Opinion

The Munich Security Conference and the limits of American power

Published

17.02.2026 10:19

The 62nd Munich Security Conference, convened in Munich, Germany, has demonstrated once again that the divergences of opinion within the Atlantic alliance are far from negligible. Yet, despite the lofty rhetoric and ambitious pronouncements of European leaders, they possess neither the courage, the capability, nor the will to operationalize these words or do what is necessary.

The events unfolding within the Atlantic alliance are not novel; they are part of a longstanding debate. Western leaders face formidable challenges not only in foreign policy but also in their domestic spheres. They are besieged by difficulties ranging from poverty and unemployment to inflation and the refugee-migrant crisis. U.S. President Trump recognizes this as well. The state capacity of his country is waning. Neither the Democrats nor the Republicans can arrest the decline in America’s hegemonic capability or its dominance over the global ecosystem. The U.S. is unable to prevent the rise of adversaries such as China and Russia, nor can it impede them from forging alliances with one another.

Since international relations is a discipline predicated on necessities and imperatives rather than mere preferences, alliances shift as needs evolve. Every alliance inevitably begets a counter-alliance.

The U.S. is struggling to adapt to these shifting balances. This is the root cause of its hardening stance, its growing belligerence, and its declaration that it will no longer abide by the order for which it wrote the rules and established the institutions. This reality is already reflected in the country’s economy, diplomacy, and social structure. In a nation with a population of 343 million, 7.3 million are unemployed. The country’s federal debt is exceedingly high, standing at 38.7 trillion dollars, against an economic volume of 31.2 trillion dollars. The disparity in income distribution is at a terrifying level. The wealth of the richest 50 individuals equals that of half the population. By the end of 2025, the 10 wealthiest billionaires in the U.S. added another 698 billion dollars to their fortunes in a single year. More than 40 percent of the U.S. population—and half of its children—are classified as low-income. According to OECD data, the U.S. ranks first in relative poverty, second in child poverty and infant mortality, and second to last in life expectancy.

Therefore, when discoursing on the United States, it is imperative to look beyond its imperial character and scrutinize its economy, social structure, the systemic failures in health and education, high crime rates, and overflowing prisons. The political, social, cultural, and class chasms in the U.S. are numerous and diverse. Resolving these issues in the short term is a formidable task.

U.S. Policies Regarding China and Russia

The greatest rival to the U.S. is China. This reality is already inscribed in foreign policy, national security, defense, and strategy documents. China, alongside Russia, is characterized as an “adversary state,” a state challenging U.S. hegemony. However, despite their political and diplomatic friction, the U.S. and China both collaborate and compete on an economic scale. The U.S. owes the most debt to China, and China holds the most U.S. debt. Economic relations are defined by mutual investment, debt-credit dynamics, import-export volumes, and fierce competition. It is impossible for them to decouple from one another.

China, the world’s second-largest economy after the U.S., has surpassed the U.S. in calculations based on purchasing power parity to become the largest economy. In merchandise trade, China is the European Union’s second-largest partner after the U.S. China’s foreign exchange reserves reached 3.357 trillion dollars by the end of 2025. China overtook the U.S. in manufacturing in 2011, in merchandise trade in 2013, and in patent numbers in 2019. In 2020, it became the world’s largest consumer market. It is projected to become the world’s largest economy by 2030.

To encircle China within its immediate periphery, the U.S. spearheaded the quadrilateral alliance known as the QUAD (U.S., Japan, India, Australia). It is striving to expand this alliance further. The U.S. attempts to prevent a rapprochement between China and Russia and to neutralize institutions led or participated in by these two nations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS). It is particularly eager for India to cooperate closely with the U.S. against China, developing a specific “Indo-Pacific Strategy” to this end. Yet, thus far, it has not achieved the desired results.

As witnessed once again at the Munich Security Conference, Germany encounters friction in its relations with the U.S. whenever it articulates a desire to become a political, diplomatic, and military power commensurate with its economic, industrial, and technological might. However, despite these words, Germany cannot transition into action. It increases its defense budget and makes grand pronouncements with France regarding joint steps in defense, security, foreign policy, and even nuclear deterrence, yet it fails to do what is necessary. Let us recall that in previous years, the U.S. and Germany admitted to spying on each other’s leaders through intelligence agencies and levied massive fines on each other’s major corporations.

With Donald Trump’s return to the White House, the U.S. has begun to signal a more temperate stance toward Russia. Sensitivity regarding Ukraine has diminished. The U.S. has taken steps to cool the close relationship between Russia and China, though it has not found the success it hoped for.

Russia remains a major power with its rich natural gas and oil resources, high-tech defense industry, and capacity to build nuclear power plants. It possesses the largest landmass in the world and is rich in skilled human capital. Its statecraft experience, bureaucratic tradition, and the leadership prowess exemplified by Putin are robust. Russia also capitalizes on the eroding power of the U.S., particularly in Ukraine.

Türkiye’s Relations with the West

The U.S. possesses a potent and deep-rooted influence within Turkish political life, bureaucracy, civil-military security institutions, the business world, academia, and trade unions. Loyalty to NATO runs strong in both the government and the opposition in Türkiye. In the diplomatic sphere, while Türkiye occasionally experiences friction with the U.S. and the European Union, economic relations remain solid. Türkiyes largest economic partner in foreign trade is the European Union, and specifically Germany within the EU. They are followed by Russia and China. Russia is Türkiye’s largest energy supplier. Furthermore, the Russians are constructing Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu, Mersin.

The gravest threats to Türkiye’s independence, integrity, and sovereignty originate from the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. and the European Union are the primary supporters of anti-Türkiye terrorist organizations such as FETÖ and the PKK-PYD-YPG. Beyond terrorist organizations, U.S. support for coups and coup attempts is well documented. The U.S. is attempting to carve out a Kurdish state by dividing four countries in the region (Iran, Iraq, Syria, Türkiye). Historically, many crises have occurred—and continue to occur—between Türkiye and the U.S., including the Johnson Letter, the U-2 spy plane crisis, the missile crisis, the embargo imposed after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation, the March 1st motion refusal, and in the present day, CAATSA sanctions, the F-35 fighter jet and S-400 crisis, the Halkbank case, the Pastor Brunson crisis, and support for the so-called Armenian genocide allegations. In bilateral and multilateral issues to which Türkiye is a party, the U.S. invariably positions itself against Türkiye.

The U.S. is an imperialist state. Its priorities, expectations, political culture, principles, values, objectives, interests, anxieties, threat definitions, and threat perceptions differ fundamentally from those of Türkiye. Moreover, the U.S. is not comprised solely of the White House. Congress, the bureaucracy, intelligence agencies, the Departments of Treasury, State, and Defense, as well as the business world—primarily the military-industrial complex—academia, think tanks, media, and lobbies are power centers that must absolutely be taken into account.

From the U.S. perspective, Türkiye is important due to its geopolitical location, its Muslim identity, and its possession of the second-largest army in NATO. It is not a strategic ally of the U.S., but rather a solution partner whose cooperation is valued in Middle Eastern issues. Because Türkiye purchased the S-400 air defense system from Russia, the U.S. refused to deliver the F-35 fighter jets for which Türkiye had already paid. It excluded Türkiye from the production process of these aircraft and activated CAATSA sanctions.

U.S.-Middle East Relations

The U.S. has won in Syria. It has broken the influence of Russia and Iran. Although the U.S. prioritizes China and dedicates a significant portion of its energy to containing Beijing, it will not withdraw completely from the Middle East. Even if it reduces its military presence in the region, it will never exit entirely. U.S. interest in the Middle East can be fundamentally explained by the following seven points:

First is the security of Israel. Second is U.S. efficacy over energy resources and routes. Third is regime change in Iran. Fourth is the establishment of a Kurdish state. Fifth is ensuring the security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries it leads. Sixth is reducing Russia’s influence in the region. Seventh is curbing China’s increasing weight in the region.

Due to its diminishing state capacity, as has been more clearly observed in recent years, the U.S. is pushing its allies in the region to the forefront. It prioritizes dark warfare methods, proxy wars, and hybrid warfare—including the utilization of terrorist organizations—to destabilize the region.

There is no major power in the Middle East capable of challenging the U.S. in terms of power. A state aspiring to establish global hegemony must be able to compete with the U.S. on economic, industrial, technological, and military scales. Militarily, it must possess offensive capability, deterrence, the ability to forge alliances, and the skill to deny its adversary area dominance. It must possess economic and cultural power and instruments of public diplomacy that influence other nations. It must be capable of manufacturing consent and persuading others of its leadership.

The Trajectory of Global Change

The U.S. maintains approximately 800 bases, large and small, in over 150 countries worldwide. This military presence is simultaneously the collateral for its economic power. It is the guarantee that the U.S. dollar continues to be used as the currency of circulation on a global scale. However, for the U.S., this situation is not sustainable globally. It accepts this via the Monroe Doctrine. This is the reason for its primary focus on its immediate periphery, the Americas. The fact that Trump is less willing to use military force, despite the U.S. having a navy on the open seas, is not a preference; it is a necessity.

The U.S. is striving to preserve, at any cost, the superiority it gained after the Cold War in four areas: Economy, technology, defense, and culture. However, the U.S. is not at its former strength. Today, there is no absolute, runaway U.S. hegemony. The U.S. is far from the days when it led the world not only in economy, industry, technology, and military power but also in culture, cinema, music, academia, lifestyle, fashion, sports, and dietary habits. It has ceased to be the locomotive of growth and production. It has lost its former allure.

There no longer exists a United States defined by both invasions and color revolutions across a vast geography stretching from the Middle East to Central Asia, from Africa to Latin America. The world must recognize this reality and act accordingly.

Related Topics:CAATSA China Donald Trump EU F-35 İran Israel middle east Munich Security Conference oil PKK QUAD Russia S-400 Syria United States

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“Blue wave” fears at Mar-a-Lago: What will the midterms bring for the US?

Published

3 days ago

03/11/2026

Sarp Sinan Hacır

The US is heading to the midterms under the shadow of the Iran War. While the American media debates whether Trump will use nuclear weapons against Iran after the midterm elections, a more realistic tension looms over Mar-a-Lago: a blue wave.

If the Trump administration can wrap up the night having surrendered only the House of Representatives, I am certain Trump will frame this as a victory. In part, one might even say it would be. Amidst so much public discontent—economic troubles, oil and electricity prices, broken promises regarding wars—nobody could plausibly claim Trump had lost if he emerged from battle carrying the Senate on his back. In any case, it is hardly unusual for the governing party to forfeit one chamber of Congress in a midterm election.

Although expectations long pointed to the Senate either remaining red or coming down to a razor-thin outcome, the situation has turned even bleaker for the Trump administration over the past month. According to polls, Democrats are leading in every single neck-and-neck state in the Senate race.

Let me lay out the arithmetic:

Presently, Republicans hold a 53-to-47 majority in the Senate. If the Democrats pick up three states tonight without losing any of their own, they reach a 50-50 tie, which can be broken by the vice president’s vote. Consequently, the Democrats must flip four states blue. For this cycle, Alaska, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, and North Carolina can be considered the battleground states. Contests in Iowa and Kansas are particularly likely to be fierce. It is worth noting that Texas has not elected a Democratic senator since 1988, and Kansas has not done so since 1932.

Will the polls be wrong?

The accuracy of polling varies considerably from cycle to cycle in the US. In the 2024 elections, for instance, the forecasts proved roughly accurate. Even in 2024, however, Republican support was slightly understated in the final count. One should not automatically ascribe this to malice. While Republicans are generally strong in rural areas, urban Republicans often prefer to conceal their leanings in liberal settings. This complicates the work of pollsters.

It remains possible that the surveys are overly optimistic on behalf of Democrats. Nonetheless, the absence of Trump’s name on the midterm ballot demobilizes the Republican base. When the expected “red wave” failed to materialize in the 2022 midterms, it was claimed that Trump had lost his aura, prompting a search for new leadership. Tonight, too, Republican turnout may fall short of projections.

The road to 2028

Beyond determining the composition of Congress, this election carries another critical function: it will chart the course to 2028 for both parties. Although the Democratic Party has begun to attract interest due to Trump’s missteps, it faces formidable internal struggles, marked by both a leadership deficit and an ideological vacuum.

Following the 2024 debacle, as resentment swelled against centrist Democrats like Chuck Schumer, Kamala Harris, and the Clintons, a new current emerged on the progressive left. Spearheaded first by New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani and subsequently by Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed, this 2026-model leftist movement dwells less on identity politics than its predecessor, striking Republicans directly at their points of vulnerability: the economy and Israel.

These two battlegrounds are the decisive factors in the 2026 midterms. Americans heading to the ballot box are squeezed by an electricity bill crisis stemming from the massive power consumption of expanding data centres following the AI boom, alongside oil prices driven by the Iran War and diesel costs tied to the Russia-Ukraine War.

In the first Trump term, an economy that performed well in its early years was derailed by the pandemic, costing him re-election. Now, however, Trump is being held accountable not for crises that developed outside his control, but for his own failures. He initiated the Iran War himself. He failed to honour his pledge to deliver peace regarding Ukraine.

El-Sayed and progressive leftists went before the public with promises to combat the cost of living and halt support for Israel, a message that resonated across the wider electorate. Yet, as in every election, what truly matters are the independents in the battleground states.

The Israel question

The Democratic Party’s mainstream establishment is uneasy with the party drifting away from Israel. Chuck Schumer, who could be regarded as the party’s leader, once even remarked, “my job is to keep the left with Israel.”

Yet centrist Democrats are currently avoiding an open confrontation with progressive leftists in light of their own recent failures. The pressure and dismissive conduct once directed at Bernie Sanders no longer seem tolerable to the party’s rank and file.

Dissenting voices persist, of course. For instance, Democratic Representative Haley Stevens of Michigan could not contain herself just days before the vote: not only did she withdraw her endorsement from El-Sayed, but she also crossed the aisle to back his Republican opponent, Mike Rogers!

Stevens faced fierce condemnation within her party, explaining her decision by claiming that “Sayed did not involve her in the campaign.” Those close to Stevens even suggested that she was pressured by her fiancé, who is Jewish, though she is not.

Radical Zionists like Stevens and Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman are attempting to hold the line against internal party transformation.

Another major consequence of this election will be the fate of this new progressive leftist current, also characterized as “Woke 2.0.” El-Sayed is attempting to defend an already Democratic-held seat, and he looks strong in the polls. Should an upset occur and he loses, Democratic hopes of securing the Senate would require a miracle, and the progressive momentum inside the party could evaporate overnight. Ultimately, with El-Sayed, this new progressive left faces its first true test outside major metropolitan centres.

Rubio waits in the wings

This election holds significant stakes for the quiet rivalry playing out within Trump’s cabinet. If Republicans suffer a devastating defeat, Marco Rubio and JD Vance, both jockeying for the 2028 presidential nomination, may find their ambitions dampened. Entering an election weighed down by the record of an administration widely judged a failure would carry severe risks. That dynamic brought defeat to Kamala Harris, who bore the burden of Joe Biden’s missteps. Rubio is a politician who avoids unwinnable contests; because he remains well regarded by the establishment, he can afford to bide his time.

JD Vance, on the other hand, made a sudden ascent through the ranks straight to the vice presidency. While he enjoys support from Peter Thiel and his circle, his backing among the party’s senior leadership is far thinner. Because he is vice president, convention dictates that the broader party will defer to his candidacy. For that reason, 2028 remains Vance’s best opportunity despite everything.

Lame duck

In summary, while the situation heading into the midterms looks grim for Republicans, it is hardly bright for Democrats. A persistent lethargy has hung over them since 2024. They produce few compelling arguments, scarcely raising their voices against Trump as they once did. The rift between the centrist establishment and the progressive left may well generate more friction than the turmoil among Republicans. Trump exploited this fault line throughout his campaign. Conservative media and politicians did not hesitate to target El-Sayed over his Muslim faith and his ties to the controversial Turkish streamer Hasan Piker.

Should Trump truly suffer a rout tonight, the incoming Congress seated in January will curtail his room for manoeuvre on international matters. It is still too early to predict the course of the Iran War, as the political landscape that emerges in both Israel and the US will exert a direct influence on its trajectory.

Ultimately, the fate of the war also hinges on the blue wave that may crash ashore in Florida tonight.

Opinion

What are Europe’s ignorant leaders failing to see?

Published

3 days ago

03/11/2026

Barış Doster

The European Union (EU) has reportedly reacted against the agreement reached between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which temporarily lifts US sanctions on Russian diesel. While Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, demanded that pressure on Russia be intensified to end the war, the foreign ministers of EU member states stated that sanctions targeting Moscow would continue despite the US decision.

While this report is striking for laying bare the ignorance of those governing the EU, it also demonstrates that, contrary to European perceptions, the US does not view the EU as an ally and does not care about its sensitivities. Clearly, priorities, goals, concerns, definitions of threats, and threat perceptions between the two sides of the Atlantic are starkly different.

What those who govern Europe fail to understand is this: neither is the US the old US, nor is Europe the old Europe, nor is the world the old world. Sadly, the EU’s rulers are blind to this plain truth. Clearly, the ignorance that is so deeply organized and institutionalized in academia, politics, and the bureaucracy in our own country is widespread in Europe as well.

Those who rule Europe need to be reminded of the words of my late, revered master, Attila Ilhan: “If only you had known a little political economy.”

At international summits and in bilateral meetings, European leaders unashamedly applaud US President Trump even as he insults them to their faces.

Yet this is not the first time in history that the US has scolded Europe; it has done so before. It was none other than the US that drove Europe from the American continent, declared “America for the Americans” (the Monroe Doctrine), and defined Latin America as its backyard. Indeed, they were the first to introduce the term “backyard” into political science. They maintained that there was no room for any other state in their backyard. Under the Monroe Doctrine, no European power, including Spain, had any place anywhere in Latin America. Only the US was to call the tune across the continent. And for long years, with the exception of Cuba, that was precisely the case.

The dictators, the presidents, the prime ministers, the chiefs of the general staff, and the senior bureaucrats were all appointed by the US. Coups, political assassinations, and conspiracies were executed or orchestrated by the US. To that end, a school was even established in the US in 1946 for their training: The School of the Americas.

The political influence of the US in the region opened the wealth of regional countries – be it oil, coffee, gold, or sugar – to plunder by US corporations. In the end, the peoples of Latin America were reduced to impoverished watchmen over bountiful resources. They were ruthlessly exploited by politicians elected by themselves, yet working for and on behalf of the US. For that reason, the US could never stomach the changing political climate in Latin America, nor could it accept losing in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. It feared the influence of Hugo Chavez’s line across the countries of the region. It viewed China’s growing weight, trade volume, and investments in the region as a threat.

Because Europe’s current leaders view the US as an unshakeable ally, they fail to grasp what the US has done, including its actions in Latin America, and how the US actually views its own hemisphere, the world, and Europe. What is more, they are afraid. And because they are afraid, they cannot respond to the humiliating remarks about Europe made by Trump and his close associates, or to their contempt for Europe’s history, values, culture, and political understanding. They dread finding themselves in the predicament that Ukrainian leader Zelensky faced at the White House a few years ago.

Those who govern Europe do not know this: no one respects those who lack self-respect, and a leader as insolent, arrogant, egotistical, and untrustworthy as Trump will have no respect for them at all.

Opinion

Energy and electoral politics in Gagauzia: the promise of Russian gas through Türkiye’s image

Published

3 days ago

03/11/2026

Harici.com.tr

Dr. Violeta Stratan İlbasmış, lecturer

A few weeks before the presidential election scheduled for 15 November 2026 in Gagauzia, the promise of cheap natural gas is returning to the region’s political discourse. This time, the message in question is being linked to Türkiye, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline, and the possibility of procuring gas under more favourable terms. Beyond an economic pledge, this initiative raises a geopolitical question: How can Türkiye’s image be used to bolster Russia’s interests in the Republic of Moldova?

An electoral promise with geopolitical dimensions

Fiodor Gagauz, the candidate for the presidency of Gagauzia supported by the Socialist Party, announced on 21 October that he had been invited to the Verona Eurasian Economic Forum held in Istanbul on 22–23 October 2026. According to his statement, his son Dmitri Gagauz was to attend the event and discuss with Turkish partners the possibility of allocating a quota for supplying natural gas to Gagauzia under more advantageous conditions via the TurkStream pipeline.

This initiative comes at a time when Igor Dodon, leader of the Socialist Party and former president of the Republic of Moldova, announced that the socialists had reached an agreement with Russia regarding cheaper natural gas, and that a company was being sought to transport the gas to the border of the Republic of Moldova. To date, however, public statements lack sufficient detail regarding a concrete contract, the final price of the gas, transport costs, or actual delivery terms.

Türkiye: an image capable of lending credibility to Russian gas

Türkiye is a major regional actor and an economic partner to many countries, including the Republic of Moldova. It also plays a strategic role in the transit of Russian gas across the Black Sea via the TurkStream pipeline. This standing provides a concrete and credible basis for discussions concerning energy routes. In political communications, however, Türkiye’s image can serve a purpose extending well beyond the mere promotion of a transit route.

Associating the promise of cheap Russian gas with Türkiye can make the initiative more persuasive to the public: Russia is presented as the supplier of an affordable resource, and Türkiye as the regional partner capable of facilitating access to it. Thus, the image of a state with multifaceted economic and diplomatic ties can contribute to legitimizing a political message that ultimately promotes reliance on Russian gas.

From a geopolitical perspective, Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the Republic of Moldova and keep alive the notion that dependency on Russian energy sources can yield economic benefits. Particularly in a region where the cost of living and energy expenditures represent major concerns, promises of lower prices can feed this narrative. It should be noted here that citizens of the Republic of Moldova pay 26 Moldovan lei per cubic metre of natural gas, or roughly 1.30 euros.

The impact of the message can be examined independently of the actors’ intentions: Türkiye’s image can be utilized for political ends to make an offer involving Russian gas appear more credible and to serve Moscow’s geopolitical interests.

A relevant precedent: the promise of 10-leu natural gas

The issue of cheap natural gas is not being deployed in Gagauzia’s political arena for the first time. Supported by the fugitive politician Ilan Șor, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison in a finalized ruling concerning the Republic of Moldova’s bank fraud case, Evghenia Guțul pledged in 2023 to provide natural gas at a price of 10 lei per cubic metre. That offer was tied to the local company “NordGaz-Furnizare” and a chain of intermediaries, including the Türkiye-based Zen Solar Enerji. Investigative journalism published at the time raised questions regarding the supply model’s structure and feasibility. Ultimately, the promise did not materialize for consumers under the announced terms and within the stated timeframe.

This precedent demonstrates how potent the issue of cheap natural gas can be as an electoral tool, and how the names of foreign companies or partners can help generate a perception of reliability around an offer. Nevertheless, the involvement of a Turkish company in an earlier supply model does not, on its own, prove the involvement of the Turkish state or the existence of coordination orchestrated by Russia.

Beyond the price: who gains politically?

As the 15 November election approaches, the promise of cheap natural gas can operate on two levels simultaneously. On the economic plane, it offers voters the prospect of lower utility bills. On the political plane, it can reinforce the idea that the solution to the region’s difficulties must be sought in energy ties with Russia and in the partnerships that make this option appear viable.

The mention of Türkiye introduces a significant dimension to this message. Rather than being framed solely as an initiative tied to Russian gas, the proposal is linked to an influential regional power and an existing energy route. Türkiye’s image can thus play a role in legitimizing a pledge that serves the discourse advocating for the preservation of energy ties with Moscow.

Even so, the existence of the TurkStream pipeline does not automatically mean that Gagauzia can access natural gas at a preferential rate. Such an offer requires contracts, suppliers, transport capacity, compliance with the regulatory framework, and transparency regarding the final cost. Until verifiable documentation and explicit supply terms are put forward, this pledge remains an electoral promise.

The essential issue is not merely whether Gagauzia will receive cheaper natural gas, but how this promise is framed. When Türkiye’s image is paired with Russian gas to enhance the credibility of an electoral offer, the potential gains may extend well beyond the economic realm and help advance Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Republic of Moldova.