Opinion
The 30th anniversary of the Kardak Crisis between Türkiye and Greece
How did the crisis begin, and how did it conclude?
In the 459th page of his autobiography titled My Life, released in June 2024—approximately three years after departing from the White House—Bill Clinton (William Jefferson Clinton), the 42nd President of the United States, recounted the 1996 Kardak Crisis, which brought Türkiye and Greece to the precipice of war, with the following words:
“Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived at the White House on January 30th for his sixth meeting with Al Gore. After concluding the commission’s work, Chernomyrdin visited me to provide an update on developments in Russia and Yeltsin’s prospects for re-election. Shortly before meeting with Chernomyrdin, I spoke with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Both informed me that Türkiye and Greece were on the brink of an armed conflict and implored my assistance to prevent it. They were prepared to go to war over two tiny islets in the Aegean Sea, which the Greeks called Imia and the Turks called Kardak. Although both nations laid claim to these islets, it appeared that they had passed into Greek possession following a 1947 treaty between Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, Türkiye did not recognize the Greek claims. Despite frequent visits by Turks to the islets, they remained uninhabited. The crisis was ignited when some Turkish journalists tore down the Greek flag there and hoisted the Turkish flag in its place. It seemed inconceivable that two major nations, embroiled in a genuine dispute over Cyprus, would engage in combat over a few square meters of rock inhabited only by goats. Yet, I could discern that Çiller was truly apprehensive about such a possibility. Interrupting the meeting with Chernomyrdin, I first called Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, and then re-established contact with Demirel and Çiller. After several telephone consultations, as both sides agreed to hold their fire, Dick Holbrooke—who had already begun working on the Cyprus issue—spent a sleepless night persuading the parties to resolve the matter through diplomacy. Whether or not I succeeded in brokering peace in the Middle East, Bosnia, or Northern Ireland, I could not help but chuckle at the thought that I had at least saved the lives of a few Aegean goats.”
The Kardak Crisis, which Clinton recalled and narrated with a touch of irony, was in truth a product of Greece’s ambition to transform the Aegean Sea into a “Greek Lake.” Greece, a perennial source of friction in the Aegean—also known as the Sea of Islands—precipitated the Kardak crisis in an attempt to impose its own theses upon Türkiye. The Kardak Rocks consist of two uninhabited outcrops situated 325 meters apart in the South Aegean, a mere 3.6 miles from the Turkish mainland. The distance to the nearest Greek island, Kalymnos, is 5.4 miles, while the distance between Türkiye and Kalymnos stands at 9 miles.
At the onset of the crisis, Türkiye was governed by a DYP–CHP coalition. However, following the general elections of December 24, 1995, both parties had suffered setbacks. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) emerged as the victor, while the DYP fell to third place. The CHP narrowly surpassed the 10% electoral threshold to enter the Grand National Assembly as the fifth party. Since a new government had yet to be formed, Tansu Çiller, Chairperson of the DYP, remained Prime Minister, and Deniz Baykal, Chairperson of the CHP, continued as Foreign Minister. Süleyman Demirel served as President. In Greece, a new government under Prime Minister Kostas Simitis had recently been established.
The genesis of the crisis and Greece’s disregard for international law
On December 25, 1995, a Turkish merchant vessel named Figen Akat, carrying cargo from Çanakkale to Israel, ran aground on the Kardak Rocks. Following the accident, Greek Coast Guard boats arrived at the scene, asserting that the incident had occurred within Greek territorial waters and that the salvage operation must therefore be conducted by a Greek vessel. The ship’s captain, conversely, maintained they were in Turkish waters and reported that they had immediately requested assistance from the Turkish Coast Guard Command. These two rocks, which had been largely overlooked until that day, suddenly birthed a new crisis between Ankara and Athens, compounding existing disputes.
Prime Minister Tansu Çiller adopted a nationalist rhetoric to bolster her hand and secure an influential position in the impending coalition negotiations. Aiming to galvanize public support, she declared, “That flag shall come down, and those troops shall depart.” President Süleyman Demirel, however, was more circumspect, counseling composure and moderation. He feared that if war broke out with Greece over these rocks, it would be difficult to justify to the Turkish nation, who would inevitably ask their leaders, “Was there no way to resolve this short of war?”
A nationalist fervor was also surging in Greece. The Greek media fueled public sentiment with highly nationalistic broadcasts. Greece was performing its usual maneuver, using the Kardak Rocks as a pretext to seek absolute hegemony over the Aegean Sea. According to Athens’ calculations, if Türkiye conceded that the rocks belonged to Greece, Athens would then claim sovereignty over all other disputed islands, islets, and rocks. Türkiye, on the other hand, maintained that any landmasses remaining from the Ottoman Empire whose sovereignty had not been explicitly transferred by treaty were—by natural, logical, historical, and legal necessity—Turkish territory. This is because the Republic of Türkiye was recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne, its founding document, as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire.
While Türkiye and Greece exchanged diplomatic notes, tons of cement from the grounded vessel were being spilled into the sea, necessitating an urgent salvage operation. Turkish and Greek warships anchored in the vicinity of the rocks. A Greek salvage boat approached the vessel and towed it free; however, when the towline became entangled in the ship’s swivel, a Turkish crew member promptly severed it. Once freed, the vessel quickly entered Turkish territorial waters and was towed to Güllük Harbor.
Following the ship’s salvage, the tension regarding the sovereignty of the Kardak Rocks escalated further. In a note to Türkiye, Greece claimed the rocks had been ceded to them; Türkiye rejected this, pointing to land registry records that proved the rocks were Turkish territory.
On January 26, a month after the grounding, the Mayor of Kalymnos landed on the rocks accompanied by a priest, local youths, and journalists to hoist the Greek flag. In response, two reporters from the Hürriyet newspaper landed on the rocks on January 27, lowered the Greek flag, and raised the Turkish flag.
The landing of Greek troops on the Kardak Rocks
As tensions mounted, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs meticulously avoided escalation, prioritizing diplomacy. In contrast, Greece intensified the friction; on January 28, Greek soldiers landed on the rocks, planted their flag, and stationed themselves on East Kardak (the larger of the two). Not content with this, Greece dispatched warships to encircle the rocks.
Rather than retaliating immediately, Türkiye issued a diplomatic note to the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, who was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 29. The note stated that the 1932 Turkish–Italian Protocol and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty contained no explicit provisions regarding the sovereignty of these formations. Türkiye declared its readiness to negotiate with Greece regarding the islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty had not been transferred to Greece by treaty (collectively referred to as EGAYDAAK). The note demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Greek troops stationed on the Kardak Rocks. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, however, accused Türkiye, stating, “We declare that Greece’s response to this or any other aggressive nationalism will be immediate, severe, and resolute. We shall not hesitate to utilize all means at our disposal against Türkiye. Turkish vessels must exit Greek territorial waters.” Similarly, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos told Parliament on January 30 that they would not lower the Greek flag on Kardak, nor would they make the rocks a subject of negotiation with Türkiye. Meanwhile, the United States, in constant contact with both Ankara and Athens, conveyed the message that whoever fired the first shot would find themselves in opposition to the U.S.
In the face of Greece’s preference for deepening the crisis and its bellicose rhetoric, Türkiye pursued a policy that was both composed and firm, ensuring it did not appear timid to either its domestic public or the international community. The government instructed the military to be prepared for a military option should diplomatic efforts fail. While the prospect of armed conflict heightened tensions, Türkiye was also concerned that a Greek fait accompli could lead to the annexation of another 150 islands in the region. The “dogfights” between the two countries’ aircraft and the close maneuvering of warships raised the specter of a regional conflict, even if a total war was not imminent.
At this juncture, Türkiye decided to implement a formula proposed by İnal Batu, then Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Batu’s proposal was as follows: On the smaller of the Kardak Rocks (also known as the İkizce Rocks), namely West Kardak, there was a Greek flag but no Greek troops. If Turkish Underwater Offence (SAT) teams could conduct a midnight infiltration through the Greek fleet—which consisted of 24 vessels of various sizes—land on this smaller rock, and hoist the Turkish flag, a strategic parity would be established between Türkiye and Greece, making a return to the pre-crisis status quo ante more feasible.
İnal Batu’s proposal was accepted, and Türkiye committed to this arduous and high-risk operation. The possibility of the infiltration team being detected or engaging in an armed clash was real, and Türkiye accepted this risk. Ultimately, the infiltration operation, carried out by two boats in groups of five at midnight on January 30, was successfully completed 1.5 hours later when the Turkish commandos landed on the second rock (West Kardak) and raised the Turkish flag. The success of the Turkish team sparked heated debates in the Greek Parliament; when no answer could be found as to how a 10-man team in two boats managed to pass undetected through the Greek warships and land on the rocks, the Greek Chief of the General Staff resigned.
Conclusion
Ultimately, influenced by pressure from both the United States and European nations, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from the rocks and lower their flags. On January 31, Greek troops departed first, followed by Turkish troops. The issue was resolved through diplomatic channels without a single shot being fired. However, it must not be forgotten that the crisis—as President Clinton noted—did not stem from two small rocks where goats grazed, but was a matter of territory and sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and that the crisis was, as usual, initiated by Greece.
Türkiye’s achievement in successfully executing a difficult military operation while simultaneously utilizing diplomatic channels to their fullest extent is of significant importance. By landing troops and planting a flag on the uninhabited rock, Türkiye demonstrated its political resolve and proved its military capability. Furthermore, by opting for a move designed to de-escalate rather than intensify the tension, Türkiye provided the Greek side with an opportunity to retreat without bruising the honor of Athens.
References
Hürriyet and Milliyet newspapers of the period.
Aydın Şıhmantepe, “An Analysis of the Kardak Crisis Process in Terms of Crisis Management Principles” (pp. 136–139), Journal of Security Strategies, April 2013, Issue: 17, Year: 9, pp. 127–155.
Turkish Foreign Policy Crisis Studies, 1996 Kardak Crisis, http://tdpkrizleri.org.tr/index.php/1996-kardak-crisis
Opinion
Israeli elections: The driver may change, but the destination remains the same
Haider Al-Aila, Abu Al-Amir
Anyone who views the Israeli elections as a battle between the right and the left is mistaken. The so-called Israeli left, in the conventional political sense, has long ceased to be a viable electoral force. What is actually unfolding is a struggle within the Zionist camp itself: a hardline religious and nationalist right led by Benjamin Netanyahu and his allies, versus a secular and centrist right seeking to reshape the political landscape by ousting him.
Netanyahu, having mastered the art of managing the Israeli right over the years, understands that his real vulnerability lies not merely in a Likud defeat, but in the disintegration of the broader right-wing bloc. In Israel’s electoral system—which requires parties to cross a 3.25% electoral threshold to enter the Knesset and mandates a 61-seat majority to form a government—smaller right-wing factions falling below that cutoff could deprive his bloc of the seats needed to govern. Consequently, Netanyahu has spent recent weeks fighting to unify fringe parties and prevent the fragmentation of the right-wing vote.
Herein lies the central paradox of the election: while Netanyahu’s camp is far more ideologically defined than its rivals, it is also markedly more fragile. Though it unites nationalist, religious, and ultra-Orthodox factions, these groups remain deeply divided over issues such as military conscription, the balance between religion and state, judicial governance, and even Netanyahu’s personal political future.
Conversely, the opposing camp—where leadership has increasingly shifted toward Gadi Eisenkot amid the waning influence of Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid—is not a cohesive ideological movement. Rather, it is a broad coalition united primarily by a singular goal: removing Netanyahu from power.
Eisenkot is attempting to appeal to the political center, the secular right, and voters eager to replace Netanyahu without abandoning the mainstream Zionist consensus on security issues and political settlements. Indeed, Eisenkot himself does not support the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the foreseeable future.
This captures the core reality of today’s Israeli politics: voters heading to the polls are not choosing between two fundamentally opposed visions for the Palestinian issue, but between competing approaches to governing Israel in the wake of October 7.
Netanyahu’s message to the electorate is straightforward: security demands an uncompromising, unapologetic right wing. Eisenkot, however, offers a different critique: the problem lies not in Israel’s military capability, but in the leadership that mismanaged it and failed to prevent the October 7 attacks. For him, leadership must change to restore institutional trust and state integrity. Thus, accountability for the failures of October 7 has emerged as the defining battleground of the campaign against Netanyahu.
Yet Eisenkot’s bloc harbors its own internal contradictions. It is far from a unified political movement, operating instead as a loose, pragmatic alliance of figures who lack a shared long-term agenda. To maximize their numbers, several opposition parties have already begun coordinating surplus vote-sharing agreements to minimize wasted ballots.
This dynamic brings the “Arab dilemma” to the fore.
If neither Jewish-led bloc achieves a 61-seat majority, Arab Knesset members could hold the balance of power, either by joining a governing coalition or backing one from the outside. This is no trivial variable; higher turnout among Arab citizens could decisively alter seat distribution, particularly given that their participation in previous elections fell well below the national average.
The profound irony, however, is that while anti-Netanyahu forces urge Arab citizens to turn out and “save democracy,” large segments of the Zionist establishment still refuse to treat them as legitimate governing partners. Notably, Bennett—competing fiercely against Netanyahu—has explicitly demanded a coalition restricted exclusively to Zionist parties, despite having presided over a 2021 government that relied directly on an Arab party.
Consequently, should Eisenkot’s camp require Arab support to form a government, it may secure an electoral victory tainted by political hypocrisy: Netanyahu falls, yet Arab lawmakers (such as Mansour Abbas’s bloc) are once again reduced to numerical leverage rather than genuine partners in shaping state policy.
For Palestinians, it is vital not to succumb to the illusion that Netanyahu’s downfall equates to the demise of the Israeli right or the resurrection of an Israeli peace camp. The Palestinian question runs far deeper than the name of the Israeli prime minister.
Netanyahu may fall, Eisenkot may rise, Bennett may return, and a new cabinet may be formed with different faces. Yet the overarching current within Israeli society, particularly after October 7, remains thoroughly detached from any political solution that recognizes the Palestinian right to an independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.
The upcoming Israeli elections are not, at their core, a contest between right and left. They are a contest between one right-wing faction that seeks to continue down the current path under Netanyahu, and another that seeks to replace the driver while keeping the vehicle on the exact same road—differing only in speed and driving style.
This is precisely where the lesson lies for the Palestinians: they must not expect a miracle from the Israeli ballot box. Genuine transformation cannot be measured merely by who occupies the Prime Minister’s Office, but by whether Israeli society is willing to confront the deeper trajectory that led to October 7 and its aftermath.
The driver may change, and the style of driving may shift, but the defining question for Palestinians remains: Will the destination ever change?
This is what Palestinians must recognize clearly. Netanyahu is neither the entirety of the problem, nor is his departure the ultimate solution. Even his rivals, who march under the banner of change, operate within a political and social paradigm that has only grown more right-wing, entrenched, and hostile toward Palestinian rights.
Opinion
Gaza exposes the myth of the “most moral army in the world”
Haider Al-Aila, Gaza

Calling the Israeli military the “most moral army in the world” is a claim thoroughly shattered by the facts on the ground and the atrocities committed against the Palestinian people. What morality can an army claim when it massacres civilians, collapses homes on top of families, loots private property, and desecrates the dead—all while its leadership projects an air of moral supremacy to the world?
Morality is not measured by slogans or military technology; it is defined by how force is applied and the degree of respect shown for human life and dignity. From this perspective, Israel’s devastating war on Gaza reveals systematic, criminal practices that cannot be justified under any pretext of security or self-defense.
When killing becomes a display of power
Among the most harrowing dimensions of this war is the relentless bombardment that turns inhabited homes into mass graves, with utter disregard for women, children, and the elderly. In the densely populated Gaza Strip, widespread strikes have decimated entire neighborhoods, burying thousands of families beneath the rubble.
Equally horrifying are the reports of mass graves uncovered near Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City and Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis. These sites revealed the bodies of women and the elderly, some bearing signs of execution, binding, and stripped of clothing. Eyewitnesses documented similar mass graves near the Indonesian Hospital in northern Gaza. The United Nations has rightfully demanded independent, transparent investigations to establish accountability for these apparent war crimes.
The sanctity of the dead is a fundamental human right. Any violation of this principle demands rigorous investigation and prosecution—free from diplomatic cover or denial.
A single target as a pretext to level entire blocks
I do not speak here merely from reports; I speak as a firsthand witness in Gaza. I have watched entire residential blocks—housing vulnerable families—flattened under the pretext of targeting a single individual. Time and again, the Israeli military has tracked a target via reconnaissance drones, waited until he entered a crowded residential building, and then brought the entire structure down. In doing so, they have wiped out dozens of civilians who had absolutely no connection to the individual being pursued.
This reality raises a damning question: If an army possesses the surveillance technology to track a target with surgical precision, why wait to destroy the building while innocent civilians are inside? What crime did these families commit to pay with their lives?
Deliberately subjecting civilians to catastrophic harm without taking the legally required precautions cannot be excused by the presence of a target. It is a direct violation of International Humanitarian Law and constitutes unlawful collective punishment. These are not abstract statistics or fleeting screen images to me; they are the lived realities of families wiped out in an instant.
Looting at gunpoint
The degradation extends beyond killing and physical destruction. Human rights organizations and a 2024 UN Commission of Inquiry have documented widespread instances of Israeli soldiers looting Palestinian homes—stealing cash, gold, jewelry, and electronics.
Compounding the crime, soldiers have frequently posted videos on social media mocking the victims, showing off stolen goods, and celebrating the destruction of civilian property. Pillaging the belongings of displaced or deceased civilians is not military heroism; it is a war crime and an assault on human dignity.
The racism that precedes the bullet
These actions cannot be separated from a dehumanizing, racist discourse that treats Palestinians as subhuman and undeserving of life. When national supremacy is normalized and Palestinian lives are deemed worthless, military atrocities become the inevitable outcome. In the eyes of an indoctrinated soldier, a dehumanized population becomes an open target for slaughter, torture, and humiliation.
This is not a condemnation of Jewish people, who are not a monolith; rather, it is an indictment of the racist Zionist ideology, the brutal policies of the occupation, and all who enable or justify these crimes.
When killing becomes a hunting game
Among the most chilling accounts are videos and testimonies of snipers targeting young Palestinians as if hunting prey. Soldiers have been filmed stalking victims from fortified positions, then cheering and celebrating as their bullets hit their mark.
Killing here ceases to be an act of war; it becomes sport. What moral decay allows human death to become a source of entertainment? It strips the victim of their humanity, reducing someone with dreams, a future, and a family to mere target practice.
Technology without morality
The Israeli military boasts advanced surveillance, artificial intelligence, and precision weaponry. Yet technological superiority does not confer moral superiority, nor does it grant an army a blank check to use disproportionate force.
International Humanitarian Law mandates distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Technology merely amplifies the capacity for violence; it does not legitimize mass slaughter, nor does it grant immunity from accountability.
Internal dissent: “I can no longer bear the silence”
Cracks in the narrative have also emerged from within. A widely circulated account attributed to Israeli reserve Major Avdar Shailovsky, titled “I Can No Longer Bear the Silence” (published by the Jerusalem News Agency), recounts his refusal to remain silent about the horrors he witnessed in Gaza.
The account details the deliberate targeting of civilian gatherings, aid distribution points, and the sniping of women and children, alongside systemic mockery of Palestinian suffering. Shailovsky expressed profound remorse for his complicity and called for a rejection of the racist indoctrination driving the military. While such voices of conscience exist within Israeli society, they remain a marginalized minority against a prevailing culture of right-wing extremism that condones the occupation and the erasure of Palestinian rights.
What morality remains?
The rhetoric driving this war was made clear early on when former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant referred to Palestinians as “human animals.” Such language laid the ideological groundwork for the atrocities that followed.
Public relations campaigns cannot erase the reality on the ground in Gaza. Neither military power nor foreign diplomatic protection can hide the mass graves or silence the voices of the victims.
In Gaza, I have seen multistory towers turned into tombs and human beings reduced to collateral damage by an army that views their existence as worthless. How can there be any talk of moral superiority when the dead lie trapped under concrete, emergency responders are barred from reaching them, and a nation’s suffering is trivialized?
Gaza has not only shattered the myth of the “most moral army in the world”—it has placed the conscience of the entire international community on trial.
Opinion
Imperialism, economic power, and foreign policy
In its shortest, leanest, and simplest definition, foreign policy is the management of all manner of relations entered into with other countries. Foreign policy is a costly undertaking. It demands extensive knowledge, skill, experience, and leadership. For the price of failure is heavy, in every respect. A country’s reputation, influence, and deterrence, as well as its human resources, finances, and borders, are all directly affected by the success or failure of its foreign policy.
The program researching the costs of war at Brown University in the US (see https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/paper/overview) determined in its research that post-9/11 US attacks and invasions imposed an economic burden of $8 trillion and caused the direct or indirect deaths of more than 4.5 million people. The report also noted that, alongside the financial burden of these attacks and invasions, they displaced millions of people and exacerbated global environmental pollution.
Today, to understand the decline in US imperialism’s capacity for hegemony and its ecological dominance, one must first understand the burden borne by the US economy. For the US is no longer a country that accounts for more than half of global output, as it did in the aftermath of World War II. Its share of total production stands at around 20%. The social, class, and cultural fault lines within the country, as well as the divide between rich and poor, run exceptionally deep. The combined debt of the public sector, private corporations, and households has approached $200 trillion. The total debt of the federal government has exceeded $40 trillion (see: https://www.usdebtclock.org/world-debt-clock.html).
What does the US prioritize when lending?
The 3 largest creditors to the US, according to June 2026 data, are Japan ($1.117 trillion), the United Kingdom ($940 billion), and China ($633 billion). Israel is the country receiving the greatest amount of US economic and military aid in the Middle East, followed by Egypt. Ukraine, too, has received substantial economic and military aid, funds, and loans from the US. One must also not forget that the US lends money to its allies, including Ukraine, so that they will purchase US goods, weapons, and aircraft. The US dictates how they may use this debt. What is more, it has been doing this for years. During World War II, it lent substantial sums to its allies. Britain, for instance, was only able to pay off this debt in 2006; and Britain, alongside Israel, is one of the two strategic allies of the US. Rather than lending directly to countries undergoing economic crises, the US extends credit through the IMF and the World Bank. When lending, the US takes into account not only its economic priorities but also its strategic and geopolitical ones.
As an imperialist power, the US concerns itself with the entire world. It strives to remain effective and influential on a global scale. Yet just as the power of the US itself has waned, its allies no longer possess their former strength either, especially the Europeans. The European Union, an imperialist project, is not a global actor. There is no such cohesion, no such harmony within the European Union. Nor does it have such an objective. Furthermore, the European Union possesses neither the power, nor the will, nor the courage for this. Germany, the leader of the European Union, seeks merely to exert influence in its immediate neighbourhood: the Balkans, the Baltics, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus; that is all. And the extent to which it succeeds even in this remains open to debate. Moreover, there is not a single country in the world that desires or expects the European Union to step forward, take initiative, and project power globally in distant lands.
The methods used by imperialism
When reflecting on the relationship between imperialism and foreign policy, one should remember that the tools and methods employed by imperialism have evolved. In the 19th century, for example, imperialism resorted to cruder, more brutal, and more barbaric methods. Later, while continuing to turn to military methods and brute force, it systematically deployed economic and financial instruments, cultural hegemony, and sophisticated instruments and methods of governance, utilizing them with far greater frequency.
One of the lessons history teaches is this: every empire, every great power that grows too vast, expands too far, and stretches itself too thin also hastens its own demise. This condition is natural. It is inevitable. This holds true for the Roman Empire, just as it does for the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over immense territories stretching from the Caucasus to the gates of Vienna, and from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa. For governance and rule become increasingly difficult. For the financial burden mounts. For the bureaucracy grows cumbersome. For centrifugal tendencies come to the fore, competition among local powers far from the centre sharpens, and tensions between provincial power bases escalate. For difficulties arise in implementing necessary administrative and military reforms and in taking the required steps.
In summary, when the predicament of the US is evaluated in the light of this iron law of history, the decline in US power becomes all the clearer.
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