Interview
“If Europe remains an appendage of the US, it will become an insignificant part of the world”
With the Ukraine war, anti-Russian sanctions, the economic downturn and US-China tensions, Europe seems to be once again engulfed in a major crisis. The level of integration that the Old Continent has reached once again calls for a pan-European rather than a “national” way out.
German researcher, writer and publisher Hauke Ritz has been analyzing Germany, Russia and West-Russia relations for more than 15 years. Ritz says that this work dates back to 2007, when he began to realize that in the future there would be a strong geopolitical confrontation, if not war, between the US and Russia. “And once you understand that,” he says, ”it’s hard to find a more important topic.”
This issue, the German author says, has “to some extent taken over” his life. In order to grasp the “deeper causes” of this tension, he says, he began learning the Russian language and visiting Russia.
One of Ritz’s most striking theses is that the concept of “the West” and “Europe” do not coincide. For him, “the West” refers to the post-World War II order and is clearly the name of US hegemony over Europe. “Europe”, on the other hand, is a continent that dates back thousands of years, a continent of both peace and war, a continent of Enlightenment, revolutions and Reformation, but never ruled by the hegemony of a single power, an oasis of multipolarity, culturally united but politically separate, a place of balance of power…
Hence, when Europe finds itself again, free from the “Western” hegemony of the last 75 years, it will not only become one of the poles in a “multipolar world”, but will also enter a “multipolar” era within itself. How will this happen and through whom? Whether Rtiz has an answer to this is up to the reader.

Hauke Ritz’s new book: Vom Niedergang des Westens zur Neuerfindung Europas [From the Decline of the West to the Reinvention of Europe] To order: https://mediashop.at/buecher/vom-niedergang-des-westens-zur-neuerfindung-europas/
First of all, I didn’t refer to Oswald Spengler in the book because I think the decline we see today is a very different kind of decline. At that time, the West as we know it today didn’t really exist. We will come back to this fact later. I just want to point out that today we are seeing the collapse of the West at a tremendous pace in many areas, and we get the impression that it is really accelerating year by year, month by month, and it is becoming very visible.
Compare the current situation with 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down. At that time, most of Eastern Europe and even the Soviet republics were influenced by the West, its products, its music, its way of life, its model of civilization. The same was true for many countries in the south, in the Global South and in the east. At that time, the West was the only manifestation of modernity in the world.
After the Soviet Union collapsed and the system of socialist states dissolved, the West had a kind of monopoly on modernity, on the interpretation of the modern world. And everyone wanted to be connected to this world, whether it was through movies, through products, or by emigrating to a Western country. The West also had the image of democracy, of a just, rich and prosperous society, of innovation.
Now look at what the West stands for today. For sanctions, for war, for strange ideologies like the LGBT movement… which is causing heads to shake not only in the Global South and the East, but also in the West itself. So the Western world has lost not only its moral superiority, but also its soft power, its charm.
And not only that. We no longer see the interpretation of modernity in modern China, we started to see modern India, and Russia has also come back as a great civilization. So the West is in a very different situation now, and the loss of the appeal of its status as a model of civilization is something that I think is too serious to be repaired in a short period of time.
That’s what I always use: Western world. Of course, the opposite term that should be used in this context is Europe. And Europe is something quite different from the West.
We will come to that in a moment. I think you see Europeans and westerners as separate identities and civilizations. Do you think that the US is what we should understand by the West at the moment? And what is the difference between the US vision of the world and the European world?
There are so many differences. I really think that western civilization and European civilization are quite different concepts in many ways.
First of all, the West is something quite new. How long has the West really been around? The West as we know it today first appeared after the Second World War, and at that time it was basically the American sphere of influence that was created by military expansion during the Second World War, and where the soldiers stopped, the West stopped.
North Korea was not part of the West, but South Korea was. The same is true for Germany. East Germany was not part of the West, but West Germany was. So the accidental movements during the war created a sphere of influence and it was called the West.
Of course, you can make an argument, “No, the West is older.” There were revolutions in Western European states. The French Revolution, the English Revolution, the Dutch and others. Yes, but these were also countries that not only made revolutions, but also established colonies in overseas empires. Maybe this is also connected. If you have a big trade over the seas, you have a lot of merchants who start competing with the aristocracy and then you are more likely to have revolutions.
But these early stages of the West were not united. There was a lot of competition between them. But in the late 19th and early 20th century, we see that this rivalry started to turn into a kind of alliance. For example, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France, then the alliance between Great Britain and the United States. This could be a kind of embryo of the West as we know it today.
But the West in general is not more than 100 years old. So it’s a very young entity and it includes North America on the one side and the Europe of the European Union today, which includes the Slavic states like Poland on the other side. And then you have South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. So culturally speaking, these are very different countries, very different parts of the world, influenced by different religions, and all united by one factor: American domination, American hegemony.
So in the end, you come to the conclusion that the West is basically this American hegemony. There is a lack of a cultural base, there is a lack of history.
Europe, on the contrary, is something quite different. Europe is 2500 years old. Europe started with the model of democracy in ancient Greece and democracy came back to Europe in modern times with the French revolution and other revolutions.
But there is a long period in between when Europe had quite different models of government and a different way of organizing its society.
So Europe is an entity that has a vast history of quite different periods and epochs, but there is still something that can define the whole of this time, which is more than 2000 years. So the concept of Europe is much more complex and much deeper than the concept of the West.
Do you think Europeans have some antidote to the West?
Europe, of course, belongs to Western Europe and Western Europe is that part of Europe that started to have colonies expanding overseas and then it became the west. So maybe some Western elements also belong to Europe.
But Europe is more the center of Europe. Germany, Italy are not usually seen as part of the West. They didn’t have big empires overseas for centuries. They were organized in a decentralized way. Then you have the Slavic peoples in the east. So Europe is all of that.
And the term Western suggests that there is a single model for this whole area and the whole history of Europe. Europe is also defined by its achievements in art, literature, music and philosophy. It is also defined by Christianity and Christian history. It is also defined by references to antiquity. That is, by the memory of the ancient Greek culture in ancient Rome, which was common to all European states and created a kind of unified field of knowledge and reference for all European states, for example through Latin and the ancient Greek language. So there is much more to Europe than the West.
There is also a big difference in terms of the concept of world order. The US is protected by two oceans. Nobody can harm them. If they wage a war on another shore, they can be sure that there will be no repercussions for them, that nothing will come back to them.
This was not the case in Europe. Europe has had enormous wars for as long as it has existed. One of the most brutal periods in European history was the Thirty Years’ War in Germany in the 17th century. But there were also civil wars in other European states.
What Europe learned from this war was that you cannot wage war and foreign policy on values. If you start making the issue of Catholicism and Protestantism part of your foreign policy, part of your national expansion, then you will have never-ending wars.
You are pointing to the Westphalian system.
Yes, it is. So after this war, the Westphalian system was created, where these young nation states learned to respect their differences, that each state has the right to manage its own internal affairs and that there should be no outside influence.
Every state, despite its population size and power, was equally a subject of international law, and this was a great civilizational achievement, which of course was lost again and again in the centuries that followed. But this was a very different concept of world order. A world order that accepted multipolarity, that did not interfere with each other, that started to think about each other’s otherness, that accepted the simultaneous existence of various powers.
The US has a completely different conception of world order. First of all, they think that they are somehow chosen by God, that they have a manifest destiny given to them by God. The concept of a sacred mission means that they think they can only get stronger, stronger and stronger. Therefore, the task of ruling the world belongs to them. And they are an indispensable nation. American exceptionalism. That’s why the whole history of American foreign policy is defined by the fact that they cannot be partners. They cannot partner with anyone else because they always think they are superior to others. They always think they have a better system than others.
And that’s why the Americans have so far found it difficult to make a treaty with, for example, Russia or China that they can really stick to because they always think that other nations, other states don’t have the kind of democracy that we have, that the people there are oppressed.
So the contract that we have now is only for a while, because the state that we have this contract with is not as developed as we are. It is not elected in the same way as we are.
This is basically a tragedy because the United States has not been able to create partnerships because of this notion of sacred mission, exceptionalism, indispensable nation. Instead of creating partnerships with Europe, with Germany, with France, with Italy, it has slowly but surely transformed Europe into a kind of colonial status. This is also a tragedy for America itself, because if Europe was a partner for the United States, it could have influenced it in a positive way. For example, we could have avoided many of the mistakes that American foreign policy has made in the Middle East or with Russia.
But because America does not see Europe as a partner, it has learned nothing from us. They always acted as if they already knew everything. This has led to a foreign policy that has antagonized much of the world.
The US now has a contradictory relationship not only with Russia, which is at war, but also with China, with Iran, increasingly with Turkey, with the Arab world, with Africa and Latin America, where they have waged enormous wars and destruction. So there is no area of civilization left in the world where the US has a normal relationship, not even with India.
And this is very destructive for the US because the US has basically created a kind of counter-alliance by antagonizing all the other major nations or civilizations in the world.
BRICS was created by the US, the US created BRICS, even though they were not intended to do that, but BRICS is basically the child of US foreign policy.
So you talked about two very, very different mindsets. On one side you have the manifest destiny, American exceptionalism, and on the other side you have the Westphalian system of Europe. After the Second World War, the unity of Europe was against the Soviet Union and communism, but at the same time it was doing it in conjunction with the hegemony of the United States on the continent. How did they achieve this hegemony over the continent? Or in other words, why did the Europeans allow the Americans to lead them against the Soviet Union?
Europe, as I mentioned earlier, had been organized for centuries as a kind of balance of power. After the Second World War it was difficult to go back to this system. I think the Soviet Union would have wanted to go back to that system because the Soviet Union was already a very large country and it was a burden to control more states outside of itself, especially if you think of the huge destruction that the Second World War caused in the most populated areas of the Soviet Union.
So the Soviet Union had no interest in controlling a large part of Europe and it certainly had no interest in controlling all of Europe. This may explain why, for example, in 1952, the Soviet Union made the offer that it would withdraw its forces from Germany for neutrality, that Germany could be reunified if it became neutral like Austria. But this offer was rejected by the West German government and by the United States, which wanted to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down.
Now the Americans were there and they started. For them Europe was a kind of gegenko, as we say in German, the opposite shore. So for the US, as a naval power, it was very important for them to control the opposite shore of the ocean and that was Europe and they wanted to stay there.
In their mentality, they saw their presence in Europe as a kind of trophy or a victory because they had the impression that they had a better system. And the US was populated by people who fled Europe because of political oppression or religious oppression. That is why to this day many Americans have a negative impression of Europe. For them Europe is a place that is not as free and democratic as they are. Returning to Europe after the Second World War meant for them that now they had to fix Europe.
They didn’t really do that. Of course there are some Americans who admire European art, literature and philosophy, but on the whole they look down on Europe more than they respect it. For them it was not a problem to reshape, to reorganize European culture. They also wanted to unify it, to create a kind of alliance against the Soviet Union. Because the United States saw itself as an exceptional nation with a sacred mission, they could not accept that there was another nation like the Soviet Union that had a project of socialism and an idea for humanity. So they wanted to dominate, I think.
For the Soviet Union, of course, the American presence on the European continent was a danger because Russia had experienced for several centuries that it could live in peace with Europe as long as there was a balance of power. But every once in a while Europe unites, for example under Napoleon, and then attacks Russia. Or Europe united under Hitler and the conquest of Nazi Germany and then attacked Russia. Now the American presence on the European continent means that Europe is once again united under American rule. For Moscow, this meant the danger of being attacked once again. That’s why they were in Eastern Europe.
Even so, they didn’t really want that.
Which brings us to Russia, to the question of Russia’s relationship with the West. Do you think it is possible to have, for example, a European security architecture that includes Russia again? Or will the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace” prevail? Or will post-EU Europe be a continent of wars? Because even if Europe, even if the European Union disintegrates, it is possible that the axis of Germany and France or only the axis of Germany will prevail. A post-EU Europe because Germany is still the biggest economy in Europe. It has a lot of opportunities to steer other countries.
No, no. It is not possible for the reason I just mentioned. I just said that Europe has always been organized as a balance of power, which means that if there is only one power ruling Europe, it means that Europe is destabilized. This is not good for Europe.
Germany may be the most powerful country in Europe, but it is not strong enough to rule Europe on its own. That’s the beauty of Europe, there are so many states in Europe and some of them are equally powerful: France and Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain, they are all similar, they are the biggest and they balance each other. I think that Europe can only be governed in such a balance, and the countries between which this balance is realized may differ from century to century.
In the era of the European Union, there was the German-French axis, which was a way of rebuilding or replicating this balance. Also, Germany is not very popular in the rest of Europe because of the legacy of the Second World War. Germany has friends. In China, in Japan, in Russia, Germany is highly respected. If you are far away from Germany, Germany is respected. But if you are close to Germany, in Poland, in France, in Great Britain, Germany is not so respected. For all these reasons Germany cannot unite Europe, it cannot and must not lead Europe. Europe has to organize itself in this similar balance of powerful forces.
Then you mentioned the issue of Russia. As soon as the European states or Europe as a whole understands its interest, it will very quickly start organizing a peace with Russia, if peace is possible. Because it is in Europe’s interest.
If you look at European history, you will see that Europe has been strong in times of peace and weak in times of war. In the United States it is the opposite. The US is strong in times of war and weak in times of peace. That’s why Europe needs peace.
Moreover, Russia is part of Europe. So when we talk about Europe, we are automatically talking about Russia and if we exclude Russia from Europe, it is like excluding a large region from China or an important province from India.
So in addition to the integrity of the continent, which can be shown geographically on a map, to exclude Russia from Europe culturally would be to exclude, for example, a great achievement of classical music from Europe. Tchaikovsky, Rahmaninov or the legacy of literature, philosophy or socialism is also part of Europe. The whole history of Eastern Europe during the Cold War is linked to Russia.
So Europe can only be healthy and have a future if it includes all of Europe. A Europe that excludes Russia will be badly divided and will probably have no sovereignty over its own cultural development.
Then we are once again in this distinction between the concept of the West and the concept of Europe. For the first time in history Europe is ruled by an outside power, a power that is located in a completely different geography, on a completely different continent, and it is called the West. You have pushed Russia and Russian culture out of Europe in order to maintain this artificial entity called the West. You have removed the memory that Russian culture and Russian influence is a natural part of Europe, like Italian culture and Italian influence or Spanish culture and Spanish influence. If you have the concept of the West, you will always have borders in the East.
But if we look at the concept of Europe, there is no need for a border in the east. Because Europe has been organized for centuries in a kind of balance of power, it can extend this concept even beyond the borders of Europe. And to some extent, the idea that Europe is organized in a balance of similar powerful states is a concept that very well represents the idea of BRICS, the concept of bricks of a multipolar world made up of similar powerful states like China, India, Russia, which are completely different from each other, but which accept certain ideas about the organization of the world order.
So we can say that we need to cut Russia off from Europe in order to have a US hegemony on the continent, in Europe.
Yes, this is in the interest of the United States. They want to sanctify this European interpretation of the West. So what we call the West today is basically the American interpretation of European culture.
The Americans themselves came from Europe, so they carry the heritage of European culture with them. But for a long time they lived on a different continent, in a different climate, in a different geographical situation. They are also a melting pot of nations. They have a completely different life experience and a completely different space than you have in Europe. Under these conditions, this European culture changed, which became the United States. Now American culture still has European roots, but it has become something different.
This half European, half non-European culture of the United States came back to Europe after the Second World War and started transforming Europe, reshaping Europe in the image of the United States and the EU. The European Union was an attempt to create a kind of copy of the United States in Europe.
And this is also the mistake of the European Union. The mistake of the European Union is that the European Union is not European. It has no connection with the history of European ideas. It does not refer to the 19th century. It does not refer to the 18th century, to the 17th century. It does not even refer to ancient times.
More than 20 years ago, when the European constitution was being planned, some people wanted to write a quote from the famous ancient Greek politician Pericles. Later this quote was removed because it was not politically correct. Pericles might have said something wrong about some minorities. They could not accept Pericles any more and so the quote was removed. This shows you the relationship of the European Union to European history.
Or look at the banknotes of Europe. Maybe I have one in my pocket. This is very meaningful. Here it is. This is a five euro note. Here you see a kind of building. This building is not real. It’s artificial. Fantasy. This bridge isn’t real either. It’s just an artificial bridge imagined by a painter.
So Europe has a very negative relationship with its own history and culture. So much so that we cannot even represent our own architecture on our banknotes.
So you think that in order to become more European, you need to get rid of the European Union as an institution?
This is of course dangerous. We have to look at the reality we have now. Right now we have the euro. There is a huge interconnection between different economies. We have a lot of interdependence within the European Union. The dissolution of the European Union would be catastrophic. Just like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which created a lot of poverty and civil war. So nobody wants that.
So I think this is a very complex question and I don’t have a final answer to this question. Of course the EU needs at least some kind of restructuring. It needs to be fundamentally reformed. I don’t know whether it is possible or not. Maybe history will show how it will happen, what will happen. Maybe some states will start to leave the EU. Because history shows very clearly that a state that has no real identity of its own, that is built only on the basis of dependencies and laws, is a very weak entity and can disintegrate. And this could also happen to the EU.
Of course, if the European Union really disintegrates, it could be a very ugly process because the economic consequences would be enormous.
But one way or the other, do you think we are heading towards a post-EU era?
You see, there is the emergence of BRICS in the world right now. I just mentioned that BRICS is basically built by the shortcomings of American foreign policy, by its arrogance and selfish behavior.
What is interesting about the BRICS concept is that it includes very different civilizations and some of these civilizations are also states. For example, China is a state but it is also a civilization. India is a state but it is also a civilization. The same can be said about Iran.
In the case of Russia it is more complicated because Russia is also part of the European civilization. Some Russians deny it and say no, we are Eurasian in a similar way to Europe. But if you are in Russia, you see and feel European culture in every corner. So it is really difficult to separate Russia from Europe.
But the concept of civilization state is a very interesting concept or a very interesting term. The question is: Can Europe be a civilization state? The answer is both yes and no.
Yes, it can be, because for the whole history of Europe, after the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe was somehow united. Europe was politically divided but culturally united through the church and the Christian faith and also through the monasteries that were established in many different parts of Europe, all trying to remember the old history, the old literature and writings.
And this went on for 1500 years, Europe was united either through Christianity, through religion, through the church, or later on through the philosophy of humanism, the Enlightenment and the exchange of literature.
For example, different European writers wrote in different languages, but they were always reading each other. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it sometimes took only months for the first translation. All important authors caused a reaction in other countries where they were introduced in translation. German philosophy influenced not only Germany but the whole of Europe. The same is true for the French Revolution.
So Europe is a kind of, in Germany we call it a resonance chamber, a resonance chamber where cultural styles, architectural and painting styles ripple across the continent.
At the same time, we have political fragmentation. This is unique in the world because all other parts of the world are organized differently. If you look at China, for example, China was politically united even though it had many different languages and peoples. The same is true for India. I think the same is true for the Arab world and Russia. So in most parts of the world, at some point you have some kind of political unity.
In Europe, it never happened. It never really happened. There were attempts, for example Napoleon tried, Hitler tried with his strange and brutal ideas, but it always failed.
In the end, we have again political fragmentation with a kind of cultural unity. I think this is a model for the future. If Europe can represent this model, it will also be a mirror of the multipolar world, because in the multipolar world there are different centers of power that are in some kind of balance with each other.
Europe can become a pole of the multipolar world and at the same time represent multipolarity in itself.
This brings us to the second and last part of the title of your book, which is the reinvention of Europe. How can Europe reinvent itself and what elements in Europe have that energy?
First of all, we need to understand the difference between Europe and the West. We need to understand that we have lost a lot in the last 80 years because Europe has tried to make itself more like the West, or because the European Union has tried to reconstruct Europe as a mirror, a kind of copy of the U.S. We need to recognize these differences and then we need to start reclaiming what we really are.
I think these processes are going on in a different way in every European country. I think once we understand once again what Europe really is, what Europe can offer to the world and what has been done to us in the last 80 years, I think we can start to build a kind of European union that will once again be built on culture, history and a complex understanding of culture, which will once again have a kind of utopia in terms of education and civilization.
In the 21st century we are facing great challenges. For example artificial intelligence, genetic engineering. Europe has something to offer in this regard. We have the heritage of humanism and Enlightenment. So we can start with a kind of intellectual discourse, if we really need to do everything we can, because in other parts of the world, especially in the United States, there is a tendency to do everything possible in the field of technology.
Europe can make a different proposal to the world. Let’s try to control technology. Let’s try to put the human being first so that technology adapts to the human being and not vice versa. Europe can also become a neutral part of the world, like a global Switzerland, where intellectual discussions can take place on artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, but also on the preservation of culture.
Europe has a special opportunity to play this role in the 21st century. This is because Europe has influenced the rest of the world for the last 500 years. Since the rise of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, world culture has gradually become Europeanized. If we are in Latin America today and there are political debates, people use terms from European political philosophy to discuss their internal differences. The same is true for other parts of the world.
There is only one world culture in the world, and it has been largely shaped by Europe for several centuries. That is why Europe is now in a very good position to offer a place for discussion, meeting and exchange of ideas on civilizational issues in the 21st century, which will perhaps also be accepted by other civilizations, although they are interested in developing their own traditions.
Maybe in the future we will see a Chinese world culture or an Indian world culture, an Islamic world culture. I don’t exclude it, I welcome it, but it will take time, because if you want to transform your regional culture into a world culture, you have to create art, you have to create, you have to create, you have to write books, you have to create a philosophy, you have to create music that can be attractive to other people in other parts of the world, and this cannot be done in one generation. It cannot be done even in two generations. It needs time.
Europe has already done it for the last 300, 400 years. This is a kind of heritage not only for Europe but for the world and it has to be preserved. That’s why Europe has to be sovereign, it has to be independent, it has to be an independent pole in a multipolar world, not some kind of appendage of the United States, not some kind of American colony that sees itself through American glasses and unfortunately has a kind of colonial consciousness as it is today.
So we have to overcome the colonial consciousness that we have today and start to see what we really are, what we are with our good sides, what we are with our bad sides.
Of course a lot of bad things have happened in Europe. You mentioned colonialism, especially from the Western European states. Yes, there is a bad legacy, but at the same time Europe has given something to the world and we have to see both, the bad and the good. It is not very healthy to see only one side.
So do you think Germany can play a special role in this process? I mean, when you talk about Germany and its special role, it’s a bit terrifying because Germany has historical burdens. But is it still possible for Germany to play a leading role in what you call multipolarity in Europe, as a pole in a multipolar world?
Yes, Germany can be a pole in a multipolar Europe. Of course, like France, like Italy, like other important states and regions, there should be such a pole.
Of course, at the moment Germany is most affected by the current crisis, by the war in Ukraine, for example, the high energy prices have led to a kind of deindustrialization in Germany. So we are starting to feel it.
Usually Germany is not a place where active revolutions take place. Our revolutions, the German Peasants’ War or the Revolution of 1918, of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, all failed.
If there was a revolution in Germany, it was a political revolution. Of course you can say that fascism was a kind of political revolution, which was quite ugly and of course not something we want to point out.
But if you look at history, there were spiritual or intellectual revolutions that came out of Germany. Martin Luther, for example, came up with the idea of Protestantism, which was a reform of the church, which was also a kind of revolution. But it was more of a mental thing, it was not an active political revolution.
The same was true of the idea of socialism, which was rooted in the history of German thought. Marx was, after all, a German philosopher. So maybe in this sense something can come out of Europe, maybe out of Germany. Maybe some Germans can offer an idea.
But I think other European countries are also important. France is important, with its legacy of revolution and activism. Italy is important, Eastern European countries are important.
I think in the end we will see something coming from various corners of Europe. From one side comes an idea, from another side comes political turmoil. And from another corner of Europe a reasonable reform can be realized. In the end they will contribute and help each other.
But right now we are at a crossroads. What if Europe remains as it is now, it will become an insignificant part of the world; it will not be able to play a role as an appendage of the United States; its wealth will decline, its population will probably decline; European societies will lose their coherence and identity and Europe will become an insignificant and poor part of the world.
Nowadays we are beginning to see the situation and we are beginning to come back to ourselves. I think there are forces in Europe that are interested in this. Not only the normal population, but also what we have in Europe, in Germany, what we call Mittelstand in Germany, which are small-scale factories with a hundred or 800 employees, but big businesses that are very specialized in a certain product.
So there is still a lot of wealth in Europe. So there are forces that can do something. I think these processes are already going on.
I can’t see what will happen in the future. I can’t describe to you how this change will happen. Maybe it will come in a surprising way. Just like the change in 1989 happened in a surprising way. Many people thought that the wall would be there for the next 20 years and suddenly, overnight, it disappeared.
So history is completely unpredictable. History is always a surprise. If we have a vision of the future, we can be sure that this vision will not manifest itself 100%. History is always different from what we think.
But I am sure that there is a lot at stake right now. 2500 years of history, 2500 years of emerging cultural complexity, emerging civilization. All this should not be for nothing. Europe is important not only for Europe but for the world.
And I think a Europe that is once again faithful to its tradition of history, literature, philosophy will be respected in the world. Still, we have the legacy of colonial atrocities. But there are always two sides. So I see a future for a cultural and intellectual consciousness for Europe. Maybe this is possible.
Interview
Daniel Davis warns US strategy fails against Iranian defense grid
Retired US Army Lieutenant Colonel and military analyst Daniel Davis discussed the US military operation against Iran, decision-making mechanisms in Washington, US-Israel relations, transformations in modern warfare doctrine, and the global balance of power in an interview with Harici Media.
Answering questions of Harici Editor-in-Chief Tunç Akkoç regarding the Iran war, retired Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis stated that the US administration lacks an achievable military strategy on the ground. Davis said: “I would say the US has a desire, not a strategy. It wants to subjugate the Iranian side, corner them, seize control of the Strait of Hormuz, prove they pose no threat to anyone in the region, and ensure they never possess nuclear weapons. That is our desire. But there is no strategy to achieve any of these goals.”
Drawing on his past military experience, Davis detailed the geographical and technical challenges on the ground: “As a soldier with direct combat experience, having gained combat experience in some of these mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, I know that many of the mountains inside Iran belong to the same mountain category. I knew what a difficult military task it would be to conquer a country as large as most of Western Europe, where such mountain ranges cover the entire western front. Therefore, I knew you could do nothing on the ground. However, I also knew that you could not subjugate a country with this kind of defense capacity and of this nature through air power alone.”
Pointing out that Iran’s defense infrastructure spans many years, Davis continued: “You cannot do this, especially when they have anticipated this for twenty years and made all kinds of preparations by constructing underground caves, production facilities, and storage facilities, and developing production capabilities for their unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles. There is no way you can defeat them. Because such facilities were designed not only to withstand all our strike missiles, such as Tomahawk, Jasmine cruise missiles, PSM, or ATAC, but also to survive. Most are capable of surviving nuclear explosions as well. I have been inside some of these here in the US. I have been in some physically located beneath a mountain. I know they were specifically designed when constructed to withstand the largest nuclear weapons the Soviet Union might possess. The ones there are of the same kind. If you know before embarking on an act of starting a war that the enemy is this large, possesses these types of defenses, and everyone knows these are resistant to our non-nuclear conventional munitions, why would you start a war to force them into something you clearly cannot achieve?”
Addressing the assumptions behind the war decision, Davis said: “I think this is a fantasy stoked by Benjamin Netanyahu. It was said, ‘If we assassinate their leaders, the same thing will happen as happened to Maduro in Venezuela. You went there, captured him, and disabled him; when you did that, you took control of the entire government, they basically handed the country over to you, and the same will happen here.’ Anyone who thinks Venezuela is like Iran has paid attention to nothing. The culture, history, religion, experiences, and everything that has transpired over the last 47 years are radically different from those in Venezuela, and you do not have an insider to facilitate the process as we had in Venezuela. But President Trump appears to have thought this way.”
“When he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate; we lost this war”
Pointing to inconsistencies in US President Donald Trump’s decisions and the trajectory of the operation, Davis stated: “This situation is proof that he is stuck. Because, in my view, when he started the war on February 28, he sealed our fate. We lost this war. Even if it is ongoing right now, there is no logical way for us to win it. Because we cannot eliminate the trump card held by the Iranian side.”
Stating that military pressure mechanisms are insufficient, Davis explained: “We still have our missiles, aircraft, aircraft carriers, and all such elements. That is why it appears feasible. It is thought, ‘Maybe if we make a good enough deal, or put enough pressure on them, or impose a blockade and leave the public in a dire enough position to change the government’s mind.’ This is a fantasy. This is the only thing President Trump has. Because if he were acting based solely on military reality, strategic reality, and cultural and religious reality, he would know this was an unwise move, but he does not know.”
Describing Trump’s negotiation approach and the breakdown of the reached agreement, Davis used the following expressions: “He is a transactional individual who wants relationships resolved overnight. For example, during the memorandum of understanding period, this duration was to be 60 days. After starting the war, no achievable military objectives remained. Whatever your desires were, you can no longer reach them because you have confronted reality. Now he is trying to find an exit route, but even within this understanding, he cannot arrive at a rational and consistent perspective. Any rational person would think that when the memorandum of understanding was signed on June 17, it provided him with an exit route. You implement the terms of this memorandum, the crisis is resolved, the dual blockade is lifted, and the Strait of Hormuz could reopen.”
Addressing the clauses of the agreement text and subsequent developments, Davis said: “The terms Trump signed stated that Iran had administrative control of the Strait of Hormuz but could not demand any transit fees for 60 days. Iran accepted this, but accepted only one condition: the ‘for 60 days only’ stipulation. Subsequently, they publicly announced that they would collect fees later, but not during these 60 days. The US was not mentioned in the text in any way. We had no say. The authority to decide how operations would run was left to Iran together with Oman. We gave them 30 of the 60 days to prepare their plan for this. But after four or five days passed, the US suddenly declared a new southern corridor together with Oman.”
Detailing the process of reversing the decision, Davis noted: “While a step to reopen the strait had been agreed upon, traffic had risen to approximately one-third of pre-war levels, and many shipments had passed directly on the first day, Trump personally turned back this development toward finding a reasonable exit route from the unfolding disaster. According to reports from some sources in Washington, he came under intense pressure from pro-war figures in his inner circle and those on the Israeli side. He backed down under this pressure and modified the terms by inserting himself into the fifth paragraph. He never made Israel implement the first paragraph, which covered Lebanon and envisioned a ceasefire on all fronts. We did not even give them 30 days; we intervened before five days had passed. Trump has a goal, fails to reach it, puts forward another condition, and then withdraws that as well. He is very easily manipulated; he reaches a decision, then someone speaks with him, and he changes his mind.”
Recalling that a similar situation occurred in relations with Saudi Arabia, Davis said: “He said he made a great deal with Saudi Arabia, and the next day he changed the condition by saying, ‘as long as they sign the Abraham Accords.’ Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, announced that this was not part of the agreement and had never been discussed. This situation shows that President Trump constantly makes concessions when pressured. On this basis, how can any agreement be reached with the US? This situation means that no military or diplomatic exit point remains because he does not permit it.”
“Control is no longer an economic matter; it is a national security imperative”
In response to a question about whether a mutual exit opportunity remains from the current impasse, Davis said: “We had the memorandum of understanding; we had secured this agreement. However, President Trump and his Secretary, Scott Bessent, said, ‘as long as it is a deal we like, we want a new deal.’ You already had a deal; what deal are you talking about now? Why would the Iranian side negotiate a new deal that differs from an agreement made two months ago? This is completely illogical. The Iranian side holds military superiority through its missile cities and half a dozen alternative methods to control the strait. As their official authorities stated on social media, control of the strait is no longer merely an economic matter; it is a national security imperative because it is the only tool with which they can balance their American adversary, who is far stronger militarily.”
Evaluating the impact of the oil crisis, Davis stated: “Strategic Petroleum Reserves are declining. This situation has prevented a crisis so far, but it cannot cover products like jet fuel, diesel, and fertilizer. If it continues this way and the problem is postponed, the reserves will be depleted one day, and economic activity cannot be sustained without oil. Pressure is on President Trump, and the Iranian side is aware of this. They know the blockade will harm them, but they have calculated that they can endure much longer and deeper pain than our side. This is an existential matter; they know that if they surrender their only trump card to an unpredictable president, they will be attacked again later.”
“Reflexive support for Israel in society has been broken”
Touching upon relations between the US and Israel, Davis said a clear divergence has begun in American society. Davis noted: “In the past, across all segments of society and all generations, it was reflexively said, ‘Of course we are pro-Israel, they are our democratic ally.’ This situation continued until the Gaza process following October 7. Israel was attacked on October 7, and no one found it strange that it responded. However, what happened afterward created problems. Israel used this opportunity to destroy the Gaza Strip, increase pressure in the West Bank, bring in new settlers, and discuss annexation.”
Describing the rift between political elites and the public, Davis explained: “There is a major divide in America. Elites are unaffected by genocide or the killing of women and children in the West Bank and Gaza; they close their eyes, arguing that Israel is an ally. However, the eyes of the American public are not closed. They see human suffering on social media and do not carry the memorized assumptions of the past. These elites are not merely bought with money; for decades, they genuinely believed that our interests and Israel’s interests were one and the same. In their minds, saying something negative about Israel is equivalent to saying something negative about the US. Younger generations in particular, and a growing portion of all generations, recognize that our interests are not the same.”
Drawing attention to the cost of the war to the US, Davis noted: “We elected President Trump to apply the America First principle, not Israel first, Britain first, or Germany first. There is anger against those who sacrificed America’s needs by entering the war. According to figures reflected in the public domain, at least 600 Americans were injured; according to what I have heard, this number is over a thousand. Money has been spent, our facilities have been damaged, and our aircraft destroyed; around 40 to 50 of our aircraft were damaged or destroyed. Our bases were ruined and will likely never be rebuilt. We have also lost our geopolitical influence in the region. I doubt that relations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait can return to their former state. Because the foundational assumption of this entire structure was that we could protect them; we could not even protect ourselves.”
“We are still living as if it were 1992”
Evaluating the shift in military technology, Davis stated that the US has lost its traditional military superiority. Davis said: “A large number of people in America are still living as if it were 1992. The Soviet Union had just collapsed, China was a peasant army developing militarily and economically, and we held absolute dominance following Operation Desert Storm. We are no longer in 1992. The Russians corrected their mistakes after the initial phase of the Ukraine war in 2022; they became a much stronger land force, missile, and drone force. China, meanwhile, reached immense technological and industrial capacity.”
Explaining the current situation through the example of Iran, Davis said: “We thought we could crush Iran like a fly, but we could not do so due to their missile cities and technologies. If we cannot eliminate Iran, what can we do against China or Russia, which possess power far beyond that? We have fallen behind in categories such as hypersonic missiles and the new Oreshnik missile. When I saw the Bayraktar TB2 vehicles used by the Turks in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war, as someone with an armored unit background, I understood that the nature of war had changed. The US, meanwhile, talks about producing 300,000 drones by 2030. In an environment where tactics change every six weeks on the Ukrainian and Russian battlefield, our systems remain extremely slow. Ukrainian soldiers mocked the tank platoon manual published last year, saying that with these methods, one could not survive on the battlefield for even ten minutes.”
“The idea of containing China is a fantasy”
Criticizing the US military approach toward China, Davis evaluated: “There is talk of a strategy to militarily contain China. Will you prevent their activities within their own borders, their technological developments, or the expansion of their military? You cannot stop a country with a strong economy and a massive population. We can achieve no result other than entering a war with China in the Asia-Pacific region and losing it. China’s shipbuilding capacity is approximately 200 times ours; they are vastly superior to us in artillery ammunition, aircraft, and missile production. Our methods left over from the Cold War no longer work. What we need to do is keep our own defense strong and ensure deterrence, not spend billions of dollars in the region to establish forward bases that will be hit.”
Touching upon the potential for diplomatic relations between the two countries, Davis said: “I think President Trump personally knows that going to war with China is unwise. However, the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex view China as a constant enemy, demanding more budget, more bases, and more missiles every year. No one considers diplomacy. Yet we can develop peaceful, stable relations with China based on mutual benefit, even if not friendly. Regarding Taiwan as well, I think leaders realize after seeing what occurred in the Middle East and Ukraine that help will not come, and they will adopt a more cooperative stance by withdrawing independence rhetoric. China does not want to start a war; it desires a model similar to Hong Kong. Even if a conflict breaks out in the worst-case scenario, it is between China and Taiwan; the US should not choose to join the war and lose.”
Emphasizing that the arms lobby inside the US maintains its power, Davis stated: “The military-industrial complex remains extremely powerful and holds all levers of power. They maintain control through members of Congress, the media, and public relations networks; I see no sign that this structure is weakening.”
“They did not want someone who would tell the truth about Israel”
Providing information about the process surrounding the cancellation of his appointment within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Davis recounted the issue in these words: “When Tulsi Gabbard came to me and asked me to become the number three executive in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, I said I would be honored to serve my country. However, I stated that I had openly opposed the policies pursued by Israel since October 7 and the war in Gaza and Lebanon, and that these views might not be welcomed within the administration. She thought my accurate past analyses would compensate for this situation. One of my duties was to present the daily intelligence briefing to the president.”
Describing the stage at which his candidacy was withdrawn, Davis said: “Articles against me appeared in the Israeli press and American media. I never hid my views; I said Benjamin Netanyahu’s policies were harming Israel and dragging us down as well. I advocate the ‘America First’ principle, but there are many people within the administration who say ‘Israel First’ and have zero tolerance for any criticism directed at Netanyahu. They did not want someone who would tell the truth regarding Israel. The process expanded following posts by figures like Laura Loomer. On the day I passed the CIA polygraph test and was set to begin duty, Susie Wiles was informed that I had put the president in a difficult position regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. While Trump was saying there would be a ceasefire, I stated on my program that Vladimir Putin would not agree to a ceasefire given his current advantage. Although I stated that I supported a ceasefire, this was made a pretext, and my appointment offer was withdrawn,” completing the interview.
Interview
Quincy Institute expert says the United States had no plan B
In an interview with Harici Media, Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, stated that global unipolarity is coming to an end, transitioning into an increasingly multipolar order.
Parsi addressed shifting global power dynamics, US foreign policy toward China, structural domestic pressures in Washington, and the strategic miscalculations surrounding the ongoing US conflict with Iran.
Parsi noted that while many analysts declare the arrival of a post-American world, the transition will not be an abrupt moment. Instead, he described a phased emergence where it becomes clear that no single superpower possesses deterministic influence over global affairs.
Parsi observed that many governments have been slow to internalize this reality or adjust their policies accordingly, creating the superficial illusion that a unipolar system remains intact. “Whether it’s fully multipolar or other configurations, we can be debated. What I think is clear is that the unipolarity is coming to an end,” Parsi said.
“Unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality”
Regarding Washington’s readiness for a multipolar world, Parsi asserted that the US political establishment remains unprepared and has historically denied the shift. He recalled that during the first two years of the Biden administration, describing the world as multipolar was dismissed as a Russian propaganda narrative.
However, Parsi highlighted a shift under US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who stated in a February 2025 interview that unipolarity was an anomaly. Parsi explained, “He actually went further. He said that unipolarity is an aberration, an abnormality, a historical accident. If you believe that it’s a historical accident, if you believe that it’s an abnormality, then I think it comes from that, that any effort to try to restore unipolarity should be rejected.”
Addressing US policy toward China, Parsi noted that despite the summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing, there is no structural indication that Washington views Beijing as a potential partner rather than a rival.
He contrasted the Biden administration’s aggressive posture—which assumed an existential struggle for dominance—with the Trump administration’s softer but poorly planned approach.
Parsi argued that neither power can decisively defeat the other, making mutual coexistence and co-governance essential to avoid a catastrophic zero-sum confrontation.
“An effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe for disaster”
Parsi rejected the feasibility of military containment against Beijing, warning of severe consequences. “I think an effort to indefinitely contain China is a recipe that will bring about great power competition and a confrontation between the US and China that is going to be completely disastrous,” Parsi stated.
He observed that despite significant US strategic errors, such as the conflict with Iran, China has exercised restraint rather than exploiting American vulnerabilities. Parsi argued that if Beijing were dead-set on aggressive power competition, it would have acted differently.
Economically, Parsi argued that containing China through tariffs or Soviet-era containment models is a losing proposition.
Unlike the Soviet Union, which maintained an isolated economic model, China is deeply integrated into global trade and serves as the primary trading partner for most nations, including those in Latin America such as Brazil. Parsi emphasized that economic containment is unviable against a state with such vast global integration.
“This confrontation will be the deadliest conflict in human history”
Evaluating the risk of the “Thucydides Trap,” Parsi criticized the Washington foreign policy establishment for its structural inability to envision peaceful coexistence.
He noted that the political culture in Washington is built around zero-sum competition and conflict rather than diplomatic management.
Parsi emphasized that while historical precedents exist, humanity is not bound to repeat them, particularly when the stakes involve existential risks. Parsi warned that an unmanaged confrontation between the US and China “would be the deadliest conflict in human history if it is allowed to happen,” threatening human survival itself.
Parsi attributed this narrow strategic focus to structural domestic forces, particularly the US military-industrial complex and influential lobbying groups. Working alongside the grand strategy of liberal hegemony, these forces require US military dominance worldwide, especially in Asia.
Parsi explained that institutional inertia makes it extraordinarily difficult for Washington to alter its strategic trajectory.
“The US had an unrealistic plan A and no plan B”
Turning to the conflict with Iran, Parsi asserted that Washington lacks a coherent strategy, having relied on an unrealistic plan that failed within the first three days.
He stated that the US expected a swift regime collapse or surrender within four days, but faced horizontal escalation from Iran, including threats to the Strait of Hormuz and regional strikes.
“The United States had a very unrealistic plan A and no plan B, and it’s been stuck in that situation ever since,” Parsi said, adding that Washington has been improvising and executing tactical operations without strategic success.
Parsi attributed President Trump’s shifting decisions on Iran to this absence of strategy and his personal demand for immediate results. When military action failed to yield swift progress, Trump turned to diplomacy, only to lose patience within three weeks and resume military strikes. Parsi questioned whether the global community could afford a superpower acting in such an erratic manner.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran”
Addressing Israel’s role, Parsi stated that Israeli pressure was a decisive factor in driving US policy toward confrontation with Iran.
“Without Israel’s push, there would not have been a war with Iran. Without Trump agreeing to the Israelis, there would not have been a war with Iran. Both of them were needed,” Parsi remarked, noting that Israeli efforts since 1995 elevated Iran into a primary US national security concern disproportionate to actual US interests in the region.
Parsi identified a growing divergence between US and Israeli interests in the Middle East. While the US benefits from reducing its regional military footprint of 50,000 troops, Israel requires continuous US military presence and intervention to maintain a favorable regional balance of power.
Parsi noted that this divergence has created a visible rift between Washington and Tel Aviv following the poor execution of the war and subsequent diplomatic maneuvers.
“Israel’s standing amongst the American public has plummeted”
Parsi highlighted a major shift in American public opinion regarding Israel, noting that sympathy for Palestinians has surpassed sympathy for Israel across almost every demographic category, except Republicans over the age of 65.
He attributed this decline directly to Israel’s military actions in Gaza and its perceived role in drawing the US into a disastrous war with Iran, which mirrored earlier public grievances over the Iraq War.
Regarding a resolution to the conflict, Parsi stated that a dignified exit for both the US and Iran remains possible, though the window is narrowing due to personal hostility and political miscalculations.
Finally, addressing Trump’s political image, Parsi clarified that Trump was never strictly anti-war, but rather anti-risk.
He explained that Trump entered the conflict because Israeli officials convinced him that war with Iran posed little risk and would be concluded within 100 hours. Parsi concluded that had Trump not been misled into believing the operation would be a swift success, he would not have initiated it.
Interview
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Conflicting statements from the US and Iran regarding the potential resumption of diplomatic negotiations have emerged, while ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have once again brought global energy concerns to the fore.
Addressing these developments on the Harici live broadcast of Strategic Compass, international relations scholar Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal and Alptekin Dursunoglu, journalist, author, and Editor-in-Chief of Yakin Dogu Haber (YDH), evaluated the internal, regional, and strategic dimensions of the conflict. The discussion focused on the shift in Iran’s military doctrine, the political strain within the US administration, the economic vulnerability of Gulf monarchies, and the broader realignments reshaping Middle Eastern geopolitics.
Why did Trump step back from a decision to launch a new attack on Iran?
Opening the discussion, Prof. Dr. Hasan Unal offered a sharp critique of the political rhetoric originating from Washington, contrasting executive declarations with the tactical outcomes on the ground. Unal argued that public statements made by former US President Donald Trump increasingly lack analytical consistency, complicating efforts to decipher official US strategy.
“He has reached a point where he tells more lies than the daily meowing of stray cats,” Unal remarked during the broadcast. “I do not know which part of his statements we ought to analyze, but if we evaluate him within a broader framework, it becomes possible to reach certain conclusions.”
Unal described the military confrontation between Washington and Tehran as an uneven cycle of escalation, noting that US forces continue to suffer casualties and incur immense financial costs without altering the strategic baseline. “The situation has effectively transformed into something like a defeated wrestler who never grows tired of wrestling; America repeatedly approaches and confronts Iran, yet the outcome is obvious from the outset,” Unal stated. He added that American military personnel are being deployed into conflict zones where national interests remain obscure: “I am certain that American soldiers there largely believe they have no personal interests at stake… and that it serves at most the interests of Israel.”
Dursunoglu contextualised the current phase of hostilities as part of an extended campaign, comparing the recent clashes to a second round of a broader regional conflict following earlier engagements in 2025. He noted that despite assertive claims from Washington regarding the destruction of Iranian military infrastructure, operational continuity on the Iranian side forced a shift in US messaging.
Reflecting on official declarations from US Central Command (CENTCOM) and executive statements following intensive strikes, Unal highlighted the internal contradictions in Washington’s narrative: “Trump claimed Iranian naval forces were sent to the bottom of the sea, the air force beyond the atmosphere, and the ground forces deep into the magma. Yet suddenly he declared, ‘I have forgiven Iran,’ while CENTCOM figures suggested they had reached ‘target saturation’—as if there was simply nothing left to hit.”
Is Iran insisting on its conditions regarding the Strait of Hormuz?
A central focus of the analysis was Iran’s response mechanism following the breakdown of initial ceasefire frameworks. Dursunoglu highlighted a significant structural transition in Tehran’s military posture, moving from traditional reactive containment to proactive deterrence across multiple theatres.
Dursunoglu pointed out that during the escalation, Iran did not restrict its target matrix to immediate points of contact. Instead, Iranian forces conducted strikes against US installations and logistical networks across the region, including facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman.
“Iran’s traditional defence doctrine was defensive and based on proportional retaliation,” Dursunoglu explained. “However, after the US halted strikes, Iran proceeded to target assets in Jordan and Kuwait without immediate prior attacks on those specific vectors. This indicates that Iran has begun executing preemptive strikes, effectively adapting its strategic posture.”
Unal underscored the severity of these strikes on regional logistics, noting that Iranian counter-strikes targeted the port of Aqaba and airport infrastructure in Jordan, alongside American operational facilities in the Gulf. “According to the accounts, Iranian forces began hitting American installations in Gulf states and Jordan within minutes of initial strikes, effectively neutralizing the operational depth the US relied upon,” Unal noted.
The operational status of the Strait of Hormuz remains a decisive point of leverage. Under previous draft frameworks negotiated through Omani mediation, administrative oversight of maritime traffic through the Strait was slated to transition to Iran in coordination with regional littoral states. However, subsequent US efforts to establish an independent naval corridor along the Omani coast triggered a fresh wave of Iranian interdictions.
Dursunoglu outlined the ongoing negotiations surrounding the maritime passage, noting that attempts to bypass Iranian oversight proved unviable for commercial shipping. Under the latest proposals under discussion via Omani channels, incoming maritime traffic into the Gulf would pass through Iranian-designated corridors under Iranian authorization, while outgoing traffic would proceed along Omani coastal waters following notification and approval.
“If an agreement is finalized on these terms, it represents an explicit recognition of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz by the US regime,” Dursunoglu said. He noted that while initial terms provided free passage during a temporary 60-day window, long-term frameworks anticipate structured administrative mechanisms for commercial vessels. Unal added: “Whether designated as transit fees, environmental charges, or security provisions, formalizing maritime oversight secures a permanent structural advantage for Tehran.”
Under what conditions will negotiations begin?
The economic ramifications of maritime disruption have also altered the calculations of Gulf export nations. Following attempts by Saudi Arabia to engage Ansar Allah (Houthi) forces in Yemen, retaliatory actions against critical infrastructure—including the Yanbu crude oil pipeline on the Red Sea—severely constrained alternative export routes.
“By drawing Yemeni forces back into active conflict, Saudi Arabia inadvertently placed its secondary export avenues under direct fire,” Unal observed. “The vulnerability of the Yanbu pipeline demonstrates that reliance on the Gulf cannot be bypassed easily, effectively increasing regional dependence on stability within the Strait.”
Beyond the maritime domain, the broadcast addressed heavy Iranian military engagements in northern Iraq, targeting opposition groups including the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), Komala, Pak, and Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK) along the Erbil-Suleimaniyeh axis.
Dursunoglu and Unal noted that cross-border strikes destroyed substantial ammunition depots established near border regions, followed by reported ground operations conducted by specialized Iranian units.
“Iranian special forces executed targeted ground operations across the border,” Dursunoglu stated, pointing to secondary explosions captured in operational footage as evidence of extensive pre-positioned armaments.
Unal noted that these operations underscored the strategic limitations of non-state actors aligned with Washington: “The expectations placed on armed factions in northern Iraq collapsed when confronted with direct military pressure. The narrative that these groups could serve as an internal wedge against Tehran proved to be a costly miscalculation for US planners.”
Reports indicating the start of a repositioning of US personnel and heavy military equipment from bases in Iraq and the Gulf toward Jordan and Israel were identified as a direct consequence of this vulnerability. “US forces are consolidating toward Jordan and Israel because their facilities in Bahrain and Kuwait sustained structural operational damage,” Dursunoglu observed. “When a state can no longer defend its forward command centers—such as the 5th Fleet infrastructure in Bahrain—it is forced to retreat to secondary defensive perimeters.”
How effective is the pressure from Gulf countries for negotiations?
Concluding the evaluation, Unal and Dursunoglu examined the broader diplomatic landscape, focusing on security dialogues among regional powers, including Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Both analysts agreed that any sustainable security architecture in the Middle East must incorporate Iran rather than seek its exclusion.
“How can you construct a new regional order by excluding the very nation that demonstrated the capacity to neutralize external military dominance?” Dursunoglu questioned. “An architecture that relies on Western guarantees or Israeli alignment fails to address the underlying security dynamics of the region.”
Unal reflected on the historical trajectories of Turkish foreign policy, criticizing past ideological approaches that fuelled regional fragmentation and sect-based antagonisms. He noted that realpolitik dictates close functional coordination between Ankara and Tehran despite historical differences.
“Iran’s resistance ultimately prevented the imposition of a security framework dictated entirely by external actors,” Unal concluded. “Responsible analysis requires recognizing that stability in the Middle East cannot be achieved through foreign intervention or regional fragmentation, but through direct, autonomous security coordination among the region’s core nations.”
-
Interview6 days agoDaniel Davis warns US strategy fails against Iranian defense grid
-
Diplomacy6 days agoErdogan blocked CIA-Mossad plan for armed Kurdish uprising in Iran, report says
-
America6 days agoAIPAC super PAC pours millions into key Democratic primary races
-
Middle East6 days agoUS considers land blockade on Iran involving Türkiye and neighbours
-
Interview2 weeks agoQuincy Institute expert says the United States had no plan B
-
Europe6 days agoUkraine uses British drones for long-range strikes deep inside Russia
-
Opinion2 weeks agoThe U.S. Economy and NATO’s Function
-
America6 days agoUS-Brazil rift widens over proposed sanctions and trade tariffs
