Opinion
Areas of cooperation in Turkish-Chinese relations: Is it better late than never?
The fact that global production and the resulting shift in values towards Asia has led all countries in the world to revise their policies towards the region, especially towards China. While the US under former President Barack Obama was defined as an ‘Indo-Pacific’ country, the attitude towards China in national security documents has gradually shifted from cooperation to competition. In line with a policy that the US interpreted as an attempt to mitigate risk and China as an attempt to ‘encircle’, the Washington administration preferred to build alliances with regional actors while raising tariff walls and accelerating the technology war. As a result of this preference, platforms such as AUKUS and QUAD were witnessed, while discussions on NATO’s expansion towards Asia or Asia’s NATO gained momentum.
Europe’s response to the rise of China, which has traditionally been part of the security architecture built by the US, has oscillated between competition and cooperation. While powers such as France, which defends European autonomy, and Hungary, which is on the periphery, have adopted a more cautious approach, Berlin is pointing to competition, provided that economic interests are protected.
The approach of the countries of the Global South to the rise of China has so far been in the opposite direction to that of the US and its allies. Countries that were founded as a result of the struggle against colonialism, that do not want to imitate the development prescriptions of Western countries, that come from different historical backgrounds and have different forms of governance, have seen China as a window of opportunity. China, which is seeking more friends in different parts of the world in the face of US policies of repression, would not only make more generous offers to these countries, but would also give them room to manoeuvre against Washington.
A new phase in China and Turkish-Islamic relations
It can be said that the Middle East and Central Asia are among the regions that are adapting to this reality, which has been described as a multipolar world. In the Middle East, the Sino-Arab Summit, the first of which was held with the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia in 2022, and the Sino-Arab Foreign Ministers’ Forum, the tenth of which was held this year, are seen as symbols of politically institutionalised cooperation, while the expansion of BRICS with the countries of the region sums up the dimensions of the growing economic bond. It is also noteworthy that China has been given the role of “quarterback” in regional conflicts, in line with its growing political prestige and economic weight. Having hosted the establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, China’s weight is also felt in the Palestinian issue. While the foreign ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation preferred China as the first address on their Palestine tour, Hamas and Fatah sat down in Beijing for unity negotiations. It is known that the Palestinian factions, which made goodwill statements at the first meeting, decided to continue their meetings in China.
Central Asia retains its special position among the regions where relations with China are deepening. China, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (C-C5), which have been meeting at foreign minister level since 2020, met in Xi’an, the starting point of the historic Silk Road, to raise their cooperation to the level of heads of state in 2023. Economics was not the only topic on the agenda at the summit, which heralded investment in the Central Corridor, which runs from China to Europe and includes Turkey. Announcing a $3.8 billion grant to the countries of the region, the Chinese side also stressed that they were a “community of shared destiny” with Central Asia, while the five countries underlined their support for Beijing’s foreign policy narrative.
Is Turkey too late?
Although Ankara has acknowledged China’s growing global influence, especially in regions that are among Turkey’s main areas of interest, the policy development process has been relatively slow. In 2019, Turkey launched a process called the ‘Re-Asia Initiative’ in the region, where China plays a central role, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained the need for this policy by saying that ‘the pendulum of history has shifted to Asia’. Moreover, President Erdoğan, like other countries of the Global South, expressed the fact that the international system does not give them enough representation with the words ‘The world is bigger than five’ and did not hesitate to say that multinational platforms are insufficient to solve acute global problems.
Despite the accuracy of Turkey’s observations, which have become globally recognised, it has become clear in the meantime that the steps taken by Ankara do not correspond to an improvement in the institutional order. Turkey’s engagement with the Western world, as opposed to the Middle East and Central Asian countries, as well as its lowered economic expectations and disputes over the Uighur issue, have played a role in such a picture. Former Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu expressed this difference at the end of 2022, stating that the Turkish delegation did not want to go to the Uyghur Autonomous Region, as China had planned. In addition, the fact that most of the Turkish media’s coverage of China consisted of Western-based translations and that Turkey was not sufficiently recognised in China and China in Turkey were among the factors affecting the policy-making process.
Can Minister Fidan forge a new equation?
Like other developing countries around the world, particularly in the Middle East and Central Asia, Turkey still has time to adjust its relations with China to the new realities. In this context, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to China on 3-5 June can be seen as a valuable start in announcing Ankara’s position on issues of interest to China.
In his statement here, Minister Fidan said that Ankara and Beijing overlap on many aspects of international relations, including contentious areas such as Palestine and Ukraine; that Turkey supports China’s constructive relations with Asian and Middle Eastern countries; and that Turkey appreciates China’s role as a mediator, such as in the Saudi and Iranian peace processes.
Perhaps more importantly for China, Minister Fidan said of the arm-wrestling between Washington and Beijing: ‘The fact that the markets established by the dominant powers in the last century are changing hands again under fairer, more competitive market conditions is an outcome that must be accepted. Minister Fidan’s assessments that there is a global transfer of power and that it should be peaceful, as well as his reiteration of respect for China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, were seen as positive factors.
What are the areas of cooperation?
While Minister Fidan’s presentation of Turkey’s position sets the framework for relations in the new era, the main external developments that require cooperation between Ankara and Beijing are the Palestinian and Ukrainian crises, and the risks and opportunities that arise on trade routes.
On the Palestinian issue, Turkey and China, which advocate a ceasefire in the short term and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital based on the 1967 borders in the long term, could play an active role in uniting the Palestinian factions to mature this solution. It is not known whether Turkey and China are coordinated, but it is obvious that they are taking parallel steps in this direction. Indeed, the Hamas delegation that travelled to Beijing for merger negotiations with Fatah had issued a statement to the international press from Istanbul the day before, saying that they wanted to unite under one roof.
Ukraine is also on the list of crises where Turkey and China can play an equation-changing role. Ankara and Beijing, which can simultaneously maintain diplomatic relations with Russia and Ukraine, have converging views on opposing the sanctions policy, representing Russia in peace negotiations and respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of countries. China, which has been conducting shuttle diplomacy between Moscow, Kiev and European capitals with a 12-point road map, and Turkey, which previously brought the two countries to the brink of peace in Istanbul, could play a mediating role if the warring parties, especially Ukraine, show the will to do so.
The wind blowing in Turkey’s favour on global trade routes also stands out among the dimensions of cooperation in the new period. Indeed, after the Ukraine crisis, the Northern Corridor from China to Europe via Russia lost its popularity, while the Southern Corridor, which includes Iran, became more fragile as a result of geopolitical tensions. On the other hand, the Central Corridor, centred on Turkey, has become more attractive as the Central Asian countries have largely completed infrastructure works and simplified customs procedures. The Caspian Central Corridor, which cuts the distance between China and Europe by 2,000 kilometres compared to the Northern Corridor, will remain on Turkey’s agenda in the new period. In addition, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan underlined Turkey’s comparative advantage by expressing the expectation that the Belt and Road Initiative will be harmonised with the Development Road. By stating that the Belt and Road will also provide opportunities for China, Ankara has made clear its position that China should become a partner in global trade rather than an outsider as desired by the West.
The address for cooperation: BRICS, committees, international summit and leaders’ meeting
Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s speech during his visit to China, while not as clear as Ankara’s position on hot topics and the listed areas of cooperation, also provides clues as to the platforms that can be used.
Minister Fidan’s statement that he will attend the BRICS meeting in Russia can be seen as a turning point in the institutionalisation of economic relations. BRICS, which came to the fore with President Erdoğan’s statements in 2018, represents 31 per cent of the global economy with the latest participation and includes 6 of the 10 largest oil producers in the world. The fact that BRICS, which is gaining weight every day against the G7, the so-called club of the rich, can respond to some of Turkey’s urgent needs with instruments such as the New Development Bank is one of the facts that Treasury and Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek cannot ignore. In fact, in a statement he made in 2017, Minister Mehmet Şimşek said, “In order to benefit from the projects they are going to give, you have to be a member. For this reason alone, we are seriously considering becoming a member’.
The ‘intergovernmental working committee’ announced by Minister Fidan during his visit to China is the second notable step in the context of institutionalisation between Ankara and Beijing. The appointment of Mehmet Şimşek, Turkey’s Minister of Treasury and Finance, to head this committee will help achieve results in many areas, such as correcting imbalances in the huge volume of trade, increasing investment in nuclear energy and new technologies, and further activating the Middle Corridor.
While the first meeting of the intergovernmental working committee is expected to be held in the coming months, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to visit Turkey. Announcing Turkey’s invitation, Foreign Minister Fidan said: “We would like to host Chinese President Xi Jinping in Turkey this year. I have once again conveyed our president’s invitation to our Chinese colleague. Xi’s invitation to visit Turkey may serve to open a new page in terms of regional order as well as bilateral relations.
On the other hand, the Uighur issue may complicate the parties’ engagement, which has been delayed compared to the Middle East and Central Asia. Minister Fidan’s visit added the definition of the cities of Urumqi and Kashgar to the disagreement over terms such as ‘crime, criminal, freedom and separatism’ that has been a problem between Turkey and China for some time. While Minister Fidan defined these two cities as Turkish and Islamic cities during his contacts, this thesis is not accepted by China. According to the White Book published by the Beijing administration, the region is presented as a continuation of ancient Chinese culture, while it is argued that the Uyghurs have separated from the Turks over time.
Although there has been no official or unofficial (through the media) reaction to Minister Fidan’s preference for a different definition from China’s, it would not be surprising if it caused some discomfort.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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