German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul has conducted high-level talks in Mauritania aimed at securing “energy imports,” signaling a continued expansion of Berlin’s diplomatic and economic outreach across Africa.

The initiative seeks to secure natural gas and green hydrogen from the African continent to compensate for structural deficits in Germany’s energy imports from Russia and the Persian Gulf, which have been severely disrupted by conflict.

According to a report by German Foreign Policy, the German minister held discussions in Mauritania on Monday focusing, among other agenda items, on future green hydrogen imports. Mauritania is currently positioning itself to become a primary hub for the green hydrogen economy in West Africa.

Following his talks in Nouakchott, Wadephul is scheduled to arrive in Nigeria today, where Berlin expects to secure deliveries of both green hydrogen and natural gas.

The diplomatic push follows meetings last week between German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune. Berlin is actively seeking to procure both natural gas and green hydrogen from Algeria.

However, critics have sharply condemned the strategy—which includes the construction of a major hydrogen pipeline beneath the Mediterranean Sea—labeling it a “neo-colonial project.” Detractors argue that the initiative risks exploiting the resources of the Global South at the direct expense of local economic development.

From Berlin’s perspective, these steps have become geopolitically non-negotiable. Intense systemic competition with Russia and the US-led conflict against Iran have severely threatened and disrupted Germany’s established raw material and energy supply chains.

Algeria’s strategic importance to Germany grows

Algeria is rapidly emerging as an increasingly critical natural gas supplier for Germany.

The North African nation holds the second-largest proven natural gas reserves on the continent after Nigeria, and stands as Africa’s largest exporter of natural gas.

Furthermore, Algeria is Europe’s second-largest supplier of pipeline gas, utilizing two major pipeline networks stretching north across the Mediterranean Sea: one terminating in Spain, and the other in Italy.

In addition to pipeline infrastructure, Algeria exports liquefied natural gas (LNG). In early July, the Wilhelmshaven 1 gas terminal received its maiden shipment of Algerian LNG from the state-owned energy enterprise Sonatrach, with subsequent deliveries expected to follow.

These Algerian shipments are helping Berlin reduce its heavy reliance on hydraulic fracturing (fracking) gas imported from the US. Last year, US-sourced LNG accounted for 96% of all imports arriving at German LNG terminals.

At the same time, Algeria is advancing the construction of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline. This infrastructure project is designed to transport natural gas from Nigeria, through Niger, and into Algeria, where it will connect to existing Mediterranean pipelines bound for Europe.

The pipeline’s projected transit capacity is up to 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.

Germany and the broader European Union are actively incentivizing natural gas imports from Africa. The strategy is designed not only to replace sanctioned Russian gas imports that are no longer available, but also to establish greater strategic independence from Middle Eastern gas supplies threatened by the conflict in Iran.

Africa’s role in the “green” transition

Over the longer term, Algeria is projected to play an even more significant role for Germany in the supply of green hydrogen—produced via renewable energy sources—which Berlin plans to deploy on a massive industrial scale as a foundational future energy source.

Berlin is currently planning multiple infrastructure projects to facilitate these green hydrogen imports. Chief among these is the “South H2” pipeline, designed to transport green hydrogen from Algeria through Tunisia and across the Mediterranean Sea into Italy, Austria, and Germany.

In Europe, the pipeline project is backed by a consortium of energy infrastructure firms, including the Italian pipeline operator Snam, Gas Connect Austria, and BayerNets.

The European Union has designated the pipeline as a “Project of Common or Mutual Interest” and has classified it as a flagship project of its “Global Gateway” infrastructure initiative, allocating corresponding EU financing.

To produce the requisite volumes of green hydrogen, Algeria plans to construct utility-scale renewable energy generation facilities.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz discussed the project in detail last Thursday with Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune during the latter’s official visit to Berlin.

Merz stated that Germany, in cooperation with Italy, plans to “advance the development of the southern hydrogen corridor” in order to “intensify hydrogen exports” to Germany.

Intra-European competition in Africa’s hydrogen economy

Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul’s current diplomatic mission to Mauritania represents a parallel effort to secure additional green hydrogen capacities.

Mauritania is actively working to transform its domestic economy into a regional hub for renewable energy-based hydrogen production.

One of the largest planned industrial developments in the country is being led by a joint venture comprising the German project developer Conjuncta, the Egyptian firm Infinity, and the United Arab Emirates-based Masdar Group.

The project represents a $34 billion investment aimed at installing 10 gigawatts of electrolysis capacity to produce green hydrogen earmarked for export to Europe.

This mega-project, known as “Infinity Power,” faces direct competition from a rival development named “Nour.” Initiated by Chariot Resources of the United Kingdom, TotalEnergies of France, and the Luxembourg-based Eren Group, the Nour project is also designed for 10 gigawatts of electrolysis capacity. However, this project is structured to prioritize Mauritania’s domestic energy requirements first, with only surplus volumes designated for export to Europe.

Prior to his arrival in Mauritania, Wadephul noted that the country “offers significant opportunities for renewable energy, particularly in the production of green hydrogen.”

While in Nouakchott, the Foreign Minister stated his intention to discuss “possibilities” for bilateral cooperation in “future technology sectors.”

Berlin seeks to reduce energy dependencies

Germany is also pursuing deeper strategic cooperation with Nigeria regarding both LNG and hydrogen. Wadephul is scheduled to arrive in Nigeria today for detailed consultations.

In November 2023, Germany and Nigeria signed a bilateral agreement under which Berlin committed to investing $500 million in renewable energy projects across the West African nation. In exchange, Germany secured commitments for LNG deliveries, with initial shipments scheduled to commence this year.

Much like the imports from Algeria, these Nigerian deliveries are intended to diversify Germany’s gas supply. They aim to further reduce Berlin’s reliance on US LNG, even as Germany phases out Russian LNG imports and navigates supply constraints from other traditional sources such as Qatar.

Furthermore, Berlin is evaluating the long-term potential of importing green hydrogen from Nigeria. In the autumn of 2023, then-Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated that Nigeria was not only “well-positioned” to supply Germany with the LNG “that we will continue to need in the coming years until the hydrogen market is fully established,” but could also become a “key actor” in Germany’s future hydrogen supply chain.

The German government has maintained an active “hydrogen partnership” with Nigeria for several years, which includes the operation of a dedicated “hydrogen office” in the country.

A “neo-colonial” project?

The planned hydrogen pipeline from Algeria to Germany has drawn sharp, systematic criticism from civil society organizations concerned about the geopolitical implications of the green energy trade.

In a joint protest declaration signed by 87 non-governmental organizations in March 2023, critics argued that hydrogen imports by Germany and other wealthy Western nations from Global South partners perpetuate an exploitative economic dynamic. They assert that the model prioritizes exporting domestic resources to wealthy Western economies at the expense of local populations.

Opponents contend that this framework “perpetuates the exploitative legacy of the past,” preventing independent development within Global South nations.

Critics also warn that the model strengthens multinational fossil fuel companies by enabling them to preserve legacy corporate structures through the construction of new pipelines and transport infrastructure.

They argue this occurs to the detriment of the Global South, where domestic economic development is systematically delayed by raw material extraction rather than the establishment of localized, high-value industrial supply chains.

Consequently, these organizations argue that the construction of the pipeline and the utilization of Global South renewable energy capacity for European consumption constitutes “a neo-colonial project.”

According to critics, this characterization applies equally to the other natural gas and hydrogen initiatives pursued by Foreign Minister Wadephul during his current African tour.

A struggle for influence is intensifying between the European Union and the United States in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, with the “Three Seas Initiative” (3SI) emerging as a primary arena for this geopolitical contest.

An analysis published by German Foreign Policy reveals that Western European nations and the EU are increasingly positioning renewable energy as a strategic counterweight to US liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries in the region.

At a 3SI summit convened in late April in the Croatian coastal city of Dubrovnik, representatives from the Trump administration met with officials from the 13 EU member states that comprise the initiative. The parties agreed on a series of new projects spanning energy supply, pipelines, artificial intelligence (AI), and digital infrastructure.

The immediate focus of these talks centred on new natural gas interconnectors for South-Eastern Europe and a massive AI project in Croatia carrying an estimated investment volume of €50 billion.

Originally established to modernise and expand infrastructure between the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas, the initiative has increasingly transformed into a vehicle for American power projection in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.

Energy policy remains the critical battleground: whilst the Trump administration seeks to lock in long-term US LNG export markets, the EU is pushing to pivot the region towards renewable energy. Notably, investments targeting renewable energy systems were also approved during the Dubrovnik proceedings.

A brief history of the Three Seas Initiative

The Three Seas Initiative was launched in 2015 by Polish President Andrzej Duda and Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, holding its inaugural summit in Dubrovnik in August 2016. The platform comprises 13 EU member states stretching from the Baltic nations (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) through the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and Austria, down to Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria and Greece.

Albania, Montenegro, Ukraine and Moldova have subsequently associated themselves with the platform.

The initiative derives its name from its geographical objective: linking the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas through the territory of its member countries.

The creation of the 3SI was heavily driven by the United States. US strategists drew direct inspiration from an interwar Polish foreign policy concept formulated by Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Piłsudski’s “Intermarium” plan sought to unite Eastern European nations—spanning from the Baltic states to Yugoslavia and Romania—into a geopolitical bloc designed to act as an anti-Soviet bulwark.

In late 2014, the US think tank the Atlantic Council, collaborating with Central Europe Energy Partners (CEEP)—a lobby group representing energy companies in Poland, Lithuania and Romania—published an influential analysis. The report focused on developing a “North-South Corridor” extending from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic and Black Seas.

The founding documents of the Three Seas Initiative explicitly reference this American strategic blueprint.

Washington has spent years utilising the 3SI to consolidate and expand its influence over the participant states. The cornerstone of this strategy is energy policy, specifically aimed at substituting imports of Russian pipeline gas with US-sourced LNG.

A North-South corridor to bypass the East-West axis

To achieve this geopolitical shift, the Three Seas Initiative seeks to expand the infrastructure of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe by adding robust north-south transport and energy links. Since 1990, infrastructural development in the region had run predominantly on an east-west axis, prioritising integration with Germany at the heart of the EU.

Constructing a north-south network will not only facilitate the distribution of US LNG imported via Adriatic and Baltic ports, but also foster a more autonomous regional infrastructure. By reducing reliance on road and rail networks terminates in Germany, the project threatens a significant dilution of Berlin’s economic and political leverage in the region.

Following the EU’s commitment to phase out Russian gas imports entirely by 2027, the strategic weight of LNG terminals and their corresponding north-south pipelines has steadily grown.

This structural dependency is visible within Germany itself. According to the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, approximately 96% of the LNG imported via German North Sea and Baltic terminals in 2025 originated from the US. This US supply accounts for 10.3% of Germany’s total gas imports.

German-American friction in South-Eastern Europe

The struggle for influence in Eastern Europe, and the decisive role of energy transit within it, was recently illustrated by a leadership crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina surrounding the German diplomat Christian Schmidt, the international community’s High Representative.

Schmidt’s eventual resignation was precipitated by intense political maneuvering between certain Western European nations—led by Germany—and the Trump administration, which has been actively pursuing gas and raw material agreements in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Having successfully pressured Schmidt to step down, the US proposed Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi as his successor. The nomination served to drive a wedge between EU member states, with Germany opposing Washington’s preferred candidate whilst Italy offered its support. President Trump warned that Washington would halt financial assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina if the US plans were thwarted.

The move aligns with a new US strategy for South-Eastern Europe submitted by the Trump administration to Congress in May. The updated policy pivots away from “democracy promotion,” focusing instead on security and securing market access for American corporations.

Historically, Bosnia and Herzegovina has relied on Russian natural gas delivered via the TurkStream pipeline. Washington aims to replace this supply with US LNG imported through a terminal on the Croatian island of Krk.

The proposed infrastructure plans involve constructing a new pipeline extension into Bosnia and Herzegovina, to be built by US engineering firm Bechtel alongside AAFS Infrastructure and Energy. Schmidt had increasingly been viewed by US officials as an obstacle to these plans.

A victory for the Trump administration at the 3SI summit

In late April, Dubrovnik hosted the 10th anniversary summit of the 3SI alongside an aligned Business Forum. The event drew high-level participation, including seven presidents and prime ministers from 3SI member states, numerous cabinet ministers, and senior representatives from the Trump administration.

At the forum, the US successfully leveraged multi-billion-dollar energy and technology projects to entrench its footprint in South-Eastern Europe.

US Secretary of Energy Chris Wright declared in Dubrovnik: “The United States is ushering in a new era of cooperation for Central and Eastern Europe. This partnership is built on our mutual support for an aggressive energy expansion agenda.”

To formalise this initiative, Wright, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković and the Chairwoman of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Borjana Krišto, signed a memorandum of understanding to launch the “Trump Peace Pipelines Framework”.

The agreement directly advances the “Southern Interconnection” project, which will link Bosnia and Herzegovina’s gas grid to the Croatian network and the Krk island LNG terminal.

At the summit, Polish Climate and Environment Minister Miłosz Motyka also emphasized the region’s commitment to expanding nuclear energy, calling it the “cornerstone of our new security architecture.”

Parallel to these energy agreements, American investors announced plans to build a massive AI and data centre hub in Croatia. The Pantheon Atlas investment group signed a memorandum of understanding with the Croatian firm Končar Group to construct an AI campus.

The total investment is projected at approximately €50 billion—a sum exceeding half of Croatia’s annual gross domestic product (GDP).

The gigawatt-scale power capacity required to run the data centre is comparable to the electricity demand of a major metropolitan area like Zagreb. To meet its current power requirements, Croatia relies heavily on natural gas, much of which is imported through the Krk LNG terminal.

Foreign policy implications of the energy transition

The Dubrovnik summit also marked the establishment of a new regional infrastructure fund. The vehicle is designed to finance joint investments in hydrogen production, cross-border transport infrastructure, renewable energy systems and electrical grid expansion, with at least €2 billion earmarked for initial projects.

By comparison, more than €4 billion was invested in natural gas infrastructure within the region between 2016 and 2025.

This gradual shift toward renewable energy introduces a distinct foreign policy dynamic. While LNG supplies are overwhelmingly dominated by imports from the US, the hardware and technology required to deploy renewable energy infrastructure do not carry the same transatlantic dependency. In the vast majority of cases, this technology is manufactured and supplied from within Europe itself.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz and French President Emmanuel Macron called for rapid enlargement at the European Union-Western Balkans Summit in Montenegro, acknowledging that the EU itself shares responsibility for the fact that Western Balkan states have not yet integrated into the bloc.

“If we have not accepted a new member in 13 years, this also points to shortcomings on the European Union side. Today, we want to overcome these,” German Chancellor Merz said.

Merz stated that the bloc must demonstrate both its capacity and its political will for enlargement.

The Western Balkans region comprises Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Serbia. All six countries submitted official applications to join the bloc many years ago.

“Membership-lite” model on the agenda

French President Macron emphasized the critical importance of the region for the EU. Pointing to areas such as energy, security, and migration routes, Macron said that Europe’s strategic independence will also be determined in the Western Balkans, rendering the region geopolitically critical.

Merz and Macron attended the summit in the Adriatic coastal town of Tivat with a joint draft proposal designed to bring candidate countries closer to the bloc at a faster pace.

Under the model proposed by the two leaders, candidate countries would be granted observer status in EU institutions. The initiative aims to enable these countries to participate more closely in decision-making processes and to gain privileged access to the EU internal market through gradual integration. These steps are also intended to accelerate the domestic reform process in candidate states.

The joint document noted that “overly bureaucratic and formalistic procedures” must be simplified and the negotiation process accelerated.

To build a “true European union,” the text emphasized that additional incentives should be offered within a performance-based, gradual integration framework. However, both leaders stated that the ultimate goal remains full membership at a faster pace.

Mixed reactions to the summit

Among the candidate nations, Montenegro is at the most advanced stage of the accession process, followed by Albania. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos stated that Montenegro could be admitted as the 28th member of the bloc by the end of 2028.

The initiative drew varied reactions from Balkan leaders. Montenegrin President Jakov Milatovic described the summit as a “turning point,” saying, “Our meeting offers new hope and fresh energy for all Western Balkan countries.”

Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama adopted a more cautious tone, noting that the initiative has “deepened the debate.”

While calling on Merz and Macron to exert greater effort toward rapid enlargement, Rama refrained from predicting a specific accession date for Albania. “It is impossible to predict when Albania will become a member. There are three things in the world that cannot be predicted: God, sex, and the EU,” Rama said.

Officials in Brussels continue to view the close relations that certain candidate countries—particularly Serbia—have developed with Russia with a critical eye. The EU regularly calls on Belgrade to align with sanctions against Russia.

According to observers, North Macedonia, which has been a NATO member since 2020, faces the risk of falling into the sphere of influence of Serbia and China.

Furthermore, high tensions flare periodically among countries in the region, particularly between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as between Serbia and Montenegro.

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008, a move that Belgrade has refused to recognize. Montenegro became an independent state in 2006 after separating from its state union with Serbia.