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France pushes for Russian nuclear partnership in Germany despite security concerns

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A Russian state-owned company is set to become involved in nuclear fuel production within the heart of the European Union as part of a controversial French proposal currently awaiting approval from German officials.

The French-Russian joint venture, slated to manufacture nuclear fuel rods and assemblies in Lingen in northwestern Germany, is being pitched as a key component of EU energy security at a time when nuclear power is viewed as indispensable for transitioning away from fossil fuels.

However, this initiative coincides with the EU’s broader push to ban all energy imports from Russia. The proposal has sparked concern within regional and federal governments regarding the risks of espionage and other security threats.

German officials are expected to decide whether to approve the plans within the next few weeks.

The facility would be operated by Framatome, a subsidiary of the French state energy company EDF, utilizing Russian components supplied by TVEL, a division of the Kremlin-controlled nuclear giant Rosatom.

TVEL will not be directly involved in the facility’s operations but will supply the Russian-made components essential for the production of the nuclear fuel.

The Russian-designed fuel is currently utilized in 19 Soviet-era nuclear reactors across five EU nations in Eastern and Northern Europe, as well as in 15 reactors in Ukraine.

Framatome is lobbying intensely for German officials to approve the project, mobilizing the full weight of the French government—right up to President Emmanuel Macron—and arguing that what is good business for the company is also good for Europe.

Nevertheless, saying yes is politically difficult for Germany. Officials in Berlin are concerned about security risks and Russian espionage, with some warning against allowing a Russian firm to establish a foothold in the country.

German regional authorities must also approve the plan, and they are not particularly enthusiastic. Lower Saxony Environment Minister Christian Meyer is notably skeptical; his department holds the final authority for the Lingen project.

“Germany once allowed Gazprom access to critical energy infrastructure at the Rehden gas storage facility and became vulnerable to blackmail when Putin turned off the gas tap during the crisis,” Meyer told POLITICO.

Meyer warned that they risk repeating a similar mistake if they grant Rosatom access to sensitive nuclear technology for fuel element production in Lingen.

The project is currently under review by Germany’s environment ministry and national security agencies. POLITICO has examined how Framatome is quietly applying pressure behind the scenes to secure a decision from Berlin, even as the German government seeks to reach a legally watertight conclusion.

The collaboration between Framatome and Rosatom is not new. In 2021, the two companies signed a long-term partnership agreement for nuclear fuel production. They also established a joint venture in France, in which Framatome holds a 75% stake and Rosatom’s subsidiary TVEL holds 25%.

In March 2022, just weeks after the war began, Advanced Nuclear Fuels—a wholly-owned subsidiary of Framatome—applied to the Lower Saxony environment ministry for an atomic regulatory license to manufacture Russian-designed nuclear fuel assemblies in Lingen.

The company has spent more than three years working toward the goal of producing hexagonal fuel in Lingen using Rosatom’s technology and components. The company argues that this move will ultimately reduce dependency on Russia.

The French nuclear company’s project will ultimately lead to a “100% sovereign, genuine European solution.” Lionel Gaiffe, senior executive vice president at Framatome, told POLITICO, “Only Framatome can do this.”

“I am not saying it is perfect,” the executive added, but he argued that the project would enable Europe to reduce its reliance on Russian nuclear fuel “very quickly.”

The French firm’s project consists of two phases. Through the joint venture, it aims to reproduce the Russian design at its factories in Lingen and Romans-sur-Isère, France, using Russian-made components.

The Lingen factory will produce fuel for four VVER 1000 reactors located in Bulgaria and Czechia, while the French factory will supply fuel for 15 VVER 440 reactors in Finland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary.

In parallel, Framatome is working to develop its own in-house design and guarantees that the teams working on these two projects are “completely separate.”

Framatome insists that no Russian engineers have set foot in the Lingen facility and that contacts with representatives of the Russian firm have been limited since the start of the war in Ukraine.

“We can have discussions between Russia and France, make contact, and sometimes meet and argue. Everything we do is, by definition, done in conjunction with the relevant administrations and supervisory authorities. There is no doubt about that,” said Gaiffe.

On the other hand, an expert report commissioned by the German federal government in 2023 cast doubt on this explanation. The report warned that cooperation with Rosatom at the Lingen facility could pose serious threats to national and external security.

These threats include direct interference in the facility’s operations, influence over security-related decisions, intelligence gathering on internal processes, and risks of industrial espionage.

Referencing the report written by German academic Gerhard Roller, the Lower Saxony ministry requested classified assessments from federal ministries and agencies in 2024 during Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s tenure, but the government collapsed before a decision could be reached.

The Lower Saxony government is awaiting updated assessments from federal agencies before deciding how to proceed in coordination with the federal environment ministry.

It remains unclear whether the federal government shares Lower Saxony Environment Minister Meyer’s critical view. According to individuals familiar with the process, there is sympathy for the project in Berlin.

Paris supports the project but is careful to remain cautious. “This is a highly sensitive subject. It is not something we want to advertise,” said a French official who requested anonymity.

Two individuals familiar with the discussions indicated that Merz and his French counterpart Macron discussed the Lingen issue once this year.

A French nuclear executive at EDF said the project could be summarized by a single question: “Should Russian fuel be replaced by French or American fuel?”

“This is a matter of a trade and economic war against the US,” the EDF executive added.

This perception is not limited to Paris. On the other side of the Atlantic, Washington’s strategic calculations are equally clear.

“The US is definitely not pleased about Russia entering Germany’s fuel element production market via Rosatom. This could backfire on Germany in the long term,” said Meyer.

Meanwhile, Framatome is lobbying German officials to influence the decision. According to Bundestag lobbying records, the company has commissioned the consultancy firm Berlin Global Advisors to lobby for the approval of the Lingen application in 2024.

Europe

EU divisions deepen over who should negotiate with Vladimir Putin

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As the US continues to mediate talks between Ukraine and Russia, the debate within the EU over who will sit at the table is intensifying.

Negotiations between Russia and Ukraine scheduled for next week in Abu Dhabi, mediated by the US, will take place without European participation.

There are currently no expectations of a breakthrough, but this has not prevented infighting within the EU over representation.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni added fresh friction to the debate yesterday, 5 November, stating that the EU gives “the impression of a Europe moving in different directions.”

In a letter to European Council President António Costa, she argued that the 27 EU leaders must unite behind a single representative before the end of the year.

According to Rapporteur, an “alphabet soup” of diplomatic formats, such as the E2, E3, E5, or the CoW (Coalition of the Willing), is competing to take centre stage in discussions concerning the future of Ukraine.

Facing elections next year, Meloni has long pushed back against the assertive stance adopted by the E3 format, which brings together the UK, France, and Germany, in their efforts to represent European interests in ending the war and shaping the continent’s future security architecture.

Last month, the Italian leader said:

“If France, Germany, and Great Britain believe that within that renowned E3 format they can achieve more alone than we can all achieve together, then they should at least do so in the name of everyone, with an official mandate from all parties.”

An EU diplomat remarked: “When we speak of the E3, we are talking about geopolitical influence, military strength, and financial power. This does not mean Italy is excluded, but Rome clearly believes it must have a seat at the table.”

Meloni has the backing of Poland, another major military power and the only other large EU country sharing a border with Ukraine.

However, her counterpart Donald Tusk has been less explicit about seeking a direct role in top-level talks.

“As you know, we have many different formats,” Tusk told reporters in Warsaw on Thursday. “We have a clear position as the EU and as the Coalition of the Willing. I am fully engaged in these processes.”

Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, however, proved considerably more outspoken. “The last thing we want is Western Europe dealing with Russia while bypassing Eastern Europeans,” Sikorski said, drawing parallels to the 1930s and the 1945 Yalta Conference:

“You cannot exclude Eastern Europe and Scandinavia from these talks. We are roughly 120 million people. Finland borders Russia, Norway borders Russia, the Baltic states border Russia, and Poland borders both Russia and Ukraine.”

Berlin argues that the E3 remains the natural representative group, given that Germany, France, and the UK are the three strongest military powers capable of underwriting future security guarantees for Ukraine.

Like Italy, Poland favours the E5 configuration, which would allow Warsaw and Rome to take part.

Yet Sikorski also floated another leadership lineup to meet Putin: António Costa, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, and UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham.

Sikorski argued that under EU treaties, the Costa-Kallas pairing holds the legal authority to represent the bloc.

Speaking to journalists in Lisbon on Thursday, the EU’s top diplomat, Kaja Kallas, said: “I agree with Prime Minister Meloni; we must not speak with different voices. We must remain united in stating that these matters sought by Russia require Europe’s decision as well.”

Meloni is not alone in pointing out cracks in the EU’s posture. Last week, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, a close ally of Meloni on the European Council, questioned a phone call made to Putin by the leaders of Finland and Norway, asking what they truly hoped to achieve.

Finnish President Alexander Stubb and Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre defended the conversation as a useful step taken in full coordination with Kyiv.

According to an EU official, the pair would be “more than happy” to discuss appointing a special envoy for Ukraine.

The official stressed, however, that the call was not “a bid” to position Stubb and Støre for the role.

Regardless, the war is unlikely to end this winter, even as Europeans explore fresh mechanisms to finance Ukraine.

“We must be realistic about peace talks and extremely cautious regarding Russia’s true intentions,” Donald Tusk said. “During the winter months, Putin may have less motivation to reach an agreement.”

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EU urges citizens to prepare 72-hour survival kits for crises

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European Union citizens should be prepared to meet their basic needs independently for the first 72 hours of an emergency until public services can organize relief, according to new guidelines.

Hadja Lahbib, the European Commissioner for Equality, Crisis Management and Preparedness, presented the non-binding advisory guidance at the European Civil Protection Forum.

In her remarks on the initiative, Lahbib said: “When a disaster strikes, the first hours can be vital. Every European must know what to do, how to protect their family and how to help others. Preparedness begins in our homes, our schools and our communities.”

The Brussels leadership explained that the new measures are prompted by Europe facing increasingly frequent and complex crises.

Under the recommendations, the European Commission advised citizens to stockpile essential supplies and keep pre-packed emergency grab bags ready.

These steps aim to ensure that individuals can address their primary necessities independently during the first three days of a crisis, before state aid is mobilized.

The guidelines also encompass three additional priority areas: preparing children for emergency situations, making safety measures accessible to individuals with disabilities, and ensuring the public is better informed about potential threats.

Citing the 2001 founding anniversary of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, the European Commission also proposed designating 23 October as “EU Preparedness Day” each year starting in 2027.

EU member states are preparing for an extensive hybrid attack scenario that could result in casualties, according to a Politico report citing European diplomats and officials.

The report noted that divisions have emerged within the EU over the bloc’s security role and whether its initiatives duplicate the functions of NATO.

According to the same report, ambassadors from the 27 EU member states held closed-door meetings focusing on deploying emergency response teams and allocating resources from EU funds to an affected country.

Following the outbreak of hostilities in Ukraine in 2022, both the EU and NATO intensified their preparations for a potential military confrontation with Russia.

In its “White Paper on European Defence – Preparedness 2030”, presented in March 2025, the European Commission identified Russia as one of the primary threats to European security.

The document outlines plans to boost defence production and improve air and missile defence, unmanned systems, and military mobility.

Meanwhile, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have begun drafting contingency action plans for a potential Russian attack, including measures for the evacuation of hundreds of thousands of civilians.

The three Baltic states decided in May 2025 to cooperate in the field of civil defence.

Lieutenant General Christian Freuding, head of the German Army, also stated that Berlin must be prepared for a Russian attack by 2029 or earlier.

On the other hand, Russian President Vladimir Putin stressed in a statement in September that Moscow is not preparing for war with Europe.

Putin stated that Moscow has no such plans and that there are no justifications or real reasons to escalate the situation with Europe.

Criticising the European stance, Putin described rhetoric from European nations regarding a Russian threat and the necessity of preparing for war as a “provocation” and a “deliberate incitement of the situation.”

The Kremlin also noted that the EU is turning into a “military-political-economic bloc” by spending vast budgets to weaponize its economies.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov warned that statements by EU nations regarding the risk of war with Russia are driving European rearmament, which could ultimately become a “self-fulfilling prophecy.”

In earlier remarks, Lavrov assessed that “if Europe attacks the Russian Federation, it will be a completely different war, and it will be over very quickly.”

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Paris meeting between Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage unscheduled

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Plans for a meeting in Paris between Reform UK leader Nigel Farage and French far-right National Rally (RN) figurehead Marine Le Pen remain uncertain.

Farage’s planned visit to France, which he announced for October as part of an effort to establish ties with figures on the European right before the end of the year, has yet to be officially scheduled by Le Pen’s camp.

Speaking to Politico on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive inter-party relations, four National Rally officials familiar with Le Pen’s schedule said no visit to the party leader had been planned.

Multiple party figures said they saw no urgency in drawing media attention to relations with Reform UK or to the migration pact signed in September.

One official noted that the “costs and benefits” of holding a meeting with Farage needed to be weighed.

Political circumstances for both parties have shifted markedly since the prospect of a meeting with Le Pen, widely viewed as the candidate most likely to win the first round of the 2027 French presidential election, was first mooted.

Jordan Bardella, the National Rally’s second-in-command, attended Reform UK’s conference in Birmingham in early September as guest of honour.

Bardella and Farage announced an agreement proposing the return to France of all migrants reaching the UK through unauthorised Channel crossings in small boats.

The proposal triggered a backlash across different political factions in France, where critics questioned why the country should accept the return of asylum seekers.

Internal problems also emerged within Reform UK during the Birmingham conference.

Reform UK, which had maintained its polling lead over the Labour Party led by Andy Burnham, who took over as prime minister from Keir Starmer, was shaken by an undercover investigation published on the eve of the conference.

The development, which raised fresh questions over the party’s financial structure, led to the resignation of Farage’s two most senior aides.

Labour subsequently recovered in the polls, while a rise in the Conservative Party’s share of the vote began to challenge Reform UK’s second-place standing.

The initial announcement that Farage would travel to France to meet Le Pen before the end of October was also made at the Birmingham conference in early September.

Referring to a trip to Paris after Bardella delivered a speech in English, Farage said: “The only downside is I think they’re going to invite me to Paris, and I will have to speak French, but never mind, we’ll get round it.”

However, no official invitation has been confirmed.

As October drew to a close and it became clear that Farage would not pay a return visit to the National Rally’s conference in Orleans, a senior Reform UK official maintained that the meeting was on the calendar for this year.

The leadership in Paris does not confirm that schedule.

The four officials familiar with Le Pen’s plans said they were unaware of any scheduled visit for Farage before Christmas. One of Le Pen’s advisers suggested that a meeting could instead be offered with Bardella, whose standing inside the party has weakened in recent months.

Questioning the merits of the party leader appearing alongside Farage, another adviser to Le Pen said: “We need a bit more time to think through the costs and benefits.”

Thibaut Francois, an official with the National Rally’s European Parliament delegation, said that “regular contacts” with Reform UK continued and that the two parties would meet “very soon”, though he did not clarify whether that would take place this year.

A senior Reform UK official said: “Reform’s primary objective is to become battle-ready for British elections; parading on the international stage right now would add nothing to the UK message.”

Charles-Henri Gallois, an economic adviser to Bardella, argued that there was no need for further contact between the two parties, asserting that the migration agreement was “ready and waiting to be implemented” should both parties come to power.

“There is no need to discuss this further,” Gallois told Politico. “Critics of the agreement do not understand migration flows. This agreement is entirely in France’s interest.”

With French voters wary of a UK-style exit, Le Pen has long distanced herself from efforts to pull France out of the European Union.

Jean-Yves Camus, a far-right specialist at the Jean-Jaures Foundation think-tank, said: “Farage still supports Brexit, whereas Le Pen abandoned the idea [of Frexit] because it was too frightening for French voters. Donald Trump’s defeat in the midterms will also reinforce Le Pen’s distrust of Trumpism and its European counterparts.”

The level of internal support within the National Rally for the migration deal signed by Bardella and Farage was a subject of debate even as it was being concluded.

Since the party conference in September, Bardella’s position has continued to weaken following antisemitism allegations, which he has firmly denied.

Before reaching the agreement with Bardella, Farage had proposed launching “the largest military operation in the Channel since the Second World War” to push small boats back to the French coast.

A figure close to Le Pen told Politico at the time: “Why would we take [them] back to France if they are not French?”

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