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Restrictions on exports from Turkey to Israel: Important, but must be backed up by diplomatic measures

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The Turkish Ministry of Trade has decided to impose export restrictions on 54 product groups against Israel, which continues its attacks on Palestine. We spoke to Emir Aşnas, a researcher and writer, about the decision and Israel’s reaction to it.

Turkey’s trade with Israel has long been a subject of debate due to Israel’s operations in Gaza since October. Following criticism from within the country, the Ministry of Trade took action and imposed export restrictions on 54 product groups to Israel.

The first reaction to Ankara’s decision came from Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz. In a statement on the social media platform, Katz used the following statements in his post, in which he referred to President Tayyip Erdoğan:

Israel will ask US to impose sanctions

“Erdogan is once again sacrificing the economic interests of the Turkish people for the sake of his support for the Hamas murderers who are raping, murdering and desecrating the bodies of women, girls and adults in Gaza and burning children alive. Israel will not give in to violence and blackmail, will not tolerate unilateral violations of trade agreements and will take parallel measures against Turkey that will damage its economy. We will ask our friends in the United States to draw up another list of products that Israel will prevent Turkey from exporting, to contact US organisations, to stop investments in Turkey and to prevent the import of products from Turkey. Congress will investigate violations of the boycott laws and impose sanctions on Turkey accordingly”.

‘A total export ban is not possible’

Emir Aşnas, a researcher and writer specialising in international trade and investment, public administration and commercial diplomacy, explained the difference between an export restriction and an export ban: “A restriction can take different forms. For example, a certain product may be allowed to be exported within a certain quota, i.e. up to a certain amount, and the amount above that may not be allowed. In the case of a ban, the export of that good may be prohibited altogether. Again, the restriction can be for a certain period of time; in a prohibition, the export of that good is stopped indefinitely.”

More importantly, Aşnas pointed out that it is not possible to ban exports completely and indefinitely within the framework of GATT-WTO (World Trade Organisation) agreements and rules, reminding that both Turkey and Israel are WTO members.

Aşnas explained that the legislation on the application of the restriction has not yet been published in the Official Gazette and said, “Therefore, we do not yet have a clear idea about the scope, principles, duration and implementation methods of this application. At this stage, it is possible to make some predictions based on the official statement of the Ministry of Trade. In this context, we understand that Turkey has suspended the export to Israel of 54 products and product groups listed in the Ministry of Trade’s statement until further notice”.

‘Technical definition of banned goods should be made’

Aşnas provided the following information on how the restriction decision will be implemented in practice: “The Ministry of Trade will issue the relevant legislation, and the customs tariff statistical items will be determined and announced for the technical description and definition of the products subject to the restriction, along with the principles of implementation. In addition, the customs department of the Ministry of Trade will not approve customs declarations for the export of these goods to Israel, and thus the exports will not take place”.

However, he also pointed out that “it is of course possible for the goods in question to be registered with our customs as being destined for another destination and then shipped to Israel from that destination”.

Aşnas pointed out that in order to have a complete idea of how the restriction decision will affect Turkey’s exports to Israel, the technical definition of the goods whose exports will be restricted and the customs tariff statistical items should be determined, and said, “I think the relevant units of the Ministry of Trade are currently carrying out this work. Otherwise, there cannot be a sound application”.

A blow to Israel’s iron and steel imports

Aşnas gave the following information about the product groups announced to be restricted

“Among the products and product groups listed in the Ministry of Trade’s announcement, a significant portion of iron-steel and ferrous metals and products – and even metalworking machinery and chemicals used in metal processing – will be subject to the restriction. Exports of metals and products account for the largest share (over 20 per cent) of Turkey’s exports to Israel by sector. Moreover, Turkey is Israel’s first and most important supplier, especially in the iron and steel sector.”

“However, it can be seen that automotive products (main and sub-industry), which are the second largest sector of Turkey’s exports to Israel, are not or only partially included in this restriction. The list also includes many products and product groups for the chemical and construction sectors. When this list is analysed, it is expected that Turkey’s exports to Israel will be significantly restricted. However, as I have said before, it would be appropriate to wait for the technical definition of the goods within the scope of the restriction in order to make a clearer and more precise judgement on this issue”.

‘The decision seems to have been taken in haste’

Aşnas said it was clear that the decision on the restriction was taken in reaction and in haste, saying, “Otherwise, legal arrangements should have been made on this issue,” and continued, “The second point is that some products that have a significant share in exports to Israel (especially the automotive industry) are excluded from the list; In other words, it is understood that the metal, chemical and construction materials sectors that can be used ‘for military purposes’, which have attracted the most public reaction in the formation of the list, are to be ‘compulsorily’ included, and otherwise an attempt is being made to be selective according to the situation of the sectors. ”

Aşnas said that the Trade Ministry’s statement, “In fact, our country has not authorised and does not authorise the sale of any products or services that can be used for military purposes to Israel for a long time”, is understood to have been written in a “rush of guilt” and in order to ease the reactions of Turkish public opinion on the issue.

Commenting on the Trade Ministry’s statement that the export restrictions were based on UN resolutions and International Court of Justice (ICJ) rulings, Mr Aşnas said: “The UN Security Council resolutions cited, for example, have nothing to do with exports to Israel. They are about allowing humanitarian aid into Gaza, not blocking it. However, one of the resolutions referred to by the Department of Commerce is the injunction issued by the ICJ on 26 January 2024 in the genocide case brought by South Africa against Israel. Of course, this raises the legitimate question of why such a decision has been delayed until today. It is also an important question why Turkey, perhaps the most assertive country in the world on the Palestinian issue, has not itself filed a case with the ICJ.

Aşnas gave the following assessment of whether these export restrictions, which will be temporary until a ceasefire is implemented in Gaza, will be sufficient:

“It is understood that although it is important in terms of the products covered, it is insufficient and the arbitrariness will be seen more clearly after the legal and technical regulations on this issue are finalised. It can be said that this export restriction decision, which was announced hastily and without legal and technical arrangements, is aimed at appeasing the increasing reactions of the Turkish public opinion rather than fulfilling the ICJ decision, and that this export restriction decision, which is not supported by diplomatic/political measures, is a tactical and temporary step”.

The product groups for which the Ministry of Trade has decided to restrict exports to Israel are as follows:

1- Aluminium profiles

2- Aluminium wires

3- Paints

4- Copper profiles, rods and wires

5- Concrete mixers6- Steel tubes and fittings

7- Steel wire rod

8- Steel containers and tanks

9- Steel bridge components10 – Steel towers11- Steel profiles

12- Cement

13- Cement, concrete or artificial stone building blocks and slabs14- All iron and steel building materials15- All iron and steel wire

16- Excavators

17- Electrical cables

18- Electrical panels

19- Tiles

20 – Fibre optic cables and electric conductors21 – Forklifts22 – Granite

23 – Ropes and cables24- Hardware products25 – Hydraulic oils

26 – Rebar

27 – Construction machinery

28 – Building insulation

29 – Glass used in construction

30 – Chemical compounds

31 – Chemical fertilisers

32 – Clinker

33 – Buckets, scoops, shovels, clamps and hooks

34 – Sulphur

35 – Mineral oils

36 – Roller chains

37 – Marble

38 – Metalworking machinery

39 – Chemicals used in metalworking

40 – Mineral fertilisers

41 – Motor oils

42 – Pallets

43 – Plastic pipes

44 – Sandwich panels

45 – Ceramics

46 – Solvent paints

47 – Wire drawing machines

48 – Sawing machines

49 – Bricks

50 – Aircraft gasoline and kerosene

51 – Paints

52 – Cranes

53 – Adhesives and glues

54- Flat steel products

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Russia open to Syria’s BRICS membership amid leadership shift

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Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov announced that if Syria’s new government applies to join BRICS, its request would be taken into serious consideration. Speaking to TASS news agency, Ryabkov stated, “There is no doubt that we seriously consider the applications of all countries, and Syria is no exception.” However, he emphasized that BRICS would not pressure or influence Syria’s decision, saying, “We are not forcing anyone, we are not encouraging anyone to do anything, and we respect any choice.”

In October, Syria’s ambassador to Moscow, Bashar Jaafari, revealed that Damascus was actively discussing the possibility of joining BRICS. Moscow has reaffirmed its support for Syria in this pursuit, highlighting the historic ties between the two nations. The BRICS bloc, originally founded in 2006 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, expanded in 2011 with the inclusion of South Africa. In a significant wave of growth, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates became members as of January 1, 2024.

Recent developments suggest a strategic shift in Moscow’s approach to Syria. The Kremlin has begun direct negotiations with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a key political and military entity in the region, to safeguard Russian military interests in the Middle East. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov confirmed contact with HTS’s political committee. Meanwhile, HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Julani, now identifying as Ahmed Sharaa, expressed openness to redefining relations with Russia, noting the opportunity to “reconsider relations in a way that serves common interests.”

Simultaneously, the Syrian Embassy in Moscow raised the flag of the new administration, signaling readiness to follow directives from the country’s new leadership. This marks a notable pivot in the geopolitical alignment between Russia and Syria.

Former diplomat Nikolai Sokov, a senior fellow at the Vienna Centre for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, highlighted Russia’s pragmatic approach. In an interview with The Guardian, he remarked, “Moscow prefers to work with those who have power and control and discards those who lose it.”

Dara Massicot, an analyst at the Carnegie Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies in Berlin, noted that while Russia could extend financial, energy, or resource-based support to the new Syrian government, the coalition’s specific demands remain uncertain.

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EU sanctions Dutch oil trader for breaching Russian oil price cap

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For the first time, the European Union (EU) has imposed sanctions on a European national for violating the price cap on Russian oil exports. Nils Trost, a Dutch oil trader residing in Switzerland, faces sanctions for his involvement in breaching the $60-per-barrel price ceiling imposed by Western countries. Swiss authorities are also investigating his company, Paramount Energy & Commodities SA.

According to an EU statement, Trost’s Geneva-based company transferred its Russian oil trading operations in June 2022 to its Dubai-based subsidiary, Paramount Energy & Commodities DMCC. The EU alleges that this subsidiary regularly traded Russian crude oil at prices exceeding the established $60-per-barrel limit.

The $60 price ceiling on Russian crude oil, implemented in December 2022, was part of Western efforts to curb Moscow’s oil revenue while maintaining global supply. Under the sanctions, trade involving Western insurers and financiers must adhere to this price limit. However, Paramount’s Dubai subsidiary continued trading East Siberian Pacific Ocean (ESPO) grade oil, which typically trades at prices above the ceiling, unlike Russia’s Urals crude.

Trost has denied violating sanctions, arguing that his UAE subsidiary is legally independent and not bound by EU sanctions. Speaking to The Financial Times, he claimed that his lawyers assured him the operations of subsidiaries in the UAE are exempt from EU restrictions as long as they remain uninvolved with the European parent company. Trost also attributed the sanctions to what he described as the “machinations” of his former business partner, Gaurav Kumar Srivastava.

Swiss law allows foreign subsidiaries of Swiss companies to operate independently of Swiss sanctions. However, if direct links—such as financial transfers or managerial directives—between the parent company and subsidiaries are established, such actions could constitute a sanctions violation. The Swiss Federal Government’s Expert Group on Business Cycles (SECO) began examining the activities of Paramount and other companies in early 2023.

In the spring of 2024, SECO forwarded its findings to Switzerland’s Attorney General’s Office, recommending criminal proceedings based on two separate investigations. While the prosecutor’s office accepted one case, it rejected the other. The names of the involved companies remain undisclosed.

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Türkiye’s Moment in Europe’s Eyes: Von der Leyen’s High-Stakes Visit Amid Syria’s Turmoil

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Ahmetcan Uzlaşık, Brussels

Brussels, Dec 16, 2024 – European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s upcoming visit on December 17 to Türkiye comes at a pivotal moment for Syria, a country emerging from the long shadow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. As Syria faces unprecedented political shifts, von der Leyen’s discussions with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will not only address the immediate humanitarian crisis but also shape the future of EU-Türkiye cooperation in the region.

Ahmetcan Uzlaşık

The fall of Assad’s regime has raised hopes for a new era in Syria, yet the transition brings both risks and uncertainties. Ursula von der Leyen, in a statement ahead of her visit, emphasized the importance of continued EU support for Syria’s people, saying, “The collapse of the Assad regime offers new hope for the Syrian people. But this moment of change also carries risks and brings hardship. With the situation on the ground so volatile, our help to the people of Syria is ever more important.”

Von der Leyen: “We Are Committed to Providing Essential Aid”

The European Union has swiftly mobilized to address the urgent needs of those affected by the ongoing conflict and political upheaval in Syria. The Commission announced the launch of a new Humanitarian Air Bridge operation, delivering 50 tonnes of health supplies to Türkiye from its stockpiles in Dubai. These supplies will then be transported to northern Syria to alleviate the mounting health crisis. Additionally, 46 tonnes of shelter and education materials will be delivered, with EU funding now reaching €163 million in total humanitarian aid for 2024.

“We are committed to providing essential aid, including trauma kits, medical supplies, and food parcels to over 60,000 Syrians in the north,” said von der Leyen on December 13. The EU’s expanded humanitarian efforts reflect the urgency of the situation. However, despite the scale of this intervention, questions remain about the long-term effectiveness of these efforts, as many sanctions on Syria are ongoing.

“Türkiye will be a primus inter pares partner in dealing with Syria for the EU”

Von der Leyen’s visit comes at a time when Türkiye, a candidate country of the EU, increased its geopolitical importance in the region. Having long supported opposition forces against Assad, Türkiye is now portrayed in the West as one of the winners of the Syrian civil war.

Türkiye’s role in hosting over 4 million Syrian refugees has made it one of the most directly affected nations by the conflict, while it made Ankara important as an gate-keeper of migration before the eyes of European politicians. As von der Leyen prepares for her meeting with Erdoğan, the focus will likely be on reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation to manage the refugee crisis, protection of the minorities in Syria and prevent further instability that might cause another domestic conflict.

“We must work together to ensure that Syria’s territorial integrity is preserved and that the rights of all its people, especially minorities, are protected,” von der Leyen stated on 13th December.

Sophie Desmidt, Associate Director at ECDPM, emphasized that Türkiye’s role is central to the EU’s strategy. She noted that “Türkiye will be a primus inter pares partner in dealing with Syria for the EU, and von der Leyen will underline this during her visit.” Desmidt also highlighted the likelihood of Türkiye leveraging its position for additional EU support, especially given its pivotal role during the migration crisis. She added, “US leadership is in lame duck mode until Trump takes office, and whether he will be a spoiler or a power broker remains to be seen. I think Erdogan is keen to assert his leadership, over Iran, which plays in the EU’s cards”.

Kaja Kallas: The challenge of EU’s new face in diplomacy

The former Estonian Prime Minister, Kaja Kallas, came to the office on December 1, as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Recent statements from Kaja Kallas, the EU’s new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, add another layer of context to von der Leyen’s visit. Kallas has underscored the EU’s commitment to ensuring stability in the region, an issue of particular importance in light of Syria’s ongoing instability. On December 8, she tweeted, “Our priority is to ensure security in the region. I will work with all the constructive partners, in Syria and in the region.”

On December 14, Kallas emphasized the EU’s support for Syria’s political transition, stating, “Syria faces a hopeful but uncertain future. That’s why we all agreed in Aqaba on important principles: stability, sovereignty, territorial integrity, but also respect for minorities, institution build-up and unity of government that includes all the groups in Syria.”

Before going into her first Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, on December 16, Kallas announced that she had appointed “A European top diplomat” to go to Damascus and make contact with the new government and people there.

Kallas also stated that the bloc could ease sanctions on Syria if its new leadership forms an inclusive government and respects women’s and minority rights. She also noted that many EU foreign ministers urged Syria to eliminate Russian influence, including military bases, after the Foreign Affairs Council meeting.

“EU leadership wants decreased migration pressure”

Desmidt answered what might be the possible effects of the political crisis in Germany and France in the context of a leadership problem. “This will be a challenge for the time being, but pending the outcome of the German elections, things could move relatively fast. My sense is that EU leadership across the board, including the Commission, Parliament, and EU heads of state and government, and their domestic constituencies are by and large on the same page when it comes to the outcome they want to see as a result of support to Syria: decreased migration pressure on the EU.”

She added that there are other players who will contribute ideally to a joint EU action, such as António Costa, the new Council President, who will have the task of mobilizing member states around a common position, and Dubravka Šuica, the new Commissioner for the Mediterranean. Kaja Kallas, Desmidt noted, will have to demonstrate that this is a priority for her, as her profile has been strong in Ukraine and Russia. “She already took action over the weekend, traveling to Jordan to speak to representatives from the U.S., Türkiye, and Arab states,” she pointed out.

“Politics will ultimately trump moral frameworks”

Desmidt reinforced this view, warning against premature disengagement. “The EU has, on many occasions, been criticized for relinquishing in practice its emphasis on human rights and democracy and has been seen by many partners outside the EU as operating on double standards—being hard-line on some regimes but more lenient towards others, especially when interests are at play.”

She noted that “Politics will ultimately trump moral frameworks, but the EU should be clear on its position and interests. Closing the door to engagement with Syria’s transitional government now would also close the space for the EU to act constructively and effectively.” She drew parallels to Afghanistan, where the EU adopted a principled yet pragmatic approach to engagement with the leadership to support the people.

Looking forward, the EU faces a delicate balancing act. The potential return of Syrian refugees, combined with the need for reconstruction, will test the EU’s commitment to the region. The European Commission has already pledged to continue funding the rebuilding of Syria’s infrastructure, but as von der Leyen acknowledged, this will require the cooperation of all regional players, including Türkiye.

“The reconstruction of Syria will require significant resources, and the EU is ready to play its part,” said von der Leyen. “But it is essential that we work together with our regional partners to ensure that the political transition is inclusive and sustainable.”

Desmidt noted that budget constraints and the rise of far-right parties in Europe might further complicate these efforts. “The EU won’t shoulder the cost of reconstruction alone. Partners in the region, such as the Gulf states, will need to step up. Ideally EU’s role should focus on coordinating and supporting a regionally owned process, that prioritises respectful and innovative domestic and foreign policy solutions that pave the way for Syria’s long-term reconstruction” she concluded.

Desmidt also outlined potential avenues for support, such as international donor conferences, joint reconstruction funds with the World Bank and Asian and Islamic Development Banks, and a regional peace process and plan. She also suggested the possibility of an EU Envoy for Syria. She concluded, “I fear that other conflict zones, besides the Middle East and Ukraine, will suffer from a reallocation of interests and funds, notably Africa, as the return of migrants and easing migration pressure on the EU is higher up the political priority list than, for example, Sudan or the Sahel at the moment.”

“With the new configuration in Syria, Türkiye’s Importance Has Undoubtedly Grown in Europe”

Dr. Kadri Taştan, a non-resident senior fellow in Brussels, gave a Türkiye perspective by highlighting Türkiye’s strategic position in light of Syria’s transformation.

“Türkiye’s importance has undoubtedly grown in the eyes of Europe,” he said, pointing to Ankara’s consistent support for Syrian opposition groups even during times when the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime seemed improbable. According to Dr. Taştan, this steadfast backing has placed Türkiye in a particularly advantageous position as Syria undergoes a significant transition.

“In the short term, Türkiye is the most effective and profitable country in this new configuration, especially considering its longstanding relationships with the opposition forces,” he explained.

Security and Migration are the cornerstones of EU-Türkiye Cooperation

When asked about potential areas of collaboration between the EU and Türkiye , Dr. Taştan identified two primary points of focus: security and migration.

“Cooperation between the EU and Türkiye will center on security—specifically combating terrorism—and migration,” he said. While these two areas present clear opportunities for joint efforts, Dr. Taştan expressed skepticism regarding Europe’s ability to contribute significantly to Syria’s reconstruction.

“I don’t think Europeans can provide substantial support for reconstruction. The political environment in Europe is not conducive to this,” he noted, citing the ongoing challenges faced by the EU’s leading nations. “The two locomotive countries of Europe are facing significant political instability, and the rise of populist movements makes large-scale commitments difficult.”

Dr. Taştan also emphasized that migration and refugee return programs could become a cornerstone of EU-Türkiye cooperation. He suggested that the EU might utilize civil society organizations to fund and implement these programs through Türkiye.

“The EU can finance these initiatives through Türkiye, using entities like civil society organizations to ensure the effective management of migration and the safe return of refugees,” he added.

Last Visit Sparked Controversy Over Seating Arrangement

As European Commission President prepares for her upcoming visit to Türkiye, memories of the infamous “sofagate” incident still linger. During her 2021 visit, von der Leyen was left without a chair in a meeting with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and EU Council President Charles Michel, sparking global criticism and allegations of sexism.

The Two last saw each other during the European Political Community (EPC) Summit in Budapest, which took place in early November 2024.

As Ursula von der Leyen heads to Ankara, the stakes are high for both the EU and Türkiye in navigating Syria’s fragile transition. The visit represents a critical moment to redefine EU-Türkiye relations, balancing humanitarian aid, migration cooperation, and geopolitical strategy.

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