Diplomacy
The final frontier in Ukraine’s crisis: Trump’s peace plan and the proposal for a sanitary zone
Since its inception, the war in Ukraine has escalated into a profound crisis with far-reaching implications, not only for Eastern Europe but for the entire world. The diplomatic tensions, military interventions, and economic sanctions that have followed have underscored the precarious balance between war and peace on the European continent.
During his election campaign, former U.S. President Donald Trump made a bold assertion: “If I take office, I will end the war in Ukraine quickly.” This statement hints at a potential shift in U.S. military and material support for Europe. While the specifics of Trump’s plan remain unclear, his public rhetoric and insights from his advisors have sparked a multifaceted debate among European nations.
Trump’s stated goal is to “establish peace,” but it is evident that the U.S. aims to reduce its traditional military burdens. This could leave Europe facing a stark choice: either take on a greater role in resolving the conflict or bear the consequences of inaction. Such a scenario would force Europe, already strained by the crisis in Ukraine, to reevaluate its security framework.
At the same time, the question of sustained financial and military aid to Ukraine is testing Europe’s political resolve and economic capacity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has issued a stark warning: “Without financial support, we will lose.” He is urging Western allies to share the burden of the war. Without U.S. support—ranging from advanced weaponry to intelligence and operational planning—Ukraine’s military efforts against Russia would face even greater challenges. Meanwhile, Germany, a cornerstone of the EU, is grappling with whether it is prepared to assume a larger role if U.S. support diminishes. Within the European Union, the lack of a unified approach is evident, as each member state prioritizes its own interests.
What does Trump’s peace plan offer?
Donald Trump has claimed that, if elected president, he would swiftly end the war in Ukraine. During his previous presidency, Trump’s approach to NATO was marked by ambivalence. He notably pressured European countries to increase their defense spending and contribute more to the U.S.-led security umbrella. Now, as he eyes a potential return to the White House, his proposed actions regarding the Ukraine war are of direct concern to Europe. Given its geographical proximity, Europe is the primary region that would bear the consequences of any escalation or misstep in the conflict.
While the specifics of Trump’s peace plan remain undisclosed, leaks suggest that some politicians close to his advisors have discussed the creation of demilitarized zones between Ukraine and Russia. It is speculated that American troops would not be stationed in these zones; instead, they would be overseen by a European-led force. However, this scenario poses significant risks for Brussels. The establishment of such a buffer zone could inadvertently bring European states and Russia into direct confrontation, even with the slightest miscalculation.
Another proposal under consideration is the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force (often referred to as “blue berets”). However, the UN’s track record in conflicts like the Balkan Wars highlights the challenges of such missions. Issues such as a disorganized chain of command can undermine the effectiveness of peacekeepers on the ground. Additionally, creating a UN peacekeeping force requires approval from permanent Security Council members, including China, Russia, and the U.S., which introduces complex diplomatic hurdles. The prospect of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council—particularly on resolutions condemning Russia—remains a significant obstacle.
Within Europe itself, there are deep divisions and contradictions. Germany has pledged continued financial and military support for Ukraine, but debates persist over how much Europe can shoulder if the U.S. withdraws its backing. Ukraine, meanwhile, is in desperate need of funds, weapons, and personnel to sustain its war effort. The Ukrainian military, already outmatched by Russia in conventional power and logistics, requires far greater support from Europe. This support extends beyond cash and weaponry to include troop training, operational planning, intelligence sharing, and maintaining critical supply lines. For Europe, assuming the U.S.’s role in these areas independently would be an immense challenge. While countries like Spain, France, Poland, and Greece have called for joint military coordination, each nation has its own reservations and priorities.
In summary, while the details of Trump’s peace efforts remain unclear, the potential for their failure places Europe in a position of heightened responsibility. If U.S. support is withdrawn, European nations would need to take on greater economic and military risks to support Ukraine. Moreover, if peace negotiations collapse, the conflict could escalate into a larger-scale war, with Europe bearing the brunt of the fallout.
The Biden administration’s ATACMS decision
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden has approached arms aid to Ukraine with caution. Initially, he refrained from providing long-range ATACMS missiles, citing the risk of escalating the conflict into a potential “World War III.” However, Biden has now shifted his stance, greenlighting the use of these weapons for operations targeting deep inside Russian territory. This decision has been widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine former President Donald Trump’s peace initiative. While Ukraine argues that these strikes are acts of self-defense, the use of long-range missiles against Russian soil could escalate the conflict with a nuclear-armed state to an even more perilous level.
The Ukrainian military relies heavily on Western weapons and intelligence to target Russian strategic bases and air defense systems. While international law recognizes the right of an occupied nation to strike enemy logistics centers and military posts in self-defense, the situation remains delicate. The U.S. maintains that it only supports Ukraine’s “right to legitimate self-defense,” but this stance cannot obscure the fact that, in practice, the U.S. is aiding Ukraine by providing intelligence, target selection assistance, and advanced weaponry. This is precisely why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has resisted supplying Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles, similar to ATACMS. Scholz views it as a strategic imperative for NATO to avoid direct involvement and confrontation with Russia on the front lines.
The Biden administration’s decision also risks contradicting U.S. interests. As tensions with Russia escalate, the administration may be increasing the likelihood of a broader conflict. While the U.S. may aim to weaken Russia through attrition, the limits of this strategy remain unclear. Some commentators argue that the Biden administration is conflicted, seeking to make “final moves” on the Ukrainian front to counter Trump’s claims that he can bring peace. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its aftermath may also be influencing Biden’s reluctance to take another significant step back. By cornering Russia, the U.S. is simultaneously drawing Europe deeper into the crisis.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response to these developments will be critical. Direct strikes on Russian strategic bases or airfields using Western long-range missiles could provoke a more aggressive reaction from Moscow. In an environment where nuclear threats have been repeatedly voiced, even a minor miscalculation could lead to catastrophic consequences. Some experts speculate that if Trump returns to power, Biden’s current policy could be sharply reversed, with a renewed focus on negotiations. From a strategic standpoint, it is often argued that no matter how many weapons Biden provides to Ukraine, he lacks a decisive “trump card” to fundamentally shift the balance of the war in Ukraine’s favor.
The limitations of Europe’s military capacity
One of the most pressing debates throughout the Ukraine crisis has been the extent of the European Union and NATO member states’ commitment to bolstering their own military capabilities. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has long criticized Europe, arguing that “Europeans are not paying enough for their own security.” Indeed, the NATO target of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP faced significant resistance in many European countries. Now, discussions are even turning to higher thresholds, such as 3%. However, what this would mean in practice remains unclear. While some argue that Europe must build a conventional deterrent against Russia, viewing defense spending as a form of essential insurance, others warn that diverting massive budgets to the arms industry would come at the expense of social spending, likely provoking public backlash.
In this context, it is worth recalling the insights of Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of Germany. During the Cold War, Schmidt emphasized the importance of maintaining a “military balance” but also argued that this alone was insufficient to ensure peace. He believed that military balance needed to be complemented by political compromises, arms control agreements, and confidence-building measures. In other words, investing solely in weapons is not enough; diplomacy must also play a central role. Schmidt’s legacy serves as a warning to today’s European leaders: “Strength is important, but flexible diplomacy, openness to dialogue, and active efforts to prevent conflicts from escalating are equally essential.” This principle could be applied to rebuilding de-escalation mechanisms between Russia and NATO. However, in the current climate, such dialogue seems distant, particularly as the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate.
Moreover, the idea that “all European countries should participate in Europe’s security architecture” remains an ideal that is often voiced but rarely realized in practice. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally undermined the notion of “accepting Russia as part of the European security system.” As a result, even if peace initiatives in this new era seek some form of “deal” with Russia, it is unclear how far Europe is willing or able to stretch to accommodate such an agreement.
Zelensky’s stillborn ‘victory plan’
At the onset of the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled what he called the “Victory Plan,” aiming for complete military success. His declaration, “We will push Russia back to its borders; we will not cede a single inch of our territory,” was met with widespread enthusiasm in the West. However, as the conflict dragged on, the Ukrainian army suffered significant losses, Russia’s long-term strategy took hold, and it became evident that Western support was not unlimited. The United States and Germany, in particular, have repeatedly cautioned that Ukraine cannot afford the risk of a major escalation by launching large-scale attacks on Russian territory.
In the 10-point peace plan Zelensky presented, the primary condition is the return of all Ukrainian territory, including regions annexed by Russia. Moscow, however, claims legitimacy over these areas through referendums in Crimea and Donbas. This fundamental disagreement leaves the question, “Is there common ground for compromise?” unanswered. Furthermore, Zelensky has ruled out direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even issuing a decree declaring Putin’s administration illegitimate. This stance effectively blocks the path to a diplomatic solution from the outset. Nevertheless, some European leaders support Zelensky’s proposal to organize a peace conference, arguing that Russia’s participation would be beneficial.
This impasse has created an opening for former U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric: “If I am elected, I will sit down and talk.” In both Europe and the United States, there is growing sentiment that negotiations are the only viable way to end the war. However, a ceasefire—freezing the conflict—is a prerequisite for any talks. The direction of such negotiations, the terms under which Ukraine and Russia might reach an agreement, and the guarantees Europe would provide remain deeply uncertain. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, for instance, would require Russia to refrain from using its veto in the Security Council.
European leaders now face a critical choice: support Trump’s peace initiatives or align with President Joe Biden’s strategy of “pushing Russia back.” Both scenarios carry significant risks for Europe. If Trump succeeds, a demilitarized zone could be established between Ukraine and Russia, but European troops would likely be required to secure it. If Biden’s policy prevails, Europe could become a target for Russia amid escalating tensions, especially with the use of long-range weapons.
Moreover, institutions like the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations are grappling with their roles in this evolving security architecture. Whether Europe will develop an independent military structure or deepen its defense cooperation under the U.S. umbrella remains unclear.
The greatest irony in this situation is that the hope for peace appears to hinge on two uncertain factors: Vladimir Putin’s restraint and Donald Trump’s potential election as president, which could lead to a reversal of Biden’s policies. How sustainable or healthy this is for Europe is a matter of intense debate.
Diplomacy
South Korea begins first commercial voyage via Northern Sea Route
South Korea is launching its first commercial container ship voyage to Europe via the Northern Sea Route passing through Russian territorial waters. With this step, which shortens travel time by approximately 35%, the Seoul administration aims to transform the Arctic route into a regular trade corridor by 2030 and turn Busan into a key maritime hub.
South Korea is sending a container ship to Europe via the Arctic Northern Sea Route passing through Russian territorial waters for the first time.
Planned in the shadow of potential tensions in the Seoul administration’s relations with Western nations, this voyage represents the country’s first commercial shipping step on the route in question.
According to reports by the Reuters and Yonhap agencies, the container vessel named PanStar Acro is scheduled to set sail on 22 August.
According to VesselFinder data, the Panama-flagged vessel, which has a capacity of 2,758 TEU, is carrying a cargo of 837 TEU comprising automotive spare parts and chemical products.
Carrying its cargo measured in TEU—a unit referring to the volume of a standard 20-foot container—the ship is scheduled to depart at approximately 20:00 local time (14:00 Türkiye time).
Advancing north along Kamchatka and crossing the Bering Sea to enter the Northern Sea Route, the ship will call at the ports of Felixstowe in the United Kingdom, Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Gdansk in Poland. The entire voyage is expected to take between 40 and 45 days.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has made Arctic maritime transport one of the country’s priorities. The Seoul administration plans to turn Busan into a key maritime hub through this route and make the Arctic region a regular trade passage by 2030.
According to calculations by South Korean officials, the Arctic route reduces navigation time by roughly 35%.
Nevertheless, the project carries the risk of complicating relations with Western allies who are attempting to isolate Russia internationally due to the conflict in Ukraine.
It is reported that the Seoul administration has held consultations with Moscow regarding the process, including the provision of assistance in possible emergencies such as the vessel becoming trapped in ice.
According to data from Norway’s High North Logistics Center, 88 vessels carried out a total of 103 transit passages last year on the route, which was used by 43 ships in 2022 and 97 ships in 2024.
The primary maritime traffic on the Arctic route was provided by Russia and China. Scientists point out that while melting glaciers facilitate navigation, increasing maritime traffic accelerates global warming.
As the shortest waterway between the European part of Russia and the Far East region, the Northern Sea Route lies entirely within the Arctic Ocean and partly within the seas of the Pacific Ocean, situated within Russian borders.
Transit permits for the route are issued by the Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation, Rosatom.
Igor Tonkovidov, head of the Russian shipping company Sovcomflot, had previously proposed resuming cooperation between Russia and South Korea in the field of Northern Sea Route transportation.
Tonkovidov had called for revisiting the delivery to the Russian company of three Arctic-class liquefied natural gas tankers ordered from South Korea’s DSME shipyard.
Valued at $872.1 million, corresponding to approximately 74.24 billion roubles, this contract could not be fulfilled due to sanctions imposed following the start of the military operation.
South Korea is not the only country in the Asian region utilising the Northern Sea Route. At the beginning of August, Rosatom granted transit permission to seven vessels belonging to the Chinese shipping company Sea Legend.
Rosatom Director General Alexey Likhachev stated that the company aims to establish a regular line with weekly sailings throughout the navigation season.
Last year, China officially commissioned the world’s first Arctic express route connecting China and Europe. Within this framework, the container vessel Istanbul Bridge departed from the Port of Ningbo-Zhoushan and sailed to the Port of Felixstowe.
Stating that the surge in activity on the Northern Sea Route comes amid a crisis environment in the Strait of Hormuz, Likhachev noted that the Chinese company’s initiative confirms the growing demand for the Arctic passage and represents a new phase in this route becoming a transport artery of global significance.
Diplomacy
Blackwater founder Erik Prince creates air defence venture with Kyiv
Erik Prince, the founder of the private military contractor Blackwater—which operates today under the name Academi—has established a new enterprise, Vectus Air Defense Systems, that applies a paid subscription model to its air defence systems.
According to a report by the Financial Times (FT), the new company will operate on an “air defence as a service” principle based on software subscriptions. Under multi-year contracts, it will design, install, and maintain multi-layered air defence systems.
The company positions its air defence systems as a more cost-effective alternative to Patriot-type anti-missile systems deployed against inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles in Middle Eastern conflicts.
Vectus products will integrate technologies from the US, Ukraine, Israel, and other nations, including sensors, electronic warfare tools, interceptor drones, and high-rate-of-fire heavy autocannons.
The company was founded in partnership with Swarmer, a Ukrainian drone software development group. Swarmer, which is among the founding investors of Vectus, holds a 20% stake in the firm.
The FT reported that the two companies will collaborate on counter-drone technologies, including sensors and swarm systems. According to the report, Prince currently serves as the non-executive chairman of Swarmer.
In a statement to Axios, Prince said: “It is clear the threat is rapidly evolving, and private sector demand for such solutions is very high. We must drastically lower defence costs and enable clients to take the protection of critical facilities into their own hands.”
A representative for Prince stated that the prominent entrepreneur spent the past year meeting with technology suppliers and prospective clients across Ukraine, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.
According to the representative, the developed air defence systems offer the most viable solution for major commercial and civilian installations that either do not wish to entrust, or cannot entrust, their security entirely to the state.
An ally of US President Donald Trump, Prince has a long-standing involvement in the defence sector.
Having established his private security firm in 1997, Prince’s company Blackwater signed $2 billion in government security contracts between 1997 and 2010, including the protection of US Department of State personnel.
The company carried out approximately 100,000 missions during the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama.
Certain operations conducted by Blackwater, however, drew fierce criticism.
An incident in September 2007, in which company personnel opened fire on a crowd in Baghdad’s Nisour Square—killing 17 Iraqi civilians and severely wounding 20 others—provoked massive public outrage.
US courts convicted three employees on 15 separate counts of manslaughter in 2014 and 2019.
Following the Blackwater era, Prince established Presidential Airways, a global aviation transport company operating more than 75 aircraft across emerging markets, and Frontier Resource Group, a private investment firm focused on natural resource ventures.
A primary operational focus of this investment firm involved providing logistics to oil and mining companies in remote and hazardous regions of Africa.
In 2014, Prince acquired a 25% stake in the Austrian aviation company Airborne Technologies.
Entities affiliated with Prince sought to modify Thrush 510G agricultural crop-duster aircraft by outfitting them with surveillance equipment, machine guns, armour, and rocket pods.
The Guardian reported in September of last year that Prince planned to acquire a Ukrainian drone manufacturer. At the time, the Blackwater founder was seen engaging with local drone producers in Kyiv.
The newspaper noted that Prince’s interest in Ukraine was long-standing, recalling that in 2020 he had submitted a multi-billion-dollar proposal through his private security firm to resolve the crisis in the Donbas, though the deal never materialised.
As subsequently reported by The Guardian, Prince joined the board of directors of Swarmer, a Ukrainian start-up specialising in autonomous drone swarm management.
The Blackwater founder described the company as a venture “born in the crucible of modern combat”.
Diplomacy
US formally redesignates Hezbollah as Iranian proxy under sanctions
The US has officially changed its designation of Hezbollah to identify it as a “proxy of Iran”.
Executive Order 13224 now explicitly states that Hezbollah is sanctioned for acting for or on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).
Speaking to Al Arabiya, a US State Department official argued that this change underscores how Hezbollah operates with almost no regard for Lebanese sovereignty, the Lebanese people, or the Lebanese state.
The official continued:
“This decision formally recognizes that Hezbollah’s military operations, external security apparatus, and major financing networks function as an extension of the IRGC-QF—Iran’s primary instrument for executing terrorist activity beyond its borders. Hezbollah is not a Lebanese resistance movement.”
Pointing to repeated oaths of loyalty and allegiance by Hezbollah officials to Iran’s Supreme Leader, the official maintained that the Quds Force also exerts a decisive influence over the group’s military and strategic decisions.
The official stated that Washington remains committed to “disrupting the networks that allow Iran to use Hezbollah as an instrument to undermine Lebanese sovereignty, threaten regional stability, and advance Tehran’s terrorist agenda.”
The official further accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon into destructive wars with Israel twice within the last two years, stating that the group remains an obstacle to Lebanon’s sovereignty, stability, and economic recovery.
“The disarmament and dismantling of Hezbollah is vital for any credible path forward for Lebanon, and we are working with our partners to advance this goal,” the US State Department official said.
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