Connect with us

OPINION

Iran’s future after president Raisi’s fatal helicopter crash

Published

on

By Mohammad Mazhari

The recent helicopter crash involving senior Iranian officials, including President Ebrahim Raisi, Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, and seven others, has cast a significant shadow over Iran’s political landscape, raising pressing questions about the country’s immediate political future and long-term stability.

Officials reported that Raisi and his associates were killed when the helicopter went down in heavy fog. While the cause of the crash remains unconfirmed, many observers and social media users have speculated about potential culprits—ranging from enemy countries and internal rivals to adverse weather conditions or a mechanical fault.

Under the Iranian constitution, should the president be incapacitated or deceased, the first vice president, Mohammad Mokhber, is mandated to assume the presidency temporarily until new elections can be held within 50 days.

Mokhber, a former officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and close ally of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is expected to maintain the current political trajectory. This is because the real power in Iran rests with the Supreme Leader, who exercises ultimate authority over the executive, judiciary, and legislative branches of government.

Raisi’s death intensifies speculation about his successor after a couple of low turnouts in recent parliamentary and presidential elections. With 59,310,307 eligible voters, the turnout in the 2021 presidential election was 48.8 percent, the lowest ever in Iranian presidential elections, below the previous low of 51 percent in 1989. Likewise, in parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections which both took place on March 1, only 41% of voters came out; some 25 million cast their ballots out of Iran’s 61 million eligible voters.

This tragic event has undoubtedly plunged Iran into a period of uncertainty, with the upcoming elections likely to be a critical juncture for the nation’s future.

Early presidential elections can provide the Islamic Republic and the upper echelons of the state with a crucial opportunity to reverse course and reengage disillusioned voters. However, this requires a strategic decision to expand a political circle that has been steadily shrinking. So far, the political establishment’s inclination has been to double down on conservative rule.

The Guardian Council’s mass disqualifications, which barred prominent figures such as Ali Larijani, the former Speaker of Parliament, from competing in the presidential race, effectively paved the way for Ebrahim Raisi’s ascension to the presidency in 2021. This disqualification policy continued into the 2024 parliamentary and Assembly of Experts elections, in which former President Hassan Rouhani was banned from securing a seat in the Assembly of Experts.

Notable politicians who can be probable candidates for the presidency include Eshagh Jahangiri, the former First Vice President; Masoud Pezeshkian, a current legislator both from the reformist faction; Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the current Speaker of Parliament; and most probably Mohammad Mokhber, the current interim president both are attributed to the conservative faction.

Should Ghalibaf or Mokhber who have close ties with IRGC, ascend to power, we can predict a consolidation of the IRGC’s influence in the state-run establishments. The IRGC controls vital portions of the economy and exerts considerable sway over military and security policies. The Generals will undoubtedly try to use the post-Raisi era to deepen their influence in the domestic milieu.

However, this trajectory has marginalized many top politicians and led to low voter turnout. It can pave the way for a new round of protests and destabilization in the country. The nationwide protests of 2022-2023, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, showcased the populace’s readiness to challenge the regime. These protests, led by a new generation of women demanding greater freedoms, were suppressed by the regime. With the economy in disarray and over sixty percent of Iranians living in poverty, the government’s legitimacy is severely strained. Raisi’s death adds another layer of instability to this already volatile situation.

The conservative government is already grappling with widespread discontent due to economic hardships, and Raisi’s death could trigger new protests, particularly if the upcoming presidential election is perceived as neither free nor fair.

Internationally, Raisi’s death might not significantly influence ongoing negotiations between Tehran and Washington or relations with the West, particularly concerning Iran’s controversial nuclear program. Known for his hardline stance, Raisi’s successor may have more space to navigate these complex issues using moderate policies amidst internal and external pressures.

Iran’s foreign policy remains under the Supreme Leader’s oversight, regardless of the political orientation of the dominant government. General policies and critical decisions in foreign policy must be approved by Ayatollah Khamenei.

Nevertheless, the Iranian regime faces a critical juncture. The Assembly of Experts, responsible for selecting the Supreme Leader, must carefully consider future leadership. The regime’s primary objectives are to rebuild its voter base, expand its military capabilities through the IRGC’s domestic and regional influence, and contain opposition forces.

Mohammad Mazhari is a political scientist who served as editor-in-chief of the Arabic Mehr News Agency from 2013-2020 and as a journalist at the Tehran Times from 2020-2021.

Twitter/X: @epicoria

OPINION

Israel on the brink

Published

on

Israel’s nearly year-long operation in Gaza to oust Hamas and rescue hostages has yet to produce its full results, but it appears to have started a war with Hezbollah. At the time of writing (in the early hours of Wednesday 25 September) it had not yet launched a ground operation. Indeed, it did not seem certain that it would, as Hezbollah continued to respond to the intense air strikes on southern Lebanon over the weekend as if it had not been affected.

Although not fully reported in the mainstream media, there were reports that Hezbollah had intensively shelled northern Israel, particularly military targets and the city of Haifa, forcing Israel to evacuate (or shelter) civilians from a significant part of the northern region. In addition, Tel Aviv was also attacked with rockets in response to Israeli air strikes, all without the effectiveness of Israel’s much-vaunted Iron Dome air defence system.

Hezbollah is no pushover

In short, Hezbollah is no pushover, as it has proved in every armed conflict with Israel, and is unlikely to be this time. This organisation, which was born/strengthened in the early 1980s when Israel invaded Lebanon and has repeatedly clashed with Israel, is neither a regular army nor an ordinary guerrilla organisation. Hezbollah, which can use both methods depending on the course of the war, has always forced Israel to retreat by inflicting heavy losses on it, and did so again in the last war in 2006.

If Israel were to launch a full-scale ground operation now, the result would probably be similar. But we see that it is avoiding this as much as possible. In the last clashes between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006, which lasted 33 days, Israel started its operation with an intense aerial bombardment, without paying any attention to civilians, children and infants, as it is doing now; but as soon as it started a ground operation, it withdrew with great losses.

So much so that Hezbollah destroyed many Israeli tanks, shot down Israeli helicopters, made it difficult for the helicopters to operate, and was rumoured to have shot down some of the F-16s. On one occasion, Hezbollah leader Nasrallah even went on live television and announced that ‘right now our resistance forces are going to hit an Israeli warship’, at which point a Hezbollah missile quickly neutralised the Israeli warship. As Israel continued its intensive aerial bombardment of civilian settlements despite all warnings, Hezbollah began to attack Israeli settlements, and Hezbollah attacks, first on towns/cities near the Lebanese border, eventually reached Tel Aviv, which Israel never expected. Meanwhile, many of its soldiers were captured by Hezbollah and Israel was forced to withdraw from the war in silence.

The current military-political situation is even more in Hezbollah’s favour

What is the military and political situation now compared to 2006? Hezbollah seems to be in a better position in a war that is starting now than it was in 2006. First of all, it cannot be said that Israel achieved the desired results from its operation against Hamas, which turned into a genocide in Gaza. Genocide against civilians does not necessarily mean achieving the political-diplomatic results of using military force. For example, none of the stated aims of the war, such as rescuing hostages or eradicating Hamas, have been achieved. It is clear that a terrible genocide has taken place, but Hamas is still operational in Gaza and will and will try to harm Israel through ambushes and other methods, taking advantage of a ground operation that Israel will launch against Hezbollah.

On the other hand, another event/development that the Turkish media has almost persistently ignored provides other clues. A few days before Israel remotely detonated the pagers and radios used by some Hezbollah members, the Houthis in Yemen, who have become an important part of the axis of resistance forces, managed to hit Tel Aviv with a hypersonic missile from two thousand kilometres away.

This was particularly important because hypersonic missiles are not even in the West’s inventory. The most advanced missiles in the world are in the inventories of Russia and China, but Iran has also managed to build one. This missile, fired from Yemen, travelled more than two thousand kilometres across the Red Sea, probably passing through or close to the American navy, and hit Tel Aviv in eleven minutes. The reason for the ineffectiveness of Israel’s air defence system, Iron Dome, is that such missiles are virtually invisible on radar and/or the West does not have missiles fast enough to counter them. In the event of a ground war with Hezbollah, it is highly likely that the Yemeni Houthis will launch more of these missiles, putting Israel in a difficult position. We know that the Western naval force deployed against the Houthis is hardly effective.

It should also be noted that there are elements of the Axis of Resistance in Iraq and Syria. We must expect them to take part in the war to some extent, with drones in their hands, and to side with Hezbollah against Israel. From a political point of view, the conditions are much less favourable for Israel than they were in 2006. First of all, Israel, and especially Netanyahu’s government, has become a pariah in the eyes of world public opinion and many governments. Even in the United States, both public opinion and a significant part of the American elite are highly critical of Israel.

At first glance, this would not have much impact in a land war between Hezbollah and Israel, but it would undoubtedly have a negative psychological impact on Israeli citizens. It should be noted that since the Hamas attack of 7 October and the subsequent operations in Gaza, a significant number of Israeli citizens, many of them also citizens of other countries, have left the country. This process must have been accelerated by the rockets fired by Hamas and the ease with which Hezbollah can fire rockets at Israel, especially in low-intensity conflicts between Hezbollah and Israel. Regionally, perhaps the only change in Israel’s favour since 2006 is that the Syrian state has been weakened by a dirty war that Turkey has supported against its own interests. And in the coming days we will have a better idea of how this will affect a war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Multipolarity and the stabilisation of the collective West

The inevitable emergence of multipolarity as the new world order will have important consequences for the region and for Israel, because multipolarity means balancing the superiority of the collective West, primarily in the military sphere, but also in the economic and technological spheres, the first signs of which we are already seeing. Particularly at a time when the United States is engaged in a power struggle with Russia on the one hand and China on the other, its aid and support for Israel may not be as extensive as it is during election periods. In fact, as some Jewish organisations have noted, issues such as the rapid change in the profile of the American electorate and the focus of voters on the economy, which is not doing well, may have a serious impact on Israeli-American relations in the near future.

It may not be possible for Israel to continue its current policies of genocide, massacre, ethnic cleansing, war, etc. in the medium term if it is squeezed between the forces that define themselves as the Axis of Resistance, led by Hezbollah, on the one hand, and the Arab states that are waging a political/diplomatic struggle against the current Israeli government, which rejects a two-state solution, on the other. In short, Israel is moving rapidly towards its own demise.

There is no doubt that in order to reverse this process, a complete ceasefire in Gaza is needed, followed by serious and comprehensive steps towards the establishment of a Palestinian state. For example, if Israel had fully implemented the two-state model in the Oslo peace process, the Hamas issue would have remained an internal matter for the Palestinian state and the Palestinian political leadership. And Hezbollah and the other Axis of Resistance forces and Iran would have lost legitimacy, which is the most important element in the struggle against Israel. But the question is: can a forward-looking, visionary government in Israel, with the support of the people, initiate such a peace process? At the moment, unfortunately, we are going through a period in which hopes are very low.

Continue Reading

OPINION

China-Africa summit and the collective West: Alas, China has Africa in its grasp

Published

on

China’s diplomatic moves over the past year have set alarm bells ringing in the collective West. First, the normalisation of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries on both sides of the Gulf last year (May 20-23), after decades of conflict, was a major diplomatic achievement, even if the West tried to underestimate this big splash… Because at the time of the Shah, a close friend of the US, Iran was on one side of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia and the Arab states on the other, and almost all of these states were allies of the US (except for Iraq under Saddam Hussein), but the Washington administrations could not reconcile these friends/allies and did not even try to do so properly…

Since US strategies are not based on reconciling states and sharing resources according to the principles of justice, they did not try to do so between Turkey and Greece. It was more in line with America’s geopolitical logic to exploit the contradictions between its allies in the Gulf, the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean. We can clearly see that they are still doing so between Turkey and Greece.

China’s achievements in regional diplomacy were not limited to this. In May this year (2024), China and the Arab League countries met in Beijing at the level of foreign ministers. Some Arab states, notably Egypt, attended the meeting at the level of heads of state. China’s appeal to the Arab countries and especially to the Palestinians as an ‘oppressed nation’ seemed to be enough to win their hearts. China’s harsh criticism of Israel and the West’s collective sins in Gaza not only represented a line consistent with its previous policy, but also helped win the hearts of all Arabs. Moreover, the fact that China looked at the Palestinian issue from the perspective of the Arab side and had no hidden agenda of its own made these diplomatic initiatives both possible and fruitful.

About two months later (23 July 2024), the news broke that China had brought together and reconciled fourteen Palestinian resistance organisations, mainly Fatah and Hamas, to put aside their differences and fight together. In media terms, the news was a bombshell. None of this could/could have been done by the US or any other Western country, because it was almost impossible for Washington to achieve such a success, as the US has never respected the legitimate rights of the Arabs/Palestinians and has always been thought to act with the idea of forcing or deceiving the Arabs/Palestinians.

Africa Summit disturbs the collective West

The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which came on top of all these successful diplomatic moves, seems to have disturbed the peace of the former colonialist Western countries, especially America. In fact, the summit in question has been held eight times since 2000, the ninth in Beijing (4-5 September 2024). There is no doubt that one of the main reasons why this summit has become so prominent in the media is the extraordinary strain on the collective West caused by the establishment of a multipolar system and the fact that the American-led unipolarity is inevitably coming to an end. Another reason must be the above-mentioned consequential diplomatic moves by China, which will play a decisive role in the multipolar world order.

To put it bluntly, the collective West’s analyses and assumptions about both China and Africa over the past three decades have been completely wrong. What we were told about China and Africa in 1996, when I first went to the US for about a month on an American government programme, seems to describe quite well what is happening today… Throughout our trip, which included a week in Washington, a week in San Jose, the capital of Silicon Valley, which was very famous and important at the time, then five days in Minnesota and five days in New York, the briefings we received in both official institutions and think tanks and lobbying firms, we were told that Africa was not on the West’s radar, that China was a country that produced socks, textiles, T-shirts, etc. that China is a country that produces socks, textiles, T-shirts, etc.; that it is a free market economy. China is a country that produces socks, textiles, T-shirts, etc.; if it continues to develop with a free market economy, it will experience great changes and transformations, and it will not be able to sustain the current planned economic system.

However, in the thirty years that have passed, China has not remained a country producing cheap textiles and children’s toys as expected, nor has Africa continued to struggle in its own way, off the world’s radar. In particular, China’s investments in Africa and its economic and trade relations with African countries have put the continent on the world’s radar. African countries whose resources had been largely exploited by the former colonial powers, France and Britain, and whose regimes were ruled by dictatorships supported by these states, were introduced to a new international trade and economic practice by the new opportunities offered by China and the political pressure it did not exert.

China, once thought to be a country of simple textiles and light industry, and now thought to be ethnically fragmented, has become one of the world’s giants. Its economic and planned development programme, based on manufacturing and exports, has not only made it the world’s second largest economy, but has also made China a world leader in high-tech production and innovation. As many experts have pointed out, China is no longer competing with the United States and Europe, because China has won this race by a landslide.

One of the most important factors favouring China over Western countries in Africa is the fact that Beijing does not make political demands when granting loans or building infrastructure facilities. Moreover, it does not exploit the disagreements and contradictions between states, as the Western powers have always done, and it does not organise minorities within each state and incite them against their own states under the pretext of democracy, human rights and freedoms. These dirty methods, which have been used everywhere except in the states of the collective West, have cost many countries dearly and have even caused turmoil that has led to the disintegration of some of them.

China’s thesis that there should be cooperation between civilisations, intensive contacts between peoples, and that each civilisation should learn from the other, in contrast to the West’s insistence that one civilisation and culture is superior to all others, is also appreciated by Africans. When this civilisation initiative, which is one of the most important factors behind China’s successive successes in its Middle East initiatives, is taken together with the global security initiative and the global development initiative developed by Chinese leader Xi, one can better understand why Beijing has a complete advantage over the collective West in Africa.

Ninth forum

This year’s ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) also witnessed new initiatives from Beijing, which has built tens of thousands of kilometres of roads, thousands of kilometres of railways, numerous schools, hospitals and factories on the continent. For example, China announced that it had allocated fifty billion dollars in new investment/financing to Africa. On the other hand, it has announced that it will allow Africa and the world’s poorest countries to sell their products to China at zero tariffs, both of which represent serious investment in the real economy and indicate that the areas of cooperation between China and Africa will broaden and deepen.

Just as a strong, developed and consolidated China has emerged, while Washington has squandered its own resources and wasted trillions of dollars on wars led by the American deep state and largely instigated by the Israeli lobby, which in the last thirty years, under the pretext of democratisation, has made many countries, notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, vomit blood under the guise of democratisation stories, African states have discovered that they have an alternative. It is likely that Africa, where states such as Russia on the one hand and Turkey on the other, in addition to China, are trying to create a sphere of influence, is now on the world’s radar and will not go away.

But this radarisation will take place in a way that excludes the patronising attitude of the collective West that says ‘Africa is not on our radar’. As one Zambian analyst succinctly put it, American officials are landing at Chinese-built airports, driving on Chinese-built roads and holding meetings in Chinese-built buildings to tell Africans why they should not cooperate with China. The African peoples, now on the world’s radar, seem to be putting the propaganda of democracy, freedoms, etc. into the mouths of Westerners, especially those who turn a blind eye to Israel’s genocide in Gaza, and will continue to cooperate with China in real economic areas with increasing volume and enthusiasm.

Continue Reading

OPINION

Israel does not leave Lebanon alone

Published

on

In different parts of Lebanon and even in Syria, pagers belonging to Hezbollah members were blown up simultaneously, followed the next day by radios. This new generation of attacks, organised on an unprecedented scale, caused astonishment and horror not only in Lebanon but throughout the world. Although Israel made no statement on the matter, Hezbollah blamed Israel for the attacks and said it would retaliate.

Similar assassinations have been carried out by intelligence services in the past, but never on the scale of the attacks on Hezbollah members.

Considering the psychological damage caused by this attack, which disregarded the rules of international law and led to the injury and even death of many civilians, these attacks can be described as an act of terrorism. So much so that these acts have caused a serious sense of horror throughout the world, including in our country.

Not only the Lebanese, but people all over the world have become reluctant to use mobile phones, tablets, computers and even baby monitors, which are an integral part of their lives.

Israel has not specifically claimed responsibility for these attacks. First of all, targeting people without distinguishing between civilians and combatants is a problematic attack even for a lawless country like Israel. Although it is the usual suspect, it may not be possible to link Israel to these attacks on the basis of the evidence.

On 8 October, Hezbollah opened a new front from southern Lebanon to northern Israel in support of Gaza. The mutual attacks have been going on for almost a year, with increasing loss of life and property on both sides. So far, despite all the Israeli provocations, Hezbollah has been very cautious and diligent, avoiding a large-scale war while maintaining fierce resistance.

So, what is Israel, which has not refrained from daily conventional attacks and assassinations since 8 October, up to with a new generation of attacks?

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is under domestic and international pressure. At home, Netanyahu is facing mass protests over judicial reforms aimed at increasing his control over the government. Many in Israel see Netanyahu’s efforts to weaken the independence of the judiciary as an authoritarian trend. Meanwhile, in the face of widespread protests, his foreign policy achievements, particularly his ability to deal with Hezbollah, are becoming a trump card that he can use to boost his popularity at home. Netanyahu does not want Israel to appear weak in the face of Iran and Hezbollah. He wants to show Israelis a tangible success against Hezbollah and the Iranian threat, with the image of a strong leader. This is exactly the show of strength he needs, as the anniversary of the heavy blow dealt by Hamas in the 7 October Aqsa flooding operation and the weakness in intelligence gathering are approaching.

The new generation of attacks against Hezbollah is a strategic move by Netanyahu to demonstrate his intelligence capabilities and fend off domestic criticism. With these operations, Netanyahu is trying to show the Israeli public that the government is pursuing a deterrent and effective policy against regional threats. Netanyahu uses such attacks as a strategic tool to reduce political pressure at home and to remain a strong leader abroad. However, if the situation in the region escalates further, an Israeli ground invasion of Lebanon will remain on the table as an option.

Perhaps one of the most important reasons for these attacks is to target Lebanese society in order to undermine support for Hezbollah and strengthen the hand of opposing groups. There is a serious possibility that Lebanese society, with its multi-sectarian structure and lack of nationhood as we know it, will be dragged into chaos rather than unity in the face of external threats. Undoubtedly, in such a scenario, it would be difficult for Hezbollah to engage in a more intense or prolonged struggle with Israel, and its resistance could be broken.

Israel’s use of high technology to target Hezbollah indicates that the conflict has entered a new phase. It is not yet clear whether such operations are a prelude to a wider war or an attempt to contain the conflict without turning it into a full-scale war. Netanyahu’s strategy is focused on dealing with both internal and external threats, but the risk of these tensions escalating into a wider regional war is still on the table.

Israel may expect Hezbollah to retaliate harshly after these attacks. Since it is difficult for Hezbollah to respond in the same way with a new generation of attack, it may want to respond with a heavier conventional response. In such a situation, especially in the case of a Hezbollah attack with civilian casualties, Israel could easily portray itself as the victim, as it did after Operation Aqsa Flood. By claiming to be exercising its ‘right of self-defence’ to the US and European countries, which have already been subjected to such a fiction, Israel could lay the groundwork for a major attack or ground operation in Lebanon.

Continue Reading

MOST READ

Turkey