Interview
Prabhat Patnaik: We are entering a new era of struggle
We interviewed Prabhat Patnaik, one of India’s most important Marxist economists and whose works are closely followed in Turkey. Prabhat Patnaik is professor emeritus at the Centre for Economic Studies and Planning at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, India and from June 2006 to May 2011, he served as the vice-chairman of the Kerala State Planning Board.
Patnaik answered our questions about the past and present of capitalism; He argued that this mode of production could not survive with its own internal dynamics and could not accumulate capital, and always needed an external stimulus (colonies, pre-capitalist markets, state expenditures, accumulation by encroachment, etc.).
According to Patnaik, the reproduction schemes developed by Marx in Capital are the product of a theoretical framework in which capitalist production is assumed to be a closed system, and Marx actually rejected this assumption in his writings. The Indian writer draws attention to the fact that the current crisis of neoliberalism is also experienced at a time when external stimuli have disappeared.
Recalling the great peasant resistance in India at the beginning of the year, Patnaik argues that the ground for a worker-peasant alliance is more solid today than in Lenin’s time; because both classes are under attack by globalised financial capital. According to our guest, peasant resistance in India is the first to be a political opposition to neoliberalism; besides, it is a rather long-term struggle, unlike the working class, which is weakened against capital and stays away from long-term actions.
Prabhat Patnaik considers the Russia-Ukraine war to be a symptom of the collapsing neoliberal order. According to him, the sanctions against Russia to maintain order are one of the factors that led to the collapse of the system. Patnaik sees this as an opportunity not only for the peoples of the “Global South” but also for the workers of the “Global North.” What happens in Europe concerns the entire world; according to Patnaik, increasing strikes in the winter months is a sign: a sign that we are now entering an era of struggle…
‘LACK OF EXTERNAL STIMULI IS ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE CRISIS’
Your articles and books are followed closely in Turkey. Your recent book Capital and Imperialism: Theory, History, and the Present was translated into Turkish. Let me ask about it: You reject the analysis of capitalism as a closed self-contained system and also you claim that capitalism has always been historically ensconced within a pre-capitalist setting, even its very existence and expansion is conditional upon an interaction between the two. So, it is obvious that you refuse the claim that a simple reproduction can create an expanded reproduction without an external stimulus within the very logic of capitalist production, don’t you? Therefore, colonial setting and imperialism can not be labeled as “stages” in the history of capitalism but they are inherent qualities of capitalist production from the very beginning.
Yes, absolutely. Because when Marx wrote the reproduction schemes he assumed that whatever surplus value was produced, either consumed, accumulated or accumulated in the form of productive capital, the fact that surplus value can be accumulated in the form of money, in which case it doesn’t create any demand for goods. It is something which has been there in Marx’s writing for a very long time. Marx has rejected what he’s called Say’s law which basically says that supply creates its own demand therefore there is never a problem of efficiency of aggregate demand. But I think while working on his reproduction schemes his concern was really much more to show how exactly the process of circulation of commodities occurs. Not necessarily to claim that actually this is the way that things happen in capitalism. The reproduction schemes are fundamentally based on the assumption that Say’s Law is valid. But in fact that is something which Marx rejected throughout his writings. So I think we should not think of his picture of expanded reproduction as a realistic picture of how things happen under capitalism. The moment we reckon with the fact that accumulation can take money form, that money can be a form in which wealth can be held, then of course it becomes perfectly possible not only to see capitalism as a system subject to overproduction, not just cyclically, but something that can be subject to overproduction over a period of time, and therefore something that may actually settle down at a state of simple reproduction without necessarily experiencing expanded reproduction in the absence of an external stimulus, or in the absence of the availability of an external market. I believe colonialism has played that role or pre-capitalist markets have played that role, passed the way that Rosa Luxemburg had argued in Accumulation of Capital. And after the exhaustion of the pre-capitalist markets, obviously they did get exhausted, I think state intervention has played a similar role. And I argue at this moment in capitalism, since both the external markets are exhausted more or less and since state intervention is virtually ruled out in neoliberalism, capitalism is without an exogenous stimulus, which is why you are experiencing the existing crisis.
So you also reject Nicolai Bukharin’s criticism of Rosa Luxemburg regarding the external market and his emphasis on competition between capitals. You insist that wealth-demand for money can also be used for accumulation.
Yes. Competition forces capitalists to accumulate capital. But accumulation of capital can take many diverse forms. One is accumulation in terms of money. There is no reason why competition should force capitalists to actually accumulate in the form of capital goods. And that’s basically my point. Once one recognises the fact that accumulation can take a money form, then the need for an external stimulus becomes quite obvious.
You count three external stimuli in your book: pre-capitalist markets, public expenditure and innovation. How do you evaluate today’s setting of global capitalism regarding these stimuli? Do we have them in the era of neoliberalism?
Of the three, which have been generally discussed in the literature, I think innovations are really not a serious exogenous stimulus. This is where my argument would be different from Michael Kalecki’s, whose work I rely on so much. Because of the fact that innovations are introduced precisely when the markets are growing. In other words in a period in which there is growth taking place you have innovation being introduced. And this is something very clear during the period of the Great Depression. Lots of inventions came on stream but none of them were introduced as innovations into the production process which they actually had to wait for the post-war period of capitalist boom in order to be introduced. The automobile boom actually far from lifting the United States from the recession or the Great Depression of the 1930s. Actually it became stored because of the depression. So I don’t believe that innovations really provide an authentic exogenous stimulus. Whatever investment is decided upon, it is the form of the new processes, but the new processes themselves stimulate a larger amount of investment, that is what I am skeptical about.
Obviously, I think public expenditure can be an exogenous stimulus if public expenditures are financed not so much at the expense of the working people, but if it is financed either by taxing the capitalists or taxing the surplus earners more generally. Because in that case a part of the taxes would come out of their savings, so there is some net stimulus. Or, public expenditure can be financed by a fiscal deficit. But the point is that in conditions of neoliberalism, taxing capitalists or surplus earners is generally frowned upon by globalised financial capital. And so is the fiscal deficit which is why most countries have got fiscal responsibility legislation. Because of this fact, under neoliberalism, the individual nation-state policies must conform to the globalised financial capital, otherwise it leaves the country, goes somewhere else. And because of that, most governments find themselves in a position where they really cannot stimulate the economy, neither of the two ways in which alone they could stimulate the economy. And that’s why neoliberalism does not have access to pre-capitalist markets or in the sense that pre-capitalist markets have lost their weight now in stimulating boom under capitalism. And secondly, under neoliberalism the state cannot lead this role. And that is why the period of neoliberalism is associated with a period of general stagnation which has settled to the capitalist world after 2008.
‘HIGH PROFITS ARE THE REASON FOR INFLATION’
So you are skeptical about the so-called Green Energy, Industry 4.0., etc.?
There has been a lot of talk about it. But I do not see any of them in fact stimulating any economy. I mean we are currently moving into a fairly serious world wide recession. You may say that this world wide recession has nothing to do with the more long term factors that I am talking about. But I believe it does have to do with the longer term factors in a certain way. That’s the following: Basically in order to stimulate the economy within the parameters of neoliberalism, the governments, particularly the United States and Europe as well, for a very long time have been pursuing a policy of almost zero interest rates and quantitative easing which is really kind of putting enormous amounts of liquidity into the economy. You know the current inflation was actually stimulated by the rising profit margins. I believe the rising profit margins was in fact facilitated by the floating of this enormous amount of liquidity in most capitalist economies which really greatly reduces the liquidity risks. It would be handicap if the serious illiquidity risks that it will have to face. But the availability of this enormous amount of liquidity and virtually zero interest rates are something that actually reduce the liquidity risks to a point where many of the corporations felt they moulded to push up their profit margins. And I think that was the beginning of the inflation. In order to curb wages now the governments all over the capitalist world are actually increasing interest rates. So that is pushing the world economy into a serious recession.
In your book, you emphasize the role of metropolitan centers regarding the deindustrialization of the colonial periphery. The ocean of small producers and labor reserves serve for center and local landowners and also capitalists can stabilize the value of money even if there is a near constant share of wages. But for decades there has been a deindustrialization in imperialist countries and a sort of industrialization in former colonies. How do you explain this reversal? Moreover, real wages have been decreasing in all advanced capitalist countries progressively. How do you explain this tendency?
Let me state one thing first. Even though there has been a migration of capital in production. There have been movements of goods but capital in production has moved to a few countries of the Global South, particularly Southeast Asia and perhaps to some extent South Asia as well. But notwithstanding this movement of capital, it is true in that sense today’s capitalism is very different in this particular respect from what it was in the colonial period. In the colonial period, the world economy was segmented. Labor from the Global South was not allowed to move to the Global North – it still is not allowed to move freely. And capital from the Global North, even though it was allowed legally to move to the Global South, did not actually do so. So the point is now that the second part is no longer true. Capital from the Global North, at least for certain times of activities, is moving to the Global South. One would have thought that this would therefore use up the labor reserves which are there in the Global South, which are a legacy of colonialism. But that is not happening. And as a matter of fact labor reserves in the Global South are increasing relative to the work forces despite the movement of the capital from the Global North to the Global South. That is because of the fact that the rates of technological progress that this kind of movement of capital brings about are really very high. And what is more, if labor reserves do not get exhausted wages remain at the subsistence level where labor productivity is rising, share of surplus rises, and surplus earners prefer to buy commodities, their preference is for commodities which are really less employment-intensive.
So the shift in income distribution has also an effect in reducing employment. And of course the very high rates of labor productivity growth. Growth of employment in many countries is simply even less than the natural rate of growth of the workforce. Let alone absorbing the labor reserves. And what is more, the labor reserves are also getting replenished, because in neoliberalism there is necessarily an attack on petty producers and peasants. The whole idea is to open that entire sector for encroachment by capital. And that is why during the period of planning in many of the countries of the Global South, there was actual protection of the petty production sector. Minimum prices for the many crops, subsidiaries. In India price protection still exists for foodgrains which the current government tried to undo. But there was a year long peasant agitation against the withdrawal of this price protection.
‘PEASANT RESISTANCE IN INDIA WAS THE FIRST POLITICAL OBJECTION TO NEOLIBERALISM’
I would like to ask you about this peasant resistance against the imperialist capital. Because you make a distinction between accumulation through expansion and accumulation through encroachment. It sounds like today’s imperialism needs perpetual primitive accumulation and expropriation rather than just absorbing the surplus value. Do you agree with that? Especially in the Indian subcontinent, South East Asia and North Africa peasants and small producers are still important. It seems that expropriating Asian and African peasants is one of the main goals of imperialism.
Yes, of course, absolutely. And in fact this is something that neoliberalism brings about. And one of the things which I stand by is the fact that primitive accumulation is not something which is confined only to the origins of capitalism. The exogenous stimulus that I was talking about is in fact the part of primitive accumulation. As a matter of fact, Marx increasingly became aware of this. He wrote a letter to Danielson in 1881 in which he talks about the drain from India, the drain of the value from India to Britain. Huge figures. He says that the drain from India amounts to the incomes of 60 million agricultural and industrial workers in India. It is really something that cannot be treated just as an epiphenomenal. I think Marx himself was aware of the fact that there was a process of primitive accumulation occurring simultaneously with normal accumulation. He did not have time to develop this idea. So primitive accumulation is something that under neoliberalism, particularly an effort is made to impose a process of primitive accumulation in the Global South. And that, in turn, implies that many peasants and petty producers lose their occupations and they join the workforce in quest of jobs, but of course not enough jobs have been created. So the labor reserves increase, therefore even though there is a shift in the activities, a whole range of activities from the Global North to the Global South, this does not raise wages of the Global South, while it keeps wages in the Global North down.
So what is the significance of the Indian peasant resistance?
There are a number of things one has to bear in mind. This basically implies that the peasantry is now facing globalised capital, international agribusiness and so on. When Lenin was talking about worker-peasant alliance, the basis of that alliance lay in the fact that the workers would usher in a democratic revolution against the feudal lords and that would free the peasants. But after the peasants are freed from the classes of feudal lords, then of course the basis of that worker-peasant alliance no longer exists. Certainly, not between the peasantry as a whole and the workers. That was the Soviet industrialization debate. The Bukharin-Preobrazhensky debate was about that. And Stalin’s solution to the whole problem through forced collectivisation was, I think, left a mark on the development of socialism, i.e. the entire authoritarian structure that developed and so on. Those were really shaped in that period because recisitums [tasfiyeler] in the Soviet Union because of forced collectivisation.
Now we live in a very different world, where the basis for a worker-peasant alliance is really much firmer, because both are now confronting globalised capital. So there is no question of kulaks developing capitalist threat to socialist order. Because of the fact that they cannot develop as a capitalist class if the economy is open to encroachment by international agribusiness which would like to keep them under its control. So that actually puts a constraint on the development of indigenous capitalism from among the rich peasant class. On the other hand, to the extent they are squeezed. They have a real interest in making a common cause with the industrial workers. In other words, the basis for a worker-peasant alliance today is stronger than that of any kind from Lenin’s days.
I think the significance of the Indian peasant struggle is that it was the first challenge at the political level to the neoliberal order. The working class has been greatly weakened, both in the Global North and the Global South as well. If you go on strike, the capital would shift elsewhere, and would locate its plant elsewhere. That kind of fear is something that will generally keep the working class subdued. They have one-day strike, two-day strike but not a prolonged action. So the peasant action in India was the first prolonged action. And literally every means at the disposal of the state was used to break the peasant resistance. But they did not succeed. In every conceivable way they were mobilised against the peasants but the government did not succeed.
‘NEOFASCISM, NEOLIBERALISM’S RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE WORKERS’ MILITANCY’
You highlight one of the main consequences of the recent crisis is neo-fascism. It seems like neo-fascism claims that it is against neoliberalism and financial slavery, however, there is no indication that this movement try to cut transnational financial flows or raise workers’ consumption with a new industrial policy and public expenditures. I think India’s Narendra Modi is one of the best examples of this tendency. So, does it seem like there is no escape from neoliberalism? Presidents like Modi, Erdoğan, and Orban claim that they are resisting the Western hegemony and making their countries independent. Is that possible?
Not at all. Modi is forever begging globalised capital to come and set up plants here, the whole slogan is “make in India.” I think neofascism is neoliberalism’s answer to possible worker class militancy. The militancy that you are currently witnessing in large parts of Europe, and a militancy which can threaten at any kind, even in the Global South. In much of Asia that militancy is going to manifest itself. I think Sri Lanka is a good example. The economic crisis neoliberalism has been pushing that country is going to now explode in the sense of working class and general urban resistance. The point is that now the crisis of neoliberalism has brought it to a situation, where it simply cannot continue without requiring an alternative pillar of political support. Neofascism provides that political support in a number of ways. Firstly, it is of course authoritarian. And it is not just authoritarian in terms of state authoritarianism, but it also has its army of thugs and hooligans who go around and terrorise people. Secondly, it actually divides the working class along the lines of ethnicity, religion and so on. And third, yet most importantly, it changes the discourse. Modi now does not claim anymore that he has brought about an economic revival, created jobs that provided for employment but now he claims that he built a temple. So they change the discourse. I think that is why neofascism is useful for neoliberalism. Except that unlike all fascisms, neofascism also cannot provide any solution for the economic crisis of neoliberalism. Not even a military solution.
You said that the western sanction regime pushes the world economy away from the neoliberal order to a host of ad hoc arrangements and undermines the imperialist-dominated order altogether. Do you still believe that? Do those ad hoc arrangements draw us up to a bloody world war? Also, Russia has not nationalized any foreign or Russian industry yet and has been strictly avoiding any sign of a Soviet-style economy or socialist measures. It seems that when neoliberal era and imperialist unipolarism come to an end, it doesn’t mean that individual countries which have a strife with the West automatically adopt a new and social economic policy.
I agree with that. Socialism does not come by stealth. I think the Ukrainian war is certainly an immense crisis for global capitalism. Neoliberalism imposes upon the world an order, that is really an imperialist order because it has opened up all countries to the penetration of metropolitan capital. The post-war period you had dirigiste governments everywhere. They nationalised the industry, introduced some kind of planning, and controlled their local resources. That is something that imperialism tried to subvert. It tried to subvert through individual actions. People often tell me that in the 1950s and 60s yes imperialism was there and today is not, but the truth is the opposite. In the 1950s and 60s imperialism was weakened, which is why they attacked Mosaddeq, Allende and so on. Fundamentally imperialist military interventions were required to topple these regimes. While today that does not really require any military intervention of that kind. Except if a country is trying to threaten the order.
So the point is that I believe that because of the crisis of neoliberalism you really have some kind of a threat to the regime. When you have that kind of a threat, then the efforts to control that threat actually further accentuate the crisis.
Let me give an example. Russia, China, newly emerging countries, they are obviously revolting against the unipolar world. Russia is certainly not a socialist country, they are oligarch controlled. Except that one should not forget that oligarchs were opposed to the Russo-Ukrainian war. And China, while it calls itself a socialist country, there are all kinds of debates and discussions about it. But fundamentally, what you have today, therefore, is not a threat of socialism for the imperialist order, but the threat of multipolarism.
That is sought to be countered by having sanctions against Russia. What have the sanctions achieved? The sanctions in fact have the opposite effect of making all kinds of countries, India included, have bilateral deals with Russia. And if you have a bilateral deal, then you have opted out of global order, to that limited extent at least. So the global order whose defense is the primary objective, gets undermined by the same defense. That is the symptom of the crisis of imperialism and neoliberalism in the current context.
A country like Saudi Arabia is developing relations and some kind of bilateral talks with China. Going with Russia in the OPEC+, in order to cut down the daily production of oil against American wishes. These are straws in the wind. They are symptoms of a collapsing order. Saudi Arabia, who would have thought? The global order imposed by imperialism, I think, is collapsing.
‘THINGS GOING ON IN EUROPE INTEREST THE WHOLE WORLD’
So you think that working people of the Global South can use this opportunity.
Yes, of course, people of the Global South can use this opportunity. But I believe what is happening in the Global North is quite interesting. After all, British workers, German workers… Italian workers, they actually oppose the Ukrainian war. The Italian neofascist government, for instance, is in fact holding the line. Neoliberalism and neofascism have once more formed a formidable alliance in Italy.
What is happening in Europe is of great interest to the entire world and also to the future of capitalism. I am not saying that the workers are engaging in a socialist struggle, the workers are engaging in an economic struggle. But the economic struggle within the parameters of capitalism is really not going to be very successful. So the point is to see what the workers would do next. Obviously, then, political issues would come on to the agenda. And I believe, in a once, European workers are on paths of strikes and actions and so on, these would have a great impact on the Global South as well. I believe generally that we are entering a period of struggles.
Interview
Daniel Davis warns US strategy fails against Iranian defense grid
Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and military analyst Daniel Davis discussed the US military operation against Iran, decision-making mechanisms in Washington, US-Israel relations, transformations in modern warfare doctrine, and the global balance of power in an interview with Harici Media.
Answering questions of Harici Editor-in-Chief Tunç Akkoç regarding the Iran war, retired Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis stated that the US administration lacks an achievable military strategy on the ground. Davis said: “I would say the US has a desire, not a strategy. It wants to subjugate the Iranian side, corner them, seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, prove they pose no threat to anyone in the region, and ensure they never possess nuclear weapons. That is our desire. But there is no strategy to achieve any of these goals.”
Drawing on his past military experience, Davis detailed the geographical and technical challenges on the ground: “As a soldier with direct combat experience, having gained combat experience in some of these mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, I know that many of the mountains inside Iran belong to the same mountain category. I knew what a difficult military task it would be to conquer a country as large as most of Western Europe, where such mountain ranges cover the entire western front. Therefore, I knew you could do nothing on the ground. However, I also knew that you could not subjugate a country with this kind of defense capacity and of this nature through air power alone.”
Pointing out that Iran’s defense infrastructure spans many years, Davis continued: “You cannot do this, especially when they have anticipated this for twenty years and made all kinds of preparations by constructing underground caves, production facilities, and storage facilities, and developing production capabilities for their unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles. There is no way you can defeat them. Because such facilities were designed not only to withstand all our strike missiles, such as Tomahawk, Jasmine cruise missiles, PSM, or ATAC, but also to survive. Most are capable of surviving nuclear explosions as well. I have been inside some of these here in the US. I have been in some physically located beneath a mountain. I know they were specifically designed when constructed to withstand the largest nuclear weapons the Soviet Union might possess. The ones there are of the same kind. If you know before embarking on an act of starting a war that the enemy is this large, possesses these types of defenses, and everyone knows these are resistant to our non-nuclear conventional munitions, why would you start a war to force them into something you clearly cannot achieve?”
Addressing the assumptions behind the war decision, Davis said: “I think this is a fantasy stoked by Benjamin Netanyahu. It was said, ‘If we assassinate their leaders, the same thing will happen as happened to Maduro in Venezuela. You went there, captured him, and disabled him; when you did that, you took control of the entire government, they basically handed the country over to you, and the same will happen here.’ Anyone who thinks Venezuela is like Iran has paid attention to nothing. The culture, history, religion, experiences, and everything that has transpired over the last 47 years are radically different from those in Venezuela, and you do not have an insider to facilitate the process as we had in Venezuela. But President Trump appears to have thought this way.”
“When he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate; we lost this war”
Pointing to inconsistencies in US President Donald Trump’s decisions and the trajectory of the operation, Davis stated: “This situation is proof that he is stuck. Because, in my view, when he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate. We lost this war. Even if it is ongoing right now, there is no logical way for us to win it. Because we cannot eliminate the trump card held by the Iranian side.”
Stating that military pressure mechanisms are insufficient, Davis explained: “We still have our missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and all such elements. That is why it appears feasible. It is thought, ‘Maybe if we make a good enough deal, or put enough pressure on them, or impose a blockade and leave the public in a dire enough position to change the government’s mind.’ This is a fantasy. This is the only thing President Trump has. Because if he were acting based solely on military reality, strategic reality, and cultural and religious reality, he would know this was an unwise move, but he does not know.”
Describing Trump’s negotiation approach and the breakdown of the reached agreement, Davis used the following expressions: “He is a transactional individual who wants relationships resolved overnight. For example, during the memorandum of understanding period, this duration was to be 60 days. After starting the war, no achievable military objectives remained. Whatever your desires were, you can no longer reach them because you have confronted reality. Now he is trying to find an exit route, but even within this understanding, he cannot arrive at a rational and consistent perspective. Any rational person would think that when the memorandum of understanding was signed on June 17, it provided him with an exit route. You implement the terms of this memorandum, the crisis is resolved, the dual blockade is lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz could reopen.”
Addressing the clauses of the agreement text and subsequent developments, Davis said: “The terms Trump signed stated that Iran had administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz but could not demand any transit fees for 60 days. Iran accepted this, but accepted only one condition: the ‘for 60 days only’ stipulation. Subsequently, they publicly announced that they would collect fees later, but not during these 60 days. The US was not mentioned in the text in any way. We had no say. The authority to decide how operations would run was left to Iran together with Oman. We gave them 30 of the 60 days to prepare their plan for this. But after four or five days passed, the US suddenly declared a new southern corridor together with Oman.”
Detailing the process of reversing the decision, Davis noted: “While a step to reopen the strait had been agreed upon, traffic had risen to approximately one-third of pre-war levels, and many shipments had passed directly on the first day, Trump personally turned back this development toward finding a reasonable exit route from the unfolding disaster. According to reports from some sources in Washington, he came under intense pressure from pro-war figures in his inner circle and those on the Israeli side. He backed down under this pressure and modified the terms by inserting himself into the fifth paragraph. He never made Israel implement the first paragraph, which covered Lebanon and envisioned a ceasefire on all fronts. We did not even give them 30 days; we intervened before five days had passed. Trump has a goal, fails to reach it, puts forward another condition, and then withdraws that as well. He is very easily manipulated; he reaches a decision, then someone speaks with him, and he changes his mind.”
Recalling that a similar situation occurred in relations with Saudi Arabia, Davis said: “He said he made a great deal with Saudi Arabia, and the next day he changed the condition by saying, ‘as long as they sign the Abraham Accords.’ Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, announced that this was not part of the agreement and had never been discussed. This situation shows that President Trump constantly makes concessions when pressured. On this basis, how can any agreement be reached with the US? This situation means that no military or diplomatic exit point remains because he does not permit it.”
“Control is no longer an economic matter; it is a national security imperative”
In response to a question about whether a mutual exit opportunity remains from the current impasse, Davis said: “We had the memorandum of understanding; we had secured this agreement. However, President Trump and his Secretary, Scott Bessent, said, ‘as long as it is a deal we like, we want a new deal.’ You already had a deal; what deal are you talking about now? Why would the Iranian side negotiate a new deal that differs from an agreement made two months ago? This is completely illogical. The Iranian side holds military superiority through its missile cities and half a dozen alternative methods to control the strait. As their official authorities stated on social media, control of the strait is no longer merely an economic matter; it is a national security imperative because it is the only tool with which they can balance their American adversary, who is far stronger militarily.”
Evaluating the impact of the oil crisis, Davis stated: “Strategic Petroleum Reserves are declining. This situation has prevented a crisis so far, but it cannot cover products like jet fuel, diesel, and fertilizer. If it continues this way and the problem is postponed, the reserves will be depleted one day, and economic activity cannot be sustained without oil. Pressure is on President Trump, and the Iranian side is aware of this. They know the blockade will harm them, but they have calculated that they can endure much longer and deeper pain than our side. This is an existential matter; they know that if they surrender their only trump card to an unpredictable president, they will be attacked again later.”
“Reflexive support for Israel in society has been broken”
Touching upon relations between the US and Israel, Davis said a clear divergence has begun in American society. Davis noted: “In the past, across all segments of society and all generations, it was reflexively said, ‘Of course we are pro-Israel, they are our democratic ally.’ This situation continued until the Gaza process following October 7. Israel was attacked on October 7, and no one found it strange that it responded. However, what happened afterward created problems. Israel used this opportunity to destroy the Gaza Strip, increase pressure in the West Bank, bring in new settlers, and discuss annexation.”
Describing the rift between political elites and the public, Davis explained: “There is a major divide in America. Elites are unaffected by genocide or the killing of women and children in the West Bank and Gaza; they close their eyes, arguing that Israel is an ally. However, the eyes of the American public are not closed. They see human suffering on social media and do not carry the memorized assumptions of the past. These elites are not merely bought with money; for decades, they genuinely believed that our interests and Israel’s interests were one and the same. In their minds, saying something negative about Israel is equivalent to saying something negative about the US. Younger generations in particular, and a growing portion of all generations, recognize that our interests are not the same.”
Drawing attention to the cost of the war to the US, Davis noted: “We elected President Trump to apply the America First principle, not Israel first, Britain first, or Germany first. There is anger against those who sacrificed America’s needs by entering the war. According to figures reflected in the public domain, at least 600 Americans were injured; according to what I have heard, this number is over a thousand. Money has been spent, our facilities have been damaged, and our aircraft destroyed; around 40 to 50 of our aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Our bases were ruined and will likely never be rebuilt. We have also lost our geopolitical influence in the region. I doubt that relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait can return to their former state. Because the foundational assumption of this entire structure was that we could protect them; we could not even protect ourselves.”
“We are still living as if it were 1992”
Evaluating the shift in military technology, Davis stated that the US has lost its traditional military superiority. Davis said: “A large number of people in America are still living as if it were 1992. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, China was a peasant army developing militarily and economically, and we held absolute dominance following Operation Desert Storm. We are no longer in 1992. The Russians corrected their mistakes after the initial phase of the Ukraine war in 2022; they became a much stronger land force, missile, and drone force. China, meanwhile, reached immense technological and industrial capacity.”
Explaining the current situation through the example of Iran, Davis said: “We thought we could crush Iran like a fly, but we could not do so due to their missile cities and technologies. If we cannot eliminate Iran, what can we do against China or Russia, which possess power far beyond that? We have fallen behind in categories such as hypersonic missiles and the new Oreshnik missile. When I saw the Bayraktar TB2 vehicles used by the Turks in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, as someone with an armored unit background, I understood that the nature of war had changed. The US, meanwhile, talks about producing 300,000 drones by 2030. In an environment where tactics change every six weeks on the Ukrainian and Russian battlefield, our systems remain extremely slow. Ukrainian soldiers mocked the tank platoon manual published last year, saying that with these methods, one could not survive on the battlefield for even ten minutes.”
“The idea of containing China is a fantasy”
Criticizing the US military approach toward China, Davis evaluated: “There is talk of a strategy to militarily contain China. Will you prevent their activities within their own borders, their technological developments, or the expansion of their military? You cannot stop a country with a strong economy and a massive population. We can achieve no result other than entering a war with China in the Asia-Pacific region and losing it. China’s shipbuilding capacity is approximately 200 times ours; they are vastly superior to us in artillery ammunition, aircraft, and missile production. Our methods left over from the Cold War no longer work. What we need to do is keep our own defense strong and ensure deterrence, not spend billions of dollars in the region to establish forward bases that will be hit.”
Touching upon the potential for diplomatic relations between the two countries, Davis said: “I think President Trump personally knows that going to war with China is unwise. However, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex view China as a constant enemy, demanding more budget, more bases, and more missiles every year. No one considers diplomacy. Yet we can develop peaceful, stable relations with China based on mutual benefit, even if not friendly. Regarding Taiwan as well, I think leaders realize after seeing what occurred in the Middle East and Ukraine that help will not come, and they will adopt a more cooperative stance by withdrawing independence rhetoric. China does not want to start a war; it desires a model similar to Hong Kong. Even if a conflict breaks out in the worst-case scenario, it is between China and Taiwan; the US should not choose to join the war and lose.”
Emphasizing that the arms lobby inside the US maintains its power, Davis stated: “The military-industrial complex remains extremely powerful and holds all levers of power. They maintain control through members of Congress, the media, and public relations networks; I see no sign that this structure is weakening.”
“They did not want someone who would tell the truth about Israel”
Providing information about the process surrounding the cancellation of his appointment within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Davis recounted the issue in these words: “When Tulsi Gabbard came to me and asked me to become the number three executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I said I would be honored to serve my country. However, I stated that I had openly opposed the policies pursued by Israel since October 7 and the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and that these views might not be welcomed within the administration. She thought my accurate past analyses would compensate for this situation. One of my duties was to present the daily intelligence briefing to the president.”
Describing the stage at which his candidacy was withdrawn, Davis said: “Articles against me appeared in the Israeli press and American media. I never hid my views; I said Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies were harming Israel and dragging us down as well. I advocate the ‘America First’ principle, but there are many people within the administration who say ‘Israel First’ and have zero tolerance for any criticism directed at Netanyahu. They did not want someone who would tell the truth regarding Israel. The process expanded following posts by figures like Laura Loomer. On the day I passed the CIA polygraph test and was set to begin duty, Susie Wiles was informed that I had put the president in a difficult position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. While Trump was saying there would be a ceasefire, I stated on my program that Vladimir Putin would not agree to a ceasefire given his current advantage. Although I stated that I supported a ceasefire, this was made a pretext, and my appointment offer was withdrawn,” completing the interview.
Interview
Quincy Institute expert says the United States had no plan B
In an interview with Harici Media, Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, stated that global unipolarity is coming to an end, transitioning into an increasingly multipolar order.
Parsi addressed shifting global power dynamics, US foreign policy toward China, structural domestic pressures in Washington, and the strategic miscalculations surrounding the ongoing US conflict with Iran.
Parsi noted that while many analysts declare the arrival of a post-American world, the transition will not be an abrupt moment. Instead, he described a phased emergence where it becomes clear that no single superpower possesses deterministic influence over global affairs.
Parsi observed that many governments have been slow to internalize this reality or adjust their policies accordingly, creating the superficial illusion that a unipolar system remains intact. “Whether it’s fully multipolar or other configurations, we can be debated. What I think is clear is that the unipolarity is coming to an end,” Parsi said.
“Unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality”
Regarding Washington’s readiness for a multipolar world, Parsi asserted that the US political establishment remains unprepared and has historically denied the shift. He recalled that during the first two years of the Biden administration, describing the world as multipolar was dismissed as a Russian propaganda narrative.
However, Parsi highlighted a shift under US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stated in a February 2025 interview that unipolarity was an anomaly. Parsi explained, “He actually went further. He said that unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality, a historical accident. If you believe that it’s a historical accident, if you believe that it’s an abnormality, then I think it comes from that, that any effort to try to restore unipolarity should be rejected.”
Addressing US policy toward China, Parsi noted that despite the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, there is no structural indication that Washington views Beijing as a potential partner rather than a rival.
He contrasted the Biden administration’s aggressive posture—which assumed an existential struggle for dominance—with the Trump administration’s softer but poorly planned approach.
Parsi argued that neither power can decisively defeat the other, making mutual coexistence and co-governance essential to avoid a catastrophic zero-sum confrontation.
“An effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe for disaster”
Parsi rejected the feasibility of military containment against Beijing, warning of severe consequences. “I think an effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe that will bring about great power competition and a confrontation between the US and China that is going to be completely disastrous,” Parsi stated.
He observed that despite significant US strategic errors, such as the conflict with Iran, China has exercised restraint rather than exploiting American vulnerabilities. Parsi argued that if Beijing were dead-set on aggressive power competition, it would have acted differently.
Economically, Parsi argued that containing China through tariffs or Soviet-era containment models is a losing proposition.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which maintained an isolated economic model, China is deeply integrated into global trade and serves as the primary trading partner for most nations, including those in Latin America such as Brazil. Parsi emphasized that economic containment is unviable against a state with such vast global integration.
“This confrontation will be the deadliest conflict in human history”
Evaluating the risk of the “Thucydides Trap,” Parsi criticized the Washington foreign policy establishment for its structural inability to envision peaceful coexistence.
He noted that the political culture in Washington is built around zero-sum competition and conflict rather than diplomatic management.
Parsi emphasized that while historical precedents exist, humanity is not bound to repeat them, particularly when the stakes involve existential risks. Parsi warned that an unmanaged confrontation between the US and China “would be the deadliest conflict in human history if it is allowed to happen,” threatening human survival itself.
Parsi attributed this narrow strategic focus to structural domestic forces, particularly the US military-industrial complex and influential lobbying groups. Working alongside the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, these forces require US military dominance worldwide, especially in Asia.
Parsi explained that institutional inertia makes it extraordinarily difficult for Washington to alter its strategic trajectory.
“The US had an unrealistic plan A and no plan B”
Turning to the conflict with Iran, Parsi asserted that Washington lacks a coherent strategy, having relied on an unrealistic plan that failed within the first three days.
He stated that the US expected a swift regime collapse or surrender within four days, but faced horizontal escalation from Iran, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz and regional strikes.
“The United States had a very unrealistic plan A and no plan B, and it’s been stuck in that situation ever since,” Parsi said, adding that Washington has been improvising and executing tactical operations without strategic success.
Parsi attributed President Trump’s shifting decisions on Iran to this absence of strategy and his personal demand for immediate results. When military action failed to yield swift progress, Trump turned to diplomacy, only to lose patience within three weeks and resume military strikes. Parsi questioned whether the global community could afford a superpower acting in such an erratic manner.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran”
Addressing Israel’s role, Parsi stated that Israeli pressure was a decisive factor in driving US policy toward confrontation with Iran.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran. Without Trump agreeing to the Israelis, there would not have been a war with Iran. Both of them were needed,” Parsi remarked, noting that Israeli efforts since 1995 elevated Iran into a primary US national security concern disproportionate to actual US interests in the region.
Parsi identified a growing divergence between US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. While the US benefits from reducing its regional military footprint of 50,000 troops, Israel requires continuous US military presence and intervention to maintain a favorable regional balance of power.
Parsi noted that this divergence has created a visible rift between Washington and Tel Aviv following the poor execution of the war and subsequent diplomatic maneuvers.
“Israel’s standing amongst the American public has plummeted”
Parsi highlighted a major shift in American public opinion regarding Israel, noting that sympathy for Palestinians has surpassed sympathy for Israel across almost every demographic category, except Republicans over the age of 65.
He attributed this decline directly to Israel’s military actions in Gaza and its perceived role in drawing the US into a disastrous war with Iran, which mirrored earlier public grievances over the Iraq War.
Regarding a resolution to the conflict, Parsi stated that a dignified exit for both the US and Iran remains possible, though the window is narrowing due to personal hostility and political miscalculations.
Finally, addressing Trump’s political image, Parsi clarified that Trump was never strictly anti-war, but rather anti-risk.
He explained that Trump entered the conflict because Israeli officials convinced him that war with Iran posed little risk and would be concluded within 100 hours. Parsi concluded that had Trump not been misled into believing the operation would be a swift success, he would not have initiated it.
Interview
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Conflicting statements from the US and Iran regarding the potential resumption of diplomatic negotiations have emerged, while ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have once again brought global energy concerns to the fore.
Addressing these developments on the Harici live broadcast of Strategic Compass, international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal and Alptekin Dursunoglu, journalist, author, and Editor-in-Chief of Yakin Dogu Haber (YDH), evaluated the internal, regional, and strategic dimensions of the conflict. The discussion focused on the shift in Iran’s military doctrine, the political strain within the US administration, the economic vulnerability of Gulf monarchies, and the broader realignments reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Opening the discussion, Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal offered a sharp critique of the political rhetoric originating from Washington, contrasting executive declarations with the tactical outcomes on the ground. Unal argued that public statements made by former US President Donald Trump increasingly lack analytical consistency, complicating efforts to decipher official US strategy.
“He has reached a point where he tells more lies than the daily meowing of stray cats,” Unal remarked during the broadcast. “I do not know which part of his statements we ought to analyze, but if we evaluate him within a broader framework, it becomes possible to reach certain conclusions.”
Unal described the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran as an uneven cycle of escalation, noting that US forces continue to suffer casualties and incur immense financial costs without altering the strategic baseline. “The situation has effectively transformed into something like a defeated wrestler who never grows tired of wrestling; America repeatedly approaches and confronts Iran, yet the outcome is obvious from the outset,” Unal stated. He added that American military personnel are being deployed into conflict zones where national interests remain obscure: “I am certain that American soldiers there largely believe they have no personal interests at stake… and that it serves at most the interests of Israel.”
Dursunoglu contextualised the current phase of hostilities as part of an extended campaign, comparing the recent clashes to a second round of a broader regional conflict following earlier engagements in 2025. He noted that despite assertive claims from Washington regarding the destruction of Iranian military infrastructure, operational continuity on the Iranian side forced a shift in US messaging.
Reflecting on official declarations from US Central Command (CENTCOM) and executive statements following intensive strikes, Unal highlighted the internal contradictions in Washington’s narrative: “Trump claimed Iranian naval forces were sent to the bottom of the sea, the air force beyond the atmosphere, and the ground forces deep into the magma. Yet suddenly he declared, ‘I have forgiven Iran,’ while CENTCOM figures suggested they had reached ‘target saturation’—as if there was simply nothing left to hit.”
Is Iran insisting on its conditions regarding the Strait of Hormuz?
A central focus of the analysis was Iran’s response mechanism following the breakdown of initial ceasefire frameworks. Dursunoglu highlighted a significant structural transition in Tehran’s military posture, moving from traditional reactive containment to proactive deterrence across multiple theatres.
Dursunoglu pointed out that during the escalation, Iran did not restrict its target matrix to immediate points of contact. Instead, Iranian forces conducted strikes against US installations and logistical networks across the region, including facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman.
“Iran’s traditional defence doctrine was defensive and based on proportional retaliation,” Dursunoglu explained. “However, after the US halted strikes, Iran proceeded to target assets in Jordan and Kuwait without immediate prior attacks on those specific vectors. This indicates that Iran has begun executing preemptive strikes, effectively adapting its strategic posture.”
Unal underscored the severity of these strikes on regional logistics, noting that Iranian counter-strikes targeted the port of Aqaba and airport infrastructure in Jordan, alongside American operational facilities in the Gulf. “According to the accounts, Iranian forces began hitting American installations in Gulf states and Jordan within minutes of initial strikes, effectively neutralizing the operational depth the US relied upon,” Unal noted.
The operational status of the Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive point of leverage. Under previous draft frameworks negotiated through Omani mediation, administrative oversight of maritime traffic through the Strait was slated to transition to Iran in coordination with regional littoral states. However, subsequent US efforts to establish an independent naval corridor along the Omani coast triggered a fresh wave of Iranian interdictions.
Dursunoglu outlined the ongoing negotiations surrounding the maritime passage, noting that attempts to bypass Iranian oversight proved unviable for commercial shipping. Under the latest proposals under discussion via Omani channels, incoming maritime traffic into the Gulf would pass through Iranian-designated corridors under Iranian authorization, while outgoing traffic would proceed along Omani coastal waters following notification and approval.
“If an agreement is finalized on these terms, it represents an explicit recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz by the US regime,” Dursunoglu said. He noted that while initial terms provided free passage during a temporary 60-day window, long-term frameworks anticipate structured administrative mechanisms for commercial vessels. Unal added: “Whether designated as transit fees, environmental charges, or security provisions, formalizing maritime oversight secures a permanent structural advantage for Tehran.”
Under what conditions will negotiations begin?
The economic ramifications of maritime disruption have also altered the calculations of Gulf export nations. Following attempts by Saudi Arabia to engage Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces in Yemen, retaliatory actions against critical infrastructure—including the Yanbu crude oil pipeline on the Red Sea—severely constrained alternative export routes.
“By drawing Yemeni forces back into active conflict, Saudi Arabia inadvertently placed its secondary export avenues under direct fire,” Unal observed. “The vulnerability of the Yanbu pipeline demonstrates that reliance on the Gulf cannot be bypassed easily, effectively increasing regional dependence on stability within the Strait.”
Beyond the maritime domain, the broadcast addressed heavy Iranian military engagements in northern Iraq, targeting opposition groups including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, Pak, and Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) along the Erbil-Suleimaniyeh axis.
Dursunoglu and Unal noted that cross-border strikes destroyed substantial ammunition depots established near border regions, followed by reported ground operations conducted by specialized Iranian units.
“Iranian special forces executed targeted ground operations across the border,” Dursunoglu stated, pointing to secondary explosions captured in operational footage as evidence of extensive pre-positioned armaments.
Unal noted that these operations underscored the strategic limitations of non-state actors aligned with Washington: “The expectations placed on armed factions in northern Iraq collapsed when confronted with direct military pressure. The narrative that these groups could serve as an internal wedge against Tehran proved to be a costly miscalculation for US planners.”
Reports indicating the start of a repositioning of US personnel and heavy military equipment from bases in Iraq and the Gulf toward Jordan and Israel were identified as a direct consequence of this vulnerability. “US forces are consolidating toward Jordan and Israel because their facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait sustained structural operational damage,” Dursunoglu observed. “When a state can no longer defend its forward command centers—such as the 5th Fleet infrastructure in Bahrain—it is forced to retreat to secondary defensive perimeters.”
How effective is the pressure from Gulf countries for negotiations?
Concluding the evaluation, Unal and Dursunoglu examined the broader diplomatic landscape, focusing on security dialogues among regional powers, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Both analysts agreed that any sustainable security architecture in the Middle East must incorporate Iran rather than seek its exclusion.
“How can you construct a new regional order by excluding the very nation that demonstrated the capacity to neutralize external military dominance?” Dursunoglu questioned. “An architecture that relies on Western guarantees or Israeli alignment fails to address the underlying security dynamics of the region.”
Unal reflected on the historical trajectories of Turkish foreign policy, criticizing past ideological approaches that fuelled regional fragmentation and sect-based antagonisms. He noted that realpolitik dictates close functional coordination between Ankara and Tehran despite historical differences.
“Iran’s resistance ultimately prevented the imposition of a security framework dictated entirely by external actors,” Unal concluded. “Responsible analysis requires recognizing that stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved through foreign intervention or regional fragmentation, but through direct, autonomous security coordination among the region’s core nations.”
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