Middle East
On the eve of Women Int’l Day: Rural and project women, the two separate worlds
The struggle of women in Afghanistan has two different faces; one in conference halls, international media, reports by human rights organizations, and development projects, and the other in the silent back alleys of villages, behind mud walls, among dried-up fields, and houses that are not shelters for women but prisons of tradition and oppression.
On one side are women who speak at international meetings, participate in political meetings, and sign legal reports, and on the other side are women whose names are never mentioned in any report, women who do not chant slogans, but fight every day in the most difficult conditions for their most basic human rights.
One of the biggest gaps in the struggle of Afghan women is the gap between project women and rural women. Project women are often educated, familiar with foreign languages, and affiliated with international organizations. They defend women’s rights at conferences, speak about the situation of women in the media, and explain the Afghan crisis to representatives of Western governments.
But the rural woman, even if she has heard of these meetings, does not see them as part of her life. For her, the struggle means trying to escape hunger, violence, humiliation, and restrictions that have deprived her of even the opportunity to think about human rights.
They are analysis of the banality of evil, Hannah Arendt explains how oppressive systems, without the need for direct violence, can create conditions in which oppression appears normal and unobjectionable by creating bureaucratic structures and marginalizing certain groups.
Rural Afghan women are caught in precisely such a structure; they are not only victims of Taliban repression, but their neglect and deprivation are so institutionalized in the traditional system that their condition seems to be a natural part of the social order. This is what Arendt calls everyday evil; oppression that operates without being recognized as “oppression.”
On the other hand, Susan Sontag, in her book “On the Suffering of Others,” points out how human tragedies become insignificant when they are kept out of the eyes of the media and policymakers. The Afghan rural woman is in exactly this position; while the world focuses on female political activists, journalists, and intellectuals, the rural woman, who bears the heaviest burden of violence, remains hidden from view.
On the other hand, women’s rights movements in Afghanistan have been led mainly by urban, educated women affiliated with international institutions. Although these women fight for the rights of Afghan women, they represent a specific segment of society whose lives are completely different from those of indigenous Afghan women, rather than being the true voices of rural women.
These two struggles, although seemingly waged for a common goal, in practice, take two completely different paths.
The project woman knows the language of politics, has international networks, and uses power mechanisms to advance her goals. But the rural woman has no knowledge of these concepts, no one to defend her rights, and no opportunity to even participate in local meetings. She has never been included in official statements or international campaigns, but she fights every day on an unequal battlefield to preserve her most basic rights.
The problem begins when many project women, without knowing the reality of the lives of indigenous women, prescribe for them. They speak in the language of Western concepts and with enlightened views on gender equality, but the rural woman only knows the language of survival. For the project woman, reforming the laws is important, but for the rural woman, finding a way to save her daughter from forced marriage is important. These two struggles, although seemingly waged for a common goal, in practice, take two completely different paths.
It should not go unmentioned that the suffering of rural women in Afghanistan knows no boundaries of ethnicity, lineage, or province. The Hazara woman of Daikundi, the Pashtun woman of Uruzgan, the Tajik woman of Badakhshan, and the Uzbek woman of Faryab are all caught in a cycle of oppression that has been passed down from generation to generation. Their pain is not born of ethnic differences, but is the product of a tribal and patriarchal system that has relegated women to a subordinate position.
Although local structures, regional traditions, and cultural differences can exert various forms of pressure and control on women, the essence of the story does not change; rural women, wherever they are in this land, have neither ownership of land, nor access to income, nor the freedom to decide their own destiny.
She, like other women in different regions, has experienced only one thing: being forgotten. Policymakers, international institutions, and even women’s rights movements have often failed to acknowledge the fact that the pain of rural women is not a local or ethnic issue, but a national reality that requires collective understanding and action.
The historical and social roots of rural women’s deprivation
Afghanistan has long been dominated by tribal systems in which women are considered the “property” of men. This view has not only deprived women of property rights, decision-making and economic independence, but also placed them in a position where even their bodies and lives are at the disposal of the men in the family. In these societies, forced marriages, the exchange of women in tribal conflicts and the imposition of silence on women are part of a system that has persisted for generations. Many women remain dependent on the decisions of their brothers, fathers, and sons, even after marriage.
In his theory of “Gift and Exchange in Traditional Societies,” French sociologist Marcel Mauss explains how in some societies, women are not seen as individuals but as part of a system of power exchange between men. This is particularly evident in Afghanistan, especially in the villages, where women are often seen as part of family or tribal bargaining chips, and their personal autonomy is meaningless.
One of the main reasons for this situation to persist is the lack of an effective and inclusive central government that can extend laws protecting women to the countryside. Afghan governments have always been embroiled in civil wars, widespread corruption, and weak governance, and have failed to create a unified system to protect women’s rights. Even during periods when relatively more progressive governments ruled in Kabul, reforms never reached rural and remote areas.
In his discussion of “cultural hegemony,” Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci explains how states propagate particular ideologies in society to consolidate their power. In Afghanistan, various states have failed to establish hegemony over women’s rights in the villages because each time social reforms have been initiated, tribal structures have resisted them.
The lack of a strong and supportive national state has meant that women’s rights have never become a public issue and have remained within the purview of urban elites. Many political thinkers, including Antonio Gramsci, have argued that the absence of a “sustainable cultural hegemony” prevents social reform from reaching the depths of society.
In Afghanistan, governments have not only failed to create sustainable laws, but any changes have remained limited to urban administrative structures and have never reached the reality of rural women’s lives.
What to do?
With the Taliban closing the borders, women’s rights activists are no longer able to enter Afghanistan. But that doesn’t mean the fight is over. There are many alternative ways to reach rural women with awareness and support: A large proportion of rural women have access to mobile phones. This tool should be used to raise awareness about legal rights, ways to combat violence, and economic methods. Producing content in different formats – in local languages – can help rural women.
The second is the development of clandestine schools and informal education systems. During the early days of Taliban regime, underground schools were able to educate a new generation of girls. This model needs to be revived today. Online education, although limited, is one way to transfer knowledge to rural girls.
Another possible solution is to support small businesses run by rural women, such as carpet weaving and handicrafts, and connect them to foreign markets. Franz Fanon, in his book “The Wretched of the Earth” points out that economic independence and consciousness are two key factors in the liberation of the colonized.
Rural Afghan women will also never be able to free themselves from traditional patriarchal structures without economic independence. Therefore, developing local businesses and connecting them to the labor market can be one of the real ways to empower women.
For example, creating support and educational networks between elite women and indigenous women, and documenting rural women’s narratives can lead to the transfer of experience and knowledge from one group to another; and dozens of other things.
Yes! The Taliban have closed the borders, but they cannot cage consciousness. If rural women realize that they have the right to life, choice, education, and property, the historical chains of subordination will be broken one by one.
Israel’s Ambassador to the US, Yechiel Leiter, stated that Tel Aviv received clear intelligence showing Türkiye planned to expand its military presence in Syria significantly, an action Israel deemed the crossing of a “red line.”
Speaking to The Jerusalem Post, Leiter said: “We are not looking for an escalation or a war with either Türkiye or Syria. But a red line was crossed.”
His remarks follow an Israeli air strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Idlib, Syria, which drew swift criticism from both the Syrian and Turkish governments.
Leiter continued:
“This was seen as a blatant Turkish violation of the understandings. Those who needed access to the intelligence received it. Those who needed to know what was going to happen knew. We made it clear that this was contrary to our understandings, and that is why Israel acted as it did.”
According to Leiter, the failure to heed these warnings led Israel on Tuesday to strike the Abu al-Duhur airbase, where Turkish forces were allegedly expected to arrive.
Syrian officials stated that the airbase was targeted by at least eight strikes, whilst subsequently released satellite imagery revealed damage to the runways.
Leiter stated that the Turkish move contradicted understandings reached during the Biden administration between Israel and the administration of Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, which “froze the existing situation” in the country.
According to Leiter, these understandings were reaffirmed during a meeting held in Paris in January 2026, attended by Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani, US Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack, Leiter, then-National Security Council head Gil Reich, and Netanyahu’s military secretary Roman Gofman (now director of Mossad).
Leiter continued:
“This freeze means we do not act as long as the Turks do not act, and they do not force us to withdraw. It is also important to understand: whilst we maintain a security zone of only 78 square miles [approximately 202 square kilometres] in Syria, the Turks have, over the past few years, slowly annexed 3,500 square miles in northern Syria—roughly 5% of the country’s territory.”
According to The Jerusalem Post, with the exception of Tom Barrack, the US Special Envoy for Syria and Ambassador to Türkiye, senior US officials did not condemn the Israeli strike in Syria.
“The administration’s policy is that the previously agreed freeze should continue; that is why even Trump did not condemn the strike,” Leiter said.
Despite the tensions, Leiter emphasised Israel’s understanding that Syria is not seeking an escalation or war.
“It is clear to us that the Syrians do not want a confrontation with us. That is why we tell the Turks not to create conflict. There are multiple indications that the move planned by Türkiye was imposed on the Syrians,” the ambassador said.
Leiter argued that this apparent discord was also evident in the conflicting statements issued by Türkiye and Syria following the strike:
“Whilst Syrian Foreign Minister Shaibani acknowledged that a Turkish delegation was in Syria a few days before the strike, the Turks denied this. They need to resolve this matter between themselves.”
Leiter did not rule out a return to direct talks with Syria, as conducted in the past, but said conditions must be suitable.
“Negotiations can be resumed. We want to continue the face-to-face dialogue we previously conducted with the Syrians,” Leiter said.
Leiter added that Israel is not seeking a conflict with Türkiye and remains open to dialogue with Ankara.
“We are certainly open to dialogue with them, but judging by statements from senior officials in the country, they would prefer to wipe Israel off the map,” the Israeli diplomat said.
Alleging that Türkiye hosts Hamas leaders and “channels funds” to Hezbollah and Hamas, Leiter argued that it was inappropriate at this juncture for “Türkiye to begin expanding its influence in Lebanon and Syria.”
Leiter continued:
“Under current conditions, Türkiye cannot be a force that helps bring calm to the region. If only we could return to the state of relations between Jerusalem and Ankara from several decades ago. Back then, we would have been open to Türkiye’s influence in the region. But in an environment where Türkiye funds terrorist organisations, an increase in its regional influence makes no sense.”
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has suspended commercial and economic relations with Iran after announcing that Tehran launched two ballistic missiles towards the Gulf state on Tuesday.
The UAE Ministry of Defence stated that air defence systems detected two ballistic missiles launched from Iran towards its territory.
The incident is considered Tehran’s first direct attack targeting the Gulf country since May.
The event prompted emergency telephone alerts to be sent to residents across the UAE.
The Ministry of Defence stated that assessments indicated the missiles targeted maritime traffic, adding that one missile fell into the sea outside UAE territorial waters and the other landed within territorial waters.
The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs later announced that “in light of regional tensions that undermine regional and international peace and security, all trade, commercial relations, and financial transactions with Iran have been halted until further notice.”
Iran denied any involvement in the missile attacks. Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei said the claim “contradicts the principle of good neighbourliness and undermines ongoing efforts to strengthen trust among regional countries.”
The missile strikes occurred after a period in which the UAE and Tehran had sought to reduce tensions between the two countries.
The bulk of Tehran’s military retaliation targeted neighbouring Gulf states, which Iran accused of facilitating US-Israeli attacks.
The UAE bore the heaviest brunt of Iran’s attacks against US allies in the Gulf, sustaining nearly 3,000 missile and drone strikes.
Exhibiting the most hawkish stance against Tehran among its Gulf neighbours, the UAE responded with dozens of strikes against Iran.
However, tensions between the UAE and Iran eased following a memorandum of understanding signed between Washington and Tehran in June.
After the agreement began to unravel in early July, Iran largely redirected its attacks towards Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan.
In recent months, the UAE reactivated diplomatic and economic channels with Iran while simultaneously strengthening its military ties with Israel and the US.
Tuesday’s missile strikes threaten to disrupt the atmosphere of normalisation that had returned to the UAE.
While Dubai’s financial district was once again filling with bankers, certain commercial activities between the emirate and Iranian ports had resumed.
Furthermore, several Iranian flights to the UAE had quietly resumed.
UAE authorities had also begun permitting the return of approximately 20,000 Iranians holding UAE residency permits who were outside the country when the war began.
UAE officials have repeatedly emphasised that the country seeks to avoid being drawn further into a broader regional war.
Nevertheless, efforts to de-escalate tensions between the UAE and Iran have come under increasing strain in recent weeks.
This month, the UAE accused Iran of attacking vessels belonging to the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company in the Strait of Hormuz.
To date, the US has imposed sanctions on thousands of Iranian individuals and legal entities; however, the Tehran administration continues to bypass these restrictions by rapidly establishing new structures to replace those that have been blocked.
In an assessment citing expert opinions published by the Reuters news agency, the current situation was likened to a game of whack-a-mole.
Whack-a-mole is known as a game of agility and reflexes based on the concept of hitting plastic figures with a mallet as they pop up unexpectedly from their holes.
Speaking to the agency, experts outlined other options that Washington could deploy to increase pressure on Tehran and raise the efficacy of sanctions.
Potential measures include restrictions targeting independent Chinese refineries, known as “teapots,” which account for a quarter of China’s oil refining capacity.
China purchases more than 80% of the oil exported by Iran, and these refineries process the vast majority of those shipments. Nevertheless, these facilities have limited ties to the US financial system, rendering them partially protected against secondary sanctions.
Another option on the table is increasing pressure on major Chinese banks. The US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has applied secondary sanctions to small firms based in China and Hong Kong accused of executing billions of dollars in transactions for Iranian oil.
The agency has also warned two large banks, though it has not yet included them on its sanctions list.
While taking steps against major banks could deter other financial institutions, such actions carry the risk of Beijing enacting retaliatory measures. Washington seeks to avoid such tension ahead of a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in September.
Experts are also evaluating the possibility of enforcing a land blockade with the participation of Iran’s neighbours: Iraq, Türkiye, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia.
The Trump administration holds various leverage mechanisms against such nations, including Pakistan, which is requesting a $10 billion swap line, and Türkiye, which seeks to rejoin the F-35 program. Analysts express, however, that implementing such a blockade on the ground and generating the expected pressure inside Iran would be difficult.
Trump has repeatedly voiced threats to impose secondary tariffs on countries that trade with Iran; however, the US Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for such measures.
On the other hand, a anti-Russia “crushing” sanctions bill passed by the Senate includes new restrictions on Iran and grants Trump tariff authority.
This bill must also pass a vote in the House of Representatives; however, the text faces opposition from both Democrats and certain Republican lawmakers.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in mid-August that Trump would disclose new measures designed to raise Iran’s economic isolation to an unprecedented level.
Stating that the US President had instructed the re-establishment of the maximum economic pressure policy against Tehran, Bessent said, “We have moved from Epic Fury to Economic Fury.”
Following Bessent’s statements, Bloomberg noted that Tehran has learned to manage the consequences of a naval blockade and thousands of restrictions. According to the agency’s analysts, the principal obstacle facing Washington is the close economic relationship between Iran and China; indeed, Beijing secures more than 90% of Iranian oil exports. Sanctioning the entities facilitating these purchases would directly reduce Tehran’s oil revenues, yet the US is avoiding this step for now.
Maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains restricted. On August 11, Iran conveyed its conditions for lifting the blockade in the strait to the US through intermediaries.
Tehran’s conditions included an end to threats and military actions, the lifting of the blockade and sanctions, compensation for damages, and the release of frozen assets.
On August 14, Trump claimed that following the end of the war with Iran, he would declare the Strait of Hormuz to be US territory. Responding to these statements, the Iranian Foreign Ministry warned that the Strait of Hormuz could not be seized “by a tweet, an aircraft carrier, an executive order, or a campaign speech.”
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