Diplomacy
The final frontier in Ukraine’s crisis: Trump’s peace plan and the proposal for a sanitary zone
Since its inception, the war in Ukraine has escalated into a profound crisis with far-reaching implications, not only for Eastern Europe but for the entire world. The diplomatic tensions, military interventions, and economic sanctions that have followed have underscored the precarious balance between war and peace on the European continent.
During his election campaign, former U.S. President Donald Trump made a bold assertion: “If I take office, I will end the war in Ukraine quickly.” This statement hints at a potential shift in U.S. military and material support for Europe. While the specifics of Trump’s plan remain unclear, his public rhetoric and insights from his advisors have sparked a multifaceted debate among European nations.
Trump’s stated goal is to “establish peace,” but it is evident that the U.S. aims to reduce its traditional military burdens. This could leave Europe facing a stark choice: either take on a greater role in resolving the conflict or bear the consequences of inaction. Such a scenario would force Europe, already strained by the crisis in Ukraine, to reevaluate its security framework.
At the same time, the question of sustained financial and military aid to Ukraine is testing Europe’s political resolve and economic capacity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has issued a stark warning: “Without financial support, we will lose.” He is urging Western allies to share the burden of the war. Without U.S. support—ranging from advanced weaponry to intelligence and operational planning—Ukraine’s military efforts against Russia would face even greater challenges. Meanwhile, Germany, a cornerstone of the EU, is grappling with whether it is prepared to assume a larger role if U.S. support diminishes. Within the European Union, the lack of a unified approach is evident, as each member state prioritizes its own interests.
What does Trump’s peace plan offer?
Donald Trump has claimed that, if elected president, he would swiftly end the war in Ukraine. During his previous presidency, Trump’s approach to NATO was marked by ambivalence. He notably pressured European countries to increase their defense spending and contribute more to the U.S.-led security umbrella. Now, as he eyes a potential return to the White House, his proposed actions regarding the Ukraine war are of direct concern to Europe. Given its geographical proximity, Europe is the primary region that would bear the consequences of any escalation or misstep in the conflict.
While the specifics of Trump’s peace plan remain undisclosed, leaks suggest that some politicians close to his advisors have discussed the creation of demilitarized zones between Ukraine and Russia. It is speculated that American troops would not be stationed in these zones; instead, they would be overseen by a European-led force. However, this scenario poses significant risks for Brussels. The establishment of such a buffer zone could inadvertently bring European states and Russia into direct confrontation, even with the slightest miscalculation.
Another proposal under consideration is the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force (often referred to as “blue berets”). However, the UN’s track record in conflicts like the Balkan Wars highlights the challenges of such missions. Issues such as a disorganized chain of command can undermine the effectiveness of peacekeepers on the ground. Additionally, creating a UN peacekeeping force requires approval from permanent Security Council members, including China, Russia, and the U.S., which introduces complex diplomatic hurdles. The prospect of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council—particularly on resolutions condemning Russia—remains a significant obstacle.
Within Europe itself, there are deep divisions and contradictions. Germany has pledged continued financial and military support for Ukraine, but debates persist over how much Europe can shoulder if the U.S. withdraws its backing. Ukraine, meanwhile, is in desperate need of funds, weapons, and personnel to sustain its war effort. The Ukrainian military, already outmatched by Russia in conventional power and logistics, requires far greater support from Europe. This support extends beyond cash and weaponry to include troop training, operational planning, intelligence sharing, and maintaining critical supply lines. For Europe, assuming the U.S.’s role in these areas independently would be an immense challenge. While countries like Spain, France, Poland, and Greece have called for joint military coordination, each nation has its own reservations and priorities.
In summary, while the details of Trump’s peace efforts remain unclear, the potential for their failure places Europe in a position of heightened responsibility. If U.S. support is withdrawn, European nations would need to take on greater economic and military risks to support Ukraine. Moreover, if peace negotiations collapse, the conflict could escalate into a larger-scale war, with Europe bearing the brunt of the fallout.
The Biden administration’s ATACMS decision
Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden has approached arms aid to Ukraine with caution. Initially, he refrained from providing long-range ATACMS missiles, citing the risk of escalating the conflict into a potential “World War III.” However, Biden has now shifted his stance, greenlighting the use of these weapons for operations targeting deep inside Russian territory. This decision has been widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine former President Donald Trump’s peace initiative. While Ukraine argues that these strikes are acts of self-defense, the use of long-range missiles against Russian soil could escalate the conflict with a nuclear-armed state to an even more perilous level.
The Ukrainian military relies heavily on Western weapons and intelligence to target Russian strategic bases and air defense systems. While international law recognizes the right of an occupied nation to strike enemy logistics centers and military posts in self-defense, the situation remains delicate. The U.S. maintains that it only supports Ukraine’s “right to legitimate self-defense,” but this stance cannot obscure the fact that, in practice, the U.S. is aiding Ukraine by providing intelligence, target selection assistance, and advanced weaponry. This is precisely why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has resisted supplying Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles, similar to ATACMS. Scholz views it as a strategic imperative for NATO to avoid direct involvement and confrontation with Russia on the front lines.
The Biden administration’s decision also risks contradicting U.S. interests. As tensions with Russia escalate, the administration may be increasing the likelihood of a broader conflict. While the U.S. may aim to weaken Russia through attrition, the limits of this strategy remain unclear. Some commentators argue that the Biden administration is conflicted, seeking to make “final moves” on the Ukrainian front to counter Trump’s claims that he can bring peace. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its aftermath may also be influencing Biden’s reluctance to take another significant step back. By cornering Russia, the U.S. is simultaneously drawing Europe deeper into the crisis.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response to these developments will be critical. Direct strikes on Russian strategic bases or airfields using Western long-range missiles could provoke a more aggressive reaction from Moscow. In an environment where nuclear threats have been repeatedly voiced, even a minor miscalculation could lead to catastrophic consequences. Some experts speculate that if Trump returns to power, Biden’s current policy could be sharply reversed, with a renewed focus on negotiations. From a strategic standpoint, it is often argued that no matter how many weapons Biden provides to Ukraine, he lacks a decisive “trump card” to fundamentally shift the balance of the war in Ukraine’s favor.
The limitations of Europe’s military capacity
One of the most pressing debates throughout the Ukraine crisis has been the extent of the European Union and NATO member states’ commitment to bolstering their own military capabilities. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has long criticized Europe, arguing that “Europeans are not paying enough for their own security.” Indeed, the NATO target of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP faced significant resistance in many European countries. Now, discussions are even turning to higher thresholds, such as 3%. However, what this would mean in practice remains unclear. While some argue that Europe must build a conventional deterrent against Russia, viewing defense spending as a form of essential insurance, others warn that diverting massive budgets to the arms industry would come at the expense of social spending, likely provoking public backlash.
In this context, it is worth recalling the insights of Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of Germany. During the Cold War, Schmidt emphasized the importance of maintaining a “military balance” but also argued that this alone was insufficient to ensure peace. He believed that military balance needed to be complemented by political compromises, arms control agreements, and confidence-building measures. In other words, investing solely in weapons is not enough; diplomacy must also play a central role. Schmidt’s legacy serves as a warning to today’s European leaders: “Strength is important, but flexible diplomacy, openness to dialogue, and active efforts to prevent conflicts from escalating are equally essential.” This principle could be applied to rebuilding de-escalation mechanisms between Russia and NATO. However, in the current climate, such dialogue seems distant, particularly as the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate.
Moreover, the idea that “all European countries should participate in Europe’s security architecture” remains an ideal that is often voiced but rarely realized in practice. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally undermined the notion of “accepting Russia as part of the European security system.” As a result, even if peace initiatives in this new era seek some form of “deal” with Russia, it is unclear how far Europe is willing or able to stretch to accommodate such an agreement.
Zelensky’s stillborn ‘victory plan’
At the onset of the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled what he called the “Victory Plan,” aiming for complete military success. His declaration, “We will push Russia back to its borders; we will not cede a single inch of our territory,” was met with widespread enthusiasm in the West. However, as the conflict dragged on, the Ukrainian army suffered significant losses, Russia’s long-term strategy took hold, and it became evident that Western support was not unlimited. The United States and Germany, in particular, have repeatedly cautioned that Ukraine cannot afford the risk of a major escalation by launching large-scale attacks on Russian territory.
In the 10-point peace plan Zelensky presented, the primary condition is the return of all Ukrainian territory, including regions annexed by Russia. Moscow, however, claims legitimacy over these areas through referendums in Crimea and Donbas. This fundamental disagreement leaves the question, “Is there common ground for compromise?” unanswered. Furthermore, Zelensky has ruled out direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even issuing a decree declaring Putin’s administration illegitimate. This stance effectively blocks the path to a diplomatic solution from the outset. Nevertheless, some European leaders support Zelensky’s proposal to organize a peace conference, arguing that Russia’s participation would be beneficial.
This impasse has created an opening for former U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric: “If I am elected, I will sit down and talk.” In both Europe and the United States, there is growing sentiment that negotiations are the only viable way to end the war. However, a ceasefire—freezing the conflict—is a prerequisite for any talks. The direction of such negotiations, the terms under which Ukraine and Russia might reach an agreement, and the guarantees Europe would provide remain deeply uncertain. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, for instance, would require Russia to refrain from using its veto in the Security Council.
European leaders now face a critical choice: support Trump’s peace initiatives or align with President Joe Biden’s strategy of “pushing Russia back.” Both scenarios carry significant risks for Europe. If Trump succeeds, a demilitarized zone could be established between Ukraine and Russia, but European troops would likely be required to secure it. If Biden’s policy prevails, Europe could become a target for Russia amid escalating tensions, especially with the use of long-range weapons.
Moreover, institutions like the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations are grappling with their roles in this evolving security architecture. Whether Europe will develop an independent military structure or deepen its defense cooperation under the U.S. umbrella remains unclear.
The greatest irony in this situation is that the hope for peace appears to hinge on two uncertain factors: Vladimir Putin’s restraint and Donald Trump’s potential election as president, which could lead to a reversal of Biden’s policies. How sustainable or healthy this is for Europe is a matter of intense debate.
Diplomacy
Greece’s Marinakis says paying Hormuz transit fees beats enduring Red Sea shipping crisis detour
Evangelos Marinakis, one of Greece’s leading shipowners, has announced that he is prepared to pay up to $200,000 per transit to keep the Strait of Hormuz open to civilian maritime traffic.
Speaking to the Financial Times, Marinakis stated that paying a transit fee would be a far better option for him than having the strait closed to navigation.
As the chairman of Capital Maritime Group, which controls a fleet of 185 vessels including approximately 35 tankers, Marinakis emphasized that shipowners have been forced to use alternative routes around the Cape of Good Hope for years due to attacks launched by the Houthis in the Red Sea, a detour that has generated substantial additional costs.
The Greek shipowner indicated that paying a transit fee of $100,000 or $200,000, depending on the size of the cargo or the vessel, is far more reasonable than enduring the current logistical challenges. He added that such payments could offset all the losses experienced so far.
Following US strikes on Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the Tehran administration had introduced transit fees of up to $2 million for certain vessels transiting the waterway.
In May, Iran announced the establishment of a state agency tasked with managing the Strait of Hormuz. It was stated that the institution in question would provide real-time updates regarding maritime activities in the waterway.
Ebrahim Azizi, the chairman of the Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission, had noted that only commercial vessels and countries cooperating with Iran would be able to benefit from the facilities provided under this “professional mechanism.”
US President Donald Trump has explicitly opposed the imposition of transit fees in the Strait of Hormuz. In a statement on the matter, Trump said, “We want the strait to be open. We do not want any transit fees to be charged. This is an international waterway.”
On the other hand, the draft text of a planned 60-day ceasefire extension agreement between the parties stipulates that the Strait of Hormuz will remain open without any transit fees being demanded.
According to the draft details reviewed by Axios, the US in return commits to lifting the blockade it has imposed on Iranian ports. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, announced that the management of the Strait of Hormuz has been excluded from the scope of the agreement with the US, asserting that the issue will be addressed solely by littoral states.
Diplomacy
Pashinyan promises aid to farmers hit by Russian import restrictions
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has pledged compensation for Armenian farmers affected by restrictions on exports to Russia.
According to Sputnik Armenia, Pashinyan made the announcement during an election campaign meeting in the Gegharkunik region.
Speaking at the event, Pashinyan said the subsidies would be designed to offset losses incurred by producers.
The prime minister also acknowledged that some Armenian products had failed to meet required quality standards, adding that such companies would receive support aimed at improving product quality.
Addressing alternative markets for Armenian exports, Pashinyan said several Armenian business delegations were already engaged in negotiations abroad.
He added that Armenia had received offers for the purchase of roses as well as fresh fruits and vegetables.
Pashinyan argued that Armenia’s agricultural output was not particularly large, describing this as an advantage under current circumstances. According to the prime minister, “a respected supermarket chain in Europe” would be capable of selling the entire volume of these products on its own.
Russia’s Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance (Rosselkhoznadzor) imposed temporary restrictions on imports of stone fruits and grapes from Armenia effective July 2.
The ban covers cherries, sour cherries, apricots, plums, peaches and nectarines, among other products.
On the same day, a temporary suspension was also introduced on certification procedures for live fish shipments from Armenia. Russian authorities had previously restricted the entry of flower products originating from Armenia into the Russian market.
In addition, Russia’s Federal Service for Surveillance on Consumer Rights Protection and Human Wellbeing (Rospotrebnadzor) halted the import of all consignments of Jermuk mineral water from Armenia.
In a statement, the agency said levels of bicarbonate, chloride and sulfate ions in the mineral water exceeded established limits and could mislead consumers regarding the product’s medicinal properties.
The Russian regulator argued that the growing number of violations stemmed from the abolition of Armenia’s Agriculture Ministry and the transfer of its responsibilities to the Economy Ministry.
Rosselkhoznadzor further stated that Armenia’s Economy Ministry was experiencing structural problems and was unable to adequately perform the supervisory functions assigned to it.
Diplomacy
Zelenskyy urges US to grant Ukraine license to produce Patriot missiles
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he has asked the United States to grant Ukraine a license to manufacture missiles for the Patriot air defence system.
In a post on social media platform X, Zelenskyy argued that current US production of missile defence interceptors is insufficient and could contribute to crises in different parts of the world.
“Producing 60-65 missiles a month is nothing compared with the challenges we face today. This is no secret, and Russia knows it as well,” Zelenskyy wrote. “We need to expand production. As I requested from the previous US administration, I am asking the current administration to grant Ukraine a license to produce Patriot missiles.”
Zelenskyy said US companies possess advanced technologies that are not available in Ukraine, while Kyiv could contribute its extensive battlefield experience in return.
He also argued that granting such a license would benefit not only Ukraine, but also the Middle East and any country Washington chooses to support.
Washington pledges to maintain defence support
Zelenskyy’s remarks came a day after US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on May 30 that Washington would continue supporting Ukraine’s defence capabilities and ensure military shipments to Kyiv continue.
“We want them to be able to defend themselves, and we will find a way to help them do that,” Hegseth said.
Several days earlier, Yuriy Ihnat, spokesperson for the Ukrainian Air Force, warned that the country’s air defence forces were experiencing a shortage of missiles.
“Due to certain supply problems, we are practically at starvation levels when it comes to missiles today,” Ihnat said.
Concerns persist over air defence missile stocks
In April, Zelenskyy warned that Ukraine’s stockpile of air defence missiles could be exhausted at any moment.
He said that under current conditions, air defence missiles were more critical for Ukraine than the air defence systems themselves.
Highlighting what he described as a critical shortage of Patriot missiles, Zelenskyy said: “We are facing a deficit now that could hardly be worse.”
Concerns that Ukraine could face a severe shortage of US-made air defence missiles had previously been reported by Reuters.
The situation was expected to worsen as the United States and its allies depleted significant portions of their arsenals during tensions with Iran, a point Zelenskyy also underscored.
In a separate statement in January, Zelenskyy said Ukraine lacked sufficient missiles for both US- and European-made air defence systems.
The Ukrainian leader said he had been forced to personally secure every package of missiles from European countries and the United States.
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