According to U.S. media reports, White House envoy Steve Witkoff is planning to meet Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Oslo next week to restart nuclear talks. Despite approving the decision to suspend cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran affirmed its commitment to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Safeguards Agreement on 3 July. On the same day, the U.S. Treasury Department announced sanctions on multiple commercial networks that assist in Iran’s oil trade. As for Israel, it had already made it clear that it could launch further attacks on Iran at any time if it attempted to cross the nuclear threshold.

The smoke of the “Twelve-Day War” has not yet fully dissipated, yet the triangular nuclear game among Iran, the United States, and Israel has resumed, returning to the long-standing path of geopolitical maneuvering familiar to the international community, as if nothing major had just happened in the Middle East. In essence, all three countries continue to follow the same entrenched logic in addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, leaving this dangerous geopolitical game mired in stalemate.

The fundamental issue behind Iran’s nuclear dilemma lies in its missed opportunity to actually possess nuclear weapons, thus leaving it trapped in a “strategic prison” where it cannot cross the nuclear threshold. On June 17, renowned American realist theorist John Mearsheimer stated, “I’ve always believed that if I were Iran’s national security advisor, they would already have nuclear weapons.” Mearsheimer cited North Korea and Israel as examples of achieving national security through actual nuclear possession, while Libya and Iraq, which lacked nuclear weapons, had their regimes overthrown by the United States and others—thus calling Iran “extremely foolish.”

Objectively speaking, Iran began nuclear research in the 1950s under the Pahlavi dynasty with U.S. assistance but missed the best opportunity to enter the nuclear club alongside its quasi-ally Israel. Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has faced unprecedented international isolation and engaged in an eight-year war with Iraq, lacking the capacity and conditions to advance nuclear research or accelerate nuclear armament—even while repeatedly suffering from chemical weapons attacks by Iraq.

Subjectively, the new Iranian regime repeatedly emphasized that Islamic teachings forbid weapons of mass destruction, becoming entangled in a moral or procedural justice dilemma amid the complex Middle Eastern power game—repeating the strategic blunder of China’s ancient ruler Duke Xiang of Song, who famously refused to “attack the enemy mid-river.” Ultimately, Iran—while dreaming of exporting the Islamic Revolution and asserting Persian nationalist dominance in the Middle East—underestimated the strategic value of nuclear weapons as “a poor nation’s deterrent,” missing yet another strategic opportunity to cross the nuclear threshold at the end of the Cold War. Even when India and Pakistan successively became nuclear powers in 1998, Iran still hesitated at the gates of the nuclear club. In 2002, George W. Bush introduced the “Axis of Evil” theory and openly declared a plan to overthrow Iran’s government, while launching wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran’s nuclear ambitions were exposed and a nuclear crisis ensued. But with the timing, geography, and international consensus no longer in Iran’s favor, it was too late to turn back.

Of course, the concurrent North Korean nuclear crisis in East Asia and the resulting persistent tensions may have further paralyzed Iran into strategic hesitation. It continued to adopt a vague nuclear policy—reluctant or afraid to take the critical step toward actual nuclear capability, while simultaneously obstructing IAEA inspections. This indecisive stance has subjected Iran to round after round of collective international sanctions and unilateral U.S. sanctions, while also revealing to nuclear-armed Israel Iran’s strategic timidity—prompting Israel to reinforce its “zero tolerance” stance toward an Iranian nuclear capability. The Arab states’ collective anxiety over a potential Iranian bomb has also intensified, making Iran’s nuclear trajectory one of the region’s top concerns.

In 2015, the Obama administration tacitly accepted Iran’s sphere of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon in exchange for Iran’s agreement to sign the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal. This legally weak document merely delayed Iran’s nuclear development or made it more difficult. However, Iran still failed to recognize the strategic importance of nuclear capability for its national security. Moreover, unwilling to resolve its structural contradictions with Israel or even the United States, Iran ultimately sowed the seeds of its own tragic fate—exposing itself to military strikes from both Israel and the U.S.

After the outbreak of the Sixth Middle East War, the long-standing asymmetric conflict or proxy war between Iran and Israel gradually escalated into direct confrontation. In the two clashes with Israel in April and October last year, Iran, unwilling to escalate tensions, responded with “symbolic counterattacks,” fully exposing its nature as a “paper tiger.” This, in turn, stimulated Israel’s adventurous tendencies and ultimately led to the outbreak of the “Twelve-Day War.” Once Israel extended its air superiority over the Eastern Mediterranean to reach Iranian territory, the Trump administration—initially uninterested in being drawn into another Middle East war—took advantage of the chaos and joined the military campaign against Iran. Iran’s “negotiated retaliation” against U.S. military targets once again demonstrated its typical style of bluffing but faltering at the critical moment.

If Mearsheimer’s warnings and sarcasm are considered mere theoretical musings, the sudden outbreak and rapid de-escalation of the India-Pakistan conflict right before the “Twelve-Day War” clearly showed the world the fundamental security value of nuclear weapons for national survival—and their effectiveness in preventing the escalation and expansion of conflicts. Had Iran possessed nuclear capabilities equivalent to Israel’s in deterrence and destruction, Israel would likely have reconsidered the heavy price of a large-scale attack on Iran, and the U.S. might not have dared to exploit the situation.

Iran has missed multiple real opportunities to become a nuclear-armed state. Its semi-transparent nuclear policy created a gray zone that allowed Israel, the U.S., and even Iran itself to extract strategic benefits from brinkmanship, ultimately turning the nuclear crisis into a bizarre chess game in which all three players have their own agendas, justifications, and gains.

Israel is clearly determined to prevent any neighboring country—especially Iran, which refuses to recognize Israel, seeks regional hegemony, and constantly uses the Palestinian issue to exert pressure—from acquiring nuclear weapons. If Iran were to become nuclear-armed, it would inevitably break Israel’s absolute monopoly on nuclear power in the Middle East, resulting in a state of mutual nuclear deterrence—Israel’s worst nightmare. Worse, if Iran’s nuclearization prompted frightened Arab states to follow suit, Israel would find itself surrounded by nuclear-armed neighbors, creating an even greater and longer-lasting nightmare.

This is a binary, existential decision: 0 or 1, life or death. Therefore, Israel is willing to go to war to permanently block Iran at the gate of the nuclear club, relying on U.S. backing and firefighting. Israel has effectively hijacked American national security and Middle East diplomacy, and cleverly leveraged Iran’s ethnic, sectarian, and status-based conflicts with Arab countries. By continuously amplifying the narrative of an Iranian nuclear threat, Israel gradually built a unified front to prevent Iran from going nuclear. This ultimately led to the signing of the Abraham Accords, further isolating Iran in the regional power game, leaving it aligned only with a few non-state actors.

The United States, meanwhile, driven by its interest in preserving Israel’s strategic security, controlling the Persian Gulf oil lifeline, establishing air and naval bases in Arab states, and treating oil-rich Arab countries as a kind of “ATM,” has intermittently released conflicting messages—sometimes warning that Iran is “about to become nuclear,” sometimes suggesting it is “still not there.” By tightening and loosening U.S.-Iran relations at will, Washington has kept Iran sleepwalking in a state of nuclear ambiguity. Iran, in turn, has grown complacent over temporary U.S. concessions, investing the resulting petrodollars into regional expansion and proxy wars—only to ultimately become deeply entangled in a nuclear crisis web of its own making, from which it can no longer free itself.

Iran is clearly the “victim” of long-term pressure from Israel and the United States. However, in over 40 years of foreign policy struggle, Iran also seems to have benefited from its nuclear ambiguity policy: by publicly emphasizing its sovereign right to peacefully use nuclear energy, projecting a strong image of defending national and ethnic dignity, evoking the tragic consciousness and martyrdom complex of the Persian nation and the Shiite “dual minority” identity, cleverly binding the regime’s legitimacy with the rationality of state behavior, and linking public resentment against foreign oppression and interference with an aggressive foreign policy. Through its long-standing nuclear ambiguity and brinkmanship strategy, Iran has not only used external pressure and hostility to maintain the political base and legitimacy of the Islamic regime, but also skillfully avoided repeated waves of public pressure for domestic reform, external openness, livelihood improvements, and a better international image—using it even as a pressure-release valve to divert and mitigate the internal political and social contradictions that continue to intensify.

By this point, the Iranian nuclear crisis has become a tool that all three parties—Iran, Israel, and the United States—need. It has turned into a geopolitical bargaining chip that anyone can exploit for advantage or avoid for protection, and a deadlocked game that no one seems able to escape from in the short term.

For Israel and the United States, the Iranian nuclear crisis and the current Iranian regime are two sides of the same coin—offering a paradox that provokes both old and new questions: Is changing Iran’s current regime truly something Israel and the U.S. want to see happen? Wouldn’t a relatively isolated Iran, one that maintains its current ideological mindset, political system, and worldview, be more beneficial to Israel’s regional maneuvering in the Middle East, to America’s dominance and interference, and to the joint use of a seemingly powerful Iranian “scarecrow” to intimidate the many “little sparrows” of the Arab world?

Now let’s imagine the opposite scenario: if Iran gave up exporting the Islamic Revolution, abandoned the Palestine card and made peace with Israel, dissolved the “Shiite Crescent” and the “Axis of Resistance,” normalized relations with the U.S., and respected the political systems and foreign policies of neighboring Arab monarchies—would Israel still have any justification to continue occupying the territories of Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria? Could it still maintain its aggressively expansionist “Greater Israel” policy? Could it continue to violate neighboring airspaces with impunity? And would the U.S. still be able to persuade Arab countries to host numerous military bases, lavishly buy American weapons, and huddle beneath the protective wings of American power?

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Barış Karaağaç, Faculty Member at Trent University

Peace, you say?

On June 27, 2025, a peace agreement was signed in Washington between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. Mediated by the United States and Qatar, this signing ceremony was presented, at first glance, as a promising development for the region. But a closer look reveals a much more complex picture.

The symbolic photo circulated from the agreement is thought-provoking: U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stands between the foreign ministers of Rwanda and Congo as they shake hands. Behind them looms a giant portrait of Colin Powell. Signing a peace treaty under the shadow of Powell, one of the architects of the 2003 invasion and plunder of Iraq, is surely the height of historical irony.

In this article, let’s look behind the curtain of this peace agreement: Is peace truly on its way, or are other agendas at play? Let’s try to understand together what both the Congolese people and the great powers stand to gain or lose from this deal.

Background: Minerals, refugees, and the shadow of M23

This agreement came at a time when the rebel group known as M23 had captured strategic cities in eastern Congo, displaced hundreds of thousands of people, and seized control of rich mineral deposits. There are serious allegations that Rwanda is behind M23. The Kigali government, however, denies these accusations and, in turn, demands the neutralization of the FDLR, a Hutu militia group in Congo.

But the roots of these conflicts lie much deeper. Approximately 800,000 people were killed in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The privileges granted to the Tutsis by Belgium during the colonial era had, over the years, unleashed the pent-up rage of the Hutu majority. In the aftermath of the genocide, thousands of Hutus, along with armed groups, fled to the neighboring country of Zaire (today’s Democratic Republic of Congo). This further inflamed ethnic tensions in the region.

For years, eastern Congo has been ravaged by wars fought not only over people but also over precious minerals like gold, cobalt, and coltan.

Official rhetoric: Praise for peace, questions between the lines

Official statements are dominated by an atmosphere of peace. Rwanda’s state newspaper, The New Times, described the agreement as a “historic opportunity,” while the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, Mahamoud Ali Youssouf, hailed the development as a “milestone for regional peace.”

The DRC’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, stated, “Our real work begins now,” emphasizing that peace is possible not just with a signature, but with justice, the return of refugees, and the true silencing of guns.

However, Congo’s independent newspapers are approaching this process more cautiously. Kinshasa-based publications like Le Potentiel, L’Avenir, and Le Soft International are known for their independent stance from the official government line and for listening to the voices of social opposition. These outlets point out that the agreement’s implementation depends on domestic political will, foreign interference, and the actual conditions on the ground. Their writings expose the chasm between the peace on paper and the reality on the ground.

Through a critical lens: Mining disguised as peace

Now, let’s get to the heart of the matter: Congo is the world’s largest producer of cobalt. Nearly every mineral of strategic importance—coltan, gold, copper, lithium—can be found in this country. Numerous sectors, from electric vehicles to the defense industry, are dependent on these minerals.

U.S. President Donald Trump spoke quite openly after the signing: “We are getting a lot of mineral rights from Congo. This is a huge win for us.”

Around the same time, a Newsweek report explicitly stated that the U.S. agreement with the region was aimed at breaking China’s influence over rare earth metals. China should not be forgotten in this picture. Over the last decade, China has made massive investments in Africa. With its “infrastructure for resources” model, it has built roads, railways, and dams. Now, the U.S. wants to counterbalance China’s influence in the region and create space for its own companies. In short, on one side are the minerals, and on the other is the arm-wrestling of superpowers.

In this context, “peace” also comes to mean a new investment opportunity. Many thinkers on the international left interpret such processes as a “capitalist maneuver packaged as peace.” Development, stability, foreign aid… behind these flowery concepts operates a model where multinational corporations lay claim to the mines.

Congo, for its part, offered the U.S. “resources in exchange for security.” This hardly seems like a “partnership of equals.”

Moreover, the person leading the diplomatic process is Massad Boulos, an advisor to President Trump and also his daughter’s father-in-law. This makes the peace process look like both a family affair and a foreign trade deal. U.S. diplomacy, this time, seems to be operating like a family business.

Conclusion: A peace ‘Made in Congo’?

For over a century, the Democratic Republic of Congo has been at the center of colonialism, wars, and international power plays. Now there is a peace agreement, but whether it will benefit the people or the corporations remains debatable.

True peace comes—and should come—not just with the silencing of guns, but with the fair distribution of resources, accountable governance, and the right of peoples to self-determination. Otherwise, a new system of exploitation will simply be given the name “peace.”

Who knows, maybe one day electric bicycles with a “Made in Congo” label will appear on the world market. But as it stands today, this peace seems to bear the stamp “Made for US Corporations.”

The first round of the Iran-Israel conflict/war has likely concluded. This round, which consisted of mutual air strikes and missile salvos, will go down in the recent history of the Middle East as the Twelve-Day War. In the past, there was the Six-Day War; on June 5, 1967, Israel attacked Egypt first, followed by Syria and Jordan in the succeeding days, inflicting a crushing defeat on three Arab states in six days and quadrupling its territory.

Israel had previously fought these three states in 1948, immediately after its declaration of independence. In that war, it dealt a serious defeat to Egypt and Syria but was defeated by Jordan. Jordanian forces, largely trained and commanded by British officers, had ‘occupied’ the areas of what are today the West Bank and East Jerusalem. When Israel attacked its Arab neighbors in June 1967, it once again inflicted a devastating defeat on the two states it had beaten in the 1948 war, occupying Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Syria’s Golan region. It also defeated Jordan, annexing East Jerusalem and the West Bank, thereby roughly quadrupling its own territory. And because it managed to do all this in six days, these conflicts went down in history as the Six-Day War.

This defeat was not only devastating and humiliating for the warring Arab states and the Arab world in general, but it also brought about the end of the legendary Egyptian leader Nasser. Following his death from a sudden heart attack three years later (1970), it marked the end of the Pan-Arabism ideology not just in Egypt but across the entire Arab world. When the Arab states of Egypt and Syria responded to this defeat in 1973 with what was perhaps their first synchronized and well-planned attack (the Yom Kippur War, October 7, 1973), they managed to reclaim all the territory Israel had occupied in the Six-Day War on the very first day. However, thanks to the most extensive arms and ammunition airlift in history, conducted by the United States with large military transport planes flying directly to the front lines, Israel managed to turn the tide of the war and bring it to a close at its starting point. A similar airlift by the Soviet Union to the Arab countries saved Egypt’s encircled Third Army in the Sinai Peninsula from annihilation, but it was not enough for them to regain the military successes of the initial days.

Israel has not fought a war with any state since 1973

The Yom Kippur War would also be a turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The policy initiated by Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat just before the war—of rapidly distancing from the Soviet Union and moving closer to the US—paid off for Cairo. Through the US-mediated peace process (Camp David), Egypt largely recovered the territories it had lost in the 1967 war, briefly regained in the early days of the 1973 war, and then lost again as the war turned in Israel’s favor. However, when this process, which began with recognizing Israel’s right to exist in the Middle East, progressed to the appointment of ambassadors between the two countries and the signing of the Camp David Accords, Egypt would be expelled from the Arab League at the initiative of Arab nations led by Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

The subsequent years were not at all positive for the Arab states and Palestinians who favored continuing the struggle against Israel to the end. The unipolar world order that emerged under American leadership after the collapse of the Soviet Union opened every window of opportunity for Israel. Eventually, the Iraqi and Libyan regimes that opposed reconciliation with Israel were overthrown, and their leaders (Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi) were killed. Syria, destabilized by our [Türkiye’s] own misguided policies, was added to this chain of events (2011-2024). Meanwhile, the Oslo Peace Process, initiated in the early 1990s, was sabotaged by extremist parties and the political elite in Israel.

During this period, while Israel tormented Palestinians and the groups in Southern Lebanon that would become Hezbollah for years, the instability and popular discontent in Iraq helped Iran gain tremendous strategic depth in that country and in Syria. Thus began the emergence of the forces known as the Axis of Resistance. The Hamas, Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi [Popular Mobilization Forces], and Yemen’s Ansar Allah movements either began or developed during this period. The Syrian state seemed to act as a bridge connecting the Axis of Resistance, from Iran to Hezbollah and even to Hamas.

It would be appropriate to view Israel’s June 13 attack on Iran as a continuation of the series of wars it launched in response to Hamas’s attacks on October 7, 2023, waged first against Hamas in Gaza, which a majority of global expert opinion has deemed a ‘genocide’. Perhaps the most significant development that paved the way for Israel, which had been unable to achieve sufficient success against Hezbollah, was the completely unexpected fall of the Syrian regime in December 2024 and former President Bashar al-Assad’s flight to Moscow.

Israel engaged in war with a state actor for the first time since 1973

Israel’s air operation against Iran, launched on June 13, is its first conflict with a state actor since the three-week war against Egypt and Syria in 1973. Moreover, this cannot be considered a full-scale war, as the land and naval forces of these two states, separated by approximately two thousand kilometers of land borders, did not participate in the clashes, and their special forces did not conduct operations against each other.

Israel’s air strikes on Iran were launched simultaneously with assassination operations by opposition/espionage elements it had cultivated within Iran, killing high-level civilian/military officials in Tehran. In this respect, Israel’s attack must have achieved the effect of a complete surprise raid. However, it is also clear that this should not be exaggerated. Indeed, the Iranian administration made new appointments within hours and began its first missile attacks on Israel that same evening. No Western air defense system could fully stop Iran’s missile attacks, which were carried out with increasing intensity; the legendary air defense system known as the Iron Dome was largely ineffective. In contrast, the Israeli air force’s strikes had only a limited impact. The limited involvement of the US in the war did not significantly damage Iran’s missile launch capabilities, and ultimately, the parties—likely Israel—requested or agreed to a ceasefire.

The results of the Twelve-Day War

In these clashes, Iran’s subjection of Israeli territory to intense missile fire is an extraordinary achievement; since its establishment in 1948, Israeli residential areas had never been comprehensively bombed by any state. In the 1948-49 war that began immediately after its declaration of independence, Israel fought against three Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan). In contrast, in the Six-Day War, it launched a surprise attack on these three states, inflicting a disastrous defeat on all of them. In the 1973 War, it was the one surprised, but in none of these conflicts were its territories and residential areas subjected to any significant air raids by the air forces of the countries it fought.

However, in the last two of these wars—air forces were not widely used in the first—Israel had subjected the major centers of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, including their capitals, to intense aerial bombardment. While Israel’s superiority in air power was clear in the conflict with Iran, Iran’s undisputed superiority in missiles turned every inch of Israeli territory into a target. The effect this will have on the Israeli public in the short and medium term must be taken seriously. For Israeli citizens, a large majority of whom hold dual passports, the government’s refusal to allow them to leave the country for security reasons during the conflict strengthens this thesis.

The first question after the conflict concerns whether this ceasefire will be permanent. Although Israel has largely adhered to ceasefire processes signed after wars with states, it has not behaved the same way toward actors like Hamas and similar groups—with Hezbollah being a partial exception. How it will act towards a state actor like Iran remains a significant question. On the other hand, even if the ceasefire holds, it would be overly optimistic to think that Israel and the United States have abandoned the idea of regime change.

It is not easy to predict at this moment how Iran’s gaining of considerable sympathy in world public opinion and Israel’s image as a country continuing its aggression after the Gaza genocide will concretely reflect on the field of struggle. In this period, where the limits of what Trump can do for Israel have become clear, it does not appear to be a strong possibility that Israel will change its foreign and security policies by accepting multipolarity as a given.

In this case, one can assume with certainty that Iran will try to fill its gaps by acquiring air defense systems from Russia and advanced fighter jets from China, while Israel, as always, will prepare for the next round with all the systems developed by the American arms industry. It is also among the possibilities that Iran could establish a strong deterrence, dissuading Israel and America from this course. There is no doubt that there are many lessons for Türkiye to draw from this war. Foremost among them would be for Ankara to understand how wrong its Syria policies were, which completely paved the way for Israel, and to act accordingly. The lessons for Türkiye are not the subject of this article and will be addressed in other analyses, so we will leave it at that for now…

Prof. Dr. Hasan Ünal

Başkent University

Department of Political Science and International Relations