Li Yunqi, Journalist
CGTN Radio

“If there’s an extra guest, you have to prepare an extra pair of chopsticks,” – an ancient Chinese wisdom for the upcoming G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro.

The global economic order is undergoing an obvious shift toward Global South countries, as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that by 2030, developing economies will account for 60% of global GDP—up from already 50% in 2010. With emerging markets playing an increasingly prominent role at the global “economic table,” the question facing the G20 is clear: Where is the hospitality, and those extra pairs of chopsticks?

Formed in the 1970s, G7, the more “elite” club of G20, was designed to address the economic challenges of its time. At its peak, the G7 nations accounted for 60-70% of global GDP, with the U.S. alone contributing 25%. This dominance made the G7 a natural hub for global economic decision-making.

But as the global economy diversified, so too did the need for governance structures that reflected this reality. By the 1990s, the rapid growth of emerging economies such as China, India, and Brazil reduced the G7’s share of global GDP. Recognizing the limitations of G7 as an exclusive forum, the G20 was established in 1999, incorporating a broader range of voices from across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Yet, despite its broader membership, the governance structures of the G20 still tilt heavily toward historically dominant economies, leaving the perspectives of the Global South underrepresented.

In 2023, developing economies attracted about 65% of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Many of these nations boast young populations, in stark contrast to aging demographics in Western countries. For instance, Africa’s median age is 18.8, compared to over 40 in many Western European countries. By 2030, the Asian middle class alone is expected to exceed 3 billion people.

These economic transformations underline the need for more fair and inclusive governance systems. Just as a gracious host ensures there are enough chopsticks for every guest, the G20 must adapt to accommodate the realities of a multipolar economic world.

This is not merely a symbolic gesture. Global South nations have legitimate demands for reforms in international institutions like the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, and the World Bank, all of which remain skewed toward the interests of Western nations. The inclusion of perspectives from emerging economies isn’t just about fairness—it’s about crafting more effective and sustainable solutions to global challenges.

The rise of the BRICS is a case in point. Originally formed as a loose group of emerging economies, BRICS has evolved into a platform for addressing global imbalances, recently expanding to include nations like Argentina, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This expansion signals a broader desire among Global South countries for alternative frameworks to the traditional Western-led institutions.

The 2024 G20 Summit in Brazil offers a rare chance to recalibrate global governance. With a host nation that is itself a leader in the Global South, the summit is well-positioned to champion a more balanced approach to decision-making for global affairs.

This does not mean sidelining the priorities of developed nations; rather, it calls for recognizing that the inclusion of diverse perspectives leads to more innovative and equitable solutions. For Western countries, this shift will require letting go of long-held assumptions about leadership and embracing the legitimacy of different economic models and governance approaches.

The Global South’s rise is not about dismantling the established order but about evolving it to reflect the realities of today’s interconnected world. By preparing those extra pairs of chopsticks, the G20 can ensure a more inclusive future—one that respects the voices of all its members, regardless of their economic status.

Not having to share the table may seem convenient, but if we zoom out, we see that many in the world still struggle to secure even the basics, let alone a seat at the global table. Preparing a few extra pairs of chopsticks isn’t just a metaphor, but a call for a more balanced, diverse, and inclusive global order.

On November 13th, Turkish President Erdoğan announced that Türkiye has cut off trade and diplomatic relations with Israel. Anadolu Agency reported his statement during his return trip from visits to Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan. Erdoğan declared, “We currently have no relations with that country,” emphasizing that Türkiye has responded in the strongest terms to “Israel’s atrocities” by taking concrete measures, including halting all trade exchanges. He also stated that the ruling “People’s Alliance” firmly supports this stance.

Observers believe that Erdoğan’s remarks, coming just after the conclusion of the Arab-Islamic Riyadh Summit, aim to enhance Türkiye’s discourse power, express additional sympathy for the suffering of the Palestinian people, maintain sustained anger towards Israel’s belligerence, and exert pressure on Trump, who is about to return to the White House and is highly pro-Israel. This move may also serve to soothe strong anti-Israel public opinion domestically. However, it is conceivable that this posture will not affect the development of the current war situation in the Middle East, let alone change the geopolitical landscape; on the contrary, it may bring pressure on Türkiye from the United States and the European Union.

Erdoğan’s statements further highlight Türkiye’s tough stance and sanctions against Israel over the past year, attempting to demonstrate Türkiye’s political responsibility, humanitarian concern, and religious obligations as a major country in the Middle East, especially an Islamic power. Objectively, this will make the six Arab countries that still maintain policy relations with Israel feel embarrassed and will also enhance Türkiye’s discourse power in Middle East disputes, particularly in promoting the de-escalation process of this round of conflict.

Türkiye is not only a major country in the Middle East and the Islamic world but also a NATO member and EU candidate country, as well as the initiator and leader of the Turkic States Alliance. From the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Türkiye has been a very active geopolitical actor and has played an important role in shaping the regional landscape. However, in the grand chessboard of Israel’s “eight-front warfare” triggered by the current Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the space for Türkiye to maneuver is very limited.

Erdoğan’s publicized severance of relations with Israel seems to be a kind of “salami-slicing,” or even a painless “soft severance,” and therefore will not cause significant shockwaves. Tükiye had already recalled its ambassador to Israel in November last year and announced in May this year the suspension of all imports and exports with Israel to punish the latter for exacerbating the humanitarian tragedy of the Palestinian people. In August, Türkiye formally submitted an application to the International Court of Justice to join the lawsuit initiated by South Africa against Israel’s alleged “genocide,” becoming one of the few Third World countries to use international legal means to challenge Israel.

However, Türkiye has not announced the closure of its diplomatic missions in Israel, nor has it punished Israel as severely or even rudely as it did in May 2018. Six years ago, when Trump announced the relocation of the U.S. Embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, thereby recognizing the latter as Israel’s capital, the Erdoğan government not only immediately recalled its ambassadors to the United States and Israel but also expelled the Israeli ambassador to Türkiye on the spot. The ambassador was subjected to a full set of humiliating security checks at the airport, including body searches and shoe removal, causing bilateral relations to plunge to a historic low, only beginning to recover slowly two years ago.

Israel has not made any response to Türkiye’s latest declaration of “severing diplomatic relations” and may continue to maintain a low profile or restraint. Perhaps Israel has adapted to Türkiye’s nearly two-decade-long “angry diplomacy,” or perhaps it currently lacks the energy and willingness to provoke Ankara and thereby create new enemies for itself. It is already overwhelmed dealing with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” and the United Nations, not to mention the internal frictions and power struggles among its top officials.

Türkiye’s tough stance against Israel is actually facing very similar historical scenarios, making it seem powerless or even counterproductive when playing the Palestinian card. This is because the Arab world does not welcome the successor of the former Ottoman Empire changing the long-standing Western-oriented “Kemalism” to an “eastward and southward” approach. They especially strongly resist Türkiye’s deep involvement in Arab affairs, much like their strong aversion to Iran constructing a “Shia Crescent” in the Arab world. From this perspective, Middle Eastern countries, particularly the Arab world, exhibit an “Arab Monroe Doctrine,” opposing any external interference, even though they are incapable of fairly resolving the Palestinian issue.

Since the Justice and Development Party led by Erdoğan won the general election in 2002, based on the disappointment and dissatisfaction arising from repeated setbacks in pursuing EU membership, as well as a dual return to Neo-Ottomanism and Islamism, Türkiye has significantly elevated the strategic position of the East, especially the Middle East—its traditional sphere of influence—within its foreign policy framework. Ankara began by actively attempting to mediate the Iranian nuclear crisis, suddenly paying high-profile attention to the Palestinian issue, and in 2008, a public dispute erupted between then-Prime Minister Erdoğan and Israeli President Peres at the Davos World Economic Forum.

In May 2010, disregarding Israel’s warnings, Türkiye dispatched the humanitarian aid ship “Mavi Marmara,” attempting to forcibly cross Israel’s naval blockade to dock in the Gaza Strip. This led to Israeli special forces air-dropping onto the ship, resulting in a bloody conflict. Türkiye announced the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, and it was not until Israel later apologized that bilateral relations were restored. However, due to the indifferent or even critical stance of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and even the PLO towards the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), which was fighting Israel alone, Türkiye’s proactive “foreign aid” actions did not receive enthusiastic responses.

After the outbreak of the “Arab Spring” in early 2011, the development model of the Arab world was widely questioned and even lost its future direction. The “Turkish model” received widespread international attention and was even considered a reference or option for Arab countries. Facing an Arab world mired in failure and chaos, the Erdoğan government was highly proactive, even being described as “attempting to act as the leader of the Islamic world.” Driven by such wishful thinking and strategic impulses, Türkiye not only supported Egypt’s “Square Revolution” in a high-profile manner, strongly backed the Muslim Brotherhood entangled in power struggles, sent troops to Syria and Libya, intervened in the Eastern Mediterranean oil and gas disputes, and openly supported Qatar in its rivalry with Saudi Arabia. Ultimately, Türkiye’s relations with Arab countries deteriorated from the idealized “zero problems diplomacy” to a nightmarish “all problems diplomacy.”

It can be said that the decade or so during which the “Arab Spring” evolved into the “Arab Winter” was a period when Türkiye’s realist offensive diplomacy and “eastward and southward” strategy suffered major defeats. Türkiye not only lost its traditional ally Israel and offended more than half of the Arab world, but its relationships with Russia and the United States also faced unprecedented challenges.

The Middle East today has once again plunged into war and turmoil, but the causes, nature, conflicts, and opponents are vastly different from those of the “Arab Spring” or the Arab-Israeli conflicts during the Cold War. Several non-state actors from Arab countries are involved in what some are calling the “Sixth Middle East War.” However, countries that have normalized relations with Israel—such as Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and even the Palestine Liberation Organization—have no intention of re-entering the historical stream of the Arab-Israeli conflict. On the contrary, Iran and its leadership of the “Shia Crescent” have become the main forces opposing Israel in this new Middle East war. Some non-state actors in Arab countries have formed a new “Axis of Resistance” in alliance with the Shia Crescent. This shift in geopolitical relationships makes the attitudes of Arab nations more nuanced. Yet, in balancing “interests and righteousness,” they still value the hard-won Arab-Israeli peace and the crucial Arab-American relations. Although Arab countries are deeply frustrated by Israel’s refusal to cease fire and feel powerless to change the situation, they are absolutely unwilling to accept Iran and Türkiye taking the lead in Arab affairs.

Therefore, Türkiye’s new round of Middle East diplomacy is bound to fall into an awkward position similar to that after the “Arab Spring.” It is unlikely to receive widespread and positive responses in the Arab world or have any substantive impact on the current “eight-front warfare.” Nonetheless, Ankara’s diplomatic efforts to support the rights of the Palestinian people are commendable, reasonable, and even resonate with mainstream international public opinion.

With the openly pro-Israel Trump team controlling the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, and the Republican Party—which has always been more favorable toward Israel—fully controlling the U.S. legislative, executive, and judicial branches, Washington’s Middle East policy will further tilt toward Israel. Even if the new U.S. government does not encourage Israel to escalate and expand the existing conflicts and wars, it will mobilize all resources and employ all means to exert maximum pressure on Israel’s opponents to force them to compromise. At that time, Türkiye’s relations with the United States will experience new friction and uncertainties due to its tough stance against Israel.

Not only will the new U.S. government’s Middle East policy fail to reward Türkiye’s hardline approach toward Israel, but major European powers—which generally support Israel’s security and hold unfavorable views toward Iran and its led “Axis of Resistance”—will also be dissatisfied with Türkiye’s intensified pressure on Israel. This could further affect the smooth development of Türkiye-Europe relations.

Therefore, although Türkiye’s stance toward Israel is tough, the pressure it can exert is nearly exhausted, and Israel has considerable capacity to withstand such pressure, especially from Türkiye’s “soft severance of relations.” Given that Arab countries do not welcome deep Turkish intervention and that the U.S. and Europe oppose Türkiye joining the anti-Israel camp, Türkiye’s role and space for maneuvering in the Middle East are very limited and unlikely to see significant breakthroughs.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

The American elections ended “as expected” with Trump’s victory. The polls were wrong again, often showing Trump and Kamala Harris neck and neck. Trump did well both in the overall vote and in the swing states. At the time of writing, the results for the House of Representatives have not been finalized. If they win a majority there too, the Republicans will have won a huge victory. In addition to the presidency, Trump will give them overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress, state governorships and state legislatures.

What will Trump do and how will he do it?

This time I followed the American election at the annual forum of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia. The annual forum was attended by a group of about fifty to sixty academics, think-tankers, and experts from around the world, and about twenty to thirty experts from Russia, including, as usual, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (second day) and Russian President Putin (closing session on the last day). Deputy Prime Minister Novak and Kremlin Chief of Staff Oreshkin also attended the Forum, speaking at length and answering questions. As was the case last year, Putin’s introductory speech and subsequent Q&A session lasted more than four hours. He spoke with an incredibly clear content and style, without mincing words.

One of the most striking aspects of the Forum, which I attended for the second time (4-7 November), was that all participants were following the U.S. election with great interest. After Trump’s victory became clear, you could hear different comments from participants depending on which country they came from. For example, while those from Russia and other countries welcomed Trump’s arrival with the expectation that he would put an end to the policy pursued so far by the collective West in the war in Ukraine, guests from China and/or those focusing on China thought that there could be fierce winds between Washington and Beijing.

Similarly divergent views were immediately apparent among participants from Middle Eastern countries. For example, while some Middle Eastern participants were somewhat positive about the serious possibility of an American withdrawal from Syria and Iraq under Trump, Iranian participants spoke of the possibility of war between Iran and a Trump administration that is likely to fully support Israel.

On the other hand, Western participants (such as the UK and Canada) tended to see Trump’s arrival as the beginning of the end of the neo-liberal economic order. The neoliberal economic models, which have catastrophically widened the gap between rich and poor and almost eliminated the middle class, the foundation of democracies, are already being harshly criticized by the experts participating in the Valdai meetings.

First assessments

First of all, the Western participants emphasized the beginning of the end of neo-liberal economic policies. It seems that neoliberal economic policies have been rejected in their home country, America. Especially since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic policies, which the U.S. not only implemented but also imposed almost everywhere in the world, have been turned into an opportunity for their own rapid development by countries like China and Vietnam, which have implemented nationalist and planned development models, while in most developed countries, especially in the U.S., these policies have caused great rifts in societies. The consequences for us are perhaps among the worst in the world…

The main reasons for Trump’s exit were the excessive monetization of the entire U.S. system, the massive retreat from industrial production, and the fact that while the economy grew, it had no positive impact on the lives of a large part of the population. What remains to be seen is how much of what Trump says will be translated into policy and action. For example, will it be possible to force companies that have invested in industry and advanced technology in China, other Far Eastern countries, and Mexico for decades to come back and invest in the U.S.? If not, will Trump be able to impose high tariffs on goods from countries that export massive amounts of goods to the U.S., especially China, as he said during the campaign? And will he be able to maintain public support for such measures?

On the other hand, if Trump, who has promised to cut taxes, does so, how will he deal with the rapidly growing budget deficit and the national debt, which has already exceeded 35 trillion dollars and whose annual interest rate is around one trillion dollars (and will probably continue to rise)? I wonder if he will be able to seriously reduce the country’s defence spending, despite the fact that the arms companies, which are the most important part of the structure we will briefly describe as the Deep State, are engaged in a battle with him to prevent him from winning the elections? Perhaps… Maybe he even has to…

Foreign policy options

Trump has tied himself in knots over the war in Ukraine. There is no doubt that Trump, whose words ‘If I were president, I would not have allowed this war to start, if I were re-elected, I would end it with a few phone calls’ are etched in our memories, will take serious steps to end the war in our north. The opposition will be all the components of the American deep state, especially the arms companies, and the governments in Europe. If Trump, who this time seems to be more prepared for a comprehensive struggle with the Deep State, is not assassinated and consolidates his power, he can turn his statements on the Ukrainian war into policy.

The second opposition he is likely to face on the Ukraine war will be the weak governments in Europe. For the Baltic states, which would like to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and then see that huge country torn to shreds, and for the European states that have turned the historical grievances of the former Eastern Europe into their own Russia policy, Trump’s election is a disaster in the truest sense of the word.

They can say to Trump: ‘Let’s continue the war in Ukraine, you can continue your arms and financial aid, we will fully support you in your China policy, and if you want, we can even go as far as recognizing Taiwan as an independent state’. However, such a policy would mean that Trump would be doing the opposite of everything he has said so far – especially on Ukraine. On the other hand, while Trump may be preparing for a trade war with China, we do not know much about his intention to start a hot war, or rather a proxy war, over Taiwan.

It goes without saying that Trump is totally opposed to wars against overseas countries, which have become a concept of hatred in the eyes of a large part of American society and which cause enormous costs. Therefore, we can say that Trump may engage in trade wars with China while focusing on stopping the war in Ukraine, but beyond that he is more likely to stay away from a proxy war that risks setting the entire world on fire.

Middle East scenarios

We know that Trump wanted to withdraw from Syria and Iraq during his first term, but the deep state elements prevented this with many maneuvers, and in the case of Syria, Ambassador James Jeffrey, who was America’s special envoy after 2019, said in a statement after Trump lost the elections that they deceived the president by pretending to withdraw from Syria. It is even possible to speak of Trump’s determination on this issue. It is even easy to say that the same determination is in question for Iraq. All this can create extremely important opportunities for Turkey, which we will discuss in our articles and Strategic Compass broadcastings in the coming weeks.

The question of Trump and Israel undoubtedly requires extensive analysis. There is no doubt that there is a lot of truth in theses such as that he will be strongly pro-Israel, that he will march on Iran or that he will unleash Israel on Iran. On the other hand, it may be misleading to expect that Trump, who has consistently stated that he will not start a new war in the Middle East, will give Israel or Netanyahu, whom he does not like very much, a blank cheque.

This is because we know that he unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran, which had been reached in the previous period, in order to please the Israeli lobby, whose help and support he needed in his fight against the deep state, especially in his first term, and that he has made the agreement obsolete and turned to a policy of maximum pressure against Iran. However, all this does not mean that he will now start a war with Iran, especially in a multipolar world order… Since the probability of America and/or Israel winning a war with Iran is low and Iran will not be an easy target, we can assume that Trump’s support for Israel will be subject to certain limitations. All this shows that we are/will be at the beginning of a very extraordinary period.