The American elections ended “as expected” with Trump’s victory. The polls were wrong again, often showing Trump and Kamala Harris neck and neck. Trump did well both in the overall vote and in the swing states. At the time of writing, the results for the House of Representatives have not been finalized. If they win a majority there too, the Republicans will have won a huge victory. In addition to the presidency, Trump will give them overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress, state governorships and state legislatures.

What will Trump do and how will he do it?

This time I followed the American election at the annual forum of the Valdai Discussion Club in Sochi, Russia. The annual forum was attended by a group of about fifty to sixty academics, think-tankers, and experts from around the world, and about twenty to thirty experts from Russia, including, as usual, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (second day) and Russian President Putin (closing session on the last day). Deputy Prime Minister Novak and Kremlin Chief of Staff Oreshkin also attended the Forum, speaking at length and answering questions. As was the case last year, Putin’s introductory speech and subsequent Q&A session lasted more than four hours. He spoke with an incredibly clear content and style, without mincing words.

One of the most striking aspects of the Forum, which I attended for the second time (4-7 November), was that all participants were following the U.S. election with great interest. After Trump’s victory became clear, you could hear different comments from participants depending on which country they came from. For example, while those from Russia and other countries welcomed Trump’s arrival with the expectation that he would put an end to the policy pursued so far by the collective West in the war in Ukraine, guests from China and/or those focusing on China thought that there could be fierce winds between Washington and Beijing.

Similarly divergent views were immediately apparent among participants from Middle Eastern countries. For example, while some Middle Eastern participants were somewhat positive about the serious possibility of an American withdrawal from Syria and Iraq under Trump, Iranian participants spoke of the possibility of war between Iran and a Trump administration that is likely to fully support Israel.

On the other hand, Western participants (such as the UK and Canada) tended to see Trump’s arrival as the beginning of the end of the neo-liberal economic order. The neoliberal economic models, which have catastrophically widened the gap between rich and poor and almost eliminated the middle class, the foundation of democracies, are already being harshly criticized by the experts participating in the Valdai meetings.

First assessments

First of all, the Western participants emphasized the beginning of the end of neo-liberal economic policies. It seems that neoliberal economic policies have been rejected in their home country, America. Especially since the 1980s, neo-liberal economic policies, which the U.S. not only implemented but also imposed almost everywhere in the world, have been turned into an opportunity for their own rapid development by countries like China and Vietnam, which have implemented nationalist and planned development models, while in most developed countries, especially in the U.S., these policies have caused great rifts in societies. The consequences for us are perhaps among the worst in the world…

The main reasons for Trump’s exit were the excessive monetization of the entire U.S. system, the massive retreat from industrial production, and the fact that while the economy grew, it had no positive impact on the lives of a large part of the population. What remains to be seen is how much of what Trump says will be translated into policy and action. For example, will it be possible to force companies that have invested in industry and advanced technology in China, other Far Eastern countries, and Mexico for decades to come back and invest in the U.S.? If not, will Trump be able to impose high tariffs on goods from countries that export massive amounts of goods to the U.S., especially China, as he said during the campaign? And will he be able to maintain public support for such measures?

On the other hand, if Trump, who has promised to cut taxes, does so, how will he deal with the rapidly growing budget deficit and the national debt, which has already exceeded 35 trillion dollars and whose annual interest rate is around one trillion dollars (and will probably continue to rise)? I wonder if he will be able to seriously reduce the country’s defence spending, despite the fact that the arms companies, which are the most important part of the structure we will briefly describe as the Deep State, are engaged in a battle with him to prevent him from winning the elections? Perhaps… Maybe he even has to…

Foreign policy options

Trump has tied himself in knots over the war in Ukraine. There is no doubt that Trump, whose words ‘If I were president, I would not have allowed this war to start, if I were re-elected, I would end it with a few phone calls’ are etched in our memories, will take serious steps to end the war in our north. The opposition will be all the components of the American deep state, especially the arms companies, and the governments in Europe. If Trump, who this time seems to be more prepared for a comprehensive struggle with the Deep State, is not assassinated and consolidates his power, he can turn his statements on the Ukrainian war into policy.

The second opposition he is likely to face on the Ukraine war will be the weak governments in Europe. For the Baltic states, which would like to see Russia strategically defeated in Ukraine and then see that huge country torn to shreds, and for the European states that have turned the historical grievances of the former Eastern Europe into their own Russia policy, Trump’s election is a disaster in the truest sense of the word.

They can say to Trump: ‘Let’s continue the war in Ukraine, you can continue your arms and financial aid, we will fully support you in your China policy, and if you want, we can even go as far as recognizing Taiwan as an independent state’. However, such a policy would mean that Trump would be doing the opposite of everything he has said so far – especially on Ukraine. On the other hand, while Trump may be preparing for a trade war with China, we do not know much about his intention to start a hot war, or rather a proxy war, over Taiwan.

It goes without saying that Trump is totally opposed to wars against overseas countries, which have become a concept of hatred in the eyes of a large part of American society and which cause enormous costs. Therefore, we can say that Trump may engage in trade wars with China while focusing on stopping the war in Ukraine, but beyond that he is more likely to stay away from a proxy war that risks setting the entire world on fire.

Middle East scenarios

We know that Trump wanted to withdraw from Syria and Iraq during his first term, but the deep state elements prevented this with many maneuvers, and in the case of Syria, Ambassador James Jeffrey, who was America’s special envoy after 2019, said in a statement after Trump lost the elections that they deceived the president by pretending to withdraw from Syria. It is even possible to speak of Trump’s determination on this issue. It is even easy to say that the same determination is in question for Iraq. All this can create extremely important opportunities for Turkey, which we will discuss in our articles and Strategic Compass broadcastings in the coming weeks.

The question of Trump and Israel undoubtedly requires extensive analysis. There is no doubt that there is a lot of truth in theses such as that he will be strongly pro-Israel, that he will march on Iran or that he will unleash Israel on Iran. On the other hand, it may be misleading to expect that Trump, who has consistently stated that he will not start a new war in the Middle East, will give Israel or Netanyahu, whom he does not like very much, a blank cheque.

This is because we know that he unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear agreement with Iran, which had been reached in the previous period, in order to please the Israeli lobby, whose help and support he needed in his fight against the deep state, especially in his first term, and that he has made the agreement obsolete and turned to a policy of maximum pressure against Iran. However, all this does not mean that he will now start a war with Iran, especially in a multipolar world order… Since the probability of America and/or Israel winning a war with Iran is low and Iran will not be an easy target, we can assume that Trump’s support for Israel will be subject to certain limitations. All this shows that we are/will be at the beginning of a very extraordinary period.

On November 6, Donald Trump, the Republican candidate and former U.S. president, won the 2024 presidential election by an overwhelming margin, reclaiming the White House after a four-year hiatus and becoming the 47th president of the United States. Concurrently, the Republican Party secured a majority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. The controversial return of Trump as the head of state and the Republican Party’s potential absolute control over the legislative, executive, and judicial branches led global observers to exclaim that “America has changed!” and consequently, “the world is about to change too!”

The 2024 U.S. presidential election was notably dramatic and full of surprises. President Joe Biden, the Democratic incumbent, withdrew from the race mid-campaign due to health issues. Trump, despite facing significant opposition and surviving an assassination attempt, managed a successful comeback. Vice President Kamala Harris, who assumed the Democratic candidacy, initially led in the polls but ultimately suffered a resounding defeat on election day. With this dramatic power shift, prospects of a comprehensive reversal in the established domestic and foreign policies of the Democratic Party have elicited varied reactions—from joy to dismay—within the U.S. and beyond.

Republicans in the U.S. are undoubtedly jubilant, having backed the right candidate in Trump, who, despite initial skepticism during his first campaign, secured at least 312 electoral votes (preliminary figures), cementing a historic victory. Trump is now the second U.S. president to return to the White House through election after previously leaving office. The Republican Party is also poised to secure control over both houses of Congress and numerous state governments, with a Supreme Court already dominated by conservative justices aligned with Republican ideals.

Trump’s victory brings elation to his financial backers, grassroots supporters, industrial workers, and the farming community. These groups resonate with Trump and the Republican Party’s “America First” doctrine and are expected to relish the policies reversing Democratic initiatives and yielding tangible benefits over the next four years.

Conversely, Democrats are facing profound disappointment. Their tenure in the White House was abruptly cut short by the Republican resurgence, culminating in what may be seen as a historic and humiliating defeat, with significant implications for their influence over all three branches of government.

Minority communities, immigrants, leftist progressives, the renewable energy sector, and establishment figures are similarly disheartened by the resurgence of Trump and conservative forces. The return of Trump is expected to stifle minority and immigrant rights, potentially entrenching the U.S. political landscape with a Trumpian ethos. Progressive social movements advocating sexual freedom and the expanding transgender industry are likely to face stringent crackdowns, and the momentum for green and clean energy initiatives may stall. Furthermore, establishment figures fear that the Trump administration could seek to further challenge the American legal system, aiming to consolidate super-executive powers.

Isolationist groups in the U.S. are predictably celebrating, viewing this electoral outcome as a rejection of Biden’s globalist approach and a reassertion of Trumpian and Republican worldviews. The pursuit of “Making America Great Again” and the primacy of “America First” are expected to steer the U.S. away from alliances based on shared values and international obligations, leaning towards mercantilism and self-interest, thus eroding the responsibilities traditionally borne by the world’s leading power and potentially signaling the decline of American hegemony.

In contrast, globalist advocates express profound concern. Trump’s first term already disrupted globalization, alliance networks, and America’s leadership within the Western world. The modest progress made by the Biden administration in restoring these elements is likely to be undone, leaving advocates of “Pax Americana” deeply disappointed.

America’s international allies, too, are split in their reactions, aware of Trump’s policy directions and past actions. Many fear that “Trump 2.0” will push U.S. policies towards greater radicalism and polarization, shunning the compromises and moderation typical of Democratic administrations.

Notably, some U.S. allies and partners who share Trumpian ideology and leadership traits welcome his return. In Europe, far-right movements and Euroskeptics are particularly pleased. Their shared stance on white supremacy, anti-minority and anti-immigrant sentiments, opposition to globalization, and resistance to environmental initiatives align closely with Trump’s platform. Trump’s previous endorsement of Brexit and his initial victory emboldened Europe’s far-right forces. His triumphant return will likely invigorate these groups and even inspire neo-fascist movements with newfound enthusiasm and momentum.

Political leaders in South America who mirror Trump’s ideological style are likely to celebrate his return to power. Among them are Argentina’s President Javier Milei, who came to office a year ago and is often dubbed the “Argentine’s Trump,” and Brazil’s former President Jair Bolsonaro, ousted two years prior but steadfastly strategizing his political comeback. Both leaders anticipate that the resurgence of Trumpism will bolster their political influence and governance models across Latin America.

Traditional European establishment figures, globalists, advocates of European integration, and proponents of transatlantic relations are, in contrast, likely to view Trump’s return with dismay. Memories of Trump’s earlier tenure, during which he undermined the European Union, emboldened far-right movements, pressured NATO members to increase defense spending under the threat of withdrawal, and unilaterally exited various multilateral agreements and international treaties, still linger. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Trump severed air and sea connections with Europe, effectively abandoning traditional allies. Today, European leaders have two new concerns: Trump could instigate a trade war with Europe through the imposition of tariffs and force European nations to purchase U.S. oil and gas at high prices.

Reactions in Europe to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict are similarly mixed. A second Trump administration might alter the dynamics of U.S.-Russia, U.S.-Europe, and Russia-Europe relations, potentially reducing NATO’s involvement in the conflict and increasing the likelihood that Europe would have to bear greater military responsibilities independently.

Russia, for its part, would likely welcome Trump’s return. Trump has previously expressed admiration for President Vladimir Putin’s strong leadership style and has advocated for a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, aiming for a normalization of U.S.-Russia and Europe-Russia relations. Should Trump reduce military aid to Ukraine or pressure European nations to sacrifice Ukrainian interests, Russia, currently holding battlefield advantages, could see an expedited path to victory. European nations, sensing this possibility, have proactively signed security pacts with Ukraine to ensure collective defense in the event of diminished U.S. involvement.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may be entering another “darkest hour.” The recently disclosed “peace plan” by Trump, while promising continued military assistance, proposes an 800-mile-long demilitarized zone between Russia and Ukraine and bars Ukraine from joining NATO for the next 20 years. A potential ceasefire modeled after the Korean Armistice Agreement could see both sides halting active combat along current lines, resulting in a prolonged stalemate.

The U.S.’s partners in the Middle East are similarly split, with one clear beneficiary and several discontented parties. The Middle East today differs from its state four years ago, as regional states increasingly emphasize autonomy and seek intra-Islamic dialogue and reconciliation, no longer placing their hopes solely in U.S. involvement—with Israel being the notable exception.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the powerful Israeli far-right are undoubtedly delighted by Trump’s re-election. Trump’s staunch support for Israel, paralleled by his antipathy toward Iran and Palestine, signals that Israel will find a dependable ally in Washington. This support comes at a critical time, as the Democratic administration’s patience in the region has waned. With Trump back in power, Israel is expected to confidently pursue its objectives across multiple strategic fronts, leveraging U.S. backing for maximum effect. Although Trump is not inclined to entangle the U.S. in Middle Eastern conflicts, he is likely to apply pressure tactics to force concessions from Israel’s adversaries.

For Palestinians, Trump’s return represents a deepening of their plight. They recall that it was Trump who controversially recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, sidelined them with the “Deal of the Century,” downgraded diplomatic relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization, suspended economic and humanitarian aid, and withdrew from UNRWA due to its pro-Palestinian stances.

Iran will also face heightened military, diplomatic, and economic pressure, with an increased likelihood of direct conflict with Israel. Iranians cannot forget Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) during his first term in office and the subsequent tightening of sanctions. Trump’s directive in 2020 that led to the U.S. military’s targeted killing of General Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, which triggered missile strikes against U.S. bases in the Middle East, remains etched in their collective memory.

Saudi Arabia, despite its relatively warm relationship with Trump, may have more reasons for concern than joy. Riyadh faces a complex dilemma between pragmatic and moral imperatives regarding the Palestinian cause. The kingdom has chosen to distance itself from Israel and pursue rapprochement with Iran. Moreover, Saudi Arabia is wary of serving as a “cash dispenser” under U.S. pressure and being coerced into buying American arms, a recurring pattern during Trump’s first term. The potential for a new U.S.-Saudi oil and gas rivalry, spurred by Trump’s plans to flood the market with American energy exports, could exacerbate tensions.

In the Asia-Pacific, responses are similarly mixed, even within individual U.S. partners. Compared to Biden, Trump prioritizes profit over partnership, exhibiting a greater focus on economic and trade benefits for the U.S., while downplaying military alliances and geostrategic commitments.

North Korea may harbor expectations that Trump’s return could lead to a shift from the Biden administration’s policy of strategic neglect, potentially rekindling the momentum of the three summits between Kim Jong-un and Trump. These summits, initially promising steps toward U.S.-North Korea normalization, were effectively stalled due to the COVID-19 pandemic, mutual distrust, and changes in political leadership. A renewed Trump administration could reignite dialogue that has, until now, remained an unfinished diplomatic endeavor.

In contrast, South Korea and Japan are likely apprehensive about Trump’s potential policies that could undermine their military alliances. Trump’s history of pressuring allies to increase defense spending and imposing tariffs on imported goods might compel these nations to recalibrate their strategic positions amidst U.S.-China rivalry, risking a precarious diplomatic balance.

Countries like Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, and India are aware that Trump, known for his transactional approach, might deprioritize their strategic partnerships. This could shift the dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region, where economic interests are placed above security alliances.

China, labeled as the primary adversary by both major U.S. parties, has already experienced the Democratic Party’s assertive policies and Trump’s aggressive tactics during his previous term. Consequently, Beijing has remained composed in response to the White House’s change of leadership, neither cheering nor fearing Trump’s return. China is prepared for Trump’s strategic maneuvers, especially given his doctrine of caution in military engagements but willingness to escalate trade, technology, and financial confrontations. It anticipates that a second Trump term may not lead to military conflicts but could intensify economic warfare, including trade disputes and restrictions on Chinese investments.

On November 7, President Xi Jinping and Vice President Han Zheng sent congratulatory messages to President-elect Trump and his running mate, J.D. Vance, reaffirming China’s consistent principles in handling bilateral relations and expressing expectations for continued engagement. The development of U.S.-China relations under Trump’s leadership is poised to be the focal point of global attention, representing a key determinant of world peace and security.

Proponents of Taiwan independence are among the biggest losers in this shift in U.S. leadership. The Republican Party’s platform has remained silent on Taiwan, omitting any mention of its defense. Trump himself previously demanded that Taiwan contribute 10% of its GDP as a “protection fee,” signaling a transactional approach to its security.

With the Biden administration’s push to transition Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) into a “Made-in-America” entity, thereby eroding Taiwan’s core industries, further challenges loom. Elon Musk, who maintains a close rapport with Trump and supports the “One China” principle, recently urged his aerospace suppliers to cease sourcing components from Taiwan. This move underscores his recognition of the Chinese market’s importance and implies that Trump’s Taiwan policy may align with Musk’s strategic interests. Consequently, Taiwanese independence leaders, such as William Lai, are left in a precarious position, facing significant political and economic setbacks.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.

On October 30, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution urging Israel to rectify recent misconduct toward UN-mandated institutions. This included a call from all 15 member states, including the United States, for Israel to reverse its decision to shut down the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The resolution emphasized that UNRWA plays a “crucial role in all humanitarian efforts in Gaza” and provides “life-saving humanitarian aid” along with education, health, and social services in the occupied Palestinian territories, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.

This development indicates that Israel’s confrontation with the UN has escalated to a point of acute tension, placing it in an increasingly isolated position. Even the United States, which has historically supported Israel, strongly opposes its expansion and escalation of what can be called the “eighth front,” exacerbating its relations with the UN.

On October 28, the Israeli parliament passed two laws banning UNRWA’s activities in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories on grounds of alleged support for terrorism. UNRWA was established by UN General Assembly Resolution 302 on December 8, 1948, to provide aid to Palestinian refugees. Following the 1967 war, the agency’s humanitarian mandate was expanded to Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria. The wars of 1948 and 1967 displaced approximately 800,000 and 1,000,000 Palestinians, respectively, most of whom sought refuge in neighboring Arab countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, resulting in the world’s largest and longest-standing political refugee crisis.

On October 5, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lamented that his country was engaged in conflict on “seven fronts.” However, I argue that Israel’s conflict extends beyond these seven fronts, encompassing an “eighth front” that involves broader soft confrontations and localized hard conflicts with the United Nations. Many readers may be unaware of the origins and nature of Israel’s “eight fronts,” making it necessary to provide a systematic explanation.

Netanyahu’s “seven fronts” include: Gaza and the West Bank in Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. The “eighth front,” as defined by me, is Israel’s confrontation with the United Nations, spanning from the UN General Assembly to the Security Council, from UN headquarters in New York and Geneva to UNRWA in Gaza and UN peacekeeping camps along the Israel-Lebanon border. This front has included verbal assaults on the UN and its leaders, as well as acts of violence, including gunfire and shelling directed at UN forces and the occupation of peacekeeping camps. Israel’s current posture reflects an unprecedented level of defiance, characterized by audacity and recklessness—seemingly challenging the international community at large while disregarding who conferred its legitimacy as a sovereign state.

On November 29, 1947, the second session of the UN General Assembly, despite opposition from Arab nations, forcefully adopted Resolution 181 to partition Palestine. This resolution allocated 52% of the land to Jewish inhabitants, who constituted only one-third of the local population, while 48% was designated for the indigenous Arab population—now known as “Palestinians”—who represented two-thirds of the population. Sovereignty over Jerusalem was placed under the UN. The Arab world’s resistance to this resolution, which shifted the burden of Europe’s anti-Semitic and genocidal history to the indigenous Palestinian people, ignited the Arab-Israeli conflict and resulted in further illegal annexation of Palestinian land by Israel, laying the groundwork for subsequent wars between Israel and its neighboring states.

Over the course of more than half a century, various Palestinian factions have increasingly faced the reality of their situation and reached a consensus: they now only aspire to reclaim Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem—territories constituting merely 23% of pre-partition Palestine. In stark contrast, figures such as Prime Minister Netanyahu and other proponents of “Greater Israel” seek the total annexation of Palestinian lands, extending their ambitions to parts of Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, justified solely on the basis that their ancestors once resided there, even if only as refugees rather than rulers or native inhabitants.

The United Nations, having conferred legitimacy upon Israel’s sovereignty at the expense of Palestinian rights, can be considered the “mother” of Israel under international law. However, under the prolonged protection of the United States, the vast majority of UN General Assembly and Security Council resolutions concerning Israel have been vetoed, fostering a climate of impunity and defiance. Today, Israel’s actions betray an unprecedented disregard for international norms, positioning it as a “Middle Eastern Oedipus,” engaging in reckless behavior that exacerbates current conflicts and severely depletes the global sympathy once extended due to historical persecution.

UN Secretary-General António Guterres faced severe criticism from Israel for his measured statement, “Hamas’s attack on Israel did not occur in a vacuum,” highlighting the tragedy and suffering imposed on the Palestinian people through over 70 years of occupation. Israel responded by challenging Guterres’ legitimacy, persistently calling for his resignation, ultimately designating him a persona non grata, and denying him a visa.

Amid mounting censure from both the UN General Assembly and Security Council, Israel has provocatively labeled the UN a “terrorist organization” or an enabler of terrorism, prohibiting UNRWA from fulfilling its humanitarian mandate. In an even more aggressive move, Israeli forces, despite international condemnation, have repeatedly targeted UN peacekeeping troops stationed at the Israel-Lebanon border to monitor ceasefire agreements, aiming to drive them from their posts.

Gaza and the West Bank represent Israel’s first and second fronts of conflict and are the catalysts for broader regional tensions. Although Israeli forces and settlers withdrew from Gaza in 2005, Israel still maintains control over its territorial waters, airspace, and border crossings. Consequently, Gaza remains an occupied territory, often referred to as the “world’s largest open-air prison,” and continues to be an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories. Thus, the relationship between Israel and Gaza is one of occupier and occupied; between Israel and Hamas, it is one of occupier and armed resistance. Israel’s narrative framing of the “Israel-Hamas war” seeks to isolate Hamas from the broader Palestinian resistance, obscuring the fundamental nature of the “Israel-Palestine conflict.”

The West Bank, covering over 6,000 square kilometers, is separated from the 360-square-kilometer Gaza Strip by a narrow strip of Israeli territory less than 100 kilometers wide. For a long time, the West Bank was the stronghold of Hamas’s political rival, Fatah. However, in recent years, the West Bank has become progressively “Hamas-ized,” resembling a second Gaza or “Hamastan,” as more Palestinians in the West Bank have abandoned the decades-long moderate approach and turned toward Hamas.

During my tenure as an Xinhua correspondent in Gaza from 1999 to 2002, public support for Hamas was around 30%, and its influence and activities were largely confined to Gaza. In the major 2004 Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the main battleground was the West Bank, where Fatah was Israel’s principal adversary, while Hamas maintained a more passive role in Gaza.

Since Hamas’s electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, the political balance in Palestine has shifted dramatically. Subsequent Israeli-Palestinian conflicts have centered around Gaza, with Hamas and even more radical factions such as Islamic Jihad and militant Salafi groups taking the lead. No elections have been held in Palestine for years, as every poll predicts a Hamas victory. Even high-ranking Fatah officials, imprisoned by Israel for over a decade, have joined Hamas upon their release. The increasing influence of Hamas in the West Bank has prompted Israel to deploy major forces there to suppress violent resistance, inadvertently enabling Hamas to orchestrate a surprise assault from Gaza, causing significant Israeli casualties. The geographical and social “Hamas-ization” of the occupied Palestinian territories is, in part, the outcome of Netanyahu’s “mowing the grass” strategy, which has deliberately fostered a dual power structure among Palestinians.

The rationale is straightforward: although Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000, it continues to control strategically significant but limited areas, such as the Shebaa Farms, providing Hezbollah with a basis for attacking Israel under international law. Hezbollah, a Shia militant group supported and funded by Iran, has also been embroiled in both overt and covert conflicts with Lebanon’s Christian factions and Sunni Muslims. While it has undeniably brought waves of conflict upon Lebanon, Hezbollah originated as a product of Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon. Notably, no Lebanese political party has openly challenged Hezbollah’s national right to reclaim occupied territories.

Since the loss of the 1,200-square-kilometer Golan Heights after the failed counteroffensive during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, Syria has maintained a state of cold peace with Israel. The onset of the 2011 Arab Spring destabilized Syria, leading to the intervention of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Shia militias, and Hezbollah under the pretext of fighting the Islamic State (ISIS), thereby presenting a direct threat to Israel. Over the past decade, Israel has persistently targeted sites within Syria—not to destroy the Syrian government forces but to expel Iranian and Hezbollah forces from the region. The Syrian government, unable to reclaim the Golan Heights, has leveraged external actors to pressure Israel, transforming its territory into a proxy battleground.

Iraq has been engaged in hostilities against Israel since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. After the 1958 revolution that toppled the monarchy and Saddam Hussein’s ascent to power a decade later, Iraq became a prominent base and financier for the Palestinian resistance for nearly half a century. Following the Shiite ascendency post-2003, Iraq’s policy toward Israel, heavily influenced by Iran, remained unchanged. The subsequent emergence of the Shia militia “Popular Mobilization Forces” (PMF) under the banner of anti-terrorism marked a new phase.

During the current conflict, the PMF has, for the first time, embraced the mantle of Arab nationalism, engaging in attacks on Israeli and U.S. military bases in Iraq and Syria and earning the label “Iraq’s Hezbollah.” This development has plunged Iraq back into direct confrontation with Israel for the first time since the Gulf War, turning Iraqi airspace and territory into a proxy battlefield, vulnerable to incursions by Iranian missiles, drones, and Israeli jets. The PMF, under the pretext of liberating Palestine, has opened a front against Israel, motivated by Iranian influence, Shia solidarity, and its own bid for political dominance within Iraq.

The Houthi movement, which models itself after Iran’s Islamic Republic, maintains intricate ties with both Iran and Hezbollah, often coordinating actions in concert. Despite not having previously positioned itself as an advocate for the Palestinian cause, the Houthi’s sudden, significant involvement in the current conflict is perceived as “opportunistic overreach.” This maneuver reflects its efforts to consolidate power in Yemen, drape itself in the rhetoric of Arab nationalism, push for the withdrawal of Saudi and other foreign forces, and gain recognition from neighboring states as Yemen’s legitimate government in place of the now largely defunct exiled administration.

Historically, 2,500 years ago, Cyrus the Great of Persia was celebrated as a “Messiah” in the Bible for rescuing the ancestors of the Israelites. However, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been an unwavering opponent of Zionism and Israel’s expansionist policies, framing its involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian and broader Arab-Israeli conflicts as part of its Islamic duties and leveraging these engagements to assert itself as a regional power. Consequently, both Israel and the United States view Iran as the primary instigator of regional instability.

Israel and Iran have long engaged in proxy and covert warfare, which has now become more overt, evolving into direct confrontation. The conventional paradigm of Arab states waging war against Israel, which persisted until the end of the 1982 Lebanon War, has shifted. The new geopolitical landscape is defined by an “Axis of Resistance,” led by Iran and comprising sovereign Syria and non-state actors from Palestine, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq.

Israel has seldom stood alone; whether within the United Nations or in Middle Eastern conflicts, the U.S. has been its stalwart ally. Over the past year, the U.S. has vetoed five Security Council resolutions aimed at establishing a ceasefire in Gaza, provided Israel with continuous military support, and shared in some military operations. This assistance includes deploying carrier strike groups, positioning the THAAD missile defense system to protect Israel, intercepting Iranian missile and drone attacks, applauding the elimination of Hamas leaders, and conducting airstrikes on Houthi and PMF bases. Consequently, Israel’s engagement on its “eight fronts” is largely conducted with U.S. backing, symbolizing their alignment in the same strategic trench.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.