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The final frontier in Ukraine’s crisis: Trump’s peace plan and the proposal for a sanitary zone

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Since its inception, the war in Ukraine has escalated into a profound crisis with far-reaching implications, not only for Eastern Europe but for the entire world. The diplomatic tensions, military interventions, and economic sanctions that have followed have underscored the precarious balance between war and peace on the European continent.

During his election campaign, former U.S. President Donald Trump made a bold assertion: “If I take office, I will end the war in Ukraine quickly.” This statement hints at a potential shift in U.S. military and material support for Europe. While the specifics of Trump’s plan remain unclear, his public rhetoric and insights from his advisors have sparked a multifaceted debate among European nations.

Trump’s stated goal is to “establish peace,” but it is evident that the U.S. aims to reduce its traditional military burdens. This could leave Europe facing a stark choice: either take on a greater role in resolving the conflict or bear the consequences of inaction. Such a scenario would force Europe, already strained by the crisis in Ukraine, to reevaluate its security framework.

At the same time, the question of sustained financial and military aid to Ukraine is testing Europe’s political resolve and economic capacity. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has issued a stark warning: “Without financial support, we will lose.” He is urging Western allies to share the burden of the war. Without U.S. support—ranging from advanced weaponry to intelligence and operational planning—Ukraine’s military efforts against Russia would face even greater challenges. Meanwhile, Germany, a cornerstone of the EU, is grappling with whether it is prepared to assume a larger role if U.S. support diminishes. Within the European Union, the lack of a unified approach is evident, as each member state prioritizes its own interests.

What does Trump’s peace plan offer?

Donald Trump has claimed that, if elected president, he would swiftly end the war in Ukraine. During his previous presidency, Trump’s approach to NATO was marked by ambivalence. He notably pressured European countries to increase their defense spending and contribute more to the U.S.-led security umbrella. Now, as he eyes a potential return to the White House, his proposed actions regarding the Ukraine war are of direct concern to Europe. Given its geographical proximity, Europe is the primary region that would bear the consequences of any escalation or misstep in the conflict.

While the specifics of Trump’s peace plan remain undisclosed, leaks suggest that some politicians close to his advisors have discussed the creation of demilitarized zones between Ukraine and Russia. It is speculated that American troops would not be stationed in these zones; instead, they would be overseen by a European-led force. However, this scenario poses significant risks for Brussels. The establishment of such a buffer zone could inadvertently bring European states and Russia into direct confrontation, even with the slightest miscalculation.

Another proposal under consideration is the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping force (often referred to as “blue berets”). However, the UN’s track record in conflicts like the Balkan Wars highlights the challenges of such missions. Issues such as a disorganized chain of command can undermine the effectiveness of peacekeepers on the ground. Additionally, creating a UN peacekeeping force requires approval from permanent Security Council members, including China, Russia, and the U.S., which introduces complex diplomatic hurdles. The prospect of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council—particularly on resolutions condemning Russia—remains a significant obstacle.

Within Europe itself, there are deep divisions and contradictions. Germany has pledged continued financial and military support for Ukraine, but debates persist over how much Europe can shoulder if the U.S. withdraws its backing. Ukraine, meanwhile, is in desperate need of funds, weapons, and personnel to sustain its war effort. The Ukrainian military, already outmatched by Russia in conventional power and logistics, requires far greater support from Europe. This support extends beyond cash and weaponry to include troop training, operational planning, intelligence sharing, and maintaining critical supply lines. For Europe, assuming the U.S.’s role in these areas independently would be an immense challenge. While countries like Spain, France, Poland, and Greece have called for joint military coordination, each nation has its own reservations and priorities.

In summary, while the details of Trump’s peace efforts remain unclear, the potential for their failure places Europe in a position of heightened responsibility. If U.S. support is withdrawn, European nations would need to take on greater economic and military risks to support Ukraine. Moreover, if peace negotiations collapse, the conflict could escalate into a larger-scale war, with Europe bearing the brunt of the fallout.

The Biden administration’s ATACMS decision

Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, U.S. President Joe Biden has approached arms aid to Ukraine with caution. Initially, he refrained from providing long-range ATACMS missiles, citing the risk of escalating the conflict into a potential “World War III.” However, Biden has now shifted his stance, greenlighting the use of these weapons for operations targeting deep inside Russian territory. This decision has been widely interpreted as an attempt to undermine former President Donald Trump’s peace initiative. While Ukraine argues that these strikes are acts of self-defense, the use of long-range missiles against Russian soil could escalate the conflict with a nuclear-armed state to an even more perilous level.

The Ukrainian military relies heavily on Western weapons and intelligence to target Russian strategic bases and air defense systems. While international law recognizes the right of an occupied nation to strike enemy logistics centers and military posts in self-defense, the situation remains delicate. The U.S. maintains that it only supports Ukraine’s “right to legitimate self-defense,” but this stance cannot obscure the fact that, in practice, the U.S. is aiding Ukraine by providing intelligence, target selection assistance, and advanced weaponry. This is precisely why German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has resisted supplying Ukraine with long-range Taurus missiles, similar to ATACMS. Scholz views it as a strategic imperative for NATO to avoid direct involvement and confrontation with Russia on the front lines.

The Biden administration’s decision also risks contradicting U.S. interests. As tensions with Russia escalate, the administration may be increasing the likelihood of a broader conflict. While the U.S. may aim to weaken Russia through attrition, the limits of this strategy remain unclear. Some commentators argue that the Biden administration is conflicted, seeking to make “final moves” on the Ukrainian front to counter Trump’s claims that he can bring peace. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and its aftermath may also be influencing Biden’s reluctance to take another significant step back. By cornering Russia, the U.S. is simultaneously drawing Europe deeper into the crisis.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s response to these developments will be critical. Direct strikes on Russian strategic bases or airfields using Western long-range missiles could provoke a more aggressive reaction from Moscow. In an environment where nuclear threats have been repeatedly voiced, even a minor miscalculation could lead to catastrophic consequences. Some experts speculate that if Trump returns to power, Biden’s current policy could be sharply reversed, with a renewed focus on negotiations. From a strategic standpoint, it is often argued that no matter how many weapons Biden provides to Ukraine, he lacks a decisive “trump card” to fundamentally shift the balance of the war in Ukraine’s favor.

The limitations of Europe’s military capacity

One of the most pressing debates throughout the Ukraine crisis has been the extent of the European Union and NATO member states’ commitment to bolstering their own military capabilities. Former U.S. President Donald Trump has long criticized Europe, arguing that “Europeans are not paying enough for their own security.” Indeed, the NATO target of increasing defense spending to 2% of GDP faced significant resistance in many European countries. Now, discussions are even turning to higher thresholds, such as 3%. However, what this would mean in practice remains unclear. While some argue that Europe must build a conventional deterrent against Russia, viewing defense spending as a form of essential insurance, others warn that diverting massive budgets to the arms industry would come at the expense of social spending, likely provoking public backlash.

In this context, it is worth recalling the insights of Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of Germany. During the Cold War, Schmidt emphasized the importance of maintaining a “military balance” but also argued that this alone was insufficient to ensure peace. He believed that military balance needed to be complemented by political compromises, arms control agreements, and confidence-building measures. In other words, investing solely in weapons is not enough; diplomacy must also play a central role. Schmidt’s legacy serves as a warning to today’s European leaders: “Strength is important, but flexible diplomacy, openness to dialogue, and active efforts to prevent conflicts from escalating are equally essential.” This principle could be applied to rebuilding de-escalation mechanisms between Russia and NATO. However, in the current climate, such dialogue seems distant, particularly as the conflict in Ukraine continues to escalate.

Moreover, the idea that “all European countries should participate in Europe’s security architecture” remains an ideal that is often voiced but rarely realized in practice. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region, and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally undermined the notion of “accepting Russia as part of the European security system.” As a result, even if peace initiatives in this new era seek some form of “deal” with Russia, it is unclear how far Europe is willing or able to stretch to accommodate such an agreement.

Zelensky’s stillborn ‘victory plan’

At the onset of the war, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky unveiled what he called the “Victory Plan,” aiming for complete military success. His declaration, “We will push Russia back to its borders; we will not cede a single inch of our territory,” was met with widespread enthusiasm in the West. However, as the conflict dragged on, the Ukrainian army suffered significant losses, Russia’s long-term strategy took hold, and it became evident that Western support was not unlimited. The United States and Germany, in particular, have repeatedly cautioned that Ukraine cannot afford the risk of a major escalation by launching large-scale attacks on Russian territory.

In the 10-point peace plan Zelensky presented, the primary condition is the return of all Ukrainian territory, including regions annexed by Russia. Moscow, however, claims legitimacy over these areas through referendums in Crimea and Donbas. This fundamental disagreement leaves the question, “Is there common ground for compromise?” unanswered. Furthermore, Zelensky has ruled out direct talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin, even issuing a decree declaring Putin’s administration illegitimate. This stance effectively blocks the path to a diplomatic solution from the outset. Nevertheless, some European leaders support Zelensky’s proposal to organize a peace conference, arguing that Russia’s participation would be beneficial.

This impasse has created an opening for former U.S. President Donald Trump’s rhetoric: “If I am elected, I will sit down and talk.” In both Europe and the United States, there is growing sentiment that negotiations are the only viable way to end the war. However, a ceasefire—freezing the conflict—is a prerequisite for any talks. The direction of such negotiations, the terms under which Ukraine and Russia might reach an agreement, and the guarantees Europe would provide remain deeply uncertain. The deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, for instance, would require Russia to refrain from using its veto in the Security Council.

European leaders now face a critical choice: support Trump’s peace initiatives or align with President Joe Biden’s strategy of “pushing Russia back.” Both scenarios carry significant risks for Europe. If Trump succeeds, a demilitarized zone could be established between Ukraine and Russia, but European troops would likely be required to secure it. If Biden’s policy prevails, Europe could become a target for Russia amid escalating tensions, especially with the use of long-range weapons.

Moreover, institutions like the European Union, NATO, and the United Nations are grappling with their roles in this evolving security architecture. Whether Europe will develop an independent military structure or deepen its defense cooperation under the U.S. umbrella remains unclear.

The greatest irony in this situation is that the hope for peace appears to hinge on two uncertain factors: Vladimir Putin’s restraint and Donald Trump’s potential election as president, which could lead to a reversal of Biden’s policies. How sustainable or healthy this is for Europe is a matter of intense debate.

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India’s Russian oil imports hit record high as Middle East tensions disrupt markets

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23/06/2026

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India is increasing imports of Russian oil and coal as supply chain disruptions and rising prices linked to tensions involving Iran reshape global energy flows.

According to a Reuters report citing data from analytics firm Kpler, shipments from Russia to India reached record levels in June.

Kpler estimates that Russian oil deliveries to India will rise to a record 2.55 million barrels per day in June.

That would surpass both the 2.13 million barrels per day recorded in May and the previous high of 2.16 million barrels per day registered in May 2023.

Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports in June is expected to come in at just under 50%. Before the outbreak of conflict in the Middle East, the figure averaged 23% during the three months preceding February 28.

India’s shift toward Russian crude followed the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and a temporary suspension of sanctions on purchases by the administration of US President Donald Trump in an effort to increase market supply.

However, the sanctions waiver expired on June 17 and was not extended by the US Treasury Department.

Reuters noted that this could lead to a decline in purchases of Russian crude, although the outcome will depend on the willingness of Indian refiners and government officials to return to sourcing shipments from Middle Eastern suppliers.

According to Kpler forecasts, imports from Saudi Arabia are expected to remain at 349,000 barrels per day in June. That compares with an average of 832,000 barrels per day during the three months before the conflict.

A similar trend is visible in coal imports. Imports of Russian coal across all grades are expected to reach 3.16 million tonnes in June, compared with 3.27 million tonnes in May.

Both figures would rank as the second and third highest on record, respectively, behind the peak of 3.76 million tonnes registered in May last year.

Russia is also expected to overtake Australia in June to become the second-largest supplier of coal to India, the world’s second-largest coal importer after China.

According to Reuters, Russia is likely to maintain its role as one of India’s key coal suppliers. Future purchases of Russian oil, however, will depend on whether Washington moves to tighten sanctions against Moscow.

New Delhi says oil shipments will not be affected by sanctions

Indian Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said in mid-June that the country had increased purchases of Russian oil since 2022 at Washington’s request in order to help contain global energy prices.

Jaishankar criticised US restrictions on Russian commodities and urged policymakers not to present such measures as matters of grand principle.

Sujata Sharma, a representative of India’s Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, also said in May that shipments from Russia were continuing and would do so regardless of US decisions concerning sanctions waivers.

Indian refiners reduced imports from Russia in 2025 and turned to suppliers in Saudi Arabia and Iraq amid pressure from the United States and threats of a 25% tariff on Indian goods.

However, Reuters data show that following the outbreak of war in the Middle East and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, Indian companies began increasing purchases of Russian crude again in early March.

Russia’s ambassador to New Delhi, Denis Alipov, said at the end of April that Moscow was prepared to supply as much raw material as India was willing to accept.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov later confirmed that Moscow remained committed to its agreements on energy shipments to India.

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EU, US and China intensify competition over Africa’s strategic minerals through Lobito Corridor

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23/06/2026

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Africa is becoming an increasingly intense arena of competition among China, the US and the European Union over access to strategic raw materials.

According to an analysis by German Foreign Policy, the Lobito Corridor, a rail link connecting the copper belt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the Atlantic port of Lobito in Angola, is playing a pivotal role in that contest.

The infrastructure project is regarded as one of the flagship initiatives of the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and is also viewed by Washington, which is investing in the region, as a means of reducing dependence on China.

In the future, copper, cobalt, lithium and other raw materials essential for the production of batteries, electric vehicles, digital technologies and military equipment will be transported westward via this route.

The initiative builds on infrastructure originally constructed during the colonial era to facilitate the export of African raw materials.

Critics argue that the expansion of the Lobito Corridor perpetuates existing patterns of resource extraction under new conditions.

Global Gateway as a counter to the Belt and Road

The European Commission approved the Global Gateway programme in September 2021.

Under the programme, nearly €300 billion is to be invested in infrastructure projects across Africa, Asia, Oceania, Southeast Europe, and South and Central America by 2027.

The programme is widely viewed as a response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

One of its central objectives is to diversify Europe’s imports of critical raw materials, particularly by reducing dependence on supplies from China.

During a visit to China in late May 2026, German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche of the CDU underscored the importance of secure access to critical raw materials and rare earth elements. This is the area in which Germany remains most dependent on China.

Colonial-era infrastructure remains intact

One of the clearest examples is the 1,300-kilometre Lobito Corridor, which runs from the edge of the Zambia-Southern Congo copper belt to the port of Lobito in Angola.

The core infrastructure of this trade corridor was established through the Benguela Railway, which was built as early as 1902 at the height of European colonial expansion. The railway extended eastward from the port city of Lobito through what is now Angola, providing access to the mineral-rich regions of southern Congo and Zambia.

In 1931, following completion of the initial railway line, the British mining and railway company Tanganyika Concessions transferred its 99-year concession rights to Portugal’s colony of Angola.

The concession expired in 2001, after which the infrastructure, previously controlled by Portuguese authorities, was transferred to the Angolan government.

By 2030, annual copper shipments through the route are expected to reach one million metric tonnes.

Both the EU and the US are relying heavily on the Lobito Corridor in an effort to counter China’s dominant position in Africa’s raw materials sector.

Estimates indicate that roughly two-thirds of global cobalt production originates in the Congo, where Chinese companies are particularly active in mining operations.

China also accounts for approximately 75% of global cobalt processing capacity.

The colonial-era rail line leading to Lobito is intended to redirect exports of copper, cobalt and other raw materials, which have until now largely been shipped eastward via Tanzania, toward western markets, enabling processing in Europe or North America rather than China.

Europe seeks to reduce dependence on China for the green transition

In addition to copper and cobalt, the region holds substantial deposits of lithium, coltan, nickel and rare earth elements, giving it significant economic importance.

These materials are used in electric vehicle batteries, stationary energy storage systems and alloys required for military aircraft production.

Until now, the EU has sourced much of these materials from China. Strategic investment in a new logistics hub in Luau, Angola, located along the Lobito Corridor, is intended to reduce that dependence.

The railway line along the corridor is already operated by a European consortium.

The consortium includes Swiss commodities trader Trafigura, Portuguese construction group Mota-Engil and Belgian rail company Vecturis.

However, the majority of the mines remain under Chinese control. In the Congo, 24 of the country’s 33 cobalt-exporting companies are Chinese-backed.

The Lobito Corridor is being developed through an EU-US partnership

EU efforts to secure influence over the Lobito Corridor are advancing in parallel with similar initiatives by the United States.

In early 2022, the US signed a memorandum of understanding with the EU and other G7 members to mobilise more than $600 billion for infrastructure projects worldwide over the following five years as part of the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII).

The Lobito Corridor is one of five key trade, transit and development corridors in Southern Africa designed to improve transport efficiency.

During the administration of President Joe Biden, financing for the Lobito Corridor was launched under the G7’s PGII framework as a flagship project in cooperation with the Global Gateway initiative.

The EU also regards the expansion of the Lobito Corridor as a critical project and has committed more than €2 billion in funding.

That support could increase further. The next EU budget cycle beginning in 2028 envisages nearly doubling spending on development and external assistance, from €108 billion to €200 billion.

EU officials present the strategy as an effort to offer a more comprehensive approach to infrastructure financing than China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

‘America First’ in Africa

The US has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars for the expansion of the Lobito Corridor.

In the final quarter of 2025 alone, it provided $553 million in loans for the project’s expansion.

An additional $200 million in support came from the Development Bank of Southern Africa.

Unlike the Biden administration, which frequently described the initiative as development assistance, the second Trump administration openly characterises the project as an effort to weaken China’s influence, strengthen US control over critical raw materials and diversify supply chains.

For example, Frank Garcia, a former naval officer appointed in late May as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, praised the Trump administration’s continuing engagement on the continent.

Highlighting the Lobito Corridor in particular, Garcia said the project aligns key US interests in Africa with the “America First” approach.

Germany in Africa for the energy transition

Last autumn, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier travelled several kilometres on the newly restored railway line along the Lobito Corridor and described it as “a strategic infrastructure project of enormous economic importance.”

The German politician added: “Of course, this infrastructure connection also creates investment opportunities for European and German companies along its route.”

Portuguese construction company MCA is currently building solar energy parks in 60 municipalities across Angola at a cost of just under €1.29 billion.

The client is Angola’s Energy Ministry, while the German government is supporting the project through export credit guarantees.

Should Angola fail to meet its payment obligations, Germany would step in. A total of 95% of the project value is guaranteed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

In return, Angola agreed to allow German companies to participate in the project. For example, the battery storage system is being supplied by SMA Solar Technology, based in Niestetal near Kassel.

German solar technology provider Gantner Instruments Environment Solutions is supplying the digital control system.

Critics of the Lobito Corridor expansion warn that the project will primarily benefit the EU and the US.

In their view, the initiative promotes the export of African raw materials rather than strengthening intra-African trade.

Although the EU presents these measures as a development project aligned with African interests, critics argue that they ultimately represent a continuation of Western exploitation of African resources.

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EU presses Türkiye for non-Russian gas supplies under future energy contracts

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22/06/2026

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The European Union is insisting that natural gas delivered to member states via Türkiye under new supply agreements must not be of Russian origin.

German Economy Minister Katherina Reiche said after an official visit to Ankara that “Türkiye understands that the EU attaches great importance to ending the supply of raw materials originating from Russia and accepts this reality.”

Reiche added that Turkish officials had made it clear that replacing supplies from Russia could not be achieved overnight, either economically or in terms of available alternative sources.

As of June 17, a ban on pipeline natural gas imports from Russia under short-term contracts signed more than a year ago entered into force across the European Union.

The measure was approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament at the end of last year. In January 2025, EU member states also voted to phase out Russian gas completely by 2027. Under that decision, member states are required to verify the origin of gas supplies before authorizing deliveries.

Meanwhile, Swiss-based company Nord Stream 2 AG, the operator of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, has launched legal action challenging the regulation imposing the ban on Russian gas imports.

Türkiye, for its part, is continuing negotiations with Gazprom on natural gas supplies for the period after 2026, as existing contracts are approaching expiration.

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar previously said the parties had yet to reach agreement on potential shipment volumes and the duration of any new contracts.

In December 2025, Ankara extended by one year two agreements with Gazprom covering gas deliveries through the TurkStream and Blue Stream pipelines.

Türkiye is seeking to reduce Russia’s share of its gas supply mix. Russia’s share of Türkiye’s natural gas imports has already fallen below 40%.

As part of its energy diversification strategy, Ankara plans to replace part of Russian gas imports with supplies from the United States and Central Asia.

Bayraktar previously said that despite US calls to abandon Russian energy resources, Türkiye would continue purchasing natural gas from Russia.

“We cannot tell our citizens there is no gas available. We have agreements with Russia. Winter is approaching. We need gas from Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan,” Bayraktar said.

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