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INTERVIEW

“If Europe remains an appendage of the US, it will become an insignificant part of the world”

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With the Ukraine war, anti-Russian sanctions, the economic downturn and US-China tensions, Europe seems to be once again engulfed in a major crisis. The level of integration that the Old Continent has reached once again calls for a pan-European rather than a “national” way out.

German researcher, writer and publisher Hauke Ritz has been analyzing Germany, Russia and West-Russia relations for more than 15 years. Ritz says that this work dates back to 2007, when he began to realize that in the future there would be a strong geopolitical confrontation, if not war, between the US and Russia. “And once you understand that,” he says, ”it’s hard to find a more important topic.”

This issue, the German author says, has “to some extent taken over” his life. In order to grasp the “deeper causes” of this tension, he says, he began learning the Russian language and visiting Russia.

One of Ritz’s most striking theses is that the concept of “the West” and “Europe” do not coincide. For him, “the West” refers to the post-World War II order and is clearly the name of US hegemony over Europe. “Europe”, on the other hand, is a continent that dates back thousands of years, a continent of both peace and war, a continent of Enlightenment, revolutions and Reformation, but never ruled by the hegemony of a single power, an oasis of multipolarity, culturally united but politically separate, a place of balance of power…

Hence, when Europe finds itself again, free from the “Western” hegemony of the last 75 years, it will not only become one of the poles in a “multipolar world”, but will also enter a “multipolar” era within itself. How will this happen and through whom? Whether Rtiz has an answer to this is up to the reader.

Hauke Ritz’s new book: Vom Niedergang des Westens zur Neuerfindung Europas [From the Decline of the West to the Reinvention of Europe] To order: https://mediashop.at/buecher/vom-niedergang-des-westens-zur-neuerfindung-europas/

Let’s start with the first part of the title of your book. The “decline of the West” is a recurrent theme in European history. In what sense do you use this term popularized by Spengler and his followers? Do you agree with the idea that the West is in decline? Or to put it another way, how many collapses of the West is this?

First of all, I didn’t refer to Oswald Spengler in the book because I think the decline we see today is a very different kind of decline. At that time, the West as we know it today didn’t really exist. We will come back to this fact later. I just want to point out that today we are seeing the collapse of the West at a tremendous pace in many areas, and we get the impression that it is really accelerating year by year, month by month, and it is becoming very visible.

Compare the current situation with 1989, when the Berlin Wall came down. At that time, most of Eastern Europe and even the Soviet republics were influenced by the West, its products, its music, its way of life, its model of civilization. The same was true for many countries in the south, in the Global South and in the east. At that time, the West was the only manifestation of modernity in the world.

After the Soviet Union collapsed and the system of socialist states dissolved, the West had a kind of monopoly on modernity, on the interpretation of the modern world. And everyone wanted to be connected to this world, whether it was through movies, through products, or by emigrating to a Western country. The West also had the image of democracy, of a just, rich and prosperous society, of innovation.

Now look at what the West stands for today. For sanctions, for war, for strange ideologies like the LGBT movement… which is causing heads to shake not only in the Global South and the East, but also in the West itself. So the Western world has lost not only its moral superiority, but also its soft power, its charm.

And not only that. We no longer see the interpretation of modernity in modern China, we started to see modern India, and Russia has also come back as a great civilization. So the West is in a very different situation now, and the loss of the appeal of its status as a model of civilization is something that I think is too serious to be repaired in a short period of time.

That’s what I always use: Western world. Of course, the opposite term that should be used in this context is Europe. And Europe is something quite different from the West.

We will come to that in a moment. I think you see Europeans and westerners as separate identities and civilizations. Do you think that the US is what we should understand by the West at the moment? And what is the difference between the US vision of the world and the European world?

There are so many differences. I really think that western civilization and European civilization are quite different concepts in many ways.

First of all, the West is something quite new. How long has the West really been around? The West as we know it today first appeared after the Second World War, and at that time it was basically the American sphere of influence that was created by military expansion during the Second World War, and where the soldiers stopped, the West stopped.

North Korea was not part of the West, but South Korea was. The same is true for Germany. East Germany was not part of the West, but West Germany was. So the accidental movements during the war created a sphere of influence and it was called the West.

Of course, you can make an argument, “No, the West is older.” There were revolutions in Western European states. The French Revolution, the English Revolution, the Dutch and others. Yes, but these were also countries that not only made revolutions, but also established colonies in overseas empires. Maybe this is also connected. If you have a big trade over the seas, you have a lot of merchants who start competing with the aristocracy and then you are more likely to have revolutions.

But these early stages of the West were not united. There was a lot of competition between them. But in the late 19th and early 20th century, we see that this rivalry started to turn into a kind of alliance. For example, the Entente Cordiale between Great Britain and France, then the alliance between Great Britain and the United States. This could be a kind of embryo of the West as we know it today.

But the West in general is not more than 100 years old. So it’s a very young entity and it includes North America on the one side and the Europe of the European Union today, which includes the Slavic states like Poland on the other side. And then you have South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. So culturally speaking, these are very different countries, very different parts of the world, influenced by different religions, and all united by one factor: American domination, American hegemony.

So in the end, you come to the conclusion that the West is basically this American hegemony. There is a lack of a cultural base, there is a lack of history.

Europe, on the contrary, is something quite different. Europe is 2500 years old. Europe started with the model of democracy in ancient Greece and democracy came back to Europe in modern times with the French revolution and other revolutions.

But there is a long period in between when Europe had quite different models of government and a different way of organizing its society.

So Europe is an entity that has a vast history of quite different periods and epochs, but there is still something that can define the whole of this time, which is more than 2000 years. So the concept of Europe is much more complex and much deeper than the concept of the West.

Do you think Europeans have some antidote to the West?

Europe, of course, belongs to Western Europe and Western Europe is that part of Europe that started to have colonies expanding overseas and then it became the west. So maybe some Western elements also belong to Europe.

But Europe is more the center of Europe. Germany, Italy are not usually seen as part of the West. They didn’t have big empires overseas for centuries. They were organized in a decentralized way. Then you have the Slavic peoples in the east. So Europe is all of that.

And the term Western suggests that there is a single model for this whole area and the whole history of Europe. Europe is also defined by its achievements in art, literature, music and philosophy. It is also defined by Christianity and Christian history. It is also defined by references to antiquity. That is, by the memory of the ancient Greek culture in ancient Rome, which was common to all European states and created a kind of unified field of knowledge and reference for all European states, for example through Latin and the ancient Greek language. So there is much more to Europe than the West.

There is also a big difference in terms of the concept of world order. The US is protected by two oceans. Nobody can harm them. If they wage a war on another shore, they can be sure that there will be no repercussions for them, that nothing will come back to them.

This was not the case in Europe. Europe has had enormous wars for as long as it has existed. One of the most brutal periods in European history was the Thirty Years’ War in Germany in the 17th century. But there were also civil wars in other European states.

What Europe learned from this war was that you cannot wage war and foreign policy on values. If you start making the issue of Catholicism and Protestantism part of your foreign policy, part of your national expansion, then you will have never-ending wars.

You are pointing to the Westphalian system.

Yes, it is. So after this war, the Westphalian system was created, where these young nation states learned to respect their differences, that each state has the right to manage its own internal affairs and that there should be no outside influence.

Every state, despite its population size and power, was equally a subject of international law, and this was a great civilizational achievement, which of course was lost again and again in the centuries that followed. But this was a very different concept of world order. A world order that accepted multipolarity, that did not interfere with each other, that started to think about each other’s otherness, that accepted the simultaneous existence of various powers.

The US has a completely different conception of world order. First of all, they think that they are somehow chosen by God, that they have a manifest destiny given to them by God. The concept of a sacred mission means that they think they can only get stronger, stronger and stronger. Therefore, the task of ruling the world belongs to them. And they are an indispensable nation. American exceptionalism. That’s why the whole history of American foreign policy is defined by the fact that they cannot be partners. They cannot partner with anyone else because they always think they are superior to others. They always think they have a better system than others.

And that’s why the Americans have so far found it difficult to make a treaty with, for example, Russia or China that they can really stick to because they always think that other nations, other states don’t have the kind of democracy that we have, that the people there are oppressed.

So the contract that we have now is only for a while, because the state that we have this contract with is not as developed as we are. It is not elected in the same way as we are.

This is basically a tragedy because the United States has not been able to create partnerships because of this notion of sacred mission, exceptionalism, indispensable nation. Instead of creating partnerships with Europe, with Germany, with France, with Italy, it has slowly but surely transformed Europe into a kind of colonial status. This is also a tragedy for America itself, because if Europe was a partner for the United States, it could have influenced it in a positive way. For example, we could have avoided many of the mistakes that American foreign policy has made in the Middle East or with Russia.

But because America does not see Europe as a partner, it has learned nothing from us. They always acted as if they already knew everything. This has led to a foreign policy that has antagonized much of the world.

The US now has a contradictory relationship not only with Russia, which is at war, but also with China, with Iran, increasingly with Turkey, with the Arab world, with Africa and Latin America, where they have waged enormous wars and destruction. So there is no area of civilization left in the world where the US has a normal relationship, not even with India.

And this is very destructive for the US because the US has basically created a kind of counter-alliance by antagonizing all the other major nations or civilizations in the world.

BRICS was created by the US, the US created BRICS, even though they were not intended to do that, but BRICS is basically the child of US foreign policy.

So you talked about two very, very different mindsets. On one side you have the manifest destiny, American exceptionalism, and on the other side you have the Westphalian system of Europe. After the Second World War, the unity of Europe was against the Soviet Union and communism, but at the same time it was doing it in conjunction with the hegemony of the United States on the continent. How did they achieve this hegemony over the continent? Or in other words, why did the Europeans allow the Americans to lead them against the Soviet Union?

Europe, as I mentioned earlier, had been organized for centuries as a kind of balance of power. After the Second World War it was difficult to go back to this system. I think the Soviet Union would have wanted to go back to that system because the Soviet Union was already a very large country and it was a burden to control more states outside of itself, especially if you think of the huge destruction that the Second World War caused in the most populated areas of the Soviet Union.

So the Soviet Union had no interest in controlling a large part of Europe and it certainly had no interest in controlling all of Europe. This may explain why, for example, in 1952, the Soviet Union made the offer that it would withdraw its forces from Germany for neutrality, that Germany could be reunified if it became neutral like Austria. But this offer was rejected by the West German government and by the United States, which wanted to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down.

Now the Americans were there and they started. For them Europe was a kind of gegenko, as we say in German, the opposite shore. So for the US, as a naval power, it was very important for them to control the opposite shore of the ocean and that was Europe and they wanted to stay there.

In their mentality, they saw their presence in Europe as a kind of trophy or a victory because they had the impression that they had a better system. And the US was populated by people who fled Europe because of political oppression or religious oppression. That is why to this day many Americans have a negative impression of Europe. For them Europe is a place that is not as free and democratic as they are. Returning to Europe after the Second World War meant for them that now they had to fix Europe.

They didn’t really do that. Of course there are some Americans who admire European art, literature and philosophy, but on the whole they look down on Europe more than they respect it. For them it was not a problem to reshape, to reorganize European culture. They also wanted to unify it, to create a kind of alliance against the Soviet Union. Because the United States saw itself as an exceptional nation with a sacred mission, they could not accept that there was another nation like the Soviet Union that had a project of socialism and an idea for humanity. So they wanted to dominate, I think.

For the Soviet Union, of course, the American presence on the European continent was a danger because Russia had experienced for several centuries that it could live in peace with Europe as long as there was a balance of power. But every once in a while Europe unites, for example under Napoleon, and then attacks Russia. Or Europe united under Hitler and the conquest of Nazi Germany and then attacked Russia. Now the American presence on the European continent means that Europe is once again united under American rule. For Moscow, this meant the danger of being attacked once again. That’s why they were in Eastern Europe.

Even so, they didn’t really want that.

Which brings us to Russia, to the question of Russia’s relationship with the West. Do you think it is possible to have, for example, a European security architecture that includes Russia again? Or will the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace” prevail? Or will post-EU Europe be a continent of wars? Because even if Europe, even if the European Union disintegrates, it is possible that the axis of Germany and France or only the axis of Germany will prevail. A post-EU Europe because Germany is still the biggest economy in Europe. It has a lot of opportunities to steer other countries.

No, no. It is not possible for the reason I just mentioned. I just said that Europe has always been organized as a balance of power, which means that if there is only one power ruling Europe, it means that Europe is destabilized. This is not good for Europe.

Germany may be the most powerful country in Europe, but it is not strong enough to rule Europe on its own. That’s the beauty of Europe, there are so many states in Europe and some of them are equally powerful: France and Germany, Britain, Italy, Spain, they are all similar, they are the biggest and they balance each other. I think that Europe can only be governed in such a balance, and the countries between which this balance is realized may differ from century to century.

In the era of the European Union, there was the German-French axis, which was a way of rebuilding or replicating this balance. Also, Germany is not very popular in the rest of Europe because of the legacy of the Second World War. Germany has friends. In China, in Japan, in Russia, Germany is highly respected. If you are far away from Germany, Germany is respected. But if you are close to Germany, in Poland, in France, in Great Britain, Germany is not so respected. For all these reasons Germany cannot unite Europe, it cannot and must not lead Europe. Europe has to organize itself in this similar balance of powerful forces.

Then you mentioned the issue of Russia. As soon as the European states or Europe as a whole understands its interest, it will very quickly start organizing a peace with Russia, if peace is possible. Because it is in Europe’s interest.

If you look at European history, you will see that Europe has been strong in times of peace and weak in times of war. In the United States it is the opposite. The US is strong in times of war and weak in times of peace. That’s why Europe needs peace.

Moreover, Russia is part of Europe. So when we talk about Europe, we are automatically talking about Russia and if we exclude Russia from Europe, it is like excluding a large region from China or an important province from India.

So in addition to the integrity of the continent, which can be shown geographically on a map, to exclude Russia from Europe culturally would be to exclude, for example, a great achievement of classical music from Europe. Tchaikovsky, Rahmaninov or the legacy of literature, philosophy or socialism is also part of Europe. The whole history of Eastern Europe during the Cold War is linked to Russia.

So Europe can only be healthy and have a future if it includes all of Europe. A Europe that excludes Russia will be badly divided and will probably have no sovereignty over its own cultural development.

Then we are once again in this distinction between the concept of the West and the concept of Europe. For the first time in history Europe is ruled by an outside power, a power that is located in a completely different geography, on a completely different continent, and it is called the West. You have pushed Russia and Russian culture out of Europe in order to maintain this artificial entity called the West. You have removed the memory that Russian culture and Russian influence is a natural part of Europe, like Italian culture and Italian influence or Spanish culture and Spanish influence. If you have the concept of the West, you will always have borders in the East.

But if we look at the concept of Europe, there is no need for a border in the east. Because Europe has been organized for centuries in a kind of balance of power, it can extend this concept even beyond the borders of Europe. And to some extent, the idea that Europe is organized in a balance of similar powerful states is a concept that very well represents the idea of BRICS, the concept of bricks of a multipolar world made up of similar powerful states like China, India, Russia, which are completely different from each other, but which accept certain ideas about the organization of the world order.

So we can say that we need to cut Russia off from Europe in order to have a US hegemony on the continent, in Europe.

Yes, this is in the interest of the United States. They want to sanctify this European interpretation of the West. So what we call the West today is basically the American interpretation of European culture.

The Americans themselves came from Europe, so they carry the heritage of European culture with them. But for a long time they lived on a different continent, in a different climate, in a different geographical situation. They are also a melting pot of nations. They have a completely different life experience and a completely different space than you have in Europe. Under these conditions, this European culture changed, which became the United States. Now American culture still has European roots, but it has become something different.

This half European, half non-European culture of the United States came back to Europe after the Second World War and started transforming Europe, reshaping Europe in the image of the United States and the EU. The European Union was an attempt to create a kind of copy of the United States in Europe.

And this is also the mistake of the European Union. The mistake of the European Union is that the European Union is not European. It has no connection with the history of European ideas. It does not refer to the 19th century. It does not refer to the 18th century, to the 17th century. It does not even refer to ancient times.

More than 20 years ago, when the European constitution was being planned, some people wanted to write a quote from the famous ancient Greek politician Pericles. Later this quote was removed because it was not politically correct. Pericles might have said something wrong about some minorities. They could not accept Pericles any more and so the quote was removed. This shows you the relationship of the European Union to European history.

Or look at the banknotes of Europe. Maybe I have one in my pocket. This is very meaningful. Here it is. This is a five euro note. Here you see a kind of building. This building is not real. It’s artificial. Fantasy. This bridge isn’t real either. It’s just an artificial bridge imagined by a painter.

So Europe has a very negative relationship with its own history and culture. So much so that we cannot even represent our own architecture on our banknotes.

So you think that in order to become more European, you need to get rid of the European Union as an institution?

This is of course dangerous. We have to look at the reality we have now. Right now we have the euro. There is a huge interconnection between different economies. We have a lot of interdependence within the European Union. The dissolution of the European Union would be catastrophic. Just like the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which created a lot of poverty and civil war. So nobody wants that.

So I think this is a very complex question and I don’t have a final answer to this question. Of course the EU needs at least some kind of restructuring. It needs to be fundamentally reformed. I don’t know whether it is possible or not. Maybe history will show how it will happen, what will happen. Maybe some states will start to leave the EU. Because history shows very clearly that a state that has no real identity of its own, that is built only on the basis of dependencies and laws, is a very weak entity and can disintegrate. And this could also happen to the EU.

Of course, if the European Union really disintegrates, it could be a very ugly process because the economic consequences would be enormous.

But one way or the other, do you think we are heading towards a post-EU era?

You see, there is the emergence of BRICS in the world right now. I just mentioned that BRICS is basically built by the shortcomings of American foreign policy, by its arrogance and selfish behavior.

What is interesting about the BRICS concept is that it includes very different civilizations and some of these civilizations are also states. For example, China is a state but it is also a civilization. India is a state but it is also a civilization. The same can be said about Iran.

In the case of Russia it is more complicated because Russia is also part of the European civilization. Some Russians deny it and say no, we are Eurasian in a similar way to Europe. But if you are in Russia, you see and feel European culture in every corner. So it is really difficult to separate Russia from Europe.

But the concept of civilization state is a very interesting concept or a very interesting term. The question is: Can Europe be a civilization state? The answer is both yes and no.

Yes, it can be, because for the whole history of Europe, after the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe was somehow united. Europe was politically divided but culturally united through the church and the Christian faith and also through the monasteries that were established in many different parts of Europe, all trying to remember the old history, the old literature and writings.

And this went on for 1500 years, Europe was united either through Christianity, through religion, through the church, or later on through the philosophy of humanism, the Enlightenment and the exchange of literature.

For example, different European writers wrote in different languages, but they were always reading each other. In the 18th and 19th centuries, it sometimes took only months for the first translation. All important authors caused a reaction in other countries where they were introduced in translation. German philosophy influenced not only Germany but the whole of Europe. The same is true for the French Revolution.

So Europe is a kind of, in Germany we call it a resonance chamber, a resonance chamber where cultural styles, architectural and painting styles ripple across the continent.

At the same time, we have political fragmentation. This is unique in the world because all other parts of the world are organized differently. If you look at China, for example, China was politically united even though it had many different languages and peoples. The same is true for India. I think the same is true for the Arab world and Russia. So in most parts of the world, at some point you have some kind of political unity.

In Europe, it never happened. It never really happened. There were attempts, for example Napoleon tried, Hitler tried with his strange and brutal ideas, but it always failed.

In the end, we have again political fragmentation with a kind of cultural unity. I think this is a model for the future. If Europe can represent this model, it will also be a mirror of the multipolar world, because in the multipolar world there are different centers of power that are in some kind of balance with each other.

Europe can become a pole of the multipolar world and at the same time represent multipolarity in itself.

This brings us to the second and last part of the title of your book, which is the reinvention of Europe. How can Europe reinvent itself and what elements in Europe have that energy?

First of all, we need to understand the difference between Europe and the West. We need to understand that we have lost a lot in the last 80 years because Europe has tried to make itself more like the West, or because the European Union has tried to reconstruct Europe as a mirror, a kind of copy of the U.S. We need to recognize these differences and then we need to start reclaiming what we really are.

I think these processes are going on in a different way in every European country. I think once we understand once again what Europe really is, what Europe can offer to the world and what has been done to us in the last 80 years, I think we can start to build a kind of European union that will once again be built on culture, history and a complex understanding of culture, which will once again have a kind of utopia in terms of education and civilization.

In the 21st century we are facing great challenges. For example artificial intelligence, genetic engineering. Europe has something to offer in this regard. We have the heritage of humanism and Enlightenment. So we can start with a kind of intellectual discourse, if we really need to do everything we can, because in other parts of the world, especially in the United States, there is a tendency to do everything possible in the field of technology.

Europe can make a different proposal to the world. Let’s try to control technology. Let’s try to put the human being first so that technology adapts to the human being and not vice versa. Europe can also become a neutral part of the world, like a global Switzerland, where intellectual discussions can take place on artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, but also on the preservation of culture.

Europe has a special opportunity to play this role in the 21st century. This is because Europe has influenced the rest of the world for the last 500 years. Since the rise of the Spanish and Portuguese empires, world culture has gradually become Europeanized. If we are in Latin America today and there are political debates, people use terms from European political philosophy to discuss their internal differences. The same is true for other parts of the world.

There is only one world culture in the world, and it has been largely shaped by Europe for several centuries. That is why Europe is now in a very good position to offer a place for discussion, meeting and exchange of ideas on civilizational issues in the 21st century, which will perhaps also be accepted by other civilizations, although they are interested in developing their own traditions.

Maybe in the future we will see a Chinese world culture or an Indian world culture, an Islamic world culture. I don’t exclude it, I welcome it, but it will take time, because if you want to transform your regional culture into a world culture, you have to create art, you have to create, you have to create, you have to write books, you have to create a philosophy, you have to create music that can be attractive to other people in other parts of the world, and this cannot be done in one generation. It cannot be done even in two generations. It needs time.

Europe has already done it for the last 300, 400 years. This is a kind of heritage not only for Europe but for the world and it has to be preserved. That’s why Europe has to be sovereign, it has to be independent, it has to be an independent pole in a multipolar world, not some kind of appendage of the United States, not some kind of American colony that sees itself through American glasses and unfortunately has a kind of colonial consciousness as it is today.

So we have to overcome the colonial consciousness that we have today and start to see what we really are, what we are with our good sides, what we are with our bad sides.

Of course a lot of bad things have happened in Europe. You mentioned colonialism, especially from the Western European states. Yes, there is a bad legacy, but at the same time Europe has given something to the world and we have to see both, the bad and the good. It is not very healthy to see only one side.

So do you think Germany can play a special role in this process? I mean, when you talk about Germany and its special role, it’s a bit terrifying because Germany has historical burdens. But is it still possible for Germany to play a leading role in what you call multipolarity in Europe, as a pole in a multipolar world?

Yes, Germany can be a pole in a multipolar Europe. Of course, like France, like Italy, like other important states and regions, there should be such a pole.

Of course, at the moment Germany is most affected by the current crisis, by the war in Ukraine, for example, the high energy prices have led to a kind of deindustrialization in Germany. So we are starting to feel it.

Usually Germany is not a place where active revolutions take place. Our revolutions, the German Peasants’ War or the Revolution of 1918, of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, all failed.

If there was a revolution in Germany, it was a political revolution. Of course you can say that fascism was a kind of political revolution, which was quite ugly and of course not something we want to point out.

But if you look at history, there were spiritual or intellectual revolutions that came out of Germany. Martin Luther, for example, came up with the idea of Protestantism, which was a reform of the church, which was also a kind of revolution. But it was more of a mental thing, it was not an active political revolution.

The same was true of the idea of socialism, which was rooted in the history of German thought. Marx was, after all, a German philosopher. So maybe in this sense something can come out of Europe, maybe out of Germany. Maybe some Germans can offer an idea.

But I think other European countries are also important. France is important, with its legacy of revolution and activism. Italy is important, Eastern European countries are important.

I think in the end we will see something coming from various corners of Europe. From one side comes an idea, from another side comes political turmoil. And from another corner of Europe a reasonable reform can be realized. In the end they will contribute and help each other.

But right now we are at a crossroads. What if Europe remains as it is now, it will become an insignificant part of the world; it will not be able to play a role as an appendage of the United States; its wealth will decline, its population will probably decline; European societies will lose their coherence and identity and Europe will become an insignificant and poor part of the world.

Nowadays we are beginning to see the situation and we are beginning to come back to ourselves. I think there are forces in Europe that are interested in this. Not only the normal population, but also what we have in Europe, in Germany, what we call Mittelstand in Germany, which are small-scale factories with a hundred or 800 employees, but big businesses that are very specialized in a certain product.

So there is still a lot of wealth in Europe. So there are forces that can do something. I think these processes are already going on.

I can’t see what will happen in the future. I can’t describe to you how this change will happen. Maybe it will come in a surprising way. Just like the change in 1989 happened in a surprising way. Many people thought that the wall would be there for the next 20 years and suddenly, overnight, it disappeared.

So history is completely unpredictable. History is always a surprise. If we have a vision of the future, we can be sure that this vision will not manifest itself 100%. History is always different from what we think.

But I am sure that there is a lot at stake right now. 2500 years of history, 2500 years of emerging cultural complexity, emerging civilization. All this should not be for nothing. Europe is important not only for Europe but for the world.

And I think a Europe that is once again faithful to its tradition of history, literature, philosophy will be respected in the world. Still, we have the legacy of colonial atrocities. But there are always two sides. So I see a future for a cultural and intellectual consciousness for Europe. Maybe this is possible.

INTERVIEW

German economist: Militarization of industry is a path to disaster

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Lucas Zeise, a German economist and co-founder of Financial Times Deutschland, shared his views on the militarization of industry in a recent interview. Zeise said, “If more and more is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of the road to disaster.”

Born in 1944, Lucas Zeise is a financial journalist with a background in philosophy and economics. His career includes positions with the Japanese Ministry of Economics, the German aluminum industry, the Frankfurt-based Börsen-Zeitung, and the Financial Times Deutschland, which he co-founded. Until 2017, he served as editor-in-chief of UZ, the weekly newspaper of the German Communist Party (DKP). He currently writes a regular column for Junge Welt and contributes articles to various publications.

Lucas Zeise answered Tunç Akkoç’s questions about the debate on German industry and economy and global developments.

Tunç Akkoç: First of all, is deindustrialization a reality?

Lucas Zeise: Yes, I think so, but of course it is a long-lasting reality. Deindustrialization is a process that coincides with capitalist development in general. Industry has been the main surplus-value-producing element of capitalism in all countries, and in some of the more developed countries, notably Britain, deindustrialization has reached a more advanced level. Since Britain was the first fully developed capitalist country, this process started earlier.

Economists often refer to this process as the tertiary sector, i.e. the service sector in general. In capitalist countries, the share of services in the economy is steadily increasing. This is a general trend that can be observed everywhere, and is particularly related to the fact that developed countries are gradually shifting their industries to other regions, especially South-East Asia, by exporting capital. While industrialization is taking place in these regions, the process of deindustrialization in developed countries has accelerated.

In addition, the process of financialization has also accelerated and the financial sector has become stronger. However, the finance sector is a service sector, not an industry. Nevertheless, all these service sectors depend on industry remaining strong. When we analyze the UK, we can see that the country has experienced a relative decline compared to other regions. For example, Germany had overtaken the UK in the industrialization process and even surpassed it before the First World War. Likewise, the US has also overtaken the UK in terms of industrialization.

This is a long-term trend. However, two major industrialized countries, Germany and Japan, have managed to resist this process for a long time. The recent economic shocks, however, have accelerated Germany’s deindustrialization process, which has brought about an inevitable crisis. This is the essence of the whole issue.

Tunç Akkoç: Some influential figures in the European Union, such as Mario Draghi, have argued that Germany should move away from the car industry and invest in new technologies such as artificial intelligence. What do you think about such proposals for structural change?

Lucas Zeise: I think such proposals for structural change will happen spontaneously on the one hand. I mean, this process is already going on naturally. China has already overtaken Germany in the car industry. Therefore, Mario Draghi’s advice on this issue is actually a cheap suggestion. It is easy to suggest something like this and then say ‘Great job!'”

On the other hand, it would be ridiculous to think that it is possible to steer the economy in this way. It is not enough to say, ‘OK, now we are investing heavily in artificial intelligence and we will get ahead in this field.’ Moreover, it is debatable whether artificial intelligence is really a great revolution or just a passing fad. Artificial intelligence can actually be considered as a sub-branch of the semiconductor industry, i.e. microelectronics.

Of course, the development of microelectronics is important and all countries are making state-sponsored investments in this field. The European Union and Germany are already encouraging this. However, this is not something that is unique to Germany or something that makes Germany different from others. While it is possible to make great progress in this area, this alone is not the final solution to a problem.

Tunç Akkoç: In general, how do you assess Germany’s future energy supply strategy?

Lucas Zeise: Obviously, I am not an expert in this field, so it is difficult for me to give a really good assessment. But it seems very clear to me that all states have to pay attention to such a central sector of the economy.

Germany was already in a different position in that it did not have its own oil companies. This has become a historical tradition. As for natural gas, there used to be two big centers: one centered around BASF, the other around Ruhrgas. These two structures were interconnected and worked well for a while. Over time, however, this system changed and other areas of the energy sector, especially electricity generation, were restructured.

However, this does not change the fact that the energy sector must be guided by the state. Energy policy should be managed by the state in a holistic manner. Developing a common energy policy in the European Union already seems unlikely. However, such a policy should have been mandatory for such a large common market.

At this point, if we look at the example of Turkey, the energy sector there is handled, managed and coordinated in a relatively centralized manner. In Germany, and at the EU level in general, there is a major deficiency in this respect. The state does not really take enough ownership of the energy issue.

Tunç Akkoç: On the other hand, German industry is increasingly turning to the defense industry. Some see in the militarization of the economy the potential for a kind of ‘re-industrialization’. After the war in Ukraine, more and more German companies are breaking the taboo on supplying the defense industry and entering the military equipment sector. How should we assess this development?

Lucas Zeise: On the one hand, this is clearly a sign of the collapse of the still developing and relatively well-functioning global economy. If more and more of it is being spent on the defense industry, this is actually a loss. Because this activity is a production that exists only for destruction. This is a sign of a general decline and at the same time an indication of a road to disaster.

It is also clear that there is competition for the best defense tenders in the international arena. That is why everyone feels that it needs to enter this field strongly. Nobody just wants to buy aircraft from the US, but wants to build their own defense industry. Germany was already taking part in this process. Although not always at the forefront, tank production in particular has long been strong. This sector was progressing steadily, albeit at a slow pace.

However, this development seems to herald an impending catastrophe. It shows that everyone is preparing for war. This is very similar to the atmosphere before the First World War.

Tunç Akkoç: Elections are approaching in Germany. Do you think that after these elections, Germany’s economic policies will change with a new political order?

Lucas Zeise: More likely no, I don’t think so. I think that economic issues have become a bit more prominent, but if we look back, I remember that in the German Bundestag elections in 1969, one of the main debates in the election campaign was whether the German Mark (D-Mark) should appreciate against the US Dollar. So, a very specific and economically critical issue for Germany at that time was at the center of the election campaign. This debate was directly related to the position Germany should take vis-à-vis the US and Europe.

Today such a debate is missing. The issues that really need to be addressed —energy policy, deindustrialization— are being dealt with in a strangely distorted way. The only thing that everyone seems to agree on is the Agenda 2010 program that Gerhard Schröder launched in 2002 or 2003. This program meant lowering wages, reducing social benefits and increasing profit-making opportunities for companies.

But this approach was already wrong at the time. Schröder’s move enabled some big companies to make a big leap forward and strengthened German capital, especially in the European domestic market. This had certain advantages, but repeating it now would only worsen the situation.

That’s why I think the debate is being conducted in the wrong way and not particularly along party lines. On the contrary, there seems to be a consensus among most political actors on this issue.

Tunç Akkoç: How do you assess the first actions of the Trump administration and what will be the impact on international relations and the global economy?

Lucas Zeise: In my opinion, there is not a new wave of deregulation (liberalization). The US government’s more aggressive stance towards other great powers, or as Trump calls them, ‘shitholes’, or small states, ruthlessly suppressing and crushing them, is not deregulation. It is, in fact, a further intensification of the rivalry between the capitalist states, which are essentially allies, by any means necessary. We can see this situation clearly.

This is not deregulation; it is more like what happened during the Ronald Reagan era. At that time, the US tried to revitalize its rivalry, not with China, but especially with Japan and Western Europe. Reagan’s ruthless behavior towards his own allies was aimed at strengthening the US global position. Today, I think it has become even harsher, so much so that the President of the US can stand up and say, ‘Oh Denmark, you have to give us Greenland, or else we will buy it.’ They even imply that they can intervene directly if necessary.

This kind of behavior is actually a continuation of the past US policies towards Panama. Panama was detached from Colombia and made independent because the US wanted to build a canal there. In other words, this imperialist behavior towards weak countries is already a tradition. But the behavior towards medium-sized states such as Germany, Britain, France or Japan is becoming more and more brutal. I see this as the result of an intensifying and ever more bitter rivalry.

The US in particular is less and less reluctant to use its military power more recklessly, and this is becoming more and more prominent. This is not a new era; it is a further advance of neoliberalism and laissez-faire. The so-called ‘rules-based economic policy’ rhetoric has been completely discarded.

Tunç Akkoç: We see both overly optimistic and overly pessimistic comments about the Chinese economy. When government bonds lose value, pessimists sound the alarm; when exports break records, optimists raise their voices. Does China have the intention or the power to ‘share’ the world with the US?

Lucas Zeise: I completely agree with you; the overly optimistic comments are as exaggerated as the overly pessimistic ones. If I try to think from the point of view of the Chinese Communist Party and its leaders, their tradition has been to position China as the largest economic power and to take the first place in the capitalist world.

In the present situation, if I am the second most powerful country, naturally my goal is to equalize with the first. And I have to do this because there is almost no scenario in which the US will accept this and say, ‘OK, we can live in peace with China.’ For a while it seemed as if there was this understanding, that we were working well with China and we were happy with that. But this is clearly no longer possible.

The official US policy is based on not allowing China to become an equal power. They want to continue to set the rules and, if necessary, to violate them according to their own interests. Therefore, China is forced to act like an imperial power.

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INTERVIEW

Head of Roscongress: Local currencies are used to bypass sanctions

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Alexander Stuglev, the Head of  Roscongress Foundation, spoke to Harici: “For easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS can be used.”

With the Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow has increasingly turned to business diplomacy and international trade cooperation as strategic tools to mitigate the effects of Western sanctions. Central to this effort is Roscongress Foundation, Russia’s premier organization for fostering global economic dialogue and partnerships. Established to enhance Russia’s business ties internationally, Roscongress serves as a bridge connecting Russian enterprises with global markets through high-profile forums such as the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF). The organization plays a critical role in reshaping Russia’s economic development by emphasizing collaboration with emerging economies, strengthening ties with traditional partners, and exploring new trade opportunities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Roscongress was organized a meeting in Istanbul and Alexander Stuglev, the Head of  Roscongress Foundation, replied the questions of Harici.

As we understand, Roscongress is the main tool for business diplomacy and to eliminate the impacts of Western sanctions. Can you tell us more about the organization?

Yes, you have noticed correctly, Roscongress was established in 2007 as a non-financial development institution that deals with the organization and holding of major international economic and political events in Russia in the interests of attracting investments to the Russian Federation and developing the economy of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, while organizing events we, of course, proceed from the fact that in addition to interaction between Russia and businessmen from a particular country, direct connections can also be established with third countries, that we are also welcoming.

Could you tell us more about the opportunities and risks you see in Turkish-Russian relations in business sector?

Undoubtedly, to some extent, sanctions affect the development of Russian-Turkish relations and, in general, business relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, today, all those who use these turbulences in a pragmatic way to build their business projects in Russia are winning, occupying the vacated niches from Western countries, developing their own business. And from the point of view of easing the sanctions regime, national currencies are currently used, and potentially in the future, a digital currency developed by the BRICS association (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) can be used.

First of all, there are always risks out there, marketing risks included. Secondly, in addition to the fact that Turkish companies have occupied the niches vacated by Western companies, we see a general change in the structure of the Russian economy with a greater focus on creating products and services within Russia.

Tourism for example; the number of tourist trips that have now emerged in Russia is many times higher than there were before COVID, about 83 million trips are made by Russian citizens annually within Russia.  And this requires the infrastructure development.

Taking into account the large number of support programs from the Russian state for companies that are developing tourism infrastructure, there are great chances, for foreign companies as well, if they organize a Russian legal entity in the format of an LTD and get the opportunity to develop their projects. This is one of the possibilities.

Creative industry, computer IT security, IT products; in all those areas we can cooperate completely freely. These are such cross-border industries, where, I think, it’s very difficult to be a subject for sanctions.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin set a goal of increasing bilateral trade volume to $100 billion. Do you see an expansion or a contraction in the Turkish-Russian trade volume in 2025?

Firstly, this is practically 100% growth to what we have now.As for the forecast for 2025-2026, the main thing is,first: in my opinion, the construction of transport and logistics projects.There is the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea for example.Second; this is cooperation in the field of energy. Thirdly, this is cooperation in the field of chemistry (creation of chemical products) from supplied raw materials, from oil and gas.This is a promising area of pharmaceuticals, supplies of medical equipment, as well as medical services in Türkiye.Undoubtedly, the development of tourism is very promising but also creative industry, IT industry, Cybersecurity.These are the areas that, in my opinion, will develop in the near future. Of course, traditional cooperation in the field of metallurgy.Traditional cooperation in the field of agriculture and food supplies will grow for sure.

What challenges do sanctions pose to bilateral relations?

The first is an axis from the sanctions regime, including through payment in national currencies and using digital currencies. The second is business, thanks to its capabilities, will find a solution to any restrictions. I do not want to go into details now, do not want to disclose the details of the opportunities that companies can use to maintain a normal trade balance.

Anti-colonial movements in Africa seem to have opened up space for Russia in both diplomatic and commercial terms. How do you assess the situation there?

This is an anti-colonialist movement not only in relation to France, but also in relation to other countries. This is also a movement in relation to proposals that are unfair to Africa, for example, on the green transition, because it will destroy African business and will give great advantages to global companies. In my opinion, it is necessary to proceed from the interests of African countries, which, in fact, Russia always does. This is the advantage of our economy and politics.

We work in a ‘win-win’ mode. In the same way, the Turkish side can work in Africa. In the same way, Chinese investors have been actively working in Africa to this day in the form of the prospects of this market. But based on common interests, on the one hand there is a creation of profitable enterprises. On the other hand – the development of the African economy.  Only this will provide an opportunity for further mutual growth. If we simply export material resources from the colonies as a consumer and do not give anything in return, nothing good will come for sure.

After the fall of Assad government, does Russia have any interest in doing business in the reconstruction of Syria?

I am sure that Russian companies will take part in this process, just like other international companies. Now a period of political stabilization will pass and a period of certain growth will begin. The main thing is that extremist movements and non-constructive movements in relation to Syria and the Syrian people do not prevail in politics.  I believe that politics and economics will improve in the near future.

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INTERVIEW

‘Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis’

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From January 9 to 11, the World Festival of the Antifascist International took place in Caracas, Venezuela. More than 2,000 national and international guests from more than 100 countries, as well as other Venezuelan cities, attended the event. Among them were representatives of social movements, political parties, cultural and popular organizations, intellectuals, indigenous peoples, youth, students, workers, parliamentarians, communicators and other personalities. The mega activity was carried out within the framework of the Inauguration of Nicolás Maduro, who on January 10, was sworn in as President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for the period 2025-2031, and also served as an example of international support for the continuity of the Bolivarian Revolution under the leadership of Maduro. Another important event that surrounded the Festival was the Inauguration of Donald Trump this January 20.

The Italian-Argentine philosopher Rocco Carbone, who has delved into the discursivities and political and cultural processes of Latin America, was born in Cosenza, Calabria, in southern Italy, but has lived for more than 20 years in the Argentine capital, Buenos Aires. Carbone studied at the Università degli Studi della Calabria. He received his doctorate in Philosophy from the University of Zürich, Switzerland, and currently teaches at the National University of General Sarmiento (UNGS) and is part of the prestigious world of Argentine scientific research center CONICET.

In addition to the aforementioned International Fascist Festival, Carbone participated in other activities carried out in Caracas within the framework of the Inauguration of President Nicolás Maduro, such as the January 9 March; the Swearing-in on January 10; and, the III World Communication Congress of the University of Communications (LAUICOM) held on January 11, among others. In that sense, Harici was able to talk with the Italian-Argentine philosopher about what fascism is, who is Argentine with Javier Milei as its president, and what is coming for Latin America and the world with the arrival of Trump to the White House.

Venezuela has just celebrated the International World Anti-Fascite Festival. Can you give us a definition of what fascism is and how it is expressed today?

The first thing I would tell you is that fascism is never something new, fascism is always old. With this I want to tell you that I am a little reluctant to talk about neofascism, but rather the word fascism convinces me more. I know that, at least in Argentina, where I have lived for more than 20 years, and also in the rest of Latin America this is a difficult word. It is a difficult word from political theory, from political action, for different reasons. But, without a doubt, when we say fascism we are referring to the Italian experience, to the German experience of the 20th century, which were experiences that extended more or less between the 20s, 30s and 40s. But if one theorizes this word a little, in the 20th century we see fascism in different places, that is, fascism in the 20th century was an international force. We find fascism, for example, in Great Britain, where in the 1920s and 1930s there was the British Union of Fascists, led by Oswald Mosley, a guy who had trained with Lord Keynes, the key to economics who was part of a brain of the Blackmore Group.

For example, in old China in the 1930s, within the Kuomintang of the Chinese Nationalist Party, founded by Sun Yat-sen, there also existed a dual power apparatus called the Blue Shirt Association, which was an apparatus fascist type military politician. If we think about Our America, for example, in Cuba governed by Gerardo Machado y Morales, the greatest fact against that political experience is that he persecuted a great militant who was part of the student movement and the Cuban labor movement, Julio Antonio Mella. Being an avid writer, in some of his texts, which we can read today because they have been preserved, Mella called Machado Morales “the tropical Mussolini”, that is, Mella identified Machado as a fascist. Then Mella had to exile himself from Cuba and went to live in Mexico and Machado had him murdered.

And if we think about Argentina in the 1930s, the so-called “Infamous Decade”, there was an Argentine fascist party recognized by the Italian fascist party that had a mass experience, especially in the city of Córdoba, where it was led by a relatively important Argentine Thomist philosopher, Nimio Juan Manuel de Anquí.

And why do I say all this? Because everything that is in history, everything that is in the political history of the world and in the political history of Latin America, at some later point, that history can be reactivated again. And it seems to me that this is happening today in Our America with different expressions of politics that if we call it right or extreme right or extreme right, we say absolutely nothing, because that is an insufficient descriptive expression.

So it seems to me that using these categories says nothing, for example, about the Venezuelan opposition, about Milei, about Bolsonaro. And it seems to me that this word, fascism, has indeed been reactivated. Now you ask me to give a definition of fascism, and I believe that we can think of fascism in many ways, we can think of it in relation to statehood, but we can think of it as political power without necessarily linking it to the nation-state.

Regarding Javier Milei, you have just released a book about the type of fascism that the Argentine president characterizes. Tell us a little about that.

Yes, the book is precisely called “Flamethrower: Milei and Psychotizing Fascism.” Fascism is a psychotizing power because it is a power that tends to drive the citizen, the free organizations of the people, the political parties, and politics crazy… Fascism is a power that discursively, but also politically, when it makes policy, always says two things at the same time and these things contradict each other.

In the case of Milei we can see it clearly, for example, when he was in the middle of the presidential campaign, Milei said that the current Minister of Economy, his Minister of Economy, Luis Caputo, was a criminal and a thief, because he had requested a loan from the IMF for 45 billion dollars, which became an enormous Argentine external debt. But then, when Milei won the presidential election, he chose Caputo as economy minister and now praises him.

Well, there we effectively see a power that narratively says two things at the same time that deny each other. That is why I say that it is a psychotizing power, that is, a power that tends to drive the citizens crazy. And, from my point of view, that psychotizing style basically tends to at least inhibit the popular response to fascism. That is the psychotizing element, the permanent contradictory element, that activates fascist power. We also see it in the permanent development of policies.

In the case of Milei, before becoming president he was briefly a deputy, and when he was a parliamentarian he voted in favor of the elimination, for example, of a tax that is the Income tax (also called the tax on great wealth). Milei voted against that entry, because for him, the Argentine State is a kind of evildoer, it is a kind of thief. The State is a kind of criminal because it taxes the citizens. However, now that he is president he is reinstating the income tax. Once again we see a contradictory policy that balances between a denial and an affirmation.

I believe that in this way we can understand fascism: as a kind of latent political force that is present in the life of people, as a kind of small person (a dwarf) that is – to a greater or lesser extent – in each one. of us and that, appropriately stimulated, grows again.

This January 20, the White House has a new tenant. What can we expect from Trump’s international policy towards Venezuela and Latin America?

Klara Zetkin in her 1923 text: “Fight against fascism. And how to defeat it”, argues that fascism is “a tool of capitalism in crisis.” In that sense, Trump is the head of state who represents the maximum expression of capitalism, and when capitalism is in crisis (in fact, Trump feels that the United States is in crisis, is in danger) to surf that crisis and stay afloat, capitalism expands. a much more radical tool than capitalism itself: fascism. It seems to me that this is a great definition to understand what we are talking about when we talk about fascism, because as we said before, that word activates historical comparisons, which can confuse us or divert us a little. And it seems to me that if, on the contrary, we connect it with the rationality of capitalism, especially the capitalism in crisis that we are experiencing in the 21st century, that is, a capitalism that has many dimensions, there is a productive capitalism, analog capitalism, there is another platform capitalism, financial or digital, there is another type of capitalism, specifically in Latin America, the narco capitalism.

And capitalism at this moment is going through a transition phase, because there is a dispute for the hegemony of capitalism between the old US imperialism and new emerging countries, such as the BRICS. I am referring to Russia, I am thinking of China, India, Iran, which are disputing that hegemony, that leadership. 

And so, because capitalism is closely linked to imperialism, the United States feels the pressure of that crisis. Trump has expressed it several times, for him American power is in crisis, in decline. So in different places in the Western world, forms of fascism are activated so that capitalism stays afloat, stays alive and reaffirms itself in this moment of transition from one hegemony to another hegemony, which we still do not know what it will be. Let’s say, this neo-hegemony or hegemonism is still uncertain, but it seems to me that the world is moving towards it, therefore, it seems to me that we must effectively understand it under that paradigm: fascism as a tool of capitalism in crisis.

As to how Trump’s arrival at the White House may affect Venezuela, this is also a bit uncertain. But the obvious thing is that the Trump administration needs an antagonist. If Israel and Gaza reach a prolonged peace agreement, beyond the circumstantial ceasefire, and if Trump manages to end the war in Ukraine. The United States will exert greater pressure and interference against Venezuela. Trump is acting psychotically against the Chinese government, his main enemy in the fight to maintain global hegemony. That is why thinking about a “reasonable capitalism” is nonsense, which is why people must unite and organize.

What do we do?

Imagining and organizing a new world, alternative to the power schemes of powers that do not fight to achieve something but rather covet everything that exists is the task of participation and struggle for the forces of emancipation that vibrate in the ideas of social justice. and egalitarianism. National and popular forces with the Latin American perspective of the great Homeland. Because, what is a town, after all? It is not a fixed or eternal idea but an idea that names and summons the possibility of being constituted in each historical stage. That idea indicates less a large number, a large conglomerate, or a conspicuous number of people mobilized than a fluctuating community experiencing an epiphany. A revelation of power, of knowledge, of beauty, of shared knowledge. A social bond, a hug. An experience: a constitutive part of what one is and without which one cannot be, nor continue to be. From Our America it must still be possible to imagine and organize an emancipatory action – spliced ​​with the dimensions of multipolarity and the BRICS – constituted around a popular slogan: Make Antifascism Great Again, on the 80th anniversary of the subordination of archaeological fascism at the hands of the revolution.

Notes

“Flamethrower. Milei and psychotizing fascism” (2024) by Rocco Carbone. In this essay, the Italian-Argentine philosopher maintains that “fascism is a highly psychotizing or maddening political power. And this characteristic is expressed very well in Milei, because Every time Milei speaks he says two things that clash with each other, for example: First he said: ‘Pope Francis is the representative of the evil one on earth’ and then, when he makes a trip to Rome and visits the Vatican, he says: “The Pope is the most important Argentine in history.” In this text, Rocco invites us to resist and combat this political power because “fascism does not imply an idea different from our own, but the death of all ideas.” And he concludes that “Fascism is a tool of capitalism in crisis,” a thought previously postulated (1923) by the feminist and German communist deputy Klara Zetkin (1857-1933) in the text “Fight against fascism. And how to beat it.”

In “Mafia capital: The hidden logics of power” (2019) the philosopher maintains that: “Organized crime (now nationalized) has a very broad advantage over Argentine democracy and its laws.” In his text, Rocco reviews Latin American history and the recent radicalization of neoliberal governments. It also describes the development of the Mafia, from its origins and how: “in just two generations it stopped being a regional and rural organization to become another, made up of modern, cosmopolitan and refined businessmen, with doctorates, capable of expressing themselves and doing things.” His work has been published in many languages.

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