Donald Trump, the President-elect of the United States (U.S.), is likely to surprise the world during his second term. His remarks about Panama, Greenland, and even Canada should not be dismissed as mere indiscretions. Considering his persistent focus on these issues, it seems the U.S. is preparing to adopt a strategy that deviates significantly from its traditional approach.

The U.S.’s imperialist approach has historically differed from European-style imperialism. Western European countries, constrained by limited territories and resources during the colonial era, expanded outward to secure economic gains. Nations such as Britain and France sought to dominate economically valuable regions by occupying territories worldwide.

In contrast, the vast landmass and abundant natural resources of the U.S. rendered such motivations largely unnecessary. When the country underwent its industrial revolution, it still had vast, resource-rich land to cultivate. Today, with one of the world’s most productive service economies, direct territorial occupation for economic gain is often unnecessary or impractical.

American-style imperialism prioritizes security over economic conquest. For the U.S., the goal is not to control large territories but to dominate critical trade routes, especially maritime ones, and to restrict rivals’ access to vital resources like energy.

Rather than occupying large areas, the U.S. focuses on small, strategically significant, and defensible regions. These regions are typically sparsely populated, pose minimal security risks, and limit rivals’ strategic options. This strategy minimizes administrative burdens while maximizing security interests. From this perspective, the number of regions of interest to the U.S. is limited.

U.S. strategic priorities

The U.S. already controls several strategically significant territories in the Pacific. Territories like the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and American Samoa, acquired during the 19th century and World War II, are crucial for U.S. security, military bases, and control of Asia-Pacific sea routes.

If the U.S. seeks to extend its influence in Africa, small island states such as São Tomé and Príncipe could become strategic focal points. São Tomé, with its population of 200,000 and advantageous location, provides access to West Africa, offering potential military and logistical superiority across a wide region stretching from South Africa to Senegal.

Similarly, Yemeni islands like Socotra are strategically significant. Socotra’s location provides access to the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and the eastern coast of Africa. However, seizing such islands would require a long-term U.S. commitment to Africa, a strategy historically avoided by American administrations.

New trade routes

Regions like Panama and Greenland, which Trump has highlighted, could impose significant administrative and infrastructural burdens on the U.S.

For example, while the Panama Canal holds immense strategic value, Panama’s large population and social challenges, including drug trafficking, present administrative hurdles. With over 4 million people and persistent security concerns, direct control of Panama is unnecessary, especially since the U.S. already holds full transit rights and military privileges over the canal.

Greenland, by contrast, gains prominence due to the growing strategic importance of the Arctic. Melting glaciers are opening new trade routes, and Greenland’s control is key to leveraging these opportunities. However, its vast and challenging terrain makes complete control costly, despite its sparse population. Furthermore, Denmark, which currently governs Greenland, maintains a strong alliance with the U.S. and already fulfills American security demands there. Annexing Greenland could strain U.S.-Denmark relations and pose a diplomatic burden, making such a move impractical. Nonetheless, Trump appears to favor direct U.S. sovereignty over Greenland, citing economic justifications.

The future of American strategy

The current U.S. security strategy is based on indirect control mechanisms. Instead of direct territorial control, it seeks to minimise the costs and reactions of local populations by maintaining its influence in strategic regions in cooperation with allied countries. The adoption by the U.S. of an expansionist strategy based on territorial occupation will entail many risks. We hope that with Trump we have buckled up for a brave new world and identified the risks and opportunities for our country.

The Lebanese Parliament elected Joseph Aoun as the new president. Since the term of former Lebanese president Michel Aoun expired in October 2022, no candidate had been agreed upon in parliament. Notably, the election of Michel Aoun also took more than two years.

Joseph Aoun, an army commander and member of the Free Patriotic Party, was once allied with former president Michel Aoun and his son-in-law, former foreign minister Jibran Bassil. However, he later became an independent political figure. Initially, his candidacy was rejected by Lebanon’s most influential Christian politicians, Jibran Bassil and Samir Geagea. Despite their reluctance, both eventually supported his candidacy. Notably, Jaca had ambitions to become president himself. According to the Lebanese National Accord, the president must be a Maronite Christian.

Political environment during the election process

This election underscores Lebanon’s complex and often contradictory political landscape. The new president, closely aligned with the United States and Washington’s strategic interests, benefitted significantly from international backing. Aoun’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, where he met with the defense minister and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s brother, further strengthened his position. Divided Sunni factions also supported Aoun, largely in line with Saudi Arabia’s preferences.

International actors such as the United States, France, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia played crucial roles in the electoral process. This external involvement highlighted Lebanon’s enduring struggle for independence in its internal affairs. Ironically, parties identifying as ‘anti-Hezbollah’ celebrated this foreign intervention as a victory against Hezbollah, despite their rhetoric against external interference.

Suleiman Franjieh, leader of the Maronite Marada Movement, backed by Hezbollah and its ally Amal Movement, withdrew his candidacy in favor of Joseph Aoun to build broader consensus. Franjieh’s decision, made a day before the election, rendered Aoun’s victory a foregone conclusion.

Hezbollah’s resistance and strategic vision

Despite political attacks and betrayals, Hezbollah remains a formidable force in Lebanon. The group has consistently demonstrated its ability to adapt to adverse circumstances and execute complex political strategies.

As Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem recently emphasized, Hezbollah’s approach extends beyond military resistance, encompassing a broader strategic vision shaped by evolving circumstances. Recognizing shifting power dynamics in the Middle East, Hezbollah continues to act in ways it perceives as protecting Lebanon’s interests.

Important questions for the future of Lebanon

Will the new president, Joseph Aoun, succumb to the influence of the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and their allies—key players in his election—or will he prioritize Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal stability?

Since the general elections in May 2022, Lebanon has yet to form a new government. The pre-election prime minister and cabinet remain in place on an interim basis. Aoun must now appoint a prime minister and assemble a government within Lebanon’s fractured political framework. This process is likely to face delays as factions vie for control over key ministries, potentially extending the tenure of the current interim government.

A crucial decision for the Lebanese Army is appointing Joseph Aoun’s successor as Chief of the General Staff. This choice will significantly impact internal security and the delicate balance between Western interests and Hezbollah. As the 60-day ceasefire with Israel nears its end, concerns are mounting over the Lebanese Army’s ability to maintain security alongside UNIFIL troops south of the Litani River. Per the National Accord, the Chief of General Staff must also be a Maronite Christian.

Why Joseph Aoun could be elected now?

Why did Aoun, whose election had been stalled for two years, finally secure the presidency? The primary reason lies in Hezbollah’s waning influence within Lebanon, the decline of the Assad regime, and the broader weakening of the resistance axis. A secondary factor is Lebanon’s dire need for international funding and support for reconstruction, particularly in southern regions, the Beqaa Valley, and Beirut, which were devastated by the recent war.

Had Hezbollah’s candidate, Suleiman Franjieh, or any other contender aligned with Hezbollah been elected, international aid would have been unlikely. Riyadh and Washington viewed this election as leverage. Without a president acceptable to the international community, financial support for Lebanon’s reconstruction was improbable. Additionally, with Assad’s regime weakened, Lebanon has devolved into an internally fragmented, institutionally bankrupt, and diplomatically isolated nation—a significant concern for regional powers.

Lebanon’s new president assumes office amidst deep political divisions and significant foreign interference. While his election signals a shift in the nation’s leadership dynamics, challenges remain. Forming a government, balancing domestic and international interests, and maintaining internal stability will test Joseph Aoun’s leadership. Ultimately, Lebanon’s future hinges on its leaders’ ability to transcend factionalism and prioritize national sovereignty and unity.

On New Year’s Day 2025, Syrian transitional government Foreign Minister Assad Shibani arrived in Riyadh at the invitation of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister, marking his first diplomatic visit. This visit is a reciprocal gesture following the Saudi delegation’s visit to Damascus last week, showcasing to the world that “New Syria” is moving away from the dark era of war and embarking on a new chapter of national reconstruction.

At the onset of the Syrian crisis 13 years ago, Saudi Arabia led the Arab League in cooperation with Western nations in an attempt to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime to dismantle the “Shiite Crescent,” which was perceived as a strategic threat. This effort failed as the rise of ISIS became the top international threat, and Russia, along with the Shiite Crescent, successfully preserved Assad’s rule. Syrian-Saudi relations hit rock bottom and only began to recover in 2023 when Saudi Arabia and Iran ended their sectarian disputes and normalized relations. However, before these ties fully normalized, the Assad regime rapidly collapsed.

As the international community subtly acknowledged Syria’s new government—especially after both the Shiite Crescent and the Resistance Axis faltered—Syria and Saudi Arabia found a historic opportunity for structural realignment. Saudi Arabia quickly became the top regional partner of the Syrian transitional government. This cooperation is mutually beneficial and logical, as neither Saudi Arabia nor the new Syrian regime are natural allies of Iran. The closeness and potential alliance between “New Syria” and Saudi Arabia, the leading Arab nation, will further consolidate Arab unity and diminish Iranian and Shiite influence.

The Syrian Foreign Minister’s visit to Saudi Arabia signifies a key move by the transitional government to open a new chapter. It sends a practical message to the outside world about the desire to end war and conflict, seek internal reconciliation and stability, and rebuild national governance, society, and the economy, as well as rejoin the international community. This visit also serves as a test for the new governance and diplomatic philosophy of the leader Ahmed Shara (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), making it particularly noteworthy.

Last week, Saudi state television “Al Arabiya” aired a half-hour interview with Shara. The controversial figure, once clad in military gear, appeared in a suit, spoke elegantly, and demonstrated fluent, standard Arabic with composure and confidence. His governance ideas and strategic planning impressed viewers, but his signature beard served as a reminder of his origins linked to Al-Qaeda.

Shara reflected on his governance experience in Idlib, emphasizing that toppling Assad required not only military strength but also mobilizing civilian forces to minimize destruction and casualties. He underscored efforts to engage with the previous regime, including Assad himself, to ensure a smooth transition of power. Although Shara acknowledged that the “Idlib experience” might not fully apply to the complexities of all of Syria, the transitional government is willing to unite different factions under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254, address the interests of various ethnic groups, restore order, and establish a national unity government based on constitutional reforms or a new constitution. A population census and general elections will follow to facilitate the return of 15 million displaced Syrians.

Shara acknowledged the diverse forces involved in Syria and stressed the importance of developing bilateral relations with all parties based on mutual respect for Syria’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. This includes recognizing Syria’s historical ties with Russia and urging the U.S. to lift the “Caesar Act” sanctions to ease Syria’s economic hardships. He also highlighted the need to address Turkey’s control over northern territories but avoided more sensitive issues like the fate of the Golan Heights, relations with Israel, and complete disengagement from terrorism. However, he made it clear that ending Iran’s long-standing influence in Syria was a top priority.

As a Sunni Muslim—representing 80% of Syria’s population—Shara emphasized the role of Saudi Arabia and Gulf Arab states. He linked Syria’s security and stability to the Gulf’s prosperity and expressed hope that these countries would play a significant role in Syria’s reconstruction and share in the benefits. Shara revealed that he had extensively studied Saudi Arabia’s “Vision 2030” and admired its economic diversification efforts. He welcomed Saudi participation in major Syrian reconstruction projects and infrastructure investments, reflecting a clear strategic direction in his choice of Saudi Arabia for his first diplomatic visit. This signaled that “New Syria” aligns with the Arab world and mainstream Sunni leadership, seeking Gulf Arab states’ support for stability and recovery.

Less than a month after the opposition coalition, led by Shara, seized power in Damascus, they initiated dialogue, reconciliation, and measures to dissolve armed factions and unify national forces. They also began negotiations with Kurdish forces in the northeast and Druze leaders. The transitional government declared that “New Syria” would not adopt the federalism favored by some Kurds but would retain a highly centralized republic.

Upon capturing Damascus on December 8, the transitional government appointed Mohamed Bashir, a technocrat widely accepted by the opposition, as Prime Minister. Former President Assad, in exile in Moscow, announced his resignation and called for a peaceful transfer of power. Diplomatic transitions occurred smoothly, ensuring the continuity of Syrian representation internationally.

To foster “New Syria’s” reconstruction, Shara announced plans to dissolve his core military force, the “Syrian Sham Liberation Army,” at a national dialogue conference, paving the way for the integration of all factions into the national army. He outlined a three-year plan for constitutional reform and a four-year timeline for general elections, prioritizing legal reconstruction and restoring order.

Although the international community was surprised by Assad’s rapid fall and remains wary of Shara’s past ties to terrorism, they pragmatically accepted the transitional government. Like Afghanistan’s Taliban, conditions for diplomatic recognition include protecting minority and women’s rights, forming an inclusive government, and severing ties with terrorism. However, unlike the Taliban, Syria’s new government has quickly engaged with the international community, highlighting Syria’s strategic importance in the region.

The Syrian transitional government faces the common tasks of all new governments in war-torn countries, namely the three major reconstructions: security reconstruction, political reconstruction, and economic reconstruction. For “New Syria,” security reconstruction is clearly the top priority, which involves achieving a genuine and comprehensive ceasefire, integrating all armed factions into the national armed forces, ending armed divisions, restoring full peace and security, and ensuring the free flow of people, goods, and particularly humanitarian supplies.

Political reconstruction, which is a more long-term and fundamental task, depends on the success of security reconstruction. This includes conducting political dialogues under the framework of UN Security Council resolutions, forming a coalition government with broad representation, and drafting or amending a new constitution through comprehensive consultation, public opinion solicitation, and the guidance of legal experts. Subsequently, nationwide elections will be organized based on the new constitution and an authoritative, reliable, and updated population census, resulting in unified legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Achieving this step is expected to take three to five years.

Political reconstruction represents a fragile and sensitive transitional phase that will test the ability of various factions to compromise and reconcile their political demands, national identity, and ethnic identity. It will challenge the transitional government in managing the “dual legacy” of Arab nationalism and the Ba’ath Party ideology, which has governed Syria for over half a century. The goal is to avoid the tragic scenario seen in Iraq, where the new government, after Saddam Hussein’s fall, hastily disbanded the national defense forces and purged the Ba’ath Party, leading to nationwide chaos. If this transitional phase is not carefully navigated, “New Syria” risks falling into the kind of decade-long civil war experienced by Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, escalating into a “small world war” or “Syria War 3.0,” thereby destroying the historical opportunity to build and shape “New Syria” and plunging an entire generation back into bloodshed and conflict. During this phase, lifting the Syrian people out of hunger and poverty and enabling them to live and work in peace is crucial. This will depend not only on the wisdom and leadership of the transitional government but also on the generous assistance and strong support of the international community.

Economic reconstruction is not only an urgent task for “New Syria” but also a long, arduous mission that will follow security and political reconstruction. To some extent, it is the fundamental guarantee for the long-term stability of Syria’s security and political systems. Had the Assad regime successfully stabilized the economy, people’s livelihoods, and the military over the past four years, the opposition forces would not have been able to overthrow decades of rule in just 12 days. The failure to fundamentally address economic and livelihood issues ultimately made the Assad government the fifth “domino” to fall 13 years after the Arab Spring erupted, following the collapses of strongman regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. This outcome underscores the Assad regime’s failure to learn from the painful lessons of those countries.

The Syrian transitional government has inherited a war-torn nation in disarray and deep crisis, but it has also ushered in a new era for “New Syria.” Whether Syria can ultimately be rebuilt into an independent, free, democratic, inclusive, stable, developing nation with full sovereignty and territorial integrity will be determined by time.

Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.