.”

Guérot pointed to profound historical and cultural grievances driving the Polish reticence, specifically controversies surrounding World War II commemorations and the glorification of nationalist figures associated with Stepan Bandera. “Around 9 May, when the Ukrainians tried to push away Soviet war memorials commemorating soldiers who fought the Wehrmacht and redeclared memorials celebrating the heroes of Bandera, the Poles made a direct connection between Bandera and elements such as the Azov formations,” she explained. “You take a look at the internet and you see many pictures that point to proto-fascism in the Ukrainian troops. The Poles, having had intense historical trauma in the Second World War with Ukrainian nationalists, shied away from this. In reaction to the redeclaration of war memorials, the Poles even threatened the EU accession process, taking a tough stance that without historical clarification, Warsaw will not support Ukrainian entry.”

This lack of collective European enthusiasm was mirrored at the institutional level within the North Atlantic alliance. When Kiesewetter publicly urged invoking Article 4 of the NATO Treaty to convene emergency alliance consultations following the Leipzig drone incident, the appeal fell on deaf ears in Brussels. Alliance leaders, including Mark Rutte, offered no substantive mobilisation. “What we see is escalation on the German side, very little solidarity, and most European and NATO countries declining to react in the manner the government perhaps planned,” Guérot stated. “This shows the isolation of the German government.”

“An interference into the Russian elections”

Guérot subsequently turned to what she identified as a critical yet largely suppressed domestic objective behind Berlin’s diplomatic confrontation: the Russian presidential election scheduled for 20 September. Germany is home to an estimated 4 million Russian citizens and dual German-Russian passport holders who possess voting rights in Russian federal ballots.

“Consular affairs were overwhelmingly dealt with in Bonn,” Guérot pointed out. “The consulate in Bonn was a huge building handling marriages, legal affairs, passports, and voting. What is done in essence when you close the consulate of the Russian Federation on 18 September, two days before the Russian elections, is that you keep 4 million Russians from voting. I think this is behind the closure of the consulate and behind the deadline of the 18th of September.”

Guérot disclosed that she had spoken directly with the Russian Consul in Bonn following the eviction directive: “He is very shocked. He and the entire consular staff will be leaving the country on 18 September. They are being pushed out.”

Drawing an explicit contrast with Germany’s domestic democratic scrutiny, Guérot noted an ongoing legal challenge before the Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe regarding the February 2025 Bundestag election. Sahra Wagenknecht’s party, the BSW, has alleged electoral irregularities involving 9,400 miscounted or uncounted votes that kept the party beneath representation thresholds and artificially preserved a parliamentary path for a Merz-led majority.

“At the same time, the German government, by closing the Russian consulate, is preventing 4 million Russians from voting,” Guérot remarked. “What they wanted to prevent in Germany is headlines in the newspapers reporting that majorities of Russians in Germany voted for Putin. In Germany, Putin is entirely demonised. If you had polling showing that out of 4 million Russians in a free election, a majority voted for Putin, the German government did not want to see those headlines. In an era where everyone systematically talks about Russian interference in Western elections, one can say that the closure of the Russian consulate in Germany was a sublimated interference into the Russian presidential elections.”

Professor Unal observed that narratives of external Russian subversion have proliferated across European and American political landscapes, often serving domestic political ends. He noted allegations of subversion surrounding Western ballots, the political pressure exerted against right-wing parties, and efforts in France to target figures such as Marine Le Pen.

Guérot underscored the broader cultural dismantling accompanying this geopolitical posture. She condemned Berlin’s parallel decision to terminate the operations of Germany’s premier cultural outposts in Russia: the Goethe Institutes in Moscow and St Petersburg.

“Goethe would turn around in his grave,” Guérot said. “Johann Wolfgang von Goethe was always for the peaceful understanding of peoples, for enlightenment. The Moscow institute had already been reduced to digital online courses and library services. The Goethe Institutes were holding German culture together, running academic conferences. Seeing that most Russians I meet speak fluent, flawless German, while almost nobody in Germany speaks Russian, severing cultural relations is entirely counterproductive. Germany would have done better to invest in cultural relations and Russian language learning.”

“We need to carry the war towards Russia”

Turning to diplomatic initiatives originating across the Atlantic, Guérot noted reports from German national broadcaster Deutschlandfunk indicating that US interlocutors, including figures such as Jared Kushner and designated negotiators, were engaging in diplomatic missions to Kyiv to explore settlement frameworks.

“The US appears alerted, which again confirms that NATO is not following Friedrich Merz’s Article 4 trajectory,” she noted. “However, Ukrainian voices interviewed on German radio insisted they do not want these negotiations, claiming nothing will emerge because Washington will not apply sufficient pressure on Moscow, and Russia will not surrender its core territorial positions in Russian-speaking areas. The visit of a US delegation to settle peace is not welcomed by Ukraine.”

Guérot added that Moscow, anticipating Vladimir Putin’s re-election on 20 September, may adopt a calculated holding pattern: “Russia may try to buy time, watching the forthcoming US midterm elections in November and speculating on the next American presidential administration in 2028, creating another prolonged phase without a formal settlement.”

This international impasse is intimately tethered to acute domestic instability within Germany, particularly the state parliamentary elections in Saxony-Anhalt, where Alternative for Germany (AfD) was tracking between 40% and 43% in polling. Guérot referenced President Putin’s public address reacting to Berlin’s escalation, noting that the Russian leader openly linked Germany’s foreign policy hostility to the Saxony-Anhalt vote.

“Putin spoke with a degree of British humour, acknowledging: ‘Dear Germans, we know that you are in a critical time and that you have forthcoming elections in Saxony-Anhalt where the AfD is between 40% and 43%,'” Guérot observed. “Putin basically indicated: ‘We understand that your escalation of the war is designed to deter attention from these elections and prevent the AfD from scoring an overwhelming victory.’ The world has understood this.”

Addressing internal speculation in Berlin, Guérot revealed that political circles had actively discussed whether federal authorities might consider invoking an emergency decree (Notstand). Under the Basic Law, a formal state of emergency could technically lead to the suspension or postponement of scheduled elections. “The war emergency has not been decreed because that would create an absolute domestic crisis,” Guérot explained. “Instead, escalating towards NATO and Article 4 was a mechanism to generate an international emergency atmosphere without declaring a formal domestic emergency that would explicitly torpedo the vote.”

The regional ballot in Saxony-Anhalt carries symbolic and structural implications far exceeding the state’s population of roughly two million. Magdeburg, the state capital, represents a historic centre of European statehood, serving as the seat of Emperor Otto the Great, the tenth-century architect of the Holy Roman Empire.

“Otto the Great returns to his grave in Magdeburg Cathedral this very Sunday,” Guérot noted. “At the exact same moment, all German, European, and global eyes are focused on Magdeburg. It is like Asterix and Obelix fighting back the Roman Empire. A decisive victory by the AfD could produce a massive domino effect across the republic.”

Guérot expressed severe alarm over the domestic pre-election mobilisation, citing street actions by radical left groups in the state capital: “The German Antifa is mobilising, setting up protest camps and tents on the streets of Magdeburg. May it remain peaceful. We are conducting democratic elections. The AfD may win 40% to 43%. The sheer fact that protest tents are being built to challenge the vote is a sign that German democracy is under immense strain.”

“The dissolution of Germany”

Beyond the immediate ballot count, the structural issue is whether the AfD, led in Saxony-Anhalt by Ulrich Siegmund, can translate a plurality into an executive mandate. Guérot outlined the severe institutional stakes involved, specifically the interstate broadcasting treaty (Rundfunkstaatsvertrag) binding all 16 federal states to fund and maintain Germany’s public media apparatus, including ARD, ZDF, and regional outlets such as Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk (MDR).

“One Bundesland stepping out of that treaty would cause the entire public service media system to collapse,” Guérot explained. “Ulrich Siegmund has announced that an AfD administration would seek to terminate that contract. For the political establishment, preventing an AfD-led regional government is considered existential.”

Parliamentary seat arithmetic remains exceedingly precarious due to Germany’s 5% electoral threshold. “If the SPD, the Greens, and the BSW all fall beneath the 5% threshold, Siegmund could capture an absolute majority of seats with roughly 43% of the vote,” Guérot stated. “Conversely, if the Greens, the SPD, and the BSW narrowly clear 5%, Siegmund’s 43% will not yield a legislative majority. Counting will stretch late into the night. Just as in the federal election where 9,400 votes proved decisive, a razor-thin margin of voters will determine the entire outcome.”

Widespread public anxiety regarding postal voting (Briefwahl) has further heightened distrust. Guérot cited legal scholarship by constitutional expert Ulrich Vosgerau, who has examined the transparency vulnerabilities inherent in unmonitored mail-in ballots: “Postal ballots are not publicly counted at polling stations at 8:00 pm in the presence of citizen observers. Professor Vosgerau has conducted numerous presentations analysing the distortion risks and irregularities associated with mail-in systems.”

Should the AfD fall short of a solo majority, the establishment parties face severe coalition paralysis. CDU state leader Sven Schulze has hinted at attempting a minority administration. Alternatively, the CDU would be compelled either to break its long-standing party resolution forbidding cooperation with the left-wing Die Linke to form an anti-AfD popular front, or reconsider its firewall (Brandmauer) against the AfD. Guérot noted that figures such as former Health Minister Jens Spahn are increasingly attuned to shifting political realities, subtly reconsidering party strategy.

“German nerves are black. Everything is completely open,” Guérot said. “It is like a billiard ball striking three or four others, setting off a chain reaction. I was raised in the spirit that Germany is a solid, exemplary democracy founded on the rule of law. We used to look with immense arrogance upon Greece, Italy, and southern Europe as unstable systems. Now, many Germans feel our own system is breaking apart. I listened to a satirical commentary this week describing ‘the dissolution of Germany’. That commentary captures a widespread national sentiment that the prevailing political order no longer holds.”

“Deeply divided between the western and eastern branches”

Turning to internal AfD dynamics, Guérot rejected homogenous caricatures, detailing severe philosophical, geopolitical, and regional fractures dividing the party. “The AfD is deeply divided between its western and eastern branches,” she stated. “The western wing, represented by figures like Alice Weidel and Beatrix von Storch, is fundamentally pro-Atlanticist, pro-capitalist, libertarian, supportive of Elon Musk, and explicitly pro-Zionist. The eastern wing, led by Ulrich Siegmund in Saxony-Anhalt and Bjoern Hoecke in Thuringia, represents an entirely different social base.”

“Hoecke and Siegmund routinely generate online videos attracting seven million views, a reach no establishment politician can match,” Guérot observed. “The eastern wing is far more critical of American hegemony and NATO, prioritises peaceful security architecture with Russia, and embraces social-national economic views. This east-west party divide mirrors the geographic electoral map of Germany. The former East Germany, with its distinct historical socialization regarding socialism, capitalism, and the West, is demanding a fundamental reconsideration of the 1990 reunification, questioning whether it was an equal union or an economic and political annexation (Anschluss).”

Guérot noted that institutional co-optation is simultaneously eroding the party’s anti-war core, drawing parallels to the historical evolution of the Green Party: “The Greens entered the Bundestag in 1983 with Petra Kelly as committed pacifists opposing nuclear weapons and militarism. Forty years later, under Annalena Baerbock and Anton Hofreiter, the Greens have become olive-green warmongers. A similar subversive dynamic is visible inside the AfD. In the Bundestag Defence Committee, several AfD deputies who strongly advocated peace with Russia ten months ago have quietly shifted towards mainstream NATO positions. Deputies who remain committed to a revised European security architecture with Moscow are facing an increasingly hostile climate.”

“Burn the French debt”

Assessing the parallel volatility in France, Guérot analysed the complex landscape shaping the May 2027 presidential race following the judiciary’s decision to allow Marine Le Pen to stand for election despite facing public fund embezzlement charges, while imposing an electronic monitoring tag.

Guérot traced Le Pen’s tactical political transformations: “Between 2012 and 2017, Marine Le Pen modified roughly 80% of her political platform to achieve mainstream acceptability. She abandoned the traditional Front National posture of Jean-Marie Le Pen, which was anti-American, anti-capitalist, anti-EU, and pro-peace with Russia. She travelled to New York, visited Tel Aviv, embraced pro-NATO and pro-EU rhetoric, and presented herself as a defender of the Jewish community against Islamist threats in southern France. Yet this normalisation strategy failed to deliver the presidency.”

The sudden emergence of Jordan Bardella, the 30-year-old president of the Rassemblement National, has accentuated programmatic confusion within French nationalist ranks. “Bardella is an MEP who is explicitly pro-NATO, pro-armament, pro-Kyiv, strongly anti-Russia, and pro-Israel,” Guérot said. “He represents a clean break from historic Gaullist and sovereignist principles. Now that the courts have permitted Le Pen to run, the central question is whether she will realign with authentic sovereignist traditions or continue along Bardella’s Atlanticist trajectory, much like Giorgia Meloni’s alignment in Rome.”

On the political centre, persistent rumours suggest European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde could be parachuted in as an establishment candidate to succeed Emmanuel Macron. Guérot noted the glaring institutional double standard governing French political scrutiny: “It would be remarkable to witness two women running for the presidency where one faced scrutiny over 50,000 euros while the other carries questions regarding 400 million euros from past arbitrations, yet one is declared clean while the other is branded far-right.”

With the French Socialist Party historically collapsed at 6% of the national vote and forced to sell its iconic Rue de Solferino headquarters, and the Greens lacking viable national figures following Anne Hidalgo’s divisive urban tenure in Paris, former Prime Minister and current Le Havre Mayor Edouard Philippe stands as the most viable moderate conservative challenger against right and left populism.

Guérot pointed to radical initiatives advanced by Jean-Luc Melenchon, leader of La France Insoumise, as evidence of deepening polarisation. Launching his campaign in the immigrant-dense northern Paris suburb of Saint-Denis, Melenchon addressed both demographic transformation and historic symbolism: “Saint-Denis is the burial site of the Kings of France in the historic basilica, now situated within an overwhelming migrant community. Melenchon framed himself as their exclusive defender, declaring they would face expulsion under Le Pen.”

Melenchon sparked broader financial panic by explicitly advocating a radical debt jubilee. “A few days ago, Melenchon declared: ‘Il faut bruler la dette’—we must burn the French debt, arguing sovereign debt is merely an accounting fiction,” Guérot stated. “This produced outrage across French ministries and financial markets, with officials warning that France’s creditworthiness was being destroyed. In semantic terms, it represents a revolutionary posture evoking 1789 and Marie Antoinette. It underscores the extreme fragility of the Fifth Republic.”

Concluding her strategic overview, Guérot warned that the core engine of European stability has broken down entirely: “For sixty years, the Franco-German tandem guaranteed European stability and institutional compromise. Today, that tandem is completely broken. Both Germany and France are simultaneously gripped by profound internal dissolution. Between the Saxony-Anhalt vote and the French presidential elections in 2027, anything can happen. As a German citizen whose two sons live in Paris, I am deeply alarmed. No one benefits from state collapse and political turmoil in the two foundational powers of Europe.”

Following the discussion, Dr Guérot and Professor Unal announced that they will convene the East-West Forum in Istanbul on 26 September, an international conference organised by Harici and the European Transcontinental Initiative to examine the fundamental shifts destabilising the global architecture.