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Riots in France: Consequences and possibilities

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French President Emmanuel Macron met with 220 elected mayors earlier this week. Some mayors, especially those on the right, felt that Paris had failed to quell the protests that erupted after the killing of Nahel, a 17-year-old Algerian teenager, by the police. According to the Interior Ministry, a total of 99 town halls were attacked during the demonstrations. David Lisnard, President of the Association of French Mayors (AMF), used the term ‘urban riot’ and said that this would happen again in the years to come, adding: “That requires immediate action to restore order, of course, and regal authority, which is what I’m telling you, and then, at the same time, a profound effort, totally different from what has been done for the last thirty years.”

It was also at this meeting that Macron floated the idea of restricting social media. “When things get out of hand, it may be necessary to regulate or cut off access [to social media],” the French president said. The Interior Ministry was forced to call the widespread rumors that France would cut the internet ‘fake news’, arguing that it was ‘illegal’ in France. But the genie was clearly out of the bottle. Starting his political career as a Trotskyist in the 1970s, then joined the Socialist Party for a while, and was eventually elected mayor of Béziers in 2014 with the support of the National Front, which was once led by Jean-Marie Le Pen, and supported Marine Le Pen in the 2022 presidential elections, Robert Ménard was publicizing Macron’s remarks at the meeting: The President had proposed cutting off access to social media platforms such as Snapchat, TikTok and Instagram.

Is the ‘escalating violence’ a new phenomenon?

The French state’s solution to the attacks on town halls and some mayors during the riots is to extend the shield of central government to local authorities. Dominique Faure, the minister responsible for local and regional government, announced that the government will allocate 5 million euros to better protect local elected officials, especially mayors. In an interview with Le Monde, Faure outlined his plan to support local elected officials, saying twelve measures would be taken, including funding for better physical and legal protections, as well as psychological support for mayors.

These measures include strengthening the relationship between local authorities and prosecutors, and increasing legal and financial protection for local authorities. A law will be presented to the French parliament in the fall that will create an ‘aggravated’ charge for those found guilty of harassing local elected officials and allow judges to give them harsher sentences, the minister added.

The home of Vincent Jeanbrun, mayor of the Paris suburb of L’Häy-les-Roses, was targeted during the demonstrations. This is one of the main justifications for increasing centralized control over local authorities. But the ‘increased violence’ predates the Nahel rebellion. The mayor of Saint-Brevin-les-Pins, Yannick Morez, ended his term early after his house was set on fire. Morez, who became the target of right-wing protests over a planned refugee center in his town, resigned on May 9. The reason for his resignation was the fire in front of his house by right-wing groups organizing a protest. In his resignation letter, Morez pointed out that he made this decision especially because of the burning of his house and the lack of state support.

Mainstreaming right, mainstream leaning to right

This is why the use of both justified and blind violence in the recent wave of riots led by young people of immigrant origin by the French right, particularly the National Rally, is far from being ‘sincere’. Violence in France did not start on June 28 and with migrants, and it will not be its only source in the future. For example, shortly before Nahel’s murder, on June 14, 19-year-old Guinean migrant Alhoussein Camara was shot dead in the chest by police officers in the southwestern French town of Angoulême on his way to work. Camara’s lawyers wonder why the outcry over Nahel has not been directed against the Guinean migrant. Why there was silence on the murder of this young warehouse worker does not matter now. What matters is that the treatment of African migrants has not changed much, despite the existence of examples of non-counter-violence.

However, in France and Europe in general, the mainstreaming of the ‘populist’ backlash against the austerity measures introduced in the wake of the Eurozone crisis has entered a new phase. The reverse is also true; in the last decade, the political spectrum known as the ‘center’ in Europe has been rapidly moving towards elements to its right. With the Macron administration being accused by Marine Le Pen and her party of ‘failing to prevent a handful of thugs’, and the parliamentary left, particularly the French Communist Party (PCF), ‘distancing itself from violence’ and at times even confronting it, the National Rally is increasingly coming to the fore as the representative of ‘law and order’.

The migrant issue is of course an important part of this picture, but only a part. Other elements of the picture include the fact that France, as an imperialist power in decline and unable to stop its decline, is unable to keep up with its economic rival Germany. French capital feels that it has become too inefficient in the face of its German ‘rival’; it still finds labor costs too high; its official weekly working hours are almost the lowest in the EU; it is struggling to find the skilled labor needed for its ‘technological breakthrough’ (it still hasn’t found it); and militant trade unionism of one dimension or another continues to plague it.

A report published in 2019 by the National Productivity Council summarizes the fascic circle in which the French system finds itself. It notes that there is a huge skills gap among school leavers, with high performers well above the European average, but low performers (overwhelmingly from less affluent families) performing significantly worse than the EU and OECD averages. Another striking data point is that labor productivity, which was actually neck and neck with Germany for a long time, started to fall in the 1990s. According to the report, “the skills of the French labor force are below the OECD average and show no sign of improving.”

Issues such as pension reform, the immigration problem and the rise of the right must be seen in the context of this ‘French decline’. While Germany picks and chooses ‘skilled migrant labor’, the French right-wing sees their country as ‘rubbish’. It is because of these needs that Le Pen’s party does not want to abolish immigration altogether, but to reduce its annual quota. This includes denying dual citizenship to those living in former French colonies. Labor migration from Africa to France is not feasible.

In this context, the National Rally’s demands to increase the budget of the Ministry of Justice, to build new prisons, to protect the ‘right of self-defense’ of the police, and to expand the powers of the police to wiretap and monitor internet communications point to a desire for a reorganization that is not limited to the immigration issue. The legal equivalent of this is likely to be ‘colonial law’ with the old-fashioned native-colonial distinction.

New mercantilism’s march to power

The main issue here is the international situation. In France, the chances are improving for the National Rally, which stands out as the greatest defender of ‘law and order’. This must be accompanied by a convincing economic program.

This program is rising in the United States under the name of ‘Bidenomics’. The re-industrialization of France, the increase in import tariffs to protect French producers, interest rate cuts for SMEs, and lower taxes, all of which are included in the National Rally’s program, indicate that the new mercantilist idea, which has increased its prestige, has matured enough to fall from the tree in France. Considering that more than 60 percent of the country’s trade comes from within the EU, a simple ‘autarkic’ approach will not work, and Le Pen has no such plan beyond ‘protectionism’. In this context, we should point out that Macron’s claim of ‘strategic autonomy of Europe’, which is questionable how much he has thought about it, clears the stones in front of the National Rally, which proposes a ‘European National Federation’.

Moreover, we should remind that the National Rally is not alone in this. Throughout the uprisings, officials of Les Républicains (LR), the party founded by Nicolas Sarkozy, pushed the ethno-nationalist throttle. For example, Bruno Retailleau, leader of LR’s Senate faction, told Franceinfo radio on July 5: “[The rioters] are French, of course, but they are French because of their identity. Unfortunately, in the second, third generation, there is a regression towards ethnicity,” Bruno Retailleau, leader of the Senate group, told Franceinfo radio on July 2. The ‘center’ right is allegedly doing this to avoid losing voters to Le Pen. But this is an overly simplistic conclusion. The right-wingization of the mainstream or the ‘center’ paves the way for the right.

Indeed, within days of describing the rebels as ‘barbarians’, LR President Eric Ciotti proposed security and anti-immigration measures. His catalog of measures bore a striking resemblance to Le Pen’s: Sharply increasing prison capacity, lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 16, abolishing benefits for the parents of criminals and stripping criminals with dual nationality of their French citizenship.

The ‘Melonization’ of Le Pen

What remains is the ‘Melonization’ of Le Pen. Clearly, this requires a Europe-wide fiction. The 2024 European Parliament elections are crucial in this regard. Whether the contacts between the Italian Meloni’s European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Le Pen’s Identity and Democracy (ID) will result in an alliance will give an idea of the course of events. The consequences of the ‘center’ right European People’s Party (EPP) closing the door to ID, forced by the German Christian Democrats, will also become clear.

We have to recognize that the French revolt and its implications, especially for Germany, are critical for the future of the right in Europe. The economic politics of the US and the prospect of economic convergence between Democrats and Republicans will fuel the rise of the new mercantilist-protectionist right in Europe. The revolt of the plebs without a program could open the gates of hell.

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Operationsplan Deutschland: The debate over ‘planned economy’ in Germany

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As Ukraine fires U.S.-made long-range missiles at Russia for the first time and Russian leader Vladimir Putin updates his country’s nuclear doctrine, European countries are preparing for an all-out war on the continent.

According to a 1,000-page document drawn up by the German armed forces called ‘Operationsplan Deutschland’, Germany will host hundreds of thousands of troops from NATO countries and act as a logistics hub to send huge amounts of military equipment, food and medicine to the front line.

The German military is also instructing businesses and civilians on how to protect key infrastructure and mobilize for national defense in the event of Russia expanding drone flights, espionage and sabotage across Europe.

Businesses have been advised to draw up contingency plans detailing the responsibilities of employees in the event of an emergency, and told to stockpile diesel generators or install wind turbines to ensure energy independence.

More state intervention in the economy under discussion

In this context, state intervention in the economy and in companies is being discussed more intensively.

The German state has far-reaching rights in crisis situations. The energy crisis showed how quickly the state can intervene: At the time, the German government filled gas storage facilities by law, nationalized the gas importer Uniper and supplied floating LNG terminals.

According to Bertram Brossardt, CEO of the Bavarian Business Association, even a “transition to a planned economy” could be possible in an emergency.

This ‘planned economy’ could involve the state issuing food vouchers or even forcing people to work in certain sectors, such as water or transport companies.

Companies could also benefit if they have employees who volunteer for disaster relief, the Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) or the fire brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel Jörn Plischke, who conducted the company training in Hamburg, said: “It costs you a few days a year to support this. But in a crisis, you have a direct link to the people who protect people and infrastructure,” he said.

Hamburg: The intersection of civil and military economy

Hamburg, where Lieutenant Colonel Plischke attended the event, is a central hub for the transport of goods and troops.

“If our infrastructure is used for military purposes, the risk of cyber-attacks and sabotage increases significantly,” the mayor of the Hanseatic city, Peter Tschentscher, told the Faz newspaper.

The Hamburg Senate has therefore created additional staff to strengthen civil defense. A third ‘home defense corps’ has been introduced, made up of volunteers who do not fight in the troops but work to ensure protection and security.

Exercises are currently being held in the Hanseatic city with the German armed forces and civilian forces.

According to the report, this exercise, called ‘Red Storm Alpha’, is training in the protection of port facilities.

The next exercise, ‘Red Storm Bravo’, will start soon and will be on a larger scale.

The lessons learnt from these exercises will then be incorporated into the ‘Operationsplan Deutschland’. This plan is intended to be a ‘living document’, constantly evolving and adapting to new information and threats.

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The era of the ‘right-wing majority’ in the European Parliament

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Under Ursula von der Leyen’s second presidency, the European Commission will abandon its previous ‘cordon sanitaire’ policy towards the ‘far right’.

Leyen’s new Commission will include two members from the ‘far right’. Raffaele Fitto of Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy – FdI), the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Olivér Várhelyi, who is close to Fidesz, the party of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Fratelli d’Italia is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the EP, while Fidesz is part of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group, which also includes the French National Rally (RN) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).

The conservative European People’s Party (EPP), led by German CSU politician Manfred Weber, has repeatedly cooperated with the ECR in the past legislature and explicitly reserves the right to do so in the future.

The cordon sanitaire against the right is practically non-existent

More recently, it has voted with the PfE and sometimes even with the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN), of which the German AfD is a member. The traditional border against the ‘extreme right’ (the so-called ‘security cordon’) is thus continuing to crumble.

The security cordon was systematically relaxed by the EPP in the last legislative period. As early as January 2022, the EPP made it possible for an MEP from the right-wing ECR to be elected as one of the vice-presidents of the EP.

A study by the Greens shows that the European Commission under Ursula von der Leyen has relied on MEPs from the ECR and even the more right-wing ID (Identity and Democracy) group in around 340 votes to secure a majority.

According to the study, these demands often included a reduction in the CO2 price for the car industry or the approval of subsidies for fossil fuels.

With the votes of the EPP, ECR and ID, the EPP also managed to block a motion in April 2024 proposing measures to prevent parliamentary staff from being harassed by MEPs.

So, one small step after another, the security cordon was broken.

Breaking point: European right united against Maduro

In September, one of the first votes of the newly elected EP attracted more attention. The resolution under discussion would have recognised Edmundo González, the defeated candidate in the presidential elections in Venezuela on 28 July 2024, as the real winner of the elections.

The resolution in favour of González was tabled jointly by the EPP and the ECR, in which the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni is the largest group.

The resolution was finally adopted with the votes of Orbán’s Fidez, Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) and PfE, which includes the FPÖ, and the ESN, which includes the AfD.

The ‘Venezuelan majority’ at work in the EP: EPP support for the AfD

The so-called ‘Venezuelan majority’ – the large voting majority of conservative and right-wing parties in the EP – has since come into play on several occasions.

This was the case in October, for example, when the European Parliament decided on the procedure for presenting and voting on future EU commissioners. Also in October, the EPP voted in favour of an AfD budget motion proposing the erection of extensive barriers at the EU’s external borders.

The EPP, ECR and PfE also voted to award this year’s European Parliament Sakharov Prize to González and right-wing Venezuelan opposition politician María Corina Machado.

Finally, last week the EPP joined with other MEPs on the right to amend a bill aimed at halting global deforestation.

Sparking outrage on the left, several rebel MEPs from the ECR, PfE, ESN and the liberal Renew group backed the EPP on key amendments.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen was elected in July on the basis of an alliance between the EPP, Liberals, Socialists and Greens.

In its second term, the European Commission is abandoning its previous ‘cordon sanitaire’ policy against the ‘far right’.

Leyen’s new Commission will include two members from the ‘far right’. Raffaele Fitto of Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy – FdI), the party of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and Olivér Várhelyi, who is close to Fidesz, the party of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán.

Fratelli d’Italia is part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the EP, while Fidesz is part of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group, which also includes the French National Rally (RN) and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ).

The conservative European People’s Party (EPP), led by German CSU politician Manfred Weber, has repeatedly cooperated with the ECR in the past legislature and explicitly reserves the right to do so in the future.

New Commissioners from the right

Raffaele Fitto, a member of Giorgia Meloni’s FdI party, is known as one of Meloni’s closest friends and will be appointed by Leyen as one of the vice-presidents of the EU Commission ‘responsible for cohesion and reforms’.

Hungary, on the other hand, has appointed former Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi as a commissioner in Brussels, with future responsibility for health. Várhelyi is very close to Prime Minister Orbán’s Fidesz party.

There is strong protest against Fitto and Várhelyi in the Socialist and Green parliamentary groups, which support the Leyen Commission. It is rumoured that both groups will not support the appointment of the two politicians.

The invisible architect of the right-wing alliance: Manfred Weber of the CSU

The row over future commissioners has come to a head in recent days.

EPP President Manfred Weber (CSU), who is seen as the main architect of his group’s alliance with the ECR and the EPP, could theoretically get two right-wing commissioners approved with a “Venezuelan majority”.

However, if CDU or CSU politicians in the EP vote with the AfD on a key decision, this could be seen as an unwelcome signal shortly before the early German elections.

But as former Italian prime ministers Romano Prodi and Mario Monti said on Tuesday, pressure is growing for the EU to act ‘as one’ at a time when it faces ‘major challenges both in the East and in the West’.

We have a responsibility to make sure that something changes after this election… The majority will very often include the ECR,” German EPP MEP Peter Liese of the CSU also told reporters on Monday.

Liese said he had no “firewall” against the ECR and claimed that Fitto’s senior position had been negotiated as part of an agreement between the main political families in the European Council at the beginning of the summer.

Continued support for Ukraine in return for right-wing MEPs

On Wednesday (20 November), however, the leaders of the European Parliament’s political groups, meeting in Brussels, reached an agreement.

According to this, Fitto and Várhelyi will be allowed to take up the positions in the European Commission that Leyen has envisaged for them, and the Socialists will agree to this.

In return, the EPP promises to cooperate only with ‘pro-Ukrainian’ parties that support the EU and the rule of law.

This means that the old ‘cordon sanitaire’, i.e. the border against the ‘extreme right’, has been replaced primarily by foreign policy conditions.

According to the EPP’s interpretation, there are no longer any obstacles to cooperation with the ECR.

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Turmoil in the SPD: Pistorius vs. Scholz

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Pressure is mounting on German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to relinquish leadership of his party, the Social Democrats (SPD), ahead of the upcoming snap elections. This move is seen as a potential lifeline for the party, currently polling in third place, to regain electoral momentum.

The SPD leadership has thus far supported Scholz’s bid for a second term in the federal elections, now rescheduled for 23 February 2025 following the collapse of the three-party coalition on 6 November. However, internal dissent is growing.

In two heated party meetings last week, SPD MPs deliberated over whether Defence Minister Boris Pistorius should replace Scholz as the party’s candidate. According to Der Spiegel and POLITICO, one meeting included the conservative wing of the SPD, while the other involved its left wing. Both groups reportedly had significant support for replacing Scholz with Pistorius.

Calls for Scholz to step aside reached a crescendo on Monday, with prominent SPD politicians from North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state, leading the charge.

Pistorius’ voices rise within the party

Dirk Wiese and Wiebke Esdar stated: “The focus is on finding the best political line-up for this election. We hear a lot of praise for Boris Pistorius. It is clear that the final decision on the chancellor candidacy will rest with the party committees, as it should.”

Markus Töns, a long-time SPD member, echoed this sentiment in Stern: “The chancellor has done a good job in difficult circumstances, but the coalition’s end signals a need for a fresh start. Boris Pistorius would make this easier than Olaf Scholz.”

Former SPD leader Sigmar Gabriel was even more critical. Writing on X (formerly Twitter), Gabriel warned of “growing resistance” within the SPD to Scholz’s leadership. “The SPD leadership’s only response is appeasement and loyalty pledges. What we need is bold political leadership. Without it, the SPD risks falling below 15 percent,” he cautioned.

Scholz confident of ‘support from the leadership’

The SPD leadership had planned to finalize the chancellor candidacy decision at its party conference on 30 November. However, the timeline may accelerate to quell the escalating debate.

Speaking from the G20 Summit in Brazil, Scholz dismissed questions about his candidacy, expressing confidence in party support. “The SPD and I aim to win this election together,” he told Die Welt. Secretary-General Lars Klingbeil reinforced this stance, stating on ARD television: “We are committed to continuing with Olaf Scholz—there’s no wavering.”

Chancellor returns without stopping in Mexico

Despite these reassurances, Scholz abruptly canceled his planned trip to Mexico, returning to Berlin after the G20 Summit amid rumors of party infighting. While the SPD leadership held a conference call on Tuesday to discuss the campaign strategy, no decisions were reached.

Recent opinion polls paint a bleak picture for both Scholz and the SPD. The party is polling at 16 percent, far behind the CDU and the far-right AfD, marking a steep decline of 10 points since the 2021 elections.

Yet, Boris Pistorius remains Germany’s most popular politician, consistently outpacing CDU leader Friedrich Merz in approval ratings. This has fueled hopes within the SPD that Pistorius could revitalize their electoral prospects.

Pistorius’ rising profile is not without controversy. Known for his hawkish stance on military issues, he advocates for making the German military “fit for war” and has pushed for increased defense spending to meet NATO’s 2 percent of GDP target. Critics argue that these positions clash with the SPD’s traditional skepticism toward military intervention and ties with Moscow.

Nonetheless, many within the SPD believe Pistorius offers the best chance to avoid a crushing defeat in February’s elections. Pistorius has championed investments to rebuild the Bundeswehr after decades of neglect and launched initiatives to recruit for Germany’s depleted armed forces. His restructuring of the army earlier this year emphasized regional defense over external missions.

Internationally, Pistorius’ assertive approach has earned respect from Western allies, positioning him as a strong contender for the chancellorship despite his public denials. “We already have a candidate, and he is the sitting chancellor,” Pistorius recently told German state television.

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