Diplomacy
How mini-middle powers leverage geography, resources, and diplomacy?
As an international order emerges in which “middle powers” seek to come to the fore alongside the relative decline of the US, “mini-middle powers” may also be coming to light.
An assessment published in the Financial Times (FT) points to countries that cannot set the broader international agenda but are nevertheless capable of making a difference.
Arguing that these states can be defined as “mini-middle powers”, the article provides the following definition: states that generally possess limited power, but exert real influence in a few areas such as energy, transport routes, regional security, mediation, finance, technology, geography, or access to actors that major powers find difficult to reach.
Noting that the crucial factor is not merely possessing one of these advantages, but being able to leverage it, the FT counts Azerbaijan, Qatar, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Oman among these mini-middle powers.
The assessment points out that Qatar and Oman are mini-middle powers in diplomatic terms: Qatar has converted its natural gas wealth, financial clout, and access to hard-to-reach actors into an extraordinary diplomatic role.
Oman, meanwhile, relies on “common sense, its strategic location, and its ability to keep channels open between adversaries.”
For both countries, mediation is not merely a diplomatic role, but also a source of influence.
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, on the other hand, possess influence rooted in geography and infrastructure. Azerbaijan exports energy, sits astride east-west trade routes, and holds significant weight in South Caucasus politics and security.
Kazakhstan’s oil, uranium, and position between Russia and China give the country an influence that extends beyond its region.
Uzbekistan’s demographic weight as Central Asia’s most populous country, combined with its central position, provides it with growing influence in regional trade and diplomacy.
The Middle Corridor demonstrates how this functions. While Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan sit at the centre of this Asia-Europe route, Uzbekistan is also strengthening its links with the corridor.
Although this route is more arduous than the northern route passing through Russia, it offers an alternative to governments and businesses.
The three countries are also developing a Caspian green energy corridor that could transport renewable energy generated in Central Asia through Azerbaijan and connect to the planned Black Sea electricity cable extending to Europe.
According to the FT, discussions regarding the South Caucasus and Central Asia are still too often treated as a rivalry between Russia, China, and the West.
Yet this approach overlooks how many countries in the region function. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan maintain multidirectional relations because relying on a single side presents risks for geographic, commercial, and security reasons.
Consequently, while attempting to maintain room for manoeuvre among them, these countries cooperate with Russia, China, Türkiye, the EU, and the US.
Qatar and Oman, despite having close security ties with Washington, also keep channels open with adversaries of the US.
In December 2024, after Russian air defence systems shot down an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane, Baku’s response was unusually sharp given the power imbalance.
While Baku demanded that Moscow accept responsibility, punish those at fault, and pay compensation, it also sought to maintain overall relations without disruption.
Russia subsequently acknowledged the contribution of its air defence systems to the crash and agreed to pay compensation.
The influence of these “mini-middle powers” becomes strongest when other countries require the resources under their control.
Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas gain even greater importance when buyers seek alternative supply sources.
The Middle Corridor benefited from the disruption of trade passing through Russia; however, governments along the route are aware that should Western commercial relations with Russia resume, some freight could shift back north.
For Qatar and Oman, mediation becomes even more valuable when the parties themselves no longer speak directly to one another.
The FT article concludes:
“These countries will not set the terms of the next international order. But those who wish to shape that order will often remain dependent on their routes, resources, or diplomatic access. Major powers will find it difficult to succeed without their cooperation.”
Diplomacy
South Korea pulls part of embassy staff from Ukraine amid POW dispute
The South Korean government has decided to withdraw part of its embassy staff from Ukraine.
According to the Yonhap news agency, Foreign Ministry spokesman Park Doo-sun cited the Kyiv administration’s failure to take “positive steps” in the dispute that began with the leak of information concerning the handover of North Korean prisoners of war as the justification for the move.
The spokesman also listed the ongoing threat of air strikes, which complicates the safety of diplomats, among the reasons.
Following the withdrawal of part of the personnel, essential diplomatic contacts will continue under the leadership of the charge d’affaires ad interim to Ukraine. All consular staff tasked with protecting South Korean citizens will remain in Ukraine.
Prior to this move, the Seoul administration decided on 8 October to withdraw its ambassador. The Foreign Ministry stated at the time that it was ready to continue consultations with Kyiv to resolve the emerging issues constructively.
Tensions between the two countries began with a speech delivered by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the United Nations General Assembly in September.
Zelenskyy announced that two captured soldiers from the North Korean army had been handed over to South Korea.
South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, meanwhile, accused Kyiv of breaching a confidentiality agreement.
Lee said the disclosure of this information endangered the prisoners’ families and stability on the Korean Peninsula.
Seoul expects a public apology
Dmytro Lytvyn, an adviser to the Ukrainian president, denied the existence of a confidentiality agreement.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry summoned Ukrainian Charge d’Affaires Andriy Veshkin on 28 September and issued a note of protest against Lytvyn’s remarks.
President Lee Jae-myung warned in a statement on 2 October that they would take additional measures against Kyiv if Ukrainian authorities did not acknowledge the agreement and make a public apology. Lee stated that Ukraine itself had initially requested that the transfer of the prisoners be kept confidential.
Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spokesman Heorhii Tykhyi said the dispute stemmed from differing interpretations of the confidentiality regime.
Tykhyi noted that Seoul, based on its constitution which recognises the entire Korean Peninsula as its own territory, requested that the prisoners be handed over “like its own citizens”.
Describing the handover as a “gesture of goodwill”, Tykhyi stated that they were conducting closed-door negotiations to resolve differences of opinion.
Ambassador Park Ki-chang returned to Seoul on 10 October. According to a report by The Korea Times newspaper citing the ministry, recalling the ambassador served as a diplomatic protest against the leak of information regarding the prisoners.
The newspaper wrote that South Korea had last taken a similar step in 2008 by withdrawing its ambassador to Japan.
Moscow warned foreign diplomats
On 3 October, the Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated its warning to foreign nationals, including diplomatic mission staff, against remaining in Ukraine.
The ministry recalled its advice to leave Kyiv, citing ongoing strikes against military targets.
The ministry noted that those who failed to heed the warnings would bear responsibility for the potential consequences.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in a statement on 24 September that they had no information regarding Kyiv handing over two North Korean prisoners of war to Seoul.
Peskov, noting that prisoner matters fall under the authority of the Defence Ministry and intelligence services, said, “Contacts through the special services are continuing.”
Diplomacy
Ex-BND head Hanning tied to former Mossad chief amid spy inquiry
August Hanning, who led Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service (BND) between 1998 and 2005, was arrested on 6 October on allegations that he obtained roughly 2,000 classified agency documents and used them during contacts with intelligence officers from a foreign state.
Accused of high treason and espionage on behalf of a foreign intelligence agency, the former spy chief is alleged to have procured the documents from former BND employee Manfred D.
Prosecutors stated that the leaked records included internal briefing notes presented to senior German officials, though the Berlin government has not yet publicly disclosed which country received the classified data.
According to an exclusive report by Jake Green for The Cradle, seized email exchanges revealed extensive ties between the arrested Hanning and former Mossad director Danny Yatom.
The correspondence shows that the two former intelligence directors built an ongoing network of contacts following their public service, combining commercial ventures, efforts to secure political influence, and intelligence links.
This dynamic has triggered debate that using personal connections and official access for private gain has left Germany’s intelligence apparatus vulnerable.
Intelligence notes for 10,000 euros and campaign proposals
According to the reviewed emails, Hanning told Yatom in a 2018 message that he could prepare an “overall assessment based on information obtained from senior German officials and intelligence agencies” concerning an unidentified candidate.
The former BND head committed to completing the report by 13 July in exchange for 10,000 euros.
Contacts between the two men subsequently expanded to cover domestic political processes in Germany. Ahead of the September 2021 federal election, Yatom asked Hanning to approach leading candidates.
Describing CIY Global as a “political campaign company”, the former Mossad chief noted that he aimed to introduce its capabilities to German politicians, and he mentioned his intention in the same exchange to transfer documents concerning a cybersecurity firm.
Cybersecurity partnership and surveillance operations across Europe
The partnership between Yatom and Hanning reached beyond political lobbying initiatives into the cybersecurity sector.
Hanning reportedly served as a consultant for World Health Energy Holdings, a cybersecurity company linked to Yatom.
Firms of this type, established or managed by former intelligence personnel, provide commercial platforms on the international market for Israeli-origin surveillance, cyber intelligence, and political influence capabilities.
The operational presence of private Israeli-based surveillance technologies across Europe has recently entered judicial records through scandals in Poland, Spain, and Greece.
Polish prosecutors announced on 12 October that data collected under the previous government via Pegasus spyware against political opponents had been transferred out of the country, adding that manufacturer NSO Group maintained access to the technical infrastructure.
In Spain, the 2022 CatalanGate investigation established that at least 65 people, including politicians, lawyers, and civil society representatives, were targeted using Pegasus or Candiru software, with Citizen Lab researchers publishing strong evidence linking the operation to Spanish authorities.
In Greece, the surveillance operation targeting journalist Thanasis Koukakis and Member of the European Parliament Nikos Androulakis was determined to have used Predator software, linked to Intellexa, a company founded by former Israeli intelligence officer Tal Dilian.
In the German espionage investigation, the traffic between Hanning and Yatom involving paid reporting, contacts with electoral candidates, and commercial partnerships does not yet provide conclusive legal evidence regarding the final destination of the roughly 2,000 classified documents.
Nevertheless, the disclosed correspondence gives German investigators a concrete line of inquiry to assess whether classified state secrets reached commercial networks tied to Israeli intelligence.
Diplomacy
Trump dismisses US envoy to Greece Kimberly Guilfoyle
US President Donald Trump has dismissed Kimberly Guilfoyle, the US ambassador in Athens, following serious press reports concerning her conduct.
White House Press Secretary Katie Zacharia told reporters during her first briefing that Guilfoyle had been asked to resign.
“She was doing a good job, but we didn’t like what we read in the press,” Trump said. “She was not a member of my family. I think she dated my son a long time ago.”
In a social media post, Guilfoyle stated: “These claims are unfounded, and I will resolutely defend my name, reputation, and integrity.” She added that she was particularly proud of the embassy’s work.
According to Kathimerini, her removal came as no surprise in Washington. Days of successive disclosures and vigorous exploitation of the matter by Democrats had been inflicting political damage on the White House ahead of the sensitive midterm elections.
The US State Department was instructed not to comment, with crisis management transferred entirely to the White House.
Reports indicate that most of the president’s team swiftly favoured Guilfoyle’s dismissal, while Secretary of State Marco Rubio was reportedly uneasy with the demonstratively warm public welcome she had staged for him.
Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee have called for an investigation.
“Her resignation does not absolve her of responsibility,” the lawmakers wrote, adding: “While American families struggled to make ends meet, she used her position as a Trump administration official to enrich herself.”
Chargé d’Affaires Josh Huck will assume ambassadorial duties until a successor is chosen.
Meanwhile, Guilfoyle’s departure is expected to cause delays in agreements between Greece and the US.
These include the so-called “Rubio package”, comprising approximately $4 billion in arms deals finalised only days before the secretary of state’s arrival.
Several procedural steps still remain before the contracts can be signed.
In Athens, opposition parties are demanding answers. Dimitris Mantzos of PASOK called for a detailed briefing on the agreements reached during Rubio’s visit.
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