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Russia-Ukraine war moves from ‘Afghanization’ to ‘Palestinianization’

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Speaking on 9 October at the Ukraine-South-East Europe Summit in Croatia, Ukrainian President Zelensky said that Ukraine has an opportunity to “promote peace and lasting stability” in the next three months and that the situation on the battlefield creates an opportunity to take decisive steps to end the conflict with Russia by 2025 at the latest. He then launched efforts to lobby for help and support from the four main members of NATO and the EU, namely Britain, France, Italy and Germany.

This was Zelenski’s most optimistic message of peace since the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and with the clearest timeframe. It clearly shows that he is not only pinning his hopes on the planned second “peace summit” on the Ukrainian conflict, but also trying to prepare public opinion for the Kiev leadership to make major concessions. Many recent indications suggest that the two-year and eight-month-long direct Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the war with the indirect involvement of 32 members of NATO, in relation to the fundamental interests of the great powers and the ambiguity of US policy, are beginning to give way to the prospect of a peaceful settlement. This situation seems to be tending towards a rapid transformation from “Afghanization” to “Palestinianization” in order to prevent the war from getting completely out of control and turning into a real “Third World War”.

At the military level, the balance of victory in the war seems to have tipped even more clearly in favor of Russia. On October 3, the Russian army took control of Ugledar, Ukraine’s major military base in the Donbas, which it had operated and defended for nearly 10 years. This area was Ukraine’s major logistical support and supply center, the junction point of the Ukrainian army on the southern and eastern fronts, and had become the site of a two-year ‘meat grinder’ struggle between the two armies. The loss of Ugledar was strategically equivalent to the loss of key battle points such as Mariupol and Bakhmut.

After taking Ugledar, Russia was able not only to facilitate its advance in the Donbas region, but also to strengthen its southern land connections and railroad security to the Kerch Strait. Ukraine, on the other hand, lost important maneuvering space and strong bridgeheads in the east and south, while the Kiev leadership and its people had to feel a series of psychological, public and diplomatic defeats.

At the diplomatic level, the US elections are starting to send negative signals for Ukraine. The Biden administration is gradually reducing military aid to Ukraine, shifting from an initial approach of “do what Ukraine needs” to “do what the US can do”. Republicans, who have a 50-50 chance of winning the election, are openly saying that they are tired of supporting Ukraine and that if Trump is elected, he may reverse Biden’s policies and abandon Ukraine. Under Harris, the Democrats may even be forced to accelerate the Russia-Ukraine war by the internal divisions in America and the need to rally public opinion. In the NATO-Europe camp, discomfort with prolonging the war is growing; stocks of military equipment and ammunition are running out, the economic situation is difficult, and it is becoming a binary choice: To switch to wartime or to continue with a normal time economy?

Under the influence of this situation, the authorities in Kiev are moving towards an increasingly pessimistic picture. On the one hand, while trying to hold on to the battlefield, they have mobilized strategic reserves in a futile attempt to strike against the Russian mainland in a last ditch effort, and are even being accused by Russia of “covert use of chemical weapons disguised as smoke bombs”. On the other hand, the Ukrainian government has started to give peace signals, willing to negotiate with Russia.

On October 7, the Financial Times reported that Kiev was holding secret talks about ceding part of its territory to Russia in exchange for Ukraine joining NATO or obtaining other security guarantees. The report read as follows: “The talks are taking place behind closed doors. Under the deal, Moscow would retain de facto control over about a fifth of the Ukrainian territory it occupies, while the rest would be allowed to join NATO or receive similar security guarantees.”

At the end of March this year, Zelensky, always a hardliner, clearly weakened his position, backtracking and saying that he would accept negotiations for peace even if they could not restore the 1991 borders. In fact, the latest Financial Times report is not new information; it is perhaps the outline of an agreement generally agreed by the two sides at the beginning of the war, or perhaps the essence of the US withdrawal plan.

In August 2023, Danish media revealed that US CIA Director Burns made a secret visit to Kiev to test the possibility of getting Ukraine to give up 16 percent of its territory in exchange for an end to the war, and on August 15, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s chief of staff publicly suggested that Ukraine cede some of its territory to Russia in exchange for a license to join NATO.

These and other developments show that the games of the great powers are getting more complicated and that the new strategies for ending the Russian-Ukrainian war are accelerating the transition from “Afghanization” to “Palestinianization”. The terms “Afghanization” and “Palestinianization” are academic conceptual approaches that I adopted after the outbreak of the war, and they have been confirmed by developments on the battlefield.

First of all, the US is forcing Ukraine to become the “European version of Afghanistan”, trying to make Russia relive the historic tragedy of the Soviet Union, which for a decade was buried in Afghanistan and accelerated its collapse; while Russia is using its overwhelming comprehensive power and geographical advantage over Ukraine to make Ukraine the “European version of Afghanistan”, thus trying to make its rivals relive the strategic nightmare. In Afghanistan, they failed to conquer the Taliban for 20 years and eventually had to withdraw their troops in distress. While both sides are building a “European version of Afghanistan”, if the Russian-Ukrainian war takes the path of “Afghanization”, it will be a brutal war of consumption and stagnation. It could last three to five years in the short term and eight to ten years in the long term. This scenario is similar to what the Soviet Union and the United States and NATO experienced in two successive Afghan wars.

On the other hand, it is clear that the United States and NATO do not intend to fight a World War I and World War II-style conventional world war with Russia, because nuclear weapons and long-range delivery vehicles are sufficient to allow both sides to annihilate each other and destroy the world. The Russians, from Tsarist Russia to the Soviet Union, have a long history of warfare and have only accepted to cede territory in defeat. Small countries in Europe have always been allies or victims at the table of the great powers. Based on this general judgment, an outcome in which Russia will win with a huge costs but Ukraine would lose totally. Most of Ukraine seems to have been foreseeable from the beginning of the war: Russia would permanently annex Crimea and parts of southeastern Ukraine, while losing the West, and the remaining western Ukraine would perhaps join NATO. Russia would then do everything to “Russify” the annexed territories, while Ukrainian nationalist insurgents would harass Russia for a long time and try to regain the lost territories. This picture could eventually turn Ukraine into a “European version of Palestine”: First it will be divided by great power interests, then it may be dragged into a perpetual conflict of division, counter-division, occupation and counter-occupation, annexation and counter-annexation. Just like the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that has been going on for more than 70 years.

Initially defending the alliance strategy and trying to rebuild the transatlantic relationship severely damaged by the Trump administration, by the end of 2021 the Biden administration rejected Russia’s demand to halt NATO’s eastward expansion and withdraw the defense line to the 1999 position, and openly declared that it would not deal with Russia’s troops by military means, encouraging desperate Moscow officials to penetrate the US undercurrents and categorically launch a “special military operation”. Subsequently, the Biden administration, through Britain, pressured Ukraine to break the ceasefire that was about to be reached between Russia and Ukraine and promised to provide support to Ukraine through NATO members. This support was reinforced by the promise to “continue to support for as long as it takes”.

Based on thousands of years of “Russophobia” and the “chilling effect” of reality, Western European countries, driven by the need to help each other, resolutely supported Ukraine in order to block Russia’s attempt to annex Ukraine. By supporting Ukraine to thwart Russia’s annexation attempts, it has made this war of comparable overall strength increasingly permanent and turned it into a proxy war. The dual strategic goals of the Biden administration are to exhaust Russia, a long-time strategic competitor, and to contain the European Union, which is trying to break free from long-term US control and realize strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence and even military self-improvement in order to maintain “Pax Americana”, i.e. US-style world hegemony.

However, politicians are often quick and forgetful, the war has started and has reached a stalemate, whether the US or the European partners are deeply aware that there is no possibility of defeating Russia on the battlefield, with its vast territory, population, strong and comprehensive national character. Moreover, it is undesirable for Europe and the United States that both the United States and Europe suffer heavily from this war and that it ultimately paves the way for a new great power game with China’s “beautiful landscape”. If the new model of the great power game avoids the ‘Afghanization’ of the Russia-Ukraine war, then this conflict will end up in ‘Palestinianization’.

Russia in particular, having learned the lessons of the war after the first half a year of failure and hardship, is rapidly seizing strategic control for victory. By 2025, it plans to increase its defense spending by 25%, launch a military mobilization plan for 133 thousands people, increase the number of active military personnel to 1.5 million and significantly increase its military production capacity. It has also reached the capacity to fire around 10,000 artillery shells per day, increased drone production six-fold and greatly expanded its inventory of hypersonic missiles.

In short, three and a half years after the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO continues to violate Russia’s “red line” to supply Ukraine with offensive weapons and even condones Ukrainian counter-attacks on Russia’s mainland; Russia is increasingly using military and even nuclear weapons to deter its rivals; and the war situation is spiraling upwards. If the war continues, even if it does not spiral out of control and trigger a ‘Third World War’, it will reopen similar wounds for the US and NATO, such as the Vietnam War, the war in Afghanistan and ultimately the blood money.

War is the mortal enemy of peace, but he who has not been through war cannot appreciate peace, and the closer the death and destruction, the easier it is to achieve peace, echoing the Chinese saying that “refuse to admit defeat until faced with overwhelming evidence; only when death is staring one in the face.”

‘Afghanization’ is certainly a tragedy for all parties to the conflict, but can ‘Palestinianization’ bring peace to Europe and the world? Shouldn’t those who caused these crises and conflicts bear their historical responsibility and public criticism?

Prof. Ma is Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University (Hangzhou). He specialises in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle East politics. He worked for many years as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine and Iraq.

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Iran-US negotiations: What does the Muscat meeting signify?

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Following a protracted period of fluctuating relations, negotiations between Iran and the United States commenced on April 12 in Muscat, Oman. While not the first instance of dialogue between Tehran and Washington, the current geopolitical landscape imbues these talks with exceptional significance, as the fate of the Middle East hinges considerably on their outcome. Consequently, the character of these negotiations differs markedly from previous encounters.

Tehran enters this round of negotiations amidst a challenging environment: the legacy of former President Trump’s maximum economic pressure campaign persists, coupled with rhetoric hinting at potential military action against Iran. Israel’s ongoing military operations in Gaza, widely criticized and labeled by some as genocide, continue as it projects an image of success; Hezbollah appears constrained within Lebanon’s internal political dynamics; the political landscape in Damascus has shifted, potentially affecting the established support lines Iran previously relied upon for Hezbollah and Palestinian resistance groups opposing Israel; Iranian-aligned forces in Iraq are preoccupied with internal political strife; and Iran itself confronts a severe currency and economic crisis. Simultaneously, Israeli lobbying efforts reportedly seek to persuade influential US figures to support decisive action against Iran. From Israel’s perspective, Iran purportedly lacks the strategic capacity for a sustained, high-intensity conflict against it.

Despite this assessment, Iran maintains it is not negotiating from a position of weakness. Ali Larijani, advisor to the Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, stated that a military attack on Iran would mean “gambling with the lives of American soldiers”. Iran acknowledges the potential for significant damage to its strategic infrastructure from a US or Israeli attack but warns that its retaliation would inflict severe consequences on both nations.

Iran has also articulated a broader retaliatory strategy, threatening not only direct retaliation for an attack but also targeting US troops and interests throughout the Middle East, including in allied Arab nations. Such actions could destabilize key regions, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and potentially impact maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This escalation would place the already delicate security balance in several Arab states under immense strain.

Therefore, while Iran-US negotiations are not unprecedented, the current context imbues them with exceptional significance for regional security.

From Saturday talks to Saturday negotiations!

Following several hours of indirect discussions on Saturday, both delegations reported a positive atmosphere. Accounts from both sides regarding the tenor of the talks were largely consistent, with both the Iranian chief negotiator and the White House offering favorable evaluations. Abbas Araghchi, Iran’s senior negotiator, described the discussions with the United States as “constructive”, “promising”, and “mutually respectful”. Araghchi said, “I have explained Iran’s position with determination and a forward-looking approach. Both sides have decided to continue this process in a few days.”

Meanwhile, the White House described the initial indirect talks hosted by Oman as “entirely positive and constructive”. The White House emphasized that the parties agreed to resume negotiations the following Saturday.

A notable point reportedly emerging from the US side emphasized a commitment to resolving disputes through diplomacy and dialogue whenever possible.

Initial reactions from both Tehran and Washington presented a consistent and cautiously optimistic narrative. This convergence has fostered a temporary de-escalation following weeks of heightened tension and raised hopes for short-term easing of friction.

Nevertheless, the path forward remains complex and challenging. While initial signals are promising, preparedness for various outcomes is essential. The willingness to continue talks might suggest, for now, that the US is not immediately demanding Iran’s “red lines” – such as the complete dismantlement of its nuclear program or severe restrictions on its missile industry – be met as preconditions. Conversely, Iran seems prepared to offer more substantial assurances regarding the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, potentially including restoring uranium enrichment levels closer to those stipulated in the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Barring unforeseen disruptions, it is plausible that future negotiations could address topics such as the easing of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and reduced pressure on purchasers of Iranian oil.

Upcoming negotiation sessions, potentially scheduled for Saturdays, appear poised to be critical junctures for Iran and the broader Middle East, making the outcomes of these weekend discussions highly anticipated.

Risks

Despite the cautiously optimistic mood following the initial talks, significant risks loom over the negotiation process. Chief among these is potential opposition from Israel. Israel may view these talks as undermining its preferred strategy towards Iran and could take actions to disrupt the process. Potential disruptive actions could range from releasing sensitive intelligence on Iran’s nuclear or missile programs to covert operations or targeted provocations, such as assassinations of Iranian officials. Furthermore, influential pro-Israel lobbying efforts in Washington represent a significant factor, potentially shaping the perspectives of US negotiators—an avenue of influence less available to Iran.

Donald Trump’s potential influence and unpredictable nature also represent a significant variable. His political style often involves projecting strength and seeking public acclaim, sometimes employing confrontational rhetoric. This approach can include language perceived as condescending or insulting by negotiating partners. Given Iran’s sensitivity to perceived disrespect or arrogance from the US, such rhetoric could derail negotiations abruptly. Iran’s preference for indirect talks, while perhaps appearing strategically complex, may stem from deep-seated mistrust rooted in historical grievances concerning perceived US arrogance and past policy shifts. Therefore, alongside potential Israeli actions, the unpredictable nature of US politics, particularly concerning figures like Trump, poses a substantial risk to the sustainability of any diplomatic progress.

Internal Iranian politics present another layer of complexity. Significant diplomatic achievements could bolster the political standing of the current Pezeshkian administration. However, such success might also galvanize domestic political opposition. While the current administration under Pezeshkian and negotiator Araghchi may adopt a more cautious public approach compared to their predecessors (like the Rouhani administration and negotiator Jawad Zarif), the risk of internal efforts aimed at undermining the negotiations to discredit the government remains.

Mahmoud Vaezi, chief of staff to former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, noted in a recent interview, “Strangely enough, in these 40 years, whenever we have wanted to open up with various countries, there has always been some negative event either inside or outside the country.”

This historical pattern highlights the potential for similar disruptive incidents to affect the current talks.

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Trump’s “New Tariff Policy” Provokes Trade War, Hurts Himself and Others

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On April 2 (EST), U.S. President Donald Trump announced a 10% “base tariff” on imports from over 180 countries and regions, effectived at midnight on April 5, with only Russia temporarily exempted. Additionally, Trump will impose personalized higher “reciprocal tariffs” on countries with the largest trade deficits with the U.S., effective from midnight on April 9. All other countries will continue under the original 10% base tariff. Trump claimed he holds the “modification authority” to raise or lower tariffs as needed. U.S. Treasury Secretary Besant also warned trade partners not to retaliate. On the same day, U.S. stock markets plummeted, with the three major indexes hitting the largest single-day drop in nearly five years, and the dollar also fell against major currencies.

If trade wars are world wars without gunpowder, then Trump has recklessly initiated an unprecedented one, pushing the U.S. into conflict with the entire world. This war concerns not only national tax revenues but also the global industrial, supply, and value chains, the rules of world trade and economic development, and even public sentiment, international relations, and the global power structure.

The Trump administration truly reflects the Republican Party’s preference for elephants, and his “new tariff policy” is like an elephant barging into the china shop of the world trade system and international relations—rampaging recklessly, ignoring friend or foe, causing massive damage, and successfully turning the U.S. into a “global enemy” and “universal nuisance” for the first time.

From an economic perspective, Trump’s tariff plan aims to force countries into new trade deals to balance trade, bring manufacturing back to the U.S., increase employment, tax revenues, and federal savings, and expand the market share of American products—all in support of “Making America Great Again.”

From a geopolitical perspective, the policy fulfills campaign promises by using economic weapons to enhance the U.S.’s bargaining position in global economics and diplomacy. Tariffs are wielded as strategic tools to coerce and weaken opponents, punish allies and partners that challenge U.S. hegemony, and suppress those with differing worldviews—all in order to maintain U.S. dominance in the international order.

Trump’s “new tariff policy” harms in three ways: harms the U.S., harms others, and harms the world.

Firstly, raising import tariffs across the board may not revive U.S. manufacturing or attract investment back home. Instead, it will raise the prices of imported goods, making American distributors and consumers pay more, especially in automobiles, electronics, and household appliances. Moreover, the policy could trigger stagflation, increase costs in agriculture and industry, weaken U.S. export competitiveness, and even lead to exclusion from global markets. Many U.S. business groups harshly criticized the policy, and more than half of public opinion polls are pessimistic. Goldman Sachs raised the probability of a U.S. recession within 12 months from 20% to 35%, in other words, Trump is, so to speak, “shooting himself in the foot.”

Secondly, imposing heavy tariffs on goods imported from various countries into the U.S. will present enormous industrial, trade, and economic challenges—and even social and political crises—for all targeted nations. The high U.S. tariffs may force many multinational companies to withdraw from traditional low-cost countries and relocate to lower-tariff regions, leading those former hosts to suffer from industrial hollowing-out, trade marginalization, financial bubbles in stock and currency markets, and economic deterioration. This could result in national bankruptcy, social unrest, regime changes, or even armed conflict. Historical experience shows that when major economies like the U.S. shift or export their crises, it can bring disaster to developing nations.

Thirdly, Trump’s “new tariff policy” creates a crushing situation, described as “where the elephant herd tramples, no grass grows,” bringing gluttonous calamity to the world. This tariff weapon not only harms over 180 U.S. trade partners, but also disrupts global pricing, trade, labor division, value, and supply systems. It undermines the global trade loop and supply-demand market that the U.S. painstakingly built post-WWII, causing an “epic-level” disaster for the global economy. The Financial Times predicted that a global trade war triggered by Trump could result in $1.4 trillion in economic losses. If countries retaliate with 25% tariffs, the resulting depression could be on par with the Great Depression of 1930.

Trump’s policy reveals a “triple loss” for the U.S. as the world’s leading power: loss of morality, loss of norms, and loss of friends.

Imposing heavy taxes reflects moral failure—selfishness and profit-seeking at the expense of others’ well-being. It’s a modern version of Louis XV’s “After me, the flood,” and a manifestation of America’s impulsive and reckless hegemony, abandoning its professed values of freedom, equality, and fraternity, as well as its evangelical “messianic mission.”

It’s also a loss of norms. As the inheritor of Western civilization, savior in two world wars, and key architect of the post-war global order, the U.S. once stood as a model. Francis Fukuyama even called the “American dream” the “end of history.” But Trump’s policy has shattered that image—applying high tariffs indiscriminately, even starting with close neighbors like Mexico and Canada, and targeting transatlantic allies and Asia-Pacific military partners. The U.S. now acts not as a leader, but as a tyrant. The Trump administration is dismantling the Western “political idol” that stood for nearly a century.

The result is also a loss of trust and allies. In pursuit of “Making America Great Again,” the U.S. is betraying even its closest friends—be it Mexico and Canada (over fentanyl and immigration), its WWII and Cold War allies in Europe, or Indo-Pacific allies like Japan and South Korea. Even new partners like Vietnam feel betrayed. No wonder European leaders now call America “Europe’s enemy” and see “de-risking” as aimed at the U.S.; no wonder Japan’s former PM Ishiba Shigeru bitterly laments his “extreme disappointment and regret”; no wonder Vietnam feels Trump’s “charm diplomacy” has hit the rocks.

In the end, those who once admired, trusted, and followed America are now disillusioned. The U.S. has become isolated.

As Mao Zedong once said, “The first question of revolution is to distinguish friends from enemies.” In today’s global trade system, it’s clear: the U.S. has made itself the enemy of the world. Applied to today’s international relations, global economic and trade systems, and the game of global circulation, all parties would likely have to acknowledge that in the process of maintaining normal and equitable international relations and ensuring smooth, stable international trade and economic operations, the United States has already positioned itself against the entire world—becoming a “global enemy .” At least when measured by the dimension of tariff wars, America’s comprehensive hostility and antagonism toward all nations, regardless of their social systems, political structures, ideologies, or values, has reached an absurd extreme. It now operates under a doctrine of “tariffs first, money above all, America supreme.” On April 2, Trump called it “Liberation Day,” but in truth, it marks America’s turn toward new conservatism, abandonment of globalization, and potential end as a global economic leader. It is a day of disaster for the world economy—and a day of declaration for global partners preparing to resist America’s trade hegemony.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

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48-Hour Exclusive Exploration of the Stronghold of the US-Israel Enemy ‘Houthi Forces’

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On March 28, after “disappearing” from my social circle for nearly 48 hours, I returned to the Yemeni capital Sana’a, coinciding with a new wave of airstrikes by the US and British air forces. Despite the danger at hand, my thoughts were still lingering in the past 48 hours—full of excitement and memories of my journey to and from Saada province and its steep mountains. We were not only among the first group of foreigners invited after the Houthi forces took control of the capital, but also pioneers lucky enough to explore the Houthi headquarters. Although the visit was brief and superficial, everything we saw and heard felt novel and fascinating.

March 26 marked the tenth anniversary of the Saudi-led Arab-Islamic coalition’s military intervention in Yemen’s civil war. For the Houthis, it also marked the tenth anniversary of their religious jihad against the Saudi coalition and the United States. On March 26, 2015, Saudi Arabia launched “Operation Decisive Storm,” with the coalition’s air force unleashing bombs and missiles across Yemen under the pretext of saving Yemen’s legitimate government and halting the Houthi advance after their capture of Sana’a.

At 5 a.m. that day, our “international brigade”—comprising former officials, journalists, and scholars from the US, UK, South Africa, Malaysia, Lebanon, Iraq, Bolivia and China—departed in a convoy arranged by the Houthis to visit their “revolutionary base” and “uprising headquarters” in Saada province.

For security reasons, our trip was kept secret. We departed at dawn when there were few pedestrians or vehicles on the streets. Instead of the armored and bulletproof vehicles we previously used in Sana’a, we traveled in identical white Toyota Land Cruisers, with a lead vehicle flashing lights but sirens off to guide us quietly out of the city.

Less than a week before the end of Ramadan, the city of Sana’a, which had been noisy all night due to evening iftar and pre-dawn suhoor, fell silent at dawn. We drove easily through the dark, sparse streets and left the city smoothly as the sky lightened, heading north on the Chinese-built Sana’a–Saada highway toward Saada city, the provincial capital 230 km away.

Sana’a and Saada, two adjacent inland provinces in Yemen’s northwestern highlands, have no rivers or tall mountains along the route—only continuous brown hills, gravel, and desert. Occasional small green oases provided a glimpse of life on this famously barren ancient land. While the scenery was monotonous and lifeless, it felt fresh and memorable to us.

No matter how far we traveled, on both sides of the road were clusters of short plants—either exposed to the sky or covered with white mesh—densely planted qat trees. Their leaves contain the hallucinogenic substance cathinone and juice that suppresses hunger and boosts alertness. Reportedly, 70% of Yemenis are addicted to qat. Though water is scarce, 60% of it is used to irrigate qat trees. In short, Yemenis can go a day without food, but not without qat.

After traveling nearly 200 km and reaching the border between Sana’a and Saada provinces, our driver told us this area was once occupied by Al-Qaeda and was only fully cleared by the Houthis after 2015. Although the Houthi-controlled area is in a state of war, we didn’t see any signs of conflict—no soldiers, military vehicles, camps, air defense systems, or war scars. Even the few security checkpoints were almost symbolic. In contrast, I experienced far stricter and more numerous checkpoints in southern Iraq last year, making that place seem more dangerous than Yemen.

Our vehicle was playing Yemeni pop songs all the way—rhythmic and powerful, in a typical Arab rap battle style. The melodies were modern and catchy, with tunes that deeply resonated, and the lyrics were passionate and stirring, featuring buzzwords like “Gaza” and “Palestine.” The driver said this was a representative work by a Houthi rap artist named Iras Laith (Iras being the Arabic name for Jesus, and Laith meaning “lion”), whose songs have gone viral globally, especially in the Third World. The U.S. government has reportedly placed a $26 million bounty on him.

Yemeni friends familiar with Irsa said that whenever he performs his rap, his comrades dance the traditional jambiya (curved dagger) dance around him, and his popular songs have seen massive downloads online. A Houthi soldier mentioned that in order to protect Irsa, the Yemeni people have hidden him—just as they’ve hidden their “revolutionary leader,” Hussein’s brother and heir to the cause, Abdul-Malik Badr al-Din al-Houthi.

Three and a half hours later, in a slightly dim and dusty atmosphere, we passed through the “Saada Gate,” damaged by U.S. or Saudi coalition airstrikes, and arrived at this city—considered the “eye of the storm” in Yemen and even the entire Middle East. We checked into the so-called five-star “Yemen Star International Hotel,” a six- or seven-story building. It is located on a side street off Saada’s main road and had clearly just been renovated, possibly even unfinished. We guessed we were among its first guests. Although the hotel lacked internet, it had most basic facilities and satellite TV with various foreign-language channels, including programs from the “Yemen TV” run by the southern government.

During our time in Saada, we experienced a rare extended internet outage, causing an unintentional scare for our families back home. On the morning of the 27th, I happened to see a text alert about a missed call—only then did I realize my daughter and other colleagues and students had tried to reach me multiple times and had been searching for us all night. Since we left the hotel at dawn on the 26th, we had lost connection with our contacts back home via social media and WeChat. In the rush to leave, I hadn’t anticipated a full communication blackout. Before departure, I had only briefly informed a contact at the embassy and a colleague at Xinhua News Agency via WeChat that I was joining the group heading to Saada. Since we didn’t return to Sana’a that day, and I had my phone on silent due to recent daily meetings, it ended up causing needless worry for friends, family, and colleagues. I truly feel sorry—though that’s another story.

Looking out the hotel window, the city of Saada was not large, shielded to the north by hills—about one kilometer wide east to west, and three to four kilometers long north to south. The city consisted mostly of low-rise buildings, many with tin roofs, and only seven or eight mid-rise buildings under ten stories tall. On the sunlit northern hills a few kilometers away, three giant Arabic slogans were spelled out in white stones: “Muhammad,” “Ali,” and “Persistence Means Victory.” The emphasis on the name “Ali” alone reveals the Shia religious identity of the people of Saada.

Yemen’s main population follows the Zaidi sect, the smallest branch of Shia Islam. Zaidis believe in the fifth-generation Imam Zaid, a descendant of Muhammad and Ali, whom they regard as the hidden Mahdi. Because of this, they are also called the “Five-Imam Sect.” Alongside the “Seven-Imam Sect” (Ismaili) and the “Twelve-Imam Sect” (Twelvers), Zaidis form one of the three major Shia branches. Zaidis have primarily survived in Yemen’s Shia-majority population and are theologically closer to Sunnis due to their recognition of the authority of the first four caliphs, making them the most moderate of all Shia sects.

Upon arriving in Saada, after a simple lunch, former Minister of Information Dayfallah al-Shami accompanied us to visit the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombing sites and the Saada Martyrs’ Cemetery. One site bombed by the U.S. was a cancer center under construction. At the scene, at least two top floors had been pierced by missiles, and the floor below had partially collapsed. Some group members found an unexploded heavy bomb in the basement. According to the site manager, this was the site of the March 24 U.S. bombing. No casualty information was mentioned.

After leaving the U.S. bombing site, we were taken to visit bombing sites left behind by the Saudi-led coalition. Along the way were several ruins, but our hosts specifically took us to see two bombed-out buildings at Saada University, one of which was a student dormitory. It’s said the bombings occurred around 2017. Desks and chairs under the rubble suggested that part of the facility had indeed been classrooms or laboratories. The seats scattered outside had been eroded by wind and rain, leaving only rusted metal frames… As for why the U.S. and Saudi coalition bombed civilian facilities, only the historical archives may one day tell us the truth.

On the 24th, while in Sana’a, we had also visited one U.S. and one Saudi coalition bombing site respectively. The U.S. strike was said to be on a residential building, but the remains didn’t look like a home—there were no signs of domestic items. Organizers said 15 people were injured and two died, though we weren’t arranged to visit any of the wounded in the hospital. The Saudi coalition site was from a few years ago and reportedly extremely tragic: over 800 people attending a funeral were “deliberately” bombed, resulting in more than 150 deaths and around 600 injuries.

What struck us the most was the Saada “Martyrs’ Cemetery,” where hundreds of war victims lie. Especially heartbreaking was the “Children’s Martyrs’ Corner,” where dozens of boys and girls who died prematurely are buried. In front of their flower-like portraits, mourners had placed bunches of fake flowers. Four of the deceased children were from the same family—it seemed they perished together in a single car, the twisted wreckage of which now hangs above their resting place. Previously, we had also visited a “Martyrs’ Cemetery” in Sana’a, but the emotional weight there couldn’t compare to the children’s section in Saada.

After our first day in Saada, we returned to the hotel together in a minibus. On the way back, we passed through the main street, where the run-down buildings resembled those in Sana’a. Infrastructure was very poor, and street shops were mostly ordinary stores, repair shops, eateries, or fruit stands. The streets were packed with people, and puddles and mud from recent rain made the roads chaotic. Cars and motorbikes weaved wildly, and there wasn’t a single traffic light on the main street. A few traffic police vaguely attempted to direct traffic. What caught my eye most was that nearly every motorcycle carried three or four children—an indirect sign of Yemen’s high birthrate and youth-heavy population.

That night in Saada wasn’t peaceful. Our thoughtful hosts knocked on the door to ask if we needed toiletries. We politely declined and hinted not to be disturbed again. However, at midnight, they knocked again and brought a large bag of unopened pajamas and toiletries, which was quite touching. In the deep of night, as we were fast asleep, they knocked a third time to deliver a hearty breakfast—flatbread, chickpea paste, eggs, drinks, and mineral water—placing the tray at our door.

Around noon on the 27th, our hosts, having taken a good nap after iftar, appeared leisurely in the hotel lobby and “suddenly” informed us that we would be going to Maran, a town on the northern border of Saada province, 70 kilometers away, to visit the hometown of Hussein, the founder of the Houthi movement. It was another unexpected delight. We divided into Toyota off-road vehicles, crossed Saada city, and headed for the northern mountains of the province bordering Saudi Arabia.

Throughout the week, all our activities had been notified at the last minute. We were never told in advance who we would meet—not even the drivers knew our next stop; they were only told to follow. Due to the wartime situation and open threats from Israel and the U.S. to assassinate Houthi leaders, the secrecy of our movements was for the safety of both our hosts and us foreign guests. We fully understood this and respected the principle: “guests follow the host.”

Heading north from Saada, the 70-kilometer journey involved crossing mountain after mountain—the farther we went, the higher the mountains, and the steeper the roads. Although the quality of the mountain roads rivaled provincial highways back home, they were still winding and twisty, taking two full hours for a one-way trip. Unlike the semi-hilly, semi-desert landscape along the Sana’a–Saada highway, this mountainous route revealed large oases, terraced fields, sparse trees, and even streams and small dams, indicating that northern Saada is a relatively agriculturally developed area, though still mostly at a subsistence level of natural economy.

Approaching the birthplace of the Houthi movement—the town of Maran, where Hussein launched his rebellion—the terrain was dominated by towering ridgeline mountains running east-west, averaging over 200 meters in height. Each mountain had three to five typical Yemeni earth buildings about ten meters tall. The mountains around Maran are densely packed, with earthen buildings scattered across peaks, forming a breathtaking skyline that resembled a miniature “Great Wall.” The scene evoked an ancient system of warning beacons, signaling threats across great distances.

Below this “Great Wall” were clusters of earth buildings that resembled a mix between farmhouses, forest forts, and watchtowers. These provided shelter from the elements for local farmers and served as strongholds against outside threats. This remote area—far from the centers of power in both Yemen and neighboring countries—offered an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare. It’s here that the Houthi movement was born, grew strong, suffered setbacks, and rose again—ultimately expanding from Yemen’s northwest corner to take over much of the country.

Finally, deep in the mountains, just 20 kilometers from the Saudi border and adjacent to the Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran, we arrived at Maran—a small, picturesque town nestled in the hills. This was Hussein’s hometown and resting place, located in a naturally defensible spot with steep terrain.

The Houthi forces built a majestic “Martyrs’ Cemetery” on a high point resembling an eagle’s beak, constructed primarily in off-white stone and offering panoramic views of the surrounding mountains. On the town’s broadest hilltop—nearly 1,000 square meters—they also built a grand marble plaza for Hussein’s tomb. At the center lies a beautifully crafted rectangular sarcophagus engraved with Quranic verses. Along a long flight of concrete stairs descending the mountain, another burial site can be found, along with a cave where Hussein once hid from government troops during the early revolutionary days.

Shami, our guide and recently resigned Minister of Information, accompanied us throughout. He vividly narrated the life of Hussein and the legends of the Houthi movement, especially the six-year “First War” from 2004 to 2010, recounting dramatic life-and-death struggles between the Houthis and the government, and the key figures who played roles in that era.

What stood out was Shami’s emphasis that the Houthi movement doesn’t operate on a cycle of revenge and has moved beyond tribal narrow-mindedness. Many former mortal enemies who once exchanged gunfire with them are now colleagues and comrades, holding positions in the Houthi-led administration. In fact, none of the Houthi officials who accompanied us to Saada—including the escorts, bodyguards, and drivers—were from Saada. They hailed from Sana’a, Ibb, Marib, and even more distant provinces. Former Houthi Prime Minister Habtoor, whom I had interacted with several times, is from Aden and once served as its governor—suggesting he is likely a Sunni Muslim.

My Houthi friends told me that they don’t differentiate by sect or region; they believe in “One Yemeni Family.” The Houthi movement’s ability to sweep through northwest Yemen and ultimately control more than half the country would have been impossible without such inclusiveness.

In 1962, a republican revolution broke out in North Yemen, ending more than 1,000 years of Zaidi Imamate theocratic rule. Afterward, Zaidi elites and the population found themselves caught between the internal pressure of Yemen’s secular republicanism and external pressure from Saudi-supported Sunni Salafism, and were gradually marginalized. In 1992, aiming to revive “Zaidism,” religious leader Hussein from Saada established the “Believing Youth” movement. Through religious schooling and preaching, it spread religious and political ideas, resisting the republican regime led by Saleh internally and countering Saudi ideological expansion externally, while also laying out a vision for an Iranian-style Islamic regime.

In 1994, four years after Yemeni unification, civil war broke out. Hussein, who belonged to the same powerful Hashid tribe as Saleh, led Saada tribal militias to help the government suppress the southern rebellion—partly out of tribal interests and other political calculations—thereby growing his own power.

After 2001, as the U.S. launched wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Saleh government was forced to align with the U.S., supporting troop deployments to both countries. While the Houthis did not support international terrorism, they consistently adhered to anti-American and anti-Zionist ideology, focused on liberating Islamic lands and reviving Islam. This caused the two sides to become enemies again. In 2004, a six-year civil war broke out between the Houthis and government forces. Hussein was killed early in the conflict. His successors renamed the “Believing Youth” to the “Houthis” in his honor, vowing to carry on his fight until a ceasefire was brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2010.

In 2011, the Arab Spring reached Yemen. The country plunged into political chaos. Losing both military and popular support, and abandoned by the Hashid tribe, Saleh was forced to resign. With backing from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the Hadi government—mainly supported by southern factions—was established. In 2014, amid efforts to form a federal system, the Houthis rebelled again, claiming their interests were not being protected. They swiftly entered the capital, seized power, and—teaming up with Saleh for the third time—set up parallel administrative and legislative institutions to replace the Hadi government, forcing it into exile in Saudi Arabia.

On March 25, 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a “Ten-Nation Coalition” of Arab and Islamic countries to intervene in Yemen’s civil war, and on March 26 officially began airstrikes against the Houthis—ushering in a new phase of the conflict. The Houthis declared Saudi Arabia, its allies, and their Western backer, the United States, as enemies. The following year, with Jordan and others mediating, the Houthis began peace talks with the coalition. In 2017, Saleh—accused by the Houthis of betrayal and of negotiating for personal gain—broke ranks. Disputes over military control further escalated tensions. Eventually, Saleh was intercepted and executed by the Houthis while fleeing Sana’a.

By 2023, the Houthis had become a powerful force, controlling half the country. They extended Hussein’s anti-American, anti-Israel ideology abroad and, for the first time, intervened in the Israel-Palestine conflict. They became a solid pillar of the “Axis of Resistance,” opened a front in the Red Sea, targeted Israel, and even launched airstrikes deep inside Israeli territory—triggering military retaliation from the U.S., U.K., and others.

On the night of the 27th, after having iftar in Saada, we concluded our rapid tour of the Houthi stronghold and began our overnight journey back to Sana’a. The drive took nearly four hours, with no streetlights along the way—our young driver relied entirely on his familiarity with the roads. He had been driving all day, and we worried about whether he had the strength to stay alert. But Yemenis have their own way—both the driver and the bodyguard riding shotgun kept chewing qat leaves for energy, seasoned by years of battlefield experience. The bodyguard, only 23 years old, was already a veteran with five years of combat experience.

While we were away from Sana’a, media reports indicated that the U.S. and U.K. had launched airstrikes on Sana’a International Airport and other targets. Shortly after midnight, we returned to the noisy city of Sana’a. We had barely settled into our hotel for half an hour, just beginning to notify friends and family via WeChat, when a series of thunderous explosions erupted in the clear night sky. The sound of F-16 fighter jets circling overhead followed, along with sporadic anti-aircraft fire. Drawing on my extensive frontline experience in Gaza and Baghdad, I could almost identify every model of jet, missile, bomb, or bullet just by sound. My immediate reaction: “The U.S. is launching an airstrike.” And this was the first time during my week in Yemen that I directly experienced and heard a U.S. strike.

On the 29th, I left Yemen as planned, bidding farewell to the Houthi movement, with whom I had only just begun to interact and was far from familiar. Yet, the Houthis have now risen to become a key part of the “Axis of Resistance” and an important player on the Middle Eastern stage. This political “celebrity” or “nouveau riche” type of non-state actor, despite Yemen’s extreme poverty and streets full of struggling citizens, has positioned itself as the backbone and vanguard of “Palestinian liberation.” In my view, its enthusiastic promotion of the Palestinian cause is a strategy aimed at shielding itself under the banners of pan-Islamism and pan-Arab nationalism, using the turmoil it stirs in the Middle East—especially in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean—to gain broader domestic, regional, and international legitimacy. Ultimately, this is a bid to force the international community to recognize it as Yemen’s sole legitimate representative, or at the very least, to secure dominance and voice in the process of forming a joint government.

This trip may not have yielded every possible gain, but it still brought many insights—some even unexpected. That said, the regrets are obvious. Despite our repeated requests, we never got the chance to visit the front lines to see Houthi soldiers, equipment, or camps. We had no opportunity to speak with their top leader—Hussein’s brother and successor Abdul-Malik al-Houthi. We didn’t visit the crucial Red Sea port city of Hudaydah under Houthi control, let alone conduct a full investigation in rival-controlled areas like Aden or Taiz.

Fouad, an advisor to the Houthi “Prime Minister” who coordinated my entire visit, tried to reassure me, saying, “It’s okay. Come again next year. We’ll take you to Aden, or anywhere else you want to go.” This wasn’t just his personal wish—it likely reflects the broader ambition of the Houthis to one day unify and rule the entire country.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

The Houthi War: The “Sixth Middle East War” and the Palestinian Narrative

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