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The 30th anniversary of the Kardak Crisis between Türkiye and Greece

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How did the crisis begin, and how did it conclude?

In the 459th page of his autobiography titled My Life, released in June 2024—approximately three years after departing from the White House—Bill Clinton (William Jefferson Clinton), the 42nd President of the United States, recounted the 1996 Kardak Crisis, which brought Türkiye and Greece to the precipice of war, with the following words:

“Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived at the White House on January 30th for his sixth meeting with Al Gore. After concluding the commission’s work, Chernomyrdin visited me to provide an update on developments in Russia and Yeltsin’s prospects for re-election. Shortly before meeting with Chernomyrdin, I spoke with Turkish President Süleyman Demirel and Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. Both informed me that Türkiye and Greece were on the brink of an armed conflict and implored my assistance to prevent it. They were prepared to go to war over two tiny islets in the Aegean Sea, which the Greeks called Imia and the Turks called Kardak. Although both nations laid claim to these islets, it appeared that they had passed into Greek possession following a 1947 treaty between Greece and Italy. Nevertheless, Türkiye did not recognize the Greek claims. Despite frequent visits by Turks to the islets, they remained uninhabited. The crisis was ignited when some Turkish journalists tore down the Greek flag there and hoisted the Turkish flag in its place. It seemed inconceivable that two major nations, embroiled in a genuine dispute over Cyprus, would engage in combat over a few square meters of rock inhabited only by goats. Yet, I could discern that Çiller was truly apprehensive about such a possibility. Interrupting the meeting with Chernomyrdin, I first called Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, and then re-established contact with Demirel and Çiller. After several telephone consultations, as both sides agreed to hold their fire, Dick Holbrooke—who had already begun working on the Cyprus issue—spent a sleepless night persuading the parties to resolve the matter through diplomacy. Whether or not I succeeded in brokering peace in the Middle East, Bosnia, or Northern Ireland, I could not help but chuckle at the thought that I had at least saved the lives of a few Aegean goats.”

The Kardak Crisis, which Clinton recalled and narrated with a touch of irony, was in truth a product of Greece’s ambition to transform the Aegean Sea into a “Greek Lake.” Greece, a perennial source of friction in the Aegean—also known as the Sea of Islands—precipitated the Kardak crisis in an attempt to impose its own theses upon Türkiye. The Kardak Rocks consist of two uninhabited outcrops situated 325 meters apart in the South Aegean, a mere 3.6 miles from the Turkish mainland. The distance to the nearest Greek island, Kalymnos, is 5.4 miles, while the distance between Türkiye and Kalymnos stands at 9 miles.

At the onset of the crisis, Türkiye was governed by a DYP–CHP coalition. However, following the general elections of December 24, 1995, both parties had suffered setbacks. The Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) emerged as the victor, while the DYP fell to third place. The CHP narrowly surpassed the 10% electoral threshold to enter the Grand National Assembly as the fifth party. Since a new government had yet to be formed, Tansu Çiller, Chairperson of the DYP, remained Prime Minister, and Deniz Baykal, Chairperson of the CHP, continued as Foreign Minister. Süleyman Demirel served as President. In Greece, a new government under Prime Minister Kostas Simitis had recently been established.

The genesis of the crisis and Greece’s disregard for international law

On December 25, 1995, a Turkish merchant vessel named Figen Akat, carrying cargo from Çanakkale to Israel, ran aground on the Kardak Rocks. Following the accident, Greek Coast Guard boats arrived at the scene, asserting that the incident had occurred within Greek territorial waters and that the salvage operation must therefore be conducted by a Greek vessel. The ship’s captain, conversely, maintained they were in Turkish waters and reported that they had immediately requested assistance from the Turkish Coast Guard Command. These two rocks, which had been largely overlooked until that day, suddenly birthed a new crisis between Ankara and Athens, compounding existing disputes.

Prime Minister Tansu Çiller adopted a nationalist rhetoric to bolster her hand and secure an influential position in the impending coalition negotiations. Aiming to galvanize public support, she declared, “That flag shall come down, and those troops shall depart.” President Süleyman Demirel, however, was more circumspect, counseling composure and moderation. He feared that if war broke out with Greece over these rocks, it would be difficult to justify to the Turkish nation, who would inevitably ask their leaders, “Was there no way to resolve this short of war?”

A nationalist fervor was also surging in Greece. The Greek media fueled public sentiment with highly nationalistic broadcasts. Greece was performing its usual maneuver, using the Kardak Rocks as a pretext to seek absolute hegemony over the Aegean Sea. According to Athens’ calculations, if Türkiye conceded that the rocks belonged to Greece, Athens would then claim sovereignty over all other disputed islands, islets, and rocks. Türkiye, on the other hand, maintained that any landmasses remaining from the Ottoman Empire whose sovereignty had not been explicitly transferred by treaty were—by natural, logical, historical, and legal necessity—Turkish territory. This is because the Republic of Türkiye was recognized in the Treaty of Lausanne, its founding document, as the successor state to the Ottoman Empire.

While Türkiye and Greece exchanged diplomatic notes, tons of cement from the grounded vessel were being spilled into the sea, necessitating an urgent salvage operation. Turkish and Greek warships anchored in the vicinity of the rocks. A Greek salvage boat approached the vessel and towed it free; however, when the towline became entangled in the ship’s swivel, a Turkish crew member promptly severed it. Once freed, the vessel quickly entered Turkish territorial waters and was towed to Güllük Harbor.

Following the ship’s salvage, the tension regarding the sovereignty of the Kardak Rocks escalated further. In a note to Türkiye, Greece claimed the rocks had been ceded to them; Türkiye rejected this, pointing to land registry records that proved the rocks were Turkish territory.

On January 26, a month after the grounding, the Mayor of Kalymnos landed on the rocks accompanied by a priest, local youths, and journalists to hoist the Greek flag. In response, two reporters from the Hürriyet newspaper landed on the rocks on January 27, lowered the Greek flag, and raised the Turkish flag.

The landing of Greek troops on the Kardak Rocks

As tensions mounted, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs meticulously avoided escalation, prioritizing diplomacy. In contrast, Greece intensified the friction; on January 28, Greek soldiers landed on the rocks, planted their flag, and stationed themselves on East Kardak (the larger of the two). Not content with this, Greece dispatched warships to encircle the rocks.

Rather than retaliating immediately, Türkiye issued a diplomatic note to the Greek Ambassador in Ankara, who was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 29. The note stated that the 1932 Turkish–Italian Protocol and the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty contained no explicit provisions regarding the sovereignty of these formations. Türkiye declared its readiness to negotiate with Greece regarding the islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty had not been transferred to Greece by treaty (collectively referred to as EGAYDAAK). The note demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Greek troops stationed on the Kardak Rocks. Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis, however, accused Türkiye, stating, “We declare that Greece’s response to this or any other aggressive nationalism will be immediate, severe, and resolute. We shall not hesitate to utilize all means at our disposal against Türkiye. Turkish vessels must exit Greek territorial waters.” Similarly, Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos told Parliament on January 30 that they would not lower the Greek flag on Kardak, nor would they make the rocks a subject of negotiation with Türkiye. Meanwhile, the United States, in constant contact with both Ankara and Athens, conveyed the message that whoever fired the first shot would find themselves in opposition to the U.S.

In the face of Greece’s preference for deepening the crisis and its bellicose rhetoric, Türkiye pursued a policy that was both composed and firm, ensuring it did not appear timid to either its domestic public or the international community. The government instructed the military to be prepared for a military option should diplomatic efforts fail. While the prospect of armed conflict heightened tensions, Türkiye was also concerned that a Greek fait accompli could lead to the annexation of another 150 islands in the region. The “dogfights” between the two countries’ aircraft and the close maneuvering of warships raised the specter of a regional conflict, even if a total war was not imminent.

At this juncture, Türkiye decided to implement a formula proposed by İnal Batu, then Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Batu’s proposal was as follows: On the smaller of the Kardak Rocks (also known as the İkizce Rocks), namely West Kardak, there was a Greek flag but no Greek troops. If Turkish Underwater Offence (SAT) teams could conduct a midnight infiltration through the Greek fleet—which consisted of 24 vessels of various sizes—land on this smaller rock, and hoist the Turkish flag, a strategic parity would be established between Türkiye and Greece, making a return to the pre-crisis status quo ante more feasible.

İnal Batu’s proposal was accepted, and Türkiye committed to this arduous and high-risk operation. The possibility of the infiltration team being detected or engaging in an armed clash was real, and Türkiye accepted this risk. Ultimately, the infiltration operation, carried out by two boats in groups of five at midnight on January 30, was successfully completed 1.5 hours later when the Turkish commandos landed on the second rock (West Kardak) and raised the Turkish flag. The success of the Turkish team sparked heated debates in the Greek Parliament; when no answer could be found as to how a 10-man team in two boats managed to pass undetected through the Greek warships and land on the rocks, the Greek Chief of the General Staff resigned.

Conclusion

Ultimately, influenced by pressure from both the United States and European nations, both countries agreed to withdraw their troops from the rocks and lower their flags. On January 31, Greek troops departed first, followed by Turkish troops. The issue was resolved through diplomatic channels without a single shot being fired. However, it must not be forgotten that the crisis—as President Clinton noted—did not stem from two small rocks where goats grazed, but was a matter of territory and sovereignty in the Aegean Sea, and that the crisis was, as usual, initiated by Greece.

Türkiye’s achievement in successfully executing a difficult military operation while simultaneously utilizing diplomatic channels to their fullest extent is of significant importance. By landing troops and planting a flag on the uninhabited rock, Türkiye demonstrated its political resolve and proved its military capability. Furthermore, by opting for a move designed to de-escalate rather than intensify the tension, Türkiye provided the Greek side with an opportunity to retreat without bruising the honor of Athens.

References

Hürriyet and Milliyet newspapers of the period.

Aydın Şıhmantepe, “An Analysis of the Kardak Crisis Process in Terms of Crisis Management Principles” (pp. 136–139), Journal of Security Strategies, April 2013, Issue: 17, Year: 9, pp. 127–155.

Turkish Foreign Policy Crisis Studies, 1996 Kardak Crisis, http://tdpkrizleri.org.tr/index.php/1996-kardak-crisis

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Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia

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Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.

An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.

The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.

Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.

Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.

The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.

Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.

The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.

Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.

In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.

Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.

Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:

  1. Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
  2. Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
  3. Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
  4. Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.

The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.

Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).

Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.

Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.

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Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.

In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored

The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.

Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.

At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.

Why Egypt?

Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.

This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.

According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.

This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.

Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios

At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.

The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.

This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.

A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies

This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”

Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.

A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.

The Messages Behind the Attack

Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.

For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.

For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.

Egypt’s Official Response

The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.

The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”

Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.

This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.

Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.

The Impact on Global Energy Markets

The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.

Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.

The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.

What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?

First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.

Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.

Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.

Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.

Conclusion

The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.

References:

1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro

2- https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-confirms-drone-caused-fire-two-gas-vessels-damietta-2026-07-30/

3- https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-hits-gas-storage-tanker-egypts-mediterranean-port-2026-07-29/

4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html

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Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism

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Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.

The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.

Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…

The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.

Why?

Because of this:

Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.

According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.

Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.

In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.

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