INTERVIEW
Latvian Ambassador: ‘Baltic Sea is kind of an internal sea of NATO’
Published
on
![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Latvian-Ambassador-to-Ankara-Peteris-Vaivars.jpeg)
Latvian Ambassador to Ankara Peteris Vaivars spoke to Harici: “Sweden is NATO, Norway is NATO, Finland is NATO, Estonia, Latvia, we are all in NATO. So, basically, this Baltic Sea is kind of an internal sea of NATO. And Russia doesn’t have the capacity to completely cut these supply chains, supply roads.”
Ambassador Vaivars evaluated the effects of the Russia-Ukraine war on Latvia and the Baltic countries, NATO’s Baltic strategy, the importance of the Suwalki Corridor, and also made evaluations on Türkiye – European Union relations.
Ambassador Peteris Vaivars, whose term of office has ended and who is preparing to return to his country, answered the questions of journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba and also shared anecdotes about his experiences in Türkiye.
![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Gorsel-1024x576.jpeg)
A photo showing a close-up of Latvia’s famous amber stone
What are the security concerns in Latvia and other Baltic states regarding Russia as a threat?
Let’s start then with these general security issues because it’s, of course, a main issue currently in Europe. It’s a main issue for the European Union and for NATO. This is the Russian threat because of Russian intervention into Ukraine and already wars that last more than two years with a lot of casualties, and honestly, it’s very difficult to see any end of this aggression from the Russian side.
About this aggression from the Russian side. So, what do we think? Of course, security of our country and of three Baltic states, our safety provided just by us is not sufficient. But being a member of NATO, of course, gives us a lot of benefits. And in general, I think we feel safe enough at this moment because the probability of direct military conflict between Russia and NATO is still extremely low. There are different reasons for this. First, things that, of course, Russia is very busy with Ukraine. Nothing went as they planned. You remember probably the slogans, “Kyiv in three days,” “Second biggest army in the world,” or “Second most powerful army in the world.”, “So, we will achieve our goals of so-called limited military operation within a few days.” So, everything failed. We can see it, everything failed. And despite the fact that maybe NATO assistance, even at the early stage of the war and aggression from the Russian side, were quite limited. Still Ukraine was able to stop Russians, and then also, after some period, push them back quite significantly, almost to the borders where Russians were from 2014 when they started actually the first occupation. This war is much longer, but threats are there. They are not current, they are not immediate. But seeing the policy and politics of the current Russian regime, it’s no doubt that if they succeed in Ukraine, their appetite will grow. They will understand that they can achieve their goals. It doesn’t go easy for them, but they can do it. They can reach their goals, they can occupy territories, they can cause disturbance all around and show the weakness of international organizations, the weakness of law-based order. And this is what they want to achieve, basically. So, it means that if they achieve their goals, after some period, be it 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, no one knows, but definitely the next step may follow.
How to prevent this and how to protect ourselves? Of course, for us, it is only NATO plus our readiness as much as possible to be ready to react immediately if any direct military threat occurs or any hybrid or small-scale operation starts. We should be ready at first to protect ourselves as much and as long as possible, plus wait for and involve NATO assistance and the NATO troops to deal with this issue together with us.
And a lot of things are done after, I think it was, the Madrid Summit, when the first deployments were made on the level of battalions. Now we have brigades, international NATO brigade in all three Baltic states and in Poland. So, actually, the military presence of NATO is much bigger there.
Our own readiness is much bigger. We have now not only a conscript army, but we have also obligatory military service. Okay, it’s partially volunteer, so we ask for volunteers to join as well, but as this number is smaller than needs for the army, then also there is an obligatory part that young people are asked to come to the army to also join. But also, different benefits are offered to them. For example, if they apply for this military service voluntarily, the government is paying for their higher education. For example, after that, they have free education in university. It seems quite popular, by the way. So, such incentives are introduced, and I think they are important also to motivate our people to be ready to protect Latvia. And then we have quite a big number of so-called land guards, which are volunteers who have training all the time, and everyone can voluntarily join these land guards and be prepared for possible threats.
Now there’s a discussion, let it be through Russian-Latvian border, let it be through the Suwalki Gap. Anyhow, if Russia decides to somehow intervene in any Baltic countries, I wish not, the experts say that NATO as a whole will not sacrifice, the rest of Europe, central European countries like Germany and France; they will not sacrifice themselves for little Baltic countries. What’s your response to this discussion?
My response is that this is basically a narrative that Russians are very much trying to impose on the public because this is what Russia wants to achieve, to make kind of disbelief or distrust between NATO countries by spreading such information. But my feeling and my belief, and what we see from meetings on top-level NATO meetings, is that NATO is very strongly committed to react from the first moment, from the first centimeter if anything happens. This is one thing.
The second thing is that Suwalki Corridor was, at first, there are a lot of false or partially false narratives which are used regarding Suwalki Corridor. The first thing is that this is an enclave, a Russian enclave, and Russians may be unhappy because they have some restrictions to reach it. This is not true. Let’s start with this. It’s not an enclave. There is free access, as it was through the air, there is access through land, road access through train connection based on the agreement between Russia and the European Union. So, it’s not isolated at all. The only restrictions are put on military goods and double usage goods for transit. So, it’s not a territory between Russia and Russia, it’s territory between Russia, Belarus, Poland, and Sweden, and then Russia again. So, this is a much more complex issue. Even if we consider at this moment that Lukashenko is totally loyal and he will in some way allow or start any military aggression again, it’s not so plausible that it will be so because he’s also caring about people’s opinion in Belarus, he’s caring about his capacity of his army.
And to start anything in Suwalki, it means that militaries from Russia should be moved to the Belarus border, which is several hundred kilometers from Russia, and then to try to capture this 60, around 62-kilometers corridor. This is one thing. Another thing is, geopolitically, so we were occupied by the Soviet Union, Poland was an independent state. There is not much infrastructure because the Soviet border was the border between Lithuania and Poland. It was the Soviet Union’s border. This border had very little crossing points and very little roads and infrastructure along this border. If there were how to cross a few places, there are almost no roads, no train connecting Belarus with Kaliningrad. All the roads were, then, from Belarus connecting to Lithuania, to Vilnius, to Kaunas, to main cities, and then from Russia to Latvia, to Riga, or to Tallinn. But there were no roads along this border, actually, because it was a border zone and the train is very complex. So, there are no roads. It’s quite low land, a lot of lakes, a lot of hills, a lot of forests. So, to think that an army can march through this immediately, it doesn’t seem so. What can be done and what Russians are doing again are hybrid operations, like this migration crisis. Yes, this is an issue, but again, it’s not military. So, they are trying to push.
But yeah, they love this Suwalki idea. They love to talk about this, and they love to really try to build this distrust between NATO members, but we don’t buy this. So, this is a short answer, what I would like to say.
And last but not least, most of these articles and all these discussions were around the year 2022 before Russian aggression to Ukraine and before Finland and Sweden joined NATO. Now, the geopolitical situation in northern Europe is totally different, and the importance of Suwalki Corridor is much less because, basically, by Suwalki Corridor, because the supply chain from the rest of Europe to the Baltics, especially in case of military conflict, supply chain of military goods and everything, now this is not so important because there are other supply chains. Because Sweden is NATO, Norway is NATO, Finland is NATO, Estonia, Latvia, we are all in NATO. So, basically, this Baltic Sea is kind of an internal sea of NATO. And Russia doesn’t have the capacity to completely cut these supply chains, supply roads. We see what happened with the Black Sea fleet in the conflict with Ukraine. This fleet doesn’t exist anymore, basically. A country without a fleet, Ukraine, has destroyed completely the Russian fleet. So, I don’t really think that an imminent threat is there.
Of course, again, if we look long term, probably yes. Probably yes, Russia will try to cause conflict somewhere. Will it be Suok? Will it be a direct threat to Latvia or Estonia, where we have a border? Maybe northern Europe, north of Europe, Norway, where there is a huge border between Russia and Finland as well, even much bigger.
But one more thing, what we see right now is that Russia is not militarizing these territories where they have a border with the Baltic states and Poland. And, vice versa, a lot of troops and equipment are removed from there for the needs of Ukraine. So, there’s much less Russian military presence on the border. In Kaliningrad a lot, yes, still.
Latvia is one of the few countries which supports Türkiye’s accession to the EU membership. Please tell us your opinion how Türkiye and the EU can find more common grounds of interests. What do you think the main challenges between Türkiye and the EU are?
Well, it is very big topic in general. One main thing is that more Europe in Türkiye or more Türkiye in Europe is very important. For us, it is both because of our economical interest. Trade numbers are very big. We are very much connected in energy issues and climate issues. So it means that basically we should get as close as we can get. But it is at the same time a philosophical question. The European Union is historically built among the countries who agreed to accept kind of different laws and regulations together. And other countries are joining in the EU because they also want to accept these laws and regulations within the EU. There was no case that any country who is willing to join this club has asked this club to change the laws and regulations.
Has Türkiye asked for this?
Of course, we can feel this. Well, I understand Turkish interests. We can hear Turkish politicians who is saying Türkiye is so big and important, therefore Europe should change some things. Then, if we look back, it is not fair anymore because, for example, when we joined Europe, we joined Europe along with those laws and regulations which Europe has until now. And we do now changes only when member countries agree on any changes. So, this is a dilemma in general. It is very well-known, of course, where the issues are, where there is discontent between the EU and Türkiye especially on the press freedom and rights, human rights, questions about democracy. Still, there are things in our understanding, the Europeans differ very much. But still we have to look at how to get closer.
Another issue is economical goals which are we are close. We are strong defenders of the modernization of customs union, trades and benefits. But Customs Union Agreement is very old and up to date. It should be modernized. There are a lot of steps done. Negotiations are going on by the mandates of European Commission on this issue. What I heard from my European colleagues they have already figured out the so-called irritants, so they are indicated and both sides are dealing with these issues.
Energy, climate, culture and these topics are going very well. One issue is about so-called visa issues and mobility. This is very common topic and sometimes we hear some allegations from media and politicians that there is a political policy to apply some restrictions on Türkiye because it is Türkiye. But it is because of the documents which are not proper or the capacity of issuing visa is limited. As an Ambassador, I have never received any political guidelines from government or Europe to implement restrictions on Türkiye. My ministry gave instruction to me to increase mobility especially with Turkish citizens, tourism and young people. And we are trying to do it as much as possible. The number of the students we receive in Latvia increases every year. But there is another issue which is capacity. For example, our embassy is very compact and we are very few people here. We have one consul here who has right to make the decision for granting visa. It takes 5 minutes to make a positive decision and half an hour to make a negative decision. If there are fake documents or insufficient amount of money for travel costs. To reject a person like this, take a lot of time. But we could issue visa for another person instead of spending half an hour for a person who also apply for visa and does not event want to go to Latvia. Some people want to go to Germany or Netherlands but there are big queues there and they are providing fake document but it is very easy to check it.
We want people to come to Latvia but we want people who really wants to come to Latvia. For example, you came and you are happy. And we hope that you will visit Latvia again. We are open for people to visit our beautiful country.
Sometimes there are organizations behind that. Sometimes the same type of documents are coming from so many different people. Most probably they are asking for many promising that they can receive visa but then they say “it is not our fault, Embassy rejected the application; they are perfect documents so pay again and we try again”.
Honestly, Turkish Foreign Ministry is very aware of the situation and they are working to solve this issue. We have very good contact and we want to have more good friends who come for business, tourism and education. We have a very strong “fast track” visa facilitating program.
Let’s personally talk about you. You stayed in Türkiye for 4 years during your duty here. What are the things you were most proud or challenged about diplomatic relations? As a high-level diplomat, what did you succeed in bilateral relations between Türkiye and Latvia? Please also tell about your experiences and the moments you liked most.
Everything is very nice regarding Türkiye. A lot of positive emotions and impressions. I have. When I was asked to come first, I had no knowledge about Türkiye but the image was not the most positive one.
Did you think that Türkiye was a Middle Eastern country?
Maybe a little, it is so crowded but I also worked in South Korea. I thought it maybe not an organized country. It was Covid period, I discovered that there are a lot of cultural, historical and natural places comparing to Korea. I love history and my end of paradise to travel to Ephesos, Sagalassos, Thermesos, Side, Perge, Olympos and etc. I visited all of them. They were lovely. It’s history has so many different civilizations and nations.
Did you also visit South Eastern Türkiye?
Yes, I did. I also went to Van, I climbed Mount Ararat last summer.
Do you call it Ararat? We call it Ağrı.
I know that it is Ağrı in Turkish but in English it is Ararat and in Latvian it is Ararat because in old Soviet Union it was called Ararat in Armenia. Sorry for that. (Laughs) But despite of different names it was amazing. I visited the mountain with a Turkish group. My assistant was the only connection between me and Turkish group. I love most of Turkish people. Such a friendship, such a hospitality that I have never experienced somewhere else. And last but not least, the most dangerous thing was food. It was so tasty. You cannot stop eating sweets and kebabs and especially fruits and vegetables, actually everything.
All in total I have million tons of positive emotions on Türkiye. But the policies are very unpredictable. Something which normally happens in another country in one year, happens here in one week or one night. So, this is of course a very difficult situation for a diplomat.
Was there anything which impacted on your work directly?
Of course, it affected me directly. Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is asking me about a topic, like what is going to happen about that situation, I answer that I don’t know. Nobody knows what is going to happen tomorrow. (Laughs) That’s why I cannot write any reports which is expected from me.
Again, it was interesting to observe. And I can completely understand Türkiye, its government, its president, its policies and its interests internally, regionally or globally. They are usually interconnected. And what is important is that what is done for internal politics does not seem different from global politics and vice versa. What is done regionally is not so attractive internally. And we observe it every day and try to understand.
I did not experience any political issue or problem that Ministry of Foreign Affairs called me. My main duty was to maintain this very very positive relations between two countries. I had my farewell speaking with Mr. Numan Kurtulmuş, the President of National Assembly around three weeks ago. Recently, I met with Mr. Mehmet Kemal Bozay, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both were extremely friendly so I am departing as a friend of Türkiye. And I am sure that my colleagues will keep the relations very good.
To sum up, we need to improve business and cultural exchange. We are also the leading country on Baltic Documentary Festival which was held in Istanbul. Our problem is our capacity. We don’t have a consulate in Istanbul. This is a little bit challenging.
You are in Ankara for 4 years. You witnessed Ministry of Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu for 2 years and a half and Ministry of Hakan Fidan for 1 year and a half. Fidan comes from intelligence service and Çavuşoğlu was the second minister who held the position this long. According to your observation, what is different between these two top diplomats?
Well, it is very difficult to have a deep analysis. But I can say that the personalities are very different. Maybe it is about their backgrounds. I had opportunity to meet both high ranked politicians. I enjoyed interaction with both of them. Çavuşoğlu is a very outgoing person, he likes to have people around him and tell them stories. Minister Fidan is more introvert but his knowledge, experience and skills are obvious when you talk to him. He seems to me very deep. I was impressed by his knowledge especially on Near East region and North Africa. Few months ago, Marko Mihkelson whom you also met and delegations of three Baltic states visited Ankara. We had meeting with Minister Fidan and his knowledge was very impressive.
What about his knowledge about Baltic region?
Oh, we are not kind of complicated or tricky region. So, it is not difficult to be briefed about our policies. There are not so many stones under the water. (Laughs)
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INTERVIEW
‘The current agenda focuses on establishing Finland within NATO’
Published
4 days agoon
08/09/2024![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Matti-Pesu.jpeg)
Dr. Matti Pesu, former researcher of Finland Defense Ministry answered our questions: “The risk of escalation into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia remains low.”
Matti Pesu is a Senior Research Fellow in the Finnish foreign policy, Northern European security, and NATO research programme at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA). From May 2022 to April 2023, he led a research project analyzing Finland’s nascent NATO policy and the country’s evolving role in Euro-Atlantic security.
He has published extensively on Finnish foreign, security, and defence policy, defence cooperation, Baltic Sea security, and Euro-Atlantic security.
Dr. Matti Pesu answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions on Russia-Ukraine war and the position of the Baltic states.
Strengthening NATO’s eastern flank has become a key agenda item for the Alliance, especially after Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine. Finally, the US decision to deploy hypersonic missiles in Germany on a long-term basis has provoked retaliation from Moscow. What do you think about the latest risks of escalation?
The risk of escalation into a full-scale war between NATO and Russia remains low, as neither party desires military conflict. The US decision to deploy a new weapon system is a measured response to Russia’s previous deployment of medium-range missiles in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, bolstering deterrence and reassuring allies about the U.S. commitment to their security.
As is well known, the danger for NATO is that the destabilisation of the Suwalki corridor could cut off all theBaltic states from Poland, which is NATO’s only route toLithuania, Latvia and Estonia. What is your comment on the allegations that Moscow will invade Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland from Ukraine? Indeed, no serious comments about it from Putin or his cabinet.
Russia has in fact avoided actions that would significantly increase the risk of a direct military conflict with NATO. However, should Ukraine collapse, it could serve as a potential springboard for Russian aggression against neighboring NATO allies. This scenario would deteriorate regional security, which is one of the reasons why the Baltic states and Poland are such strong supporters of Ukraine.
In recent months, Russia has stepped up military cooperation with Belarus and started joint nuclear exercises. How realistic are the risks of a “nuclear war” in this context?
The risk of nuclear war remains very low. However, Russia’s nuclear cooperation with Belarus is part of its strategy to intimidate and dissuade Ukraine’s Western supporters from providing more robust military assistance.
Finland has given up its long term non-aligned position by joining NATO. Do you think this will deter Russia from any actions against Finland given the fact that experts discuss NATO will not sacrifice the rest of Western Europe for small Baltic countries?
Throughout the history of NATO, experts and policymakers have debated the reliability of US and allied security guarantees, which is an inherent aspect of “extended deterrence.” Despite these discussions, the US and otherNATO allies are consistently demonstrating their commitment to collective defense. They regularly conduct exercises in Finland, develop executable operational plans to defend the country, and signal their willingness to pre-position military equipment on Finnish soil. These actions strongly indicate the allies‘ dedication to mutual defense.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó has accused the Baltic countries of launching a “campaign of lies” against Hungary. He emphasized that the decision regarding security checks does not compromise Hungary’s stringent security measures. To address these allegations, State Secretary for Security Policy Péter Sztáray provided firsthand information to the embassies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, saying “hoping to end the misinformation campaign“. What does Finland think about Hungary’s position? How is the relations after Hungary’s approval of NATO bid of Finlands membership developing recently?
The relationship between Hungary and the majority of its EU and NATO partners has recently hit rock bottom. Also Finnish politicians have been highly critical of Hungary’s recent actions, including Prime Minister Orban’s trip to Moscow and the decision to grant visas to Russians. Hungary’s obstructionist stance on Finland’s and particularly Sweden’sNATO membership has outraged many Finns. It is difficult to see what Hungary gained from its actions apart from a tarnished reputation.
What is your response to the discussions assuming that to stay in dialogue with Russia is a safer way than making it an enemy?
From the end of the Second World War until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, maintaining dialogue with Moscow was a fundamental aspect of Finnish foreign policy. The intensity of this dialogue varied over time. However, due to recent Russian aggression, there is now little to discuss, as Finnish and broader Western views on the war in Ukraine and European security diverge significantly withMoscow’s position. This situation is a direct consequence of Russia’s own counterproductive actions. For a frontline nation like Finland, it is a matter of existential interest that Russia’s aggression fails and that the West remains united in condemning such actions.
After Finland’s participation to NATO mainly with the support from Türkiye, what has changed in Helsinki-Ankara relations up to now?
The intensity of Finnish-Turkish diplomacy increased significantly during Finland’s NATO membership process, leading to the formation of working groups on issues such as terrorism. However, to my knowledge, these working groups have not been very active and have not attracted significant public attention recently. Unsurprisingly, the intensity of the bilateral relationship has decreased. There is a prevailing sentiment in Finland that Türkiye’s instrumentalization of Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership processes for its own purposes jeopardized the national security of both countries. That said, it is also recognized that Finland andTürkiye – both having significant land forces – may share considerable interests within the alliance.
What are Finland’s main foreign policy and security agenda now?
The current agenda focuses on establishing Finland within NATO and ensuring its integration into NATO’s planning, command structure, and force structure. Helsinki is also intensifying its relationships with key allies such as the US, UK, Norway, and Sweden. Additionally, supporting Ukraine remains a high priority.
INTERVIEW
‘We want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves’
Published
2 weeks agoon
29/08/2024![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Nele-Loorents.jpeg)
Nele Loorents, former Representative of Estonian Defense Ministry to Estonian Embassy in Washington, spoke to Harici: “We really believe in collective defense and Article 5. But at the same time, we understand that in the worst-case scenario, there is this timely factor. So, we really want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves.”
Nele Loorents joined the International Center for Defence and Security (ICDS) as research fellow in December 2023. Prior joining the ICDS she had a long-term career as a civil servant at the Estonian Ministry of Defence. Since 2000 she pertained to the fields of Defence Investments, as well as Defence Policy and Planning.
Nele Loorents answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions Esntonia’s defense policy and the Russia-Ukraine war.
You’re working for the defense ministry for 23 years now and you know you remember the period just post-Soviet and now. Can you briefly tell me what is the summary of the transformation you witnessed all these years in defense policy of Estonia? And you can also talk about the Baltics because you have similar experience with neighbors.
I think what is really important from our perspective is that when we gained our independence, it was immediately crucial for us to completely cut off from the Russian legacy. So, we completely started from scratch with everything. We restructured our defense to be more applicable to the western militaries.
Obviously, from the first day, we had a strong determination to join both NATO and the EU as we understood that for a small nation like Estonia, and also other Baltic states, it was essential and existential to gain membership in larger organizations. That’s why we worked heavily in the first years of our independence to be applicable to join NATO and the EU. We were very conservative in all our actions.
We tried to follow all the requirements and rules set by different organizations as we requested to join them. Economically, the first years of our independence weren’t the easiest, especially due to the fact that we started from scratch. But at the same time, we had a great opportunity to put into leadership a younger generation who just maybe came from universities and already had a western mentality.
So, it helped us a lot that we didn’t have to change the existing system, but we were allowed to build up our society in a way that we thought would be most beneficial for our future and long-term independence effort.
For Central European countries and beyond that, European countries having borders with Russia act as a type of buffer zone metaphorically. How does this make you feel personally as a defense advisor for many years? And how does it impact your policies?
What do you mean by buffer zone?
Now, Ukraine, by Russia’s claim, is in this position because Russia told Ukraine not to come close to NATO and the EU. Ukraine didn’t listen to that because it’s a sovereign country, decided to make its own decision. And now that’s the situation. It’s just being in a buffer zone between Russia and the Europe. It’s like you have the fear and you want to be brave at the same time and you don’t know the result.
I am not sure if it’s the right word to call this Eastern flank a buffer zone. But anyway, Russia has always been our neighbor. And we haven’t had any kind of positive feeling about Russia’s ambitions towards politics or overall their historically claimed regions.
Every now and then, Russian politicians say something about how they see the Baltic states still being historically part of the big Russian empire. And there has always been interest to keep the Baltic states in Russia’s sphere of influence. So that has always been the case.
We never thought there would be any change in Russia’s attitude towards us. And we have developed our defense in a way that we are independently prepared to defend our country. It has been very visible throughout the years how much Estonia, for example, has been investing in defense overall.
Estonia has invested more than two percent in defense since 2015, which is exactly the NATO criteria. But this was the year after Crimea happened. So, we immediately started to react to the situation in very relevant terms.
And it really increased during the Prime Minister Kallas term.
Yes. And now, during the past two and a half years since Ukraine’s full-scale invasion, we have made several decisions to raise our defense budget even more. Right now, the level is 3.2%. There is a commitment by the government to spend more than three percent at least for the next four years. And I think what is even more important is what you are doing with that money.
How do you distribute this money?
In our case, we are spending almost half of the defense budget on procurement and developing new capabilities, which is, I think, in NATO terms probably the highest percentage of all.
Which are the main countries you are procuring defense items from?
Oh, there are a lot of different partners. If we speak about bigger capabilities like medium and long-range fires, then obviously from the U.S. we are procuring HIMARS systems, from Germany the IRIS-T systems. There are quite many partners all over Europe to procure ammunition.
Estonia is one of the biggest procurers of ammunition at this point in Europe, which might seem surprising considering how small we are. But as I said, we really want to be prepared and we really believe in collective defense and Article 5. But at the same time, we understand that in the worst-case scenario, there is this timely factor.
So basically, any kind of reinforcement by Allied forces takes some time. So, we really want to be prepared to fight back from the first day ourselves. That’s why we are investing a lot in possible conflicts, if they happen in our region.
We are investing a lot into our territorial defense. We have also raised our wartime readiness quite significantly during the last year. I think it’s one-fourth, so it’s right now about 40,000 reserves on wartime readiness.
Lots of exercises ongoing, lots of SNAP taxes ongoing. There is a lot of effort put into this overall societal approach to increase the resilience of society. So, there is quite a significant effort actually ongoing currently in order to be prepared if something would happen in our region.
How many percent of your population is Russian? My question would be how they would react to a possible conflict with Russia because it’s their origin, as in all other countries you have Russians. And how do you manage this policy? They’re Estonian citizens but they’re Russian, so do they participate in exercises. Do you have a public questionnaire, like what is the reaction of Russian-origin citizens to the tensions?
I think we currently have about 30 percent of ethnic Russians. Many of those have been very well integrated into Estonian society already, so that’s not a relevant question for the majority of ethnic Russians. But obviously, we have some regions where there is still some pro-Russian mentality.
Yes, like the northeastern part of Estonia, we have this part where the majority of the population is Russian. What has been surprising from our part is, or from the governmental parties, that in the past two years we have made quite many different steps in order to decrease this possible Russian hybrid influence on our ethnic Russian population. We have removed some of the old monuments which were reminders of the Russian and Soviet times and where some people still went to celebrate special days.
And it seems or it was visible that the reaction by the population or Russian ethnic population was less than actually expected. It was expected to be much more restless, but there was very little. Obviously, we can speculate about the reasons for that. But I guess one of the reasons is that especially the younger generation understands that if they are really trying or following this Moscow approach, then they might be influenced by that. They might be the ones who are actually in Ukraine fighting, or their opportunities in Europe to study or work or engage more in that way will be limited or totally cut off.
So, I think the younger generation is more inclined towards the West and trying to disconnect more from this Russian political approach. And I think the older generation is just getting to an age where their voice is maybe not so heard anymore. So that’s probably one of the things.
Going back to the previous question, I would ask you about the distribution of your budget and you talked about having several different sources. So, Türkiye is one of them. I think you were working with Baykar about UAVs. So, can you tell us the level of your cooperation, your procurement, because Baykar was very effective in Ukraine, providing UAVs to the Zelensky government and it was praised for their support. What’s your level of relations with Baykar?
Because I am not exactly an official in procurement at this point, I really don’t know how close the relations with different enterprises are at this point. But I know that in our Ministry of Defense and also our procurement organization, there are really close relations with all NATO allies. And Türkiye most certainly is one of those countries where we try to find more opportunities for further cooperation.
I think what is pretty important also about the Estonian population distribution is currently the level of Ukrainian refugees, because we have more than five percent of our population as refugees from Ukraine. I guess this is really visible also if you walk on the streets and go to the shops and schools and so on, that there is quite a lot of work Estonia is also currently doing in order to integrate those people into our society, because we really don’t know how this terrible situation in Ukraine is.
I want to talk about Suwalki Gap. For Baltic countries, for you, for Lithuania, and Latvia too, that’s a critical issue. Near Kaliningrad, Politico magazine called Suwalki as the most dangerous place on earth. Russian officials are not really mentioning Suwalki. Except once Lukashenko of Belarus hinted something about Suwalki Gap. But from Russia, I don’t hear anything. Why, for Baltic countries, is it at the top of the agenda?
I would say that for Estonia, maybe this Suwalki problem has always been a little bit less relevant than in the case of Lithuania and Poland because it’s really like their borderline. And obviously, the Suwalki problem or this challenge includes also this Belarusian contribution. It means that really then Russia has to leverage Belarusian cooperation or leverage their sources.
So, there are maybe some questions about that also. But during the past two years, there have been significant changes, I would say, in this problem because NATO has made quite significant decisions, but as well they’re having national developments which address this problem. I would bring out just a couple of those which are, I think, very important in order to mitigate this challenge.
First of all, it’s a question about Allied presence. In Madrid, it was decided that NATO will increase in all the needed states, the level of presence up to that brigade. And now, already, there has been a decision made that there will be a brigade in Lithuania, there will be a brigade in Latvia, and obviously, more presence means that there is more power in order to react immediately. So, you don’t have to reinforce as many land forces through the Suwalki gap as you had needed in case you have just battle groups. So that’s the first thing.
The second thing that was decided was to set up this new NATO command structure in all the Baltic states and to decrease the command structure level to the level of divisional size of command structure HQ. Which means that basically, you don’t have to have all the forces in place from the first day, but you have in place a working command structure which is able to reinforce all the needed forces in case of crisis. And the third thing, which I would say is maybe the most crucial thing, is the joining of Finland and Sweden to NATO. Because this basically closes the Baltic Sea to be like an internal NATO sea more or less.
And it enables us to move very quickly with air and navy assets if there would be some kind of NATO’s navy and air assets to Baltic regions if needed. So even if there would be some kind of leap in moving land forces through the Suwalki gap, you can close this gap with other assets like air force, navy, and that probably lessens…
So, I think these are like three most important things decided. And the fourth thing, which is related directly to the NATO element, is the new regional plans. And although the plans themselves are restricted and we don’t have the full visibility of what has been decided in there, I am quite certain that it has played through the scenario also of Suwalki gap.
And there are really these structures in place in order to act in case of Suwalki gap, this kind of closeness would happen. So, these are like four things in NATO terms. But also, as I said, there is this national approach and Estonia is currently investing a lot into our own defense.
We are investing heavily in longer-range fires; missiles and rockets. And the aim is actually to keep the adversary out of our country, not to give him the opportunity to cross the border at all. So, I think this is also a really important aspect if we speak about Suwalki gap challenge as a general.
You also have an unratified border agreement with Russia, yes? Can you talk about that?
There is not really much to tell. There are some details which we still haven’t been able to kind of sign. But I think what is important is that last year Estonia and all other Baltic states have made a lot of effort into securing the borderline. So, we are really fencing our borderline with Russia. We are building the bunkers on the borderline in order to be also prepared in any case scenarios. And I think this is really what is important.
So, the paperwork doesn’t matter. The borderline is there anyway. It’s not ratified, but we implement it. We still implement and there is a clear understanding of where the borderline is.
Other than Suwalki and the border issue, what do you think Estonia has as a risk or danger?
Well, Russia is obviously a danger. Or may threaten Russia. There is no dispute about that. And in Estonia’s case, obviously the landline with Russia is much shorter than in other Baltic states because we have this lake Peipus on the borderline. Well, Finland is like in the north and there is a big sea in between. But I think the eastern border having this big lake in between gives us more visibility of how the troops are moving. So, there are just like a couple of places where actually Russians can cross the borderline, like on land terms. And it’s from our perspective, obviously gives us the opportunity to control those spots more than it would be to have the landline throughout our borders. I guess, that’s quite an important aspect also.
And what do you think former Primer Minister Kaja Kallas will change in the European Union, like foreign policy direction or these measurements, precautions? Because you have all of these threats and you have the experience of Russia. For Estonia, I think this is a very important role internationally. What do you think she’s going to bring?
I really think, this is my personal opinion, that there won’t be really a big change, of course, in the European Union due to that. Because Kaja Kallas and her kind of approach has been very clear and visible throughout the past years when she has been the Prime Minister. And in the international sphere, I think her judgment of the situation has been very highly valued.
So, I really think that she has to change the course of the European Union in any way because there have been many Estonian initiatives in the European Union already, which are on the way to be implemented in many ways.
![](https://harici.com.tr/en/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Marko-Mihkelson.jpeg)
Marko Mihkelson, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Estonian Parliament, spoke to Harici: “At the same time, the existential challenge posed today by Russia, not only by Russia but also by China, tells us that if we want to keep the world predictable and stable, we have to make sure that we united as NATO allies … Ukraine must win this war to avoid World War III or a similar global conflict situation. Russia cannot win this war.”
A politician with a journalist background, Marko Mihkelson has served in previous parliaments as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman of the EU Affairs Committee, Chairman of the National Defense Committee. He served as the Director of the Baltic Center for Russian Studies from 2000 to 2003. Between 1997 and 2000, he was the editor-in-chief of Estonia’s largest national daily newspaper, Postimees, before that, he served as Postimees’ correspondent in Moscow.
Marko Mihkelson answered journalist Dr. Esra Karahindiba’s questions on the Russia-Ukraine war and its effects on the Baltic states, and also commented on the Israeli-Palestinian war and tensions in the Middle East.
Let’s start with the Suwalki Corridor, of which is defined as “vulnerable” against Russia and may cause the destabilization of Baltics in case of any distruption. Such destabilization could cut off all the Baltic countries, as it is NATO’s only route to the Baltics. What is your comment on the allegations that Moscow will invade Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, or Poland from Ukraine considering the fact that there are no such statements of officials from Russia. None of the officials mentioned the Suwalki Corridor or any intentions to invade. Where are all these allegations coming from?
First and foremost, we need to understand what is going on. Certainly, when it comes to the threat posed by Russia to NATO, it is a serious and existential threat. It’s not only a concern for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and other countries bordering Russia. The war that Russia started against Ukraine is not only an attempt to destroy Ukraine’s territorial integrity or erase the nation from the political map, as they wish. But also they would like to change the world order. Their ultimate goal is to destroy the Western security architecture established since the end of World War II. The cornerstone of this architecture is NATO, which unites countries like Estonia, Türkiye, the United States, Canada, and other nations. This alliance, led by the United States and other democratic countries, is a kind of threat to the current regime in Russia, which is heavily authoritarian, perhaps even totalitarian. Russia would like to survive by expanding its borders by force, as we see in the case of Ukraine.
In October 2023, Putin explicitly stated that the war against Ukraine aims not only to change the geopolitical reality in this part of Europe but also to change the world order. This is why Russia is trying to build strategic alliances with China and closer relations with North Korea and Iran, to make sure that they are together to derail the dominance of Western countries, first and foremost the United States as a leader in the world. To do so, to destroy NATO, to undermine the alliance, they might test the seriousness of each NATO member’s commitment to defending any threatened or attacked ally.
Obviously theoretically for a long time we know that they would like to perhaps test us in different parts of alliance from Black Sea to Baltic Sea from a high North maybe to some other parts. Here one of the areas people speculate people think what might happen is a Baltic region and as you mentioned also certain areas which might be kind of the interest of Russians to test us test our resolve.
I don’t think that Suwalki Gap is the only sort of the area we have to pay attention to. And I argue that not only the Baltic nations are the only countries who might be threatened directly by Russia but certainly we have to understand that Russia won’t stop in Ukraine if we are not going to make sure as allies who are interested to restore peace in Europe, to make sure that borders which are intern internationally recognized are firm and won’t be changed by force, as Russia is trying to change. Then we have to make sure that we give help to Ukraine to win in this war and Russia must pay for their highest crime against peace which is launching a sort of most serious war in Europe since the end of World War II.
What are you and your allies are doing to reduce the risks in the Suwalki Gap?
The most importantly not only risk is posed directly to certain parts of our alliance but also what the most important step is to pay attention to our investments in defense; we show to Russia or anybody else who pose existential threat to us, that we are ready and “do not even think of attacking us or destroy stabilization in this region”.
Estonia is investing 3.4% of its GDP in self-defense and is actively working with allies to increase deterrence measures. Troops from three nuclear states —the UK, France, and the United States— are present in Estonia. We work and train closely with allies within NATO, including Türkiye, to ensure the alliance remains strong and united, deterring any threats as it was in the last 75 years, -even though Estonia is in NATO for less years about 20 years.
But it is still a very serious message to anyone who might pose a threat to us: the Alliance is still strong, united, and working together to deter any kind of threat we might face. At this moment, it is most important to seriously consider increasing defense expenditures, working more closely together, training together, and showing Russia or anyone else that their crazy ideas to change the world order cannot succeed.
Regarding nuclear deterrence, recent months have seen Russia step up military cooperation with Belarus, including joint nuclear exercises. How realistic are the risks of a nuclear war in this context?
While nuclear threats are used by Russia to blackmail others into accepting its aggression and genocidal act against Ukraine, Belarus is de facto politically occupied by Russia and used to put pressure and for illegal immigration as a weapon on NATO allies like Poland and Lithuania.
We must make clear to Russian Federation that any real threat of using nuclear weapons must be met with decisive and destructive measures.
The use of nuclear weapons in the interest of aggressive policies cannot be accepted by anyone in the world. Nuclear weapons have served as a deterrent measure for more than half a century, since the end of World War II. Whether we like it or not, they exist and are an essential part of maintaining the world and international rules agreed upon by countries with vastly different political systems, whether democratic or authoritarian so far.
Perhaps what is most important for all of us is to ensure that the proliferation of nuclear weapons can still be controlled as we have done so far. The danger here is if Russia wins the war against Ukraine, the world will become more destabilized, and countries still seeking nuclear weapons will become more active in achieving that goal. What we see is that if you don’t have nuclear weapons, you can be attacked or threatened directly by countries that do. Ukraine gave up all the nuclear weapons they inherited from the Soviet Union in 1994, and several countries, including the United States, China, and Russia itself, promised that they would never attack Ukraine, specifically Russia. Unfortunately, since 2014, we have seen that countries which gave up nuclear weapons are under attack and actually under the threat of losing their sovereignty. This is the most dangerous trend we could see if Russia succeeds in its aggression.
The US decision to deploy hypersonic missiles in Germany has provoked retaliation from Moscow. What do you think about this escalation?
If anyone escalates, it is Russia, which has pursued aggressive policies to increase its dominance since the ’90s by using military forces. This includes meddling in the South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, Moldova and invading Georgia in 2008. Russia occupied one third of Georgian territory to make sure that NATO allies agree upon not enlarging in South Caucasus.
In 2014, Russia started the war against Ukraine, occupying Crimea and illegally annexing it. After that, Russia moved into Syria in 2015. We have seen Russia escalating everywhere. The Western countries, including the United States and others, have reacted to show Russia that there are limits to their aggression. Unfortunately, we have not yet seen from the Western countries, and not only Western countries but all countries that wish to restore predictability and stability in geopolitical terms in the world, a direct help to Ukraine to defend its country against this aggression and also to win this war because the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine is paramount. It is not only important for Ukraine as a nation but also for Türkiye, Estonia, and other countries that do not want to end up in a global war or conflict in much more catastrophic terms than what we have seen so far in Ukraine. Every measure that helps to deter further Russian aggression is better for peace and the whole world order.
After the annexation of Crimea by Russia, several experts say that there is a geopolitical crisis that shook the northern countries as well as the strengthening of centrifugal tendencies in Europe. Trump’s presidency created uncertainties in NATO, and China’s presence in international affairs seems deeper. If this is indeed the case, some experts argue that it might be more logical for the countries in this region to move away from the NATO bloc to avoid these risks. What is your take on this?
(Laughes) If you ask the average Estonian here in our country, they will tell you a story from our history. We learned a very, very tough lesson, a tragic lesson from World War II. Prior to World War II, Estonia was a neutral country. In 1939, we hoped that being neutral meant that we were safe and that the turbulence happening in the world in the late ’30s wouldn’t touch us. We would survive, but unfortunately, this wasn’t the case. This was a tragic mistake, and we lost 25% of our population, either killed by Soviet occupants, Nazi Germany, or those who left Estonia or were forcefully deported to Siberia.
Ever since we regained our independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, there has been a strong political consensus, which is still very present today, that we must never be alone again. Every single moment, we have to have as many friends and allies in the world to ensure that if turbulence hits international relations, as we are right now in the middle of very turbulent international relations- our small country is much better defended if we have good allies and good friends who are ready to support us and defend us if needed. As I said, NATO, as an alliance of free nations, has shown everybody that for 75 years, which is historically significant, this alliance alone has kept Europe and the transatlantic region in peace.
Throughout 75 years, there have been many disputes between NATO allies. I think Türkiye knows much better than Estonia how it is to deal with NATO neighbors. At the same time, the existential challenge posed today by Russia, but not only by Russia but also by China, tells us that if we want to keep the world predictable and stable, and we as nations can benefit from stability in terms of international trade, innovation, and addressing global issues like climate change, we have to make sure that we, united as NATO allies, work together to deter any kind of threat and aggression tens of thousands of people are perished in Ukraine. We must make sure that countries that use military force and genocidal force cannot succeed because if we agree that Russia can move borders by force, killing, deporting, and torturing people, then we are accepting that other countries can do the same. This is a direct road to the hell and direct road to a global instability and most likely to World War III. This is why we have to stick together, and NATO alliance is the best alliance that has kept us and our part of the world in stability and peace.
Now, everybody is talking about World War III, the possibility of another immense war. So, is this just a scenario that you are taking measurements against, or do you just use the term as a deterring element?
No, it’s not only a deterring element because if somebody is using massive military force against another nation, aiming to annihilate an entire nation, like in Ukraine, where there are 40 million people living, the war launched already in 2014 by Russia against Ukraine, but in a much more massive way since February 2022, has not only the aim to destroy one member of the United Nations, actually the founding father of the United Nations as Ukraine was in 1945, but also the aim to change the world order. If somebody has ideas like Hitler had in the 1930s to make sure that Nazi Germany will completely change how the world is constructed, then this is a direct challenge to the existing world order. If somebody would like to change the world order by force, this can lead to a major global conflict, a war.
Sometimes people don’t see the connection between the very traumatic events already existing in the Middle East, such as the Gaza and Israel-Hamas conflict, which started on October 7th with an enormous terrorist attack by Hamas against Israel. What has happened in the Sahel region during the last couple of years, the change of the nature of conflict there, and the growing tensions in East Asia regarding the South China Sea or potential conflict around the Taiwan Strait; all these hotspots are all connected. Our task as responsible members of the international community are to be frank and honest about these threats and to work together to avoid this major conflict that is looming. Unfortunately, we are getting every day closer. Why I am saying that? We are getting every day closer to this because we are not paying enough serious attention to what is happening in Ukraine. The key question to avoid World War III or a similar global conflict situation is that Ukraine must win this war. Russia cannot win this war; their aggression cannot be accepted. Otherwise, we will have much more bad news to digest.
What would be your response to Russia’s criticism that Baltic countries, by removing or attacking the historical monuments are disrespectful to the history and this is bothering Russian citizens which holds a considerable population in the region?
As a historian myself, I studied history at Tartu University. These topics and questions are very close to my heart. One of the few countries in the world that really uses history in a weaponized way is Russia, and they have done so for a long time. The regime in place for many decades has used history as a tool to control the minds of their own people and to attack others, including Baltic states. We have a completely different understanding of what happened during World War II. Russia tells everyone that they liberated us at the end of World War II in 1944. However, they don’t recognize the clear fact that in 1944, after Nazi Germany was pushed out from Estonia, another occupation started. We didn’t become a free nation. In this tall hermit, our national flag is flying. In 1944, this flag wasn’t restored as a sign of independence and freedom. We were able to raise this flag again after 50 years of Soviet occupation when we regained our independence. When it comes to honoring history as it happened, the real facts are that Stalin’s Soviet Union made a deal with Hitler in 1939 to divide Europe into zones of influence and territories they could conquer and control. The Baltic states were given to the Soviet Union, and they conquered us in 1940, occupying Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and starting a war against Finland. Finland bravely fought back during the Winter War in 1939-40.
Unfortunately, we hoped, as I told you about neutrality, that as a neutral country, we could survive this turbulence. We could not. This is a very deep wound in the hearts of our society and people because many Estonians were forcefully deported as children in 1941 or 1949 to Siberia. Their parents were killed, or they went through horror. What you see happening with children in Ukraine today is similar. More than 20,000 Ukrainian kids are forcefully deported from Ukraine. Nothing has changed.
When the full-scale war started in Ukraine in February 2022, we in Estonia made a clear decision to remove from our public space all monuments connected with the occupation of Estonia by the Soviet Union. This has been carried out in a very orderly manner. If there are burial places of those killed during World War II, we honor them. And everything is done in a very orderly way. But we won’t accept any public activity that shows respect to the horrors going on right now in Ukraine.
Do we want or not it brings up memories from the past… Unfortunately, Russia hasn’t changed. They use the same methods, tools, and violence today in Ukraine as they did during World War II or after. It is not against Russia; it is to defend our independence, sovereignty, and honor all the victims who perished under dictatorships like Russia was and still is.
You have still a border problem with Russia. What is the latest situation?
We have a border really signed by ministers in February 2014, but not ratified by parliament.
Are you scared?
No, of course not. If you are scared, you are already lost. You have to be knowledgeable and understand what is going on, why it is happening, and then be ready to make decisions. As politicians in Estonia, we see that the stress level among people is higher than usual. It is natural. A major war is going on in Europe, in the middle of Europe. Unfortunately, we don’t see the end of it. We would like to see peace made, the war over, and people surviving these horrors.
However, we may have different views with our Turkish colleagues and friends on how this war should end. A few weeks ago, I accompanied our president, Mr. Alar Karis, on a state visit to Türkiye. We met President Erdogan and had a good opportunity to discuss these matters with Foreign Minister Fidan. We agree that this is a threat to stability. The war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine is a direct threat to regional stability.
Türkiye supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine and doesn’t accept the annexation of Crimea. Türkiye supports a ceasefire and mediation. In which point, do your opinions divert?
We differ on whether a ceasefire can bring the peace we would like to see, including honoring Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. We highly appreciate any effort to mediate because it is necessary. However, this is not just a regional conflict. Russia’s aim is not only to destroy and annihilate an entire nation. They have said publicly, both Putin and Medvedev, that they want to destroy all of Ukraine. They are not interested in a ceasefire. They may be interested in a temporary ceasefire only to gain more strength and start again. What happened in 2014 and 2015 with the Minsk Agreements shows this. During those years, I traveled to the front lines in Eastern Ukraine multiple times. Since February 2022, I have been to the front lines four times. I have seen with my own eyes what is happening there. It’s not just the reportings of journalists…
This war cannot end in a tie. Our goal as countries interested in international law and justice is that aggression cannot stay without pay off. War crimes must be dealt with seriously. Russia has already committed a huge number of war crimes, including the latest attack on a children’s hospital in Kiev. It cannot be handled by just making a deal and negotiating with war criminals. Ukraine, as an independent nation, must survive and they are also very interested in peace but they cannot choose independently choose their path to NATO and ensure nobody invades them again. Russia’s idea of peace is the total capitulation of Ukraine, making it a neutral country with a reduced army that cannot defend itself. This cannot be accepted by Ukrainian politicians including President Zelenskiy. Ukraine is actively seeking support for their peace formula, organizing conferences in Switzerland, and engaging with Chinese officials to understand Ukraine’s position as Foreign Minister Kuleba was there.
Putin has stated several times that he is open to negotiations. On his way back from China, he once again said he is open for negotiations. However, Zelensky has prohibited negotiations with Russia by law. As a historian, you know so many wars in the past ended with peace agreements, such as the 30 Years’ War with the Westphalia Agreement. Europeans have experienced immense massacres, millions of people died but reached peace agreements. How can you reach a peace agreement? You negotiate. I understand that this is where you divert from Türkiye’s position but still Türkiye’s approach proves that this is what the history shows that peace is only possible with negotiation. What is your take?
First and foremost, Estonia and Türkiye are on the same page that this war must finish in a way that the peace agreed upon ensures lasting peace and prevents future attacks on our countries and nations by those seeking to change the world order dramatically. I would not go that far back to the 17th century; still, the world has changed since then. In the last 100 years, major wars like World War I and II, which are very similar to today’s war, have shown that lasting peace sometimes requires fighting for it.
Not like the regional conflict that happened perhaps in 2008, when it comes to the occupation by Russia of a fifth of Georgia’s territory in 2008, the war lasted only 5 days. Today, this war has been going on for more than 10 years. For 10 years, Russia has been trying to destroy Ukraine. And they are active not only in Ukraine. But they are building a much bigger sort of alliance with North Korea and Iran. North Korea is helping directly. Iran is helping directly with their military equipment. China, obviously, is helping Russia economically, if not with our tools and means. And that is what we, as politicians or diplomats, must consider. It is a much more difficult path to peace this time. And unfortunately, sometimes to achieve lasting peace, you have to fight for that.
And this is why I argue, and this has been the very clear position of Estonia as well, from our knowledge of the past, knowing Russia. I know that Türkiye knows Russia sometimes better than many nations, having been in military conflict with Russians so many times in the past. (Laughes) To make sure that Russia understands its borders and respects the borders of others, they have to be defeated in their war of aggression. We are not talking about defeating Russia in general, but we are talking about this aggression.
Occupation of territories cannot be accepted. When Putin tells you that he is ready to negotiate, he is ready to negotiate how much more territory he can get from Ukrainians. He said publicly before this meeting, “Give me this, give me that,” referring to non-occupied territories of the Kherson and Zaporizhia regions. “And maybe then we can think about negotiations.” But at the same time, people like Medvedev or others directly tell us that they are not interested in just stopping there. They are interested in destroying the entire nation, the entire Ukrainian statehood. They would like to restore the Russian empire. As Serzhinsky said already in the early 90s, if Russia would like to restore the empire, then without Ukraine, it is impossible to imagine it happening.
So what they have done during the last, let’s say, 10 or 20 years, or even longer, as I worked as a journalist in Moscow in 1994-97, I witnessed myself. I covered the Chechen war, the First Chechen War in 1994-96. And I understood already at that time that this kind of imperial push is not gone anywhere. People thought that after the Soviet empire collapsed, the Soviet Union collapsed, that it was going to be in the past and Russia would accept the new reality. So actually, what happened in Chechnya during the first war, and then later when Putin came to power, told us or gave us a clear signal that Russia would like to stop the dismantling of their own country or empire, and would like to expand by force.
And this is what happened in 2008 against Georgia. This is what has happened since 2014 against Ukraine. What has happened in Belarus specifically, after the so-called presidential elections in August 2020, is that Russia fully controls the situation in Belarus de facto. And they would like to expand also perhaps towards Central Asian countries, specifically Kazakhstan. When you recall the ideas of, for instance, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a famous Russian writer who used to live in the United States and who came back to Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. He was expelled by the KGB in the 70s. So, his idea is that Russia must be an empire, including the territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.
So, you see that this kind of way of thinking is strongly embedded in their minds. And that triggers this kind of very aggressive way of behavior against its neighbors. And unfortunately, this has led us to this very tragic war that is going on right now in Ukraine. And this is why I’m saying that trying to make a sort of temporary peace might save lives for some time. But unfortunately, it doesn’t serve the long term. Our goal is to restore lasting peace in Europe. I think what should be done today is to help Ukraine, as Türkiye has done since 2014. As we know, Turkish help has been significant to Ukraine, and also the political decision not to recognize any kind of annexations, similar to us. But the only way today to make sure that Russia takes negotiations seriously is that they see that their idea to conquer, to establish a new reality by force, is a dead-end policy. It won’t lead to the success of what they have dreamt about.
And this is why I think what NATO allies agreed upon in Washington was significant. This final declaration is a very good one. But we have to make sure that our support and assistance to Ukraine will last until victory. Temporary peace might save some lives but doesn’t serve long-term goals of lasting peace in Europe. Helping Ukraine is crucial, as Türkiye has done since 2014, with significant support and political decisions not recognizing annexations. NATO allies’ support must last until Ukraine achieves victory.
With Kaja Kallas steped down to become the EU’s foreign policy chief, how do you foresee Estonia’s role within NATO and the EU evolving under new leadership? Estonia has been a vocal supporter of Ukraine since Russia’s invasion. What further steps do you think the EU and NATO should take to ensure regional security and support Ukraine? Also, under Kaja Kallas’ administration, Estonia increased its defense budget significantly. How do you plan to maintain or expand this investment in national defense?
Kaja Kallas’ role is enormously important. Very good news for her… It is recognizing her leadership throughout the last several years, as she has been our Prime Minister and also a very clear and leading voice among allies when it comes to deterring and standing against Russian aggression; this is the first time ever an Estonian politician has been recognized with this kind of high recognition and job as a High Representative of Foreign and Security Policy within the EU.
And I’m more than sure that from 1st November when she will take office, she will actively lead the EU’s joint efforts to tackle all the challenges. Not only what we see in Ukraine but also in the Middle East, in Asia, and Africa. So, it’s going to be for her definitely a challenge.
What will be her approach for Israel-Gaza? In your previous answer, you said that it started on October 7th. But the fact is that it has been ongoing since 1948 according to several people. Because that’s an ongoing thing. The Palestinians and Gazans under occupation and killed immensely. You would accept this, right? And what would be her approach?
You have to ask Kaja. In your next interview, I don’t know what is her position as a high representative. You can ask her since 1st November.
And what is your approach then?
Unfortunately, it comes to the question of what has happened on 7th October and afterward. Or what has happened during the last decades in the region by and large. Unfortunately, we have to understand that there are so many interests represented not only the direct sort of violence between particularly Palestinians or Israelis or Arab states against Israel who still a number of them don’t recognize the existence of Israel as a state. So, unfortunately, we see that there are interests of global players as well presented when it comes to for instance the interests of Iran or Russia or some other countries.
So, it is an extremely complicated situation today. We all of course as humans are against any suffering both those who suffered by this unimaginable terrorist attack on 7th October. I was just 7 days after this attack. I was in Bari Kibbutz and also in Nova music festival place. And believe me I have seen many unpleasant scenes. And this was something that was heartbreaking. I know that there is a long story before that. But we also know that before 7th October was relatively sort of stable period for some time. Anyway, any violence cannot be accepted at all. And specifically when it comes to the raping and torturing and killing in a way what it was done. And unfortunately, the response to that was known that it is going to lead to the unfortunate loss of many people in Gaza.
Sorry, no rapes are reported. All of them are reported to be fake news and proven. So, no single example of what you said…
Let’s please don’t go into that. I leave it to the investigators. Those facts which are known to many people. But anyway please…
You see Putin as a war criminal. Is Netanyahu a war criminal too?
Anyway, it demands international efforts to make sure that this war will end up respecting the basic rights of people to live in peace. But unfortunately, what we see right now is that the United States are in the middle of presidential elections. The European Commission is in transition. War in Ukraine is going on. And as I said, unfortunately, I see the direct link between the Russian aggression in Ukraine and also what has happened in the Middle East by and large in Syria before and the Russian meddling in killing thousands of people in Aleppo and trying to create a new reality of geopolitics in the region.
Internal politics of Israel is playing enormous impact on that and it is much more difficult to solve the situation right now. It is really huge puzzle. Unfortunately, I don’t see any immediate solution that can help us to restore lasting peace in Gaza as well. But I argue that with respect to Russian aggression, if Russian aggression against Ukraine is challenged by the international community in a way which recognize international-rules based world order, then that would help definitely to solve tensions in the Middle East which also involves Iran and others.
But you have the fact: Hospitals hit. Children are killed. Women are killed. Pregnant women are killed. And Israeli soldiers post how they mess with what is happening in Gaza in their Tiktok videos.
Do you know how many people are killed in Mariupol?
Of course, I know. I closely followed Russia-Ukraine war from the first day.
Every war crime when it comes to Russia or when it comes to October 7 events which Hamas must be recognized as terrorist organization should be condemned.
Netanyahu also killed tens of thousands of civilians after October 7th. Is he a war criminal like Putin in your eyes?
International Criminal Court must give its decision about that. But all war crimes must be dealt equally. That is something very clear. To deal with criminals like Putin, we have to think about our future and restore peace globally.
I can say you are a very good politician.
(Laughter).
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