Connect with us

EAST MEDITERRANEAN

Lebanon-Israel maritime border deal in 5 questions

Published

on

The disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, which have previously brought Lebanon and Israel -two countries with no diplomatic relations to this day- to the brink of war, is about to be resolved once and for all. Although the deal may seem more profitable for Israel from an economic point of view, the political concessions given are still a topic of debate. And it is being argued that the economic upsides of this to Lebanon, a country on the brink of economic collapse, could take some time. However, the fact that the risk of a possible war is now gone even with some gains from the maritime zones claimed by Israel, offers Beirut an opportunity to finally recover.

Israel and Lebanon, which hold no diplomatic relations to this day, have managed to reach an agreement delimiting their maritime jurisdictions. And if the agreement, which is expected to be signed on October 26-27, is approved by the parliaments of both countries, another dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean will finally be resolved.

Signatures for a final agreement are yet to be put up, but there are already debates going on about which country has come out as benefiting more in such grounds of political instability that both countries are in. We have compiled the most debated questions and answers about the history of this maritime border dispute in the region, the dynamics that led the two countries to sign after previously bringing them to the brink of war, and the agreement’s pros and cons.

1-What is the background of this dispute?

Although the disputes over the 860 square kilometer wide maritime area between the two countries has come up with the drilling and exploration activities by both countries in recent years, its origins date back to 2007. An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)  agreement was signed between Lebanon and the Greek Cypriot Administration that year. The transcript of the agreement, which left a gap for other maritime boundary agreements with neighboring countries, has still not been ratified by the Lebanese Parliament. And the formal status of the agreement, which Lebanon still has not sent to the United Nations (UN) for ratification, is still a matter of debate today. The Lebanese Minister’s cabinet has established a committee to review the agreement signed with the Greek Cypriots, and to revise the borders of the EEZ. The Committee has unilaterally notified the UN of the EEZ borders in 2010.

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot Administration has also signed an agreement with Israel in 2010 on delimitation of the EEZ. However, this deal violates a part of the EEZ border set together with Lebanon. And due to the fact that an 860 square kilometer area was shown as belonging to Israel, Lebanon announced to not recognize the Greek Cypriot-Israeli agreement and objected to it, at the UN. The disputed area covers a part of the Karish and Qana Gas Fields off the coast between the two countries.

In 2017, Lebanon agreed upon a consortium of several energy companies such as French TotalEnergies, Italian Eni and Russian Novatek to conduct hydrocarbon exploration at the maritime zones dedicated to its continental shelf, including the previously disputed territory. Works have already begun, and it has been announced that there is enough detected gas reserves for drilling operations, however the French TotalEnergies still required Lebanon to reach an agreement with Israel, in order to begin drilling efforts. Moreover, Lebanon was excluded from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) just like Turkey, but countries like Israel, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration was included. And instead of an agreement from the UN-supervised negotiations, a position was taken in which both parties have gained higher ground.

But in 2020, a step came from Israel. The Tel Aviv administration announced that  a contract was given over the Karish gas field, and in the summer of 2021 the Tel Aviv management announced that the British contractor company Energean Power was ready for drilling operations. And when a possible scenario of war came on the agenda with Hezbollah’s announcement that it would target drilling and exploration ships entering the disputed zone, the United States has stepped in.

2-Why would there be an understanding right now?

Europe’s dependence on the Russian gas has come forth as a major problem, now with the Ukraine crisis. Both the European countries and the United States have put up a soft power to end the regional tensions and to focus more on gas production, which they hope could increase European energy diversification.

On the other hand, both Lebanon and Israel have good reasons to avoid risking a possible war. The economic reasons are outweighing for Lebanon, a country that is experiencing one of the most severe economic crises in the history of the country, even more so after the catastrophic explosion at the Port of Beirut. Although it is not quite possible to profit from the gas field being ceded in the short term, the reduction of the conflict risks will surely attract more foreign investors, who had been refraining to make an investment in this country. In a country where 80 percent of the population live below the poverty line and basic public services such as electricity are in an irredeemable situation, a relatively stable political environment could create an opportunity to at least make small recovers.

The resolution of the dispute over Karish gas field near the Tanin field, where billions of cubic meters of natural gas are estimated to be in reserves, will surely ease the economy of Israel, which already got to the stage of gas production in this field. This has been an important source of morale for Israel, which has been liquefying its gas in Egypt and selling it to the European markets for the last two years, in search of an alternative to the Russian gas.

3- What are the contents of this agreement?

Although the full transcript of the agreement has not been officially announced, the statements made by officials from both countries and the details shared by both sides to the public, give a rough idea about the content of the articles.

In light of these information;

Lebanon previously argued that it owned the north of Line 29, which in total covers an area of 1,430 square kilometers. Israel on the other hand, previously claimed the south of Line 1, which is a 860 square kilometer wide zone. And the limitation shown on the map as Line 23, was drawn from the middle of the jurisdictions claimed by both countries, in the preliminary deal.

Lebanon has renounced its claims over the Karish gas field. In return, Lebanon will have the right to explore and exploit the oil and gas reserves in Qana field. However, TotalEnergies, which is the company authorized take drilling operations in this field, will pay a compensation to Tel Aviv for the remaining 17 percent of the field, that was previously under Israeli jurisdiction.

4- What did Lebanon demand and what did it get?

Officials from both countries say their demands have been met. And even Hezbollah, which was previously seen as the biggest obstacle to such an agreement, gave its implicit approval to the agreement. However, Lebanon has given up on its previous claims of;

* All rights over Karish gas field,

* Its claim that the maritime and land borders should be determined simultaneously,

* And also it seems to given up the freedom to choose the company that would take exploration and drilling operations over the Qana field.

Still, given the two countries’ initial maritime claims, it seems that Lebanon has gained more maritime zones than Israel. However, the exact quantity of the hydrocarbon reserves in the region are yet to be known. It is also estimated that it may take three to five years to exploit this gas, so it will not have any direct contributions to the Lebanese economy in the short term. And for the Lebanese economy, which could not suffer through another conflict, the total annihilation of this risk is considered to be a more comforting effect.

5- What did Israel demand and what did it get?

And it seems that Tel Aviv, which has gained full sovereignty in the disputed region and also is already in the process of exploitation of the gas field, can gain more in the short term by focusing on gas production since the threat of Hezbollah is now raveled. Despite its economic benefits, the deal has come under severe political criticism in Israel.

The most spoken criticisms of the agreement from the Israeli politicians and from the public opinion are as follows;

* Israel has made an indirect deal with the terrorists (Hezbollah).

* Israel has failed to get Lebanon to accept the phrase “international maritime border” in the transcript of the agreement. The agreement instead uses the term “no conflict area for the defined limits.

* Although the Israeli authorities say that they will receive a share of the income from the Qana field, there is no such clear statement in the agreement transcript. And it is also not clear the percentage of the income Israel will receive, the source companies, or the terms and conditions of that income percentage. In addition, Israel does not have any right of objection for the company that would work in the region. The only criteria in this context, is that “it is not subject to any international sanctions.”

* This agreement was signed by an caretaker government that does not have a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), right before the legislative elections. Moreover, the Israeli law requires a public referendum or an absolute majority in the Knesset for any handouts of the Israeli territories or jurisdictions to another country. Although the government that has signed the agreement has acknowledged the transfer of part of the Israeli EEZ to Lebanon, it has still not voted it in through a referendum and neither bringing it to the vote through Knesset, which the government is sure this deal would not pass.

*The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that an caretaker government cannot make decisions that are binding on the subsequent government, without a valid reason.

The caretaker Prime Minister of Israel, which is going through an election this November, Yair Lapid, who has signed this deal, is less likely to be elected into office than Benjamin Netanyahu, who announced that he will not recognize this maritime deal at all. Netanyahu, who has based his election strategies against his center-left political rivals entirely on right-wing rhetoric, is more likely to be a dark horse. Moreover, it would only be a surprise if a party or an alliance that would run the country for a long time, to form a government all alone. Such uncertainty in the Israeli politics and objections to the contents of it, puts the agreement in the situation of a lame duck, before it is even ratified.

EAST MEDITERRANEAN

Germany pushes for ‘positive’ message to Turkey at EU summit

Published

on

Germany has stepped up pressure in recent days for a ‘positive’ message on the future of EU-Turkey relations to be included in the final declaration of the EU summit, Euractiv has learned.

Two EU diplomats confirmed to Euractiv that Berlin is pushing for the inclusion of a paragraph in the final text of the EU summit conclusions urging the European Commission to continue monitoring the development of EU-Turkey relations.

After months of escalating relations between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, the EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell prepared a report on the state of play of EU-Turkey political, economic and trade relations in early 2023.

Although the first report was completed in November 2023, it could not be discussed due to the busy agenda of EU leaders at the last three summits.

However, according to Euractiv, Cyprus wanted a “proper” discussion at this summit before sending a “positive” message, as suggested by Germany.

An EU diplomat told Euractiv that European Council President Charles Michel was not keen to discuss the issue because of the heavy agenda.

Relations with Athens, migration and satisfaction with sanctions against Russia

According to Euractiv, the European Commission would like to see a reference to a possible EU-Turkey discussion between EU leaders in the final declaration and, at best, a reference to Borrell’s November report.

According to EU officials, positive steps have been taken in recent months, with improved relations with Greece (especially on migration) and special measures taken against Russian sanctions-busting.

However, there are still ‘some concerns’ about President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s description of Hamas as a ‘liberation group fighting to preserve Palestinian land’ rather than a ‘terrorist organisation’.

Cyprus issue stands out as main obstacle

According to Euractiv, there are also some concerns about Ankara’s stance on Cyprus. Sources in Athens stress that Greece could accept a paragraph calling on the Commission to continue the EU-Turkey situation reports.

However, the same sources said that this paragraph should include the following statement from the previous EUCO conclusions “The European Council reiterates the EU’s readiness to engage with Turkey in a gradual, proportionate and reversible way to enhance cooperation in various areas of common interest”.

In addition, the Greek Cypriot side asked for the inclusion of a sentence clarifying that the European Council should have the “last word” on any political decision concerning Turkey.

Cyprus asked for the inclusion of an EU representative on the Cyprus problem, but not all member states agree, Euractiv reported.

Finally, Cyprus asked for the inclusion of the EU’s line on the Cyprus problem, i.e. a bi-communal, bi-national federal solution, in opposition to Turkey’s efforts for a two-state solution.

Athens and Nicosia react to Erdoğan’s comments

Tensions have eased in recent months as Greece and Turkey have engaged in dialogue to improve bilateral relations.

But earlier this week Erdogan provoked the ire of Athens and Nicosia when he said: “Maybe even if we were burdened with the south, I say this as a son of today, there would be no more south-north, there would be no more south-north, Cyprus would be completely ours.”

Cyprus said the statement was “unacceptable”. In Greece, a source in the Greek Foreign Ministry argued that Erdogan’s “statements on the illegal occupation of Cyprus in 1974 constitute a blatant distortion of historical facts and an insult to the memory of the victims”.

The source pointed out that these remarks were made at a time when efforts are underway to resume negotiations under the auspices of the UN, within the framework of UN Security Council resolutions, for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Continue Reading

EAST MEDITERRANEAN

Tehran-Riyadh rapprochement may be the key in Arash/Durra

Published

on

Tehran has called for negotiations over the disputed gas field between Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A Riyadh-Tehran rapprochement could help bring the parties to a settlement in the gas field, which has not been shared since the 1960s.

After Iran announced it would drill in the Arash/Durra gas field in the Persian Gulf, Kuwait and then Saudi Arabia claimed that the field belonged to them.

The controversy started when Mohsen Khojestemehr, Managing Director of the National Iranian Oil Company, announced that “preparations to start drilling in the oil field have been completed.” “The board of directors of the National Oil Company has been allocated a significant amount of resources to implement the development plan for this field,” Khojestemehr said, according to Iranian state media.

Following Iran’s announcement, an anonymous Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry official said that the Arash/Durra Gas Field in the Persian Gulf and its natural wealth, the subject of the dispute with Iran, belongs entirely to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. The official called on Iran to sit down with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and start negotiations to define the maritime border between the two countries.

A day later, a similar call came from Saudi Arabia. Riyadh argued that the entire Durra field belongs to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and urged Iran to “sit down at the table”.

The Arash/Durra Gas Field in the Persian Gulf, discovered in 1967, has been causing problems between Iran and Kuwait for years. The Iranian side of the gas field is called Arash, while the Kuwaiti side is known as Durra.

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait signed an agreement in March 2022 to develop the Durra Gas Field. Iran, on the other hand, argued that the agreement was “illegal” and announced that it would start drilling in the region.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had previously called on Iran to negotiate on this issue, but there was no response from Tehran.

Robin Mills, CEO of Dubai-based Qamar Energy, told The National, “The Saudi-Iran restoration of diplomatic relations included talk of developing joint oil fields. Kuwait has held negotiations with Iran on the border but maintains its position that Al Durra belongs entirely to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia”.

Nora Bakhsh, a researcher on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, said that the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia was looking positive so far, but these negotiations are still in the beginning stages and Tehran’s claims to Al Durra could pose additional challenges to them.

Continue Reading

EAST MEDITERRANEAN

Dibeybe and Haftar agree on “Government of Reconciliation”

Published

on

Libya’s Government of National Unity (GNA) and Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the armed forces in the east of the country, have reportedly reached a consensus on the formation of a new “Government of Reconciliation”. This agreement was reflected in the meeting of the “6+6” committee formed to prepare the legal framework for the elections in the Moroccan capital, Rabat. The committee agreed on the formation of a joint government to manage the election process.

Cairo-based negotiations between Tripoli and Benghazi have been taking place for a long time. The most important item on the agenda of these talks is to determine the laws that will lead the country to elections. The most important disagreement in this context is the relevant articles that will determine whether Khalifa Haftar, the leader of the armed forces in the east of the country, will be a candidate. It is claimed that a consensus has been reached in the talks deadlocked because the government in Tripoli opposed Haftar’s candidacy. The deal is based on the formation of a joint government that will lead the country to elections. Accordingly, a source close to the Libyan government told AA, “During the negotiations between the delegations of the two sides in the Egyptian capital Cairo, an agreement was reached that the prime minister should be from the west of the country and his deputy from the east.” According to the source, who requested anonymity, according to the agreement between the two sides, GNU Premier Dibeybe will continue to serve as prime minister in the new government in exchange for Haftar’s renunciation of the pressure he exerted to prevent him from participating in the presidential elections. In other words, Dibeybe will not object to the electoral law’s exclusion of articles preventing “dual citizens and soldiers” from running for the presidency, paving the way for Haftar’s presidential candidacy.

The consensus in the informal Cairo-based negotiations was reflected in the talks in Rabat of the UN-supervised “6+6” committee to prepare the legal framework for the elections. According to a Libya Observer briefing last night, the meeting agreed on the rules for the election of the President and members of the National Assembly. Accordingly, they agreed to form a unified government to run the election process.

Consisting of 6 members each from the Libyan Supreme Council of State and the House of Representatives, the Committee for the Electoral Laws started its meetings in Rabat on Monday, May 22, to draft the laws for the elections planned to be held this year.

An anonymous Libyan member of the Committee told AA that logistical issues were discussed during the meeting with the UN Special Envoy to Libya and the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) election official. The member said that issues such as the individual electoral system and electoral lists were discussed during the talks, adding that closed and open lists, the majority system, the seats to be allocated to women and internal migration issues were also discussed in the meeting. The Libyan official noted that the 6+6 committee discussed these issues both among themselves and with the UN official.

The “Constitutional Declaration”, announced after the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s rule in Libya (1969-2011), is considered the provisional constitution in the country. The Committee for the Electoral Laws, consisting of 6 members each from the Libyan Supreme State Council and the House of Representatives, is planned to amend Article 13 of the Constitutional Declaration, regarded as the constitutional basis for the elections in the country.

Haftar eliminated Bashagha

On the other hand, it was claimed that Fathi Basaga was suspended from his post since he rejected the reconciliation between Dibeybe and Haftar.

The source who spoke to AA said that Bashagha did not want to take a lower-level post in the new government, “Bashagha refused to be Dibeybe’s deputy. For this reason, Haftar put pressure on the House of Representatives to remove Bashagha.”

In his resignation letter addressed to the Presidency of the House of Representatives in Tobruk on May 16, Bashagha said, “I express that Libyan Deputy Prime Minister Ali Faraj al-Katrani was assigned with all our duties and authorities.” On the same day, in a session held in the House of Representatives in Tobruk, an investigation was launched against Fathi Bashaga, who was elected Prime Minister for the east of the country in February 2022.

Abdullah Bliheg, the House spokesperson, stated in a written statement that “the Parliament voted by majority for the dismissal of Libyan Premier Fathi Bashagha and the opening of an investigation against him on charges of damaging public property” and stated that Osama Hammad, Minister of Finance and Planning, was appointed as acting Prime Minister for the seat vacated by Bashagha.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey