On May 27, the 27 EU countries approved a massive plan to strengthen the European defense industry, signaling a shift in Europe’s defense policy from relying on the U.S.-led NATO system to pursuing independent self-reliance. This major shift will also be partially endorsed at the NATO summit to be held at the end of the month, where a significant increase in defense spending is expected to be approved. Meanwhile, Germany—holding dual status as both the EU’s political leader and economic engine—is, for the first time since World War II, deploying permanent troops overseas on a large scale. This marks its departure from a long-standing homeland defense stance to a role as a vanguard of European defense. These three major developments symbolize the disintegration of the Western bloc as the world has known it, indicate a restructuring of Europe’s security landscape, and raise long-term public concerns about Germany and Russia entering direct conflict and Europe falling into another large-scale war.

At the Brussels meeting on May 27, the European Council formally approved one of the EU’s most ambitious defense plans ever—”European Security Action”—which will officially take effect on May 29. According to the plan, the EU will raise €150 billion from financial markets and lend it to member states to support defense industry development, boost military equipment production, and improve and optimize overall EU military and strategic capabilities.

The €150 billion investment is only the first step and just part of a much broader rearmament strategy for the continent. The European Commission plans to eventually raise €800 billion over the next decade. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described this as a “once-in-a-generation moment” and a decisive step toward Europe’s strategic autonomy.

Under the plan, member states can receive loan support when purchasing weapons through joint procurement procedures. To qualify, at least 65% of the project’s components must come from the EU, EU candidate or potential candidate countries, or countries with EU security defense agreements, including Norway, the UK, Moldova, Ukraine, Iceland, Switzerland, North Macedonia, Albania, and even Asian countries like Japan and South Korea.

This means non-EU manufacturers like the U.S., Turkey, and the UK can only participate to a limited extent—capped at 15% per project, or 35% under stricter conditions such as prior collaboration with EU contractors or pledging to switch to EU contractors within two years.

To reinforce EU technological sovereignty, a central agency will ensure that no third country can remotely control equipment produced in Europe. This restricts U.S. software firms from participating in EU drone programs developed under the plan. Additionally, to ensure economies of scale, interoperability, and prevent fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, member states must generally procure jointly with at least one other state to be eligible for loans—though exceptions exist for solo procurement.

The first tranche of €150 billion will prioritize artillery ammunition, missiles, drones, air defense systems, military transport aircraft, cyber defense, and AI. Analysts believe this focus addresses shortages and depletion in conventional weapons stockpiles caused by the Russia-Ukraine war, and supports Ukraine’s ongoing war effort.

The massive EU defense budget is seen as a necessary response to historic global upheaval—a major step toward strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. It also reflects the widening rift between Europe and a U.S. increasingly driven by Trump-era isolationism. EU leaders believe the U.S. has abandoned Ukraine and even Europe through rapprochement with Russia. They no longer rely on America as a security umbrella, nor expect the U.S. to rescue Europe in the event of war as it did in WWI and WWII.

Meanwhile, NATO Secretary-General Rutte hopes that at the June 24–25 summit, members will agree to raise military spending to 3.5% of GDP by 2032, with another 1.5% for related expenditures—totaling 5% of GDP, twice the long-standing U.S. target of 2%. Excluding the U.S., Canada, and Turkey, the other 29 NATO members are in Europe—so this means Europe must significantly boost its defense budgets, preparing for a future where the U.S. may fully abandon NATO.

During Trump’s first term, the U.S. pressured some EU nations to hit 2% spending by threatening to dissolve NATO. Now, Trump 2.0 demands even more—doubling the ratio to 5%. After mediation by new Secretary-General Rutte, NATO foreign ministers on May 14 discussed and compromised on the “3.5% + 1.5%” plan: 3.5% for armed forces, 1.5% for war-related infrastructure. This would increase NATO Europe’s military spending from $476 billion in 2024 to $1.15 trillion in seven years. Germany alone would quadruple its defense budget from €52 billion to €215 billion.

The doubling of NATO military spending is clearly not solely the result of direct pressure from the Trump administration, but rather a consequence of the “European panic” triggered by the U.S. shifting the burden and working off its job. Although unwilling, NATO’s European partners are forced to face a chaotic reality and an uncertain future. Major changes in the world order are an undeniable historical process, the decline of American power and its waning willingness to lead are growing trends, and Russia’s geopolitical pressure is both immediate and enduring. These three factors have gradually turned Europe’s strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance from ideals and slogans into conscious and voluntary strategic choices.

As the third barometer of Europe’s strengthening defense power, Germany—the strongest EU member and NATO European partner—has taken new historic steps in military construction, autonomy, and posture. It has boldly carried out the post-World War II breakthrough move of deploying a restructured armored unit permanently abroad for the first time.

On May 22, Germany’s Bundeswehr 45th Armored Brigade was officially deployed to Lithuania, a NATO ally on the Baltic Sea and one of the “frontline countries.” This brigade, specially formed for overseas combat, is a mechanized unit with a full strength of about 5,000 troops, expected to be fully deployed by 2027. It will be stationed at the Rukla Military Base near Lithuania’s capital, Vilnius—only 20 km from Belarus, a Russian ally. Lithuania borders Belarus and Russia’s Baltic exclave Kaliningrad, and the Suwałki Gap connecting Lithuania and Poland is considered the weakest point of NATO’s eastern defense.

German Chancellor Merz stated at the brigade’s inauguration ceremony that this step signifies the Bundeswehr “entering a new era” and that “we are taking NATO’s eastern flank defense into our own hands.” He reiterated Germany’s commitment to NATO’s collective defense and promised that Germany would assume responsibility and “not let European allies down.” Lithuanian President Nausėda called the move a “milestone” for NATO’s security architecture and for Europe. On the 26th, Merz publicly emphasized that Germany and its allies will no longer limit the range of weapons supplied to Ukraine. On the 28th, Merz promised visiting Ukrainian President Zelensky to help develop long-range missile systems.

In response to Germany stationing armored troops near its border, lifting missile range restrictions in line with the U.S., UK, and France, and assisting Ukraine in developing long-range missiles, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov warned Germany on the 28th not to repeat the mistakes of the two World Wars. He stressed that “Germany’s direct involvement in the war is obvious; it is sliding down the same slope that led to its collapse twice in the last century.” Dmitry Medvedev, Vice Chairman of the Russian Security Council, stated that Germany’s equipment and experts are directly involved in operations against Russia. Therefore, Germany is effectively a participant in the Ukraine conflict and has once again become an enemy of Russia.

On March 21, Germany’s Federal Council approved a €500 billion fiscal package, marking a departure from its long-held “debt brake”-centered fiscal conservatism, allowing large-scale government borrowing to invest in defense and infrastructure. The German parliament amended the Basic Law to remove limits on defense and cybersecurity spending. The 2025 defense budget will increase by €100 billion, and total defense spending over the next decade may reach €1 trillion. This is aimed at modernizing the under-equipped Bundeswehr and significantly boosting Germany’s defense strength and combat readiness. According to Reuters, NATO will also ask Germany to add seven more brigades—about 40,000 troops—to its NATO contribution, aiming to raise the total force defending against Russia to 35 to 50 brigades. This alone will require Germany to quadruple its current air defense capacity.

After Taking Office, Merz Quickly Deployed Troops to NATO-Russia Confrontation Zones, Raising Historic Concerns

After taking office, Merz swiftly decided to station troops in the frontline areas where NATO confronts Russia and made bold statements such as allowing Ukraine to use Western weapons to attack Russian territory. These actions not only escalate the military confrontation between Germany, Europe, and even the NATO bloc with Russia, but also easily evoke painful memories of the two world wars—especially the tragic lessons of Germany and Russia waging war over control of the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Sea.

Germany was the source of both World Wars. After World War II, its territory was fragmented, militarism and Nazi ideology were thoroughly eradicated, and the U.S. stationed heavy troops there for strategic containment. Germany was integrated into NATO’s collective defense system, which maintained European peace and security for decades. Based on the lessons and reflections from the two world wars, post-war Germany maintained a low level of armament, lacked an independent military-industrial production system, and pursued a pacifist foreign policy for a long time.

After the Cold War, as the U.S. continued its strategic retrenchment and shifted its military focus to the Asia-Pacific, and the UK exited the EU, Germany—growing stronger—became one of the EU’s dual political engines alongside France and the bloc’s unmatched economic powerhouse. Its status as a great power has continued to rise, as has its determination and role in promoting European strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and defense self-reliance. While Germany is unlikely to start another European war on its own, its increasing will to lead Europe toward defense independence by supporting Ukraine adds more tension and volatility to its relationship with Russia. If Merz’s government continues down this path, it could lead to open conflict with Russia. A German-Russian war would inevitably invoke NATO’s Article 5, dragging the entire alliance into a world war with Russia.

Professor Jiang Feng, a well-known expert on European and German issues, once said: “The concept of ‘reason through culture’ that emerged a few years ago was Europe’s contribution to international political thought, but it has now been nearly forgotten—replaced by the militarization of diplomacy and security policy. This militarization has become a central topic in European and German political debate… German diplomacy needs the courage to give Kant’s vision of ‘perpetual peace’ a new space in today’s era. Trying to create more security and peace through more weapons and larger military exercises may backfire.”

Facing the massive shocks brought by “Trump 2.0,” a desperate Europe appears to be resolutely marching toward a “post-American” era—toward a “European path” of strategic autonomy, diplomatic independence, and military self-reliance. Europe is preparing to give up the dividends of the long-enjoyed “peace under American rule,” aiming instead to shape a “New Continent” formed by a Europe-Russia bipolarity and restore a shattered Ukraine as part of a “New West.” However, this ambition is far from realistic, and a new, balanced solution must be sought.

Germany, the country that launched two world wars and suffered two national catastrophes, now stands at a new crossroads: should it insist on expanding NATO and maintain long-term strategic confrontation with Russia, or cut its losses and reach a comprehensive peace with Russia to jointly build a Europe of lasting peace, comprehensive security, and shared prosperity? This question not only tests the Merz government’s political will and strategic calculation but also its historical judgment and wisdom.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

Nikola Mikovic, Journalist-writer

Central Asia’s rich energy resources and strategically important location are making it a key area of interest for major world powers. Although China, the European Union, and, to a certain extent, the United States, are seeking to increase their presence in a region traditionally within Russia’s geopolitical orbit, small and mid-sized countries from around the world are also aiming to develop closer ties with the Central Asian states.

Moscow preoccupation with the war in Ukraine has opened the door for other actors to expand their influence in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. As a result, in 2024, China’s overall turnover with Central Asia reached $94.8 billion. At the same time, it surpassed Russia to become the main trading partner of Kazakhstan, the biggest country in the region.

The European Union, on the other hand, through its Global Gateway project – which is the EU’s version of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – as well as through regular summits with Central Asian states, is also working to secure its presence in this energy-rich region. Its decision to provide emergency funds to help keep Radio Free Europe (commonly known in Central Asia as Radio Azattyq) afloat after the Trump administration stopped grants to the media outlet, clearly suggests that Brussels is more than interested in winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

Individual EU members are also showing their ambitions to develop stronger relations with the region. The best example is Italy, whose Prime Minister Georgia Meloni took part in the Astana International Forum (AIF) on May 30 in the Kazakh capital. This two-day event saw the attendance of political and business leaders from around the globe who gathered under an expanded agenda that includes climate change, energy security, and sustainability. Meloni also participated in the first-ever Central Asia–Italy summit in Astana, having come from Uzbekistan where she met with the country’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev.

During her speech at the AIF, she quoted Halford Mackinder, a British political geographer, who said that Central Asia represents one of the “pivots” around which the fate of the world revolves. Mackinder is known for his Heartland Theory, which states that control of the Heartland — with Central Asia as a key part — grants control over the entire Eurasian continent. It is, therefore, no surprise that Italy, as well as other EU members, strongly push to establish its own foothold in the energy-rich region.

But besides the European Union and China, other actors are also pursuing a stake in Central Asia. While big players like Türkiye aim to achieve at least some of their geopolitical goals in the region, other nations such as Afghanistan view Central Asian states as potential partners that can help them overcome financial difficulties.

“Over the past few years, we have managed to establish good relations with Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy, and now we hope to strengthen economic ties between our two countries,” Muhammad Rehman Rahmani, the Taliban-appointed Chargé d’Affaires of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan to Kazakhstan, told Harici in an interview.

While speaking at one of the sessions of the Astana International Forum, Nooruddin Azizi, the Taliban’s acting Minister of Industry and Commerce, said that Kabul expects Kazakhstan’s assistance in building road and railway infrastructure in war-torn Afghanistan. It is not a secret that Astana views Afghanistan as an important transit country for its exports to the South Asian markets, which is why it seeks to increase its positions in what is often referred to as “The Graveyard of Empires.”

Kazakhstan’s 2024 decision to remove the Taliban from its list of terrorist organizations has created room for Astana’s potential participation in the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan. Astana’s presence in the Taliban-ruled country would perfectly align with what Kazakhstan’s Deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko described as a “balanced, constructive and pragmatic foreign policy.”

“We have no tense relations with any country in the world, and we aim to contribute to international peace, security and stability,” Vassilenko told Harici, emphasizing that foreign direct investment in Kazakhstan reflects the country’s foreign policy priorities.

If, however, Astana manages to achieve its goal of increasing trade turnover with Afghanistan to $3 billion, it could easily become the Taliban-ruled nation’s main economic partner in Central Asia. This approach suggests that, amid the rush by major global powers to expand their influence in Kazakhstan, Astana may seek to leverage its relationship with Afghanistan to advance at least some of its geoeconomic goals.

Simultaneously, the oil-rich country of around 20 million people will undoubtedly seek to improve its own position vis-à-vis foreign energy corporations, which currently control 98 percent of Kazakh oil revenues. There is no doubt that major foreign powers operating in Central Asia aim to make similar arrangements with other regional states, as this would allow them to fully benefit from the region’s critical minerals, oil, gas, and water resources.

But will Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have the strength to establish energy partnerships with foreign corporations in the same way that oil-rich Arab states did, where the state controls most of the revenue? From the perspective of the Central Asian nations, such an ambition should be among the top priorities of their energy policies.

A striking critique of Europe from the US State Department: Who are human rights and freedom of expression targeting this time?

An article targeting European politics through the lens of US bilateral relations was published on the official website of the US Department of State.

The article, penned by Samuel Samson, Senior Advisor at the Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), is a quintessential piece illustrating how the era, potentially inaugurated by Donald Trump’s re-election as President, is reshaping the U.S. official institutions’ view of Europe.

In his article, Samson states that the relationship between the US and Europe is not merely about geographical proximity or mutual interests. He argues that this bond is nurtured by shared culture, faith, family ties, and especially the heritage of Western civilization, and that this relationship is “reinforced by a tradition of mutual assistance in troubled times.”

‘America is grateful to Europe’

Samson traces the origins of the Transatlantic alliance, which he says is “strengthened by traditions unique to the West,” back to Athens and Rome, and states that America “is grateful to Europe”:

“The revolutionary statement in the Declaration of Independence that ‘all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights’ reflects the ideas of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and other European thinkers. These ideas are based on the principle that people’s natural rights cannot be subjected to the arbitrary decisions of any government. America is grateful to Europe for this intellectual and cultural heritage.”

Samson believes that even when disagreements arise, this ‘bond’ allows for dialogue between America and Europe. However, according to Samson—that is, Trump’s America—this bond has been damaged. The article’s reference to the controversial speech delivered by US Vice President JD Vance at the Munich Security Conference on February 14, 2025, regarding this concern, is noteworthy.

Apparently, the Trump administration’s mouthpieces see Vance’s Munich speech as a ‘turning point,’ much like Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s speech at the 43rd Munich Security Conference (February 10, 2007).

Putin’s historic speech, considered a turning point, in which he sharply criticized the unipolar world order, NATO expansion, and Western interventionist policies, and Vance’s controversial speech themed “the real danger is within us”…

Samson, too, directly quotes the following sentence from Vance’s speech in his article:

“My real concern is internal threats. Europe’s retreat from its most fundamental values, shared with the US.”

Samson also, referencing Francis Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ thesis, believes that the new order Europe established with supranational structures after two major world wars ‘to avoid further catastrophes’ has ‘turned into a wreck’:

“Today, however, this promise lies in ruins. It has been replaced by an aggressive campaign waged against Western civilization. Across Europe, governments have turned political institutions into weapons against their own citizens and our common heritage. Instead of strengthening democratic principles, Europe has become a hub for digital censorship, mass migration, restrictions on religious freedom, and many other threats that undermine democratic self-governance.”

As examples of Europe’s deviation from ‘Western civilization,’ Samson points to ‘the arrest of over 12,000 British citizens in the UK for opposing abortion or making ‘critical online comments’ about the migration crisis,’ the designation of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party as ‘extremist’ by German intelligence, and the obstruction of political parties (referring to right-wing parties) in Poland and Romania. Describing an ‘atmosphere of oppression’ in Europe, Samson believes this negatively affects electoral processes on the continent.

‘An Orwellian surveillance tool’

Samson stated that the European Union’s Digital Services Act, though presented as a measure to protect children from harmful content, has actually turned into an Orwellian surveillance tool used to silence dissenting voices. He added that independent regulatory bodies are monitoring social media companies, including X (formerly Twitter), and threatening them with massive fines.

Samson’s solution to all the problems he describes is ‘the revival of our common global heritage’:

“Our hope is that Europe and the United States will recommit to their Western heritage and that European governments will cease to use the state as a weapon against those who defend this heritage. We may not always agree on scope and tactics, but concrete steps by European governments to protect political and religious expression, secure borders, and guarantee fair elections would be welcome developments. Our relationship is too important, our history too precious, and the international risks too great. We cannot allow this partnership to falter. Therefore, on both sides of the Atlantic, we must preserve the values of our common culture and ensure that Western civilization endures for generations as a source of virtue, freedom, and human flourishing.”

What do Samson’s theses mean?

The article, shaped around the idea that the US needs ‘civilizational alliances’ in Europe, elaborates on the notion that the US-Europe relationship ‘cannot be explained solely by geographical proximity and mutual interests,’ but is shaped by ‘shared culture, faith, family ties, and the common heritage of Western civilization.’

This emphasis on historicity in US-Europe relations is based not only on strategic cooperation but also on the thesis of ‘a legal and cultural kinship spanning thousands of years.’

The contemporary political reflection of Samson’s narrative is the rising right in Europe, or, in one of the right’s popular phrases, ‘despised conservatism’. Samson describes the ‘right-wing’ and ‘Christian-conservative’ segments in Europe as ‘the fundamental defenders of civilization’ and laments that ‘Christian nations’ are unfairly branded as authoritarian and violators of human rights.

In other words, according to Samson, Christianity is a form of identity that must be embraced in Europe today.

Furthermore, according to Samson, the rising right-wing movements in Europe are political currents that have undertaken the mission of protecting Western civilization and possess a Christian identity.

The enemy, then, is roughly all parties ranging from the liberal center or center-left to the center-right. According to Samson, these are the parties that are ‘de-civilizing, alienating Europe from its values, and corrupting’ it.

The values championed by the Trump administration in the US under the main banner of ‘conservatism’ were/are welcomed by segments and even governments uncomfortable with the conceptual framework of the Democratic Party’s America.

So much so that the dismantling of USAID was met with great enthusiasm by some ‘anti-American’ circles.

The Trump administration’s particularly anti-LGBTQI+, Christian faith-based, and traditionalist rhetoric garnered widespread sympathy in countries known for their anti-American stance in Europe, especially Russia.

So, what was really happening?

As an imperialist superpower, the ideology implemented and exported by the US during the Democratic Party (Joe Biden) era was shaped by sexual/ethnic identity politics, emphasizing concepts like social justice and equality—in the broadest terms, ‘woke’ ideology.

This ideology, often labeled ‘radical left/Marxist’ by ‘Trumpism,’ serves a function that does not conflict with the capitalist order, is highly compatible with neoliberal market mechanisms, and overshadows class struggle by deepening identity-based divisions.

‘Recalibrating the course…’

The Trump administration, however, after coming to power, rolled up its sleeves not to dismantle the existing order but to rebuild it within a more conservative and nationalist framework. In other words, we are facing a course change that, at its core, still targets US geopolitical interests, with different concepts coming to the fore as the focus shifts.

The most acute effects of this transformation in US politics are naturally being felt in Europe. This article, penned by Samson from a classic Trumpist perspective, is precisely an expression of the tension between Trumpism and the European politics shaped by the Democrats.

Samson’s description is very likely to find supporters in Europe. This is because, in a political climate where leftist demands for security, stability, and welfare have been systematically suppressed for many years, right-wing alternatives have been strengthened. This has served to build a new kind of right-wing nationalist hegemony, especially in anti-Western countries. A striking example of this is the Romanian right, which until a few months ago filled squares with anti-US slogans, now filling the streets with US flags in alignment with Trump.

US imperialism has thus developed a method capable of confining ‘EU-skeptic’ and ‘anti-Western’ forces in Europe—even in an ‘enemy’ country like Russia—within its own ideological framework. All European countries where the right is on the rise or in power and where various levels of ‘anti-Western’ politics exist in their political life—such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, Slovakia, Serbia, and Romania—are nowadays applauding Trump for ‘saving the world from homosexuality.’

At the end of his article, Samson says, “The United States is determined to build a strong partnership with Europe and to work together towards common foreign policy goals,” and with the statement, “We cannot allow this partnership to falter,” he is, in a sense, issuing a veiled threat.

The US emphasis on ‘working together to solve problems’ is always followed by regime change operations. In Europe, policies aligned with Trump’s America have already achieved significant success.

Concepts such as human rights, civil liberties, and freedom of expression have been used by Democrats and European elites against Russia, especially since 2022. It is clear that these same concepts will this time be part of the Trump administration’s official narrative to describe the grievances of new conservatism and rising right-wing movements.