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The business of the beautiful game: FIFA’S 2026 World Cup and the commerce of controversy

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

When Lionel Messi struck his record-ext ninth consecutive World Cup goal to drag Argentina past Egypt in a bruising Round of 16 encounter, the roar from the 80,000 fans inside Houston’s NRG Stadium was matched only by the quiet sigh of relief in FIFA’s Zurich headquarters. The 39-year-old Argentine is not merely a player; he is a walking, dribbling balance sheet. And his continued presence in the tournament may be worth as much as $800 million to the sport’s global governing body and its commercial partners.

But beneath the spectacle of the expanded 48-team, 104-match tournament—the most nakedly commercial World Cup in history—runs a parallel narrative of governance gaps, betting economies operating in the shadows, and questions about whether football’s governing body is stewarding the sport or simply monetizing it.

The Messi dividend

FIFA’s 2023–2026 commercial cycle is budgeted to generate a record $13 billion in revenue, with the World Cup itself contributing $8.9 billion. Broadcasting rights account for $3.9 billion, marketing rights for $1.8 billion, and ticketing and hospitality for a staggering $3.0 billion—more than triple the Qatar 2022 figure.

Yet these projections rest on a fragile assumption: that the tournament’s biggest stars remain on the pitch long enough to sustain global viewership. Messi and Cristiano Ronaldo are not merely athletes; they are global brands that FIFA and its sponsors—Adidas, Coca-Cola, Visa, Aramco, and others—have bet heavily upon. Industry analysts estimate Adidas’ FIFA partnership alone at $800 million through 2030, a contract whose value is inextricably linked to the presence of its highest-profile ambassador, Messi.

Had Argentina fallen to Egypt in the Round of 16, the financial aftershocks would have extended far beyond ticket sales. FIFA’s new dynamic pricing model has pushed some match tickets to ten times their Qatar 2022 equivalents, with resale platform commissions of 15% flowing directly to the federation. An early exit for Argentina would have cratered demand for quarter-final and semi-final tickets in the U.S. markets where Messi’s Inter Miami has built a devoted following. Digital engagement metrics—already up 130% in impressions and 485% in video views over 2022—would likely have tapered.

University of Liverpool football finance expert Professor Kieran Maguire notes that FIFA “will go to any length to have the global brands of football at their main events.” The federation’s decision to defer Cristiano Ronaldo’s red-card suspension and its reversal of Folarin Balogun’s ban ahead of the U.S. Round of 16 match—reportedly after presidential pressure—have already chipped away at the tournament’s integrity, according to critics. Egypt manager Hossam Hassan went further, calling the Argentina-Egypt encounter “completely rigged,” a claim FIFA’s chief refereeing officer Pierluigi Collina has dismissed.

Testing, transparency, and the commercial conflict

Against this backdrop, questions have been raised about the uniformity of FIFA’s anti-doping regime. FIFA has expanded its partnership with the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) for the 2026 tournament, promising “a strong, transparent anti-doping program that players and fans can trust.” All samples are analyzed exclusively by WADA-accredited laboratories complying with ISO/IEC 17025 and International Standard for Laboratories requirements.

Yet the procedural rigor has not silenced skepticism. Observers note that while FIFA’s regulations are aligned with the World Anti-Doping Code, the practical application of testing—particularly around high-value commercial assets—raises governance concerns. The organization’s financial health depends on stars remaining marketable. With Messi earning an estimated $70 million annually on the pitch and a comparable sum from endorsements, the commercial incentive to ensure marquee players remain available is structural, if not conspiratorial.

Critics argue that without full public disclosure of testing schedules, sample selection methodologies, and results management protocols for star athletes, the anti-doping program risks the perception of selectivity. The intersection of multi-billion-dollar sponsorship contracts and athlete availability creates a conflict of interest that FIFA has yet to adequately address.

The shadow economy of the betting boom

If FIFA’s formal revenue streams are transparent in their accounting, the informal economy swirling around the tournament is decidedly less so. The 2026 World Cup sits at the center of a global betting market projected to handle between $2.8 billion and $4.3 billion in legal U.S. wagers alone, with industry hold rates of 7–9% generating $197–$387 million in gross gaming revenue for licensed operators.

But these figures represent only the regulated surface. Gaming Compliance International estimates that more than half a trillion dollars will be gambled on the tournament globally, with a significant portion flowing through unlicensed crypto operators and illegal prediction markets. These shadow platforms operate without anti-money laundering controls, consumer protections, or regulatory oversight, exploiting the World Cup’s global viewership to target fans through scam websites and unregulated wagering.

FIFA is not a passive observer of this economy. In January 2026, the federation appointed Stats Perform as its first official worldwide distributor of betting data and betting streaming rights, exclusively distributing live streams and data for all 104 matches to licensed sportsbooks. In May, it named Betano—owned by Kaizen Gaming—as an Official Tournament Supporter for Europe and South America, marking the betting operator’s third consecutive FIFA tournament partnership.

The question is not whether FIFA profits from betting—it does, through data rights, sponsorships, and the audience engagement that wagering drives—but whether it adequately polices the ecosystem it monetizes. FIFA’s own regulations contain detailed match-fixing provisions, but regulatory gaps and the rapid growth of online gambling allow misconduct to persist through the exploitation of underpaid athletes and weak implementation. The 2015 corruption scandal, which saw officials allegedly receive more than $150 million in bribes for broadcasting and commercial rights, exposed how FIFA’s revenue streams could be systematically diverted for personal enrichment.

The broadcasting access gap

For all its commercial success, the 2026 tournament has highlighted a growing tension between revenue maximization and public access. FIFA has struck broadcast deals covering more than 175 territories, with media rights revenues forecast to reach $3.8 billion, a 22% increase from 2022.

Yet the expansion to 48 teams and 104 matches—while enriching FIFA—has diluted the per-game value of broadcast rights by 19%, and the total volume of global broadcast deals has dropped 11%, from 495 in 2022 to 443 in 2026. In Asia, regional partnership agreements plummeted from 60 to 24, forcing FIFA to accept lower fees to avoid blackouts—notably in China, where the CCTV deal dropped from a reported $250 million to $60 million.

More troubling for football’s global democratic ethos is the erosion of free-to-air access. While European regulations mandate some public service broadcaster coverage, many qualified nations—particularly in the Global South—have seen matches locked behind paywalls or unavailable entirely. FIFA’s “preferred platform” agreements with TikTok and YouTube allow broadcasters to stream select content, but these are commercial arrangements designed to drive engagement and ad revenue, not to guarantee universal access.

For countries that invested years in qualification campaigns, the deprivation of free domestic airing represents a broken social contract. The tournament’s $80.1 billion in projected gross economic output—$30.5 billion for the U.S. alone—does little for nations whose fans cannot watch their own teams compete.

The development deficit

FIFA is a nonprofit under Swiss law, and its budget pledges substantial reinvestment: $2.25 billion for the FIFA Forward program, $660 million for the Football Development Fund, and $3.86 billion total for Development & Education across the 2023–2026 cycle. Official documents highlight projects from Rwanda’s $4.7 million national team accommodation facility to women’s football initiatives across Concacaf.

But the scale of these investments pales beside the commercial extraction. The 2026 World Cup will generate roughly $3.0 billion in ticketing and hospitality revenue alone—three times the entire development budget for the four-year cycle. Critics argue that for every dollar FIFA spends on grassroots football, it collects ten from the sport’s poorest communities through broadcast and betting margins they cannot afford.

The result is a two-tiered global football economy: elite players and wealthy federations harvest the commercial bounty, while early skillful players in under-resourced nations lack pitches, coaching, and pathways to professionalism. FIFA’s governance model—centralizing revenue in Zurich while distributing development funds through member associations with spotty accountability—has repeatedly been criticized for inefficiency and opacity. The 2015 corruption scandal revealed not just individual malfeasance but a structural tendency to prioritize commercial rights over sporting development.

FIFA and the Zionist entity

FIFA’s stance toward Israel has become a lightning rod for the politicization of world football. Throughout the 2026 cycle, over thirty legal experts and multiple federations—including Turkey and twelve Middle Eastern associations—demanded Israel’s suspension from FIFA and UEFA competitions, citing conduct in Gaza. Spain openly considered boycotting the World Cup had Israel qualified, while the Trump administration lobbied FIFA to resist any ban. Infantino’s own gestures—attempting to stage a handshake between Israeli and Palestinian federation heads and pledging $75 million to a Trump-linked Gaza reconstruction board—have drawn accusations of legitimizing occupation rather than enforcing neutrality.

Neither Israel nor Palestine qualified for the 2026 tournament, rendering the immediate suspension debate moot. As for Messi, the Argentine captain has generally steered clear of geopolitical alignment; his 2019 visit to Israel was controversial; they alleged it is commercial, not political. There is no verified evidence so far of Israeli state support for the Argentina team or Messi as a strategic asset. What remains evident is that FIFA’s reluctance to apply the same suspension standard to Israel that it applied to Russia after 2022 has exposed the federation to charges of double standards—suggesting that geopolitical alliances, not sporting integrity, increasingly dictate who gets to play.

Looking ahead

As the 2026 World Cup enters its final stages, the tension between commerce and integrity will only intensify. FIFA has built a financial architecture of unprecedented scale—$13 billion cycles, billion-dollar betting partnerships, dynamic-priced tickets, and social media streaming deals. But it has not built the governance architecture to match.

The questions raised by this tournament—about selective accountability for star players, about the shadow economy of unregulated betting, about access for the fans who fund the spectacle through their attention and their wagers, and about whether record revenues translate into genuine global development—will define FIFA’s credibility long after the final whistle.

For now, the show goes on. Messi remains on the pitch. The betting windows stay open. And the money keeps flowing—in Zurich, in the boardrooms of Adidas and Betano, and in the unlicensed crypto exchanges that FIFA cannot control but whose existence its spectacle makes possible.

Whether football’s governing body is stewarding the world’s game or simply auctioning it to the highest bidder is a question that, like the tournament itself, belongs to the global public. And it is one that FIFA has yet to satisfactorily answer.

Middle East

Likud weighs rotation premiership between Netanyahu and Eisenkot

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Officials within the Likud party and Benjamin Netanyahu’s inner circle are analysing a scenario in which the formation of a narrow coalition proves impossible and the political system enters a deadlock.

According to a report in The Jerusalem Post, one option being discussed by Likud officials in such a scenario is a broad coalition government featuring a rotation of the premiership between Netanyahu and Yashar party leader Gadi Eisenkot.

At this stage, the primary question occupying analysts is what Netanyahu could offer to persuade Eisenkot to establish a rotation government with him, and how he could convince him that the rotation agreement would be honoured this time, following the precedent set during the Netanyahu-Benny Gantz government.

Among the possibilities raised in Likud’s closed-door discussions is nominating Netanyahu for the presidency in the future.

This would create both an agreed political exit route for Netanyahu and a political guarantee that the premiership would ultimately pass to Eisenkot.

At this stage, these discussions represent strategic assessments and scenario analyses surrounding Netanyahu’s “broad coalition” campaign ahead of the elections.

Likud officials believe that Netanyahu could conclude the election without reaching 61 seats, but they also rely on the likelihood that the opposition bloc will lack sufficient seats to form a government.

If neither side can form a coalition, officials anticipate that pressure to avert a new election could bring the possibility of a unity government back to the agenda.

Eisenkot is viewed as one of the primary potential partners for such a move, provided he enters the election at the head of a major force within the anti-Netanyahu bloc.

According to the scenario discussed in Likud, one potential arrangement would involve Netanyahu assuming the premiership first under the rotation framework and subsequently handing the post over to Eisenkot.

However, the most obvious obstacle to such a step is the crisis of confidence caused by the rotation government established with Gantz in 2020.

Eisenkot would require a mechanism ensuring that he does not find himself in the identical position Gantz occupied at that time: namely, becoming a partner in a rotation government agreement that was never implemented.

In this context, the possibility of the presidency is also raised in the discussions. Under this scenario, the date of the leadership handover could be tied to Netanyahu moving to the President’s Residence following the conclusion of Isaac Herzog’s term in office.

Those raising this possibility believe such a step could offer Netanyahu an agreed political destination after the end of his term as prime minister, whilst simultaneously providing Eisenkot with greater confidence that the rotation will take place.

Even within Likud, officials emphasise that the presidency scenario remains far from a finalised plan, with some describing it as a remote possibility.

Nevertheless, the matter is already being discussed as part of efforts to find a mechanism capable of overcoming the trust deficit.

According to an assessment voiced within Likud, if the presidency scenario arises in the future, Netanyahu’s criminal trial would need to be concluded.

From a legal perspective, the argument in these discussions is that no automatic legal barrier prevents an individual standing trial from running for the presidency.

The real complexity would lie in the public and political dimensions.

Proponents of this scenario believe that it would also be possible to present such a step to the public as part of a broader arrangement that would end Netanyahu’s premiership and enable the formation of a stable government.

This discussion also explains the line Netanyahu has advocated in recent weeks regarding the necessity of establishing a “broad government”.

Likud officials assess that Netanyahu understands a 61-seat right-wing government is not a guaranteed outcome, and therefore believes it is important to prepare the public and political ground in advance for the possibility of incorporating figures from the opposition camp into the government after the elections.

If the results show that neither bloc holds a majority, Netanyahu could argue that voters did not deliver a decisive victory to either side, and that under these conditions there is no justification for excluding a large segment of the public from the government.

However, the Gantz precedent will remain at the heart of all future discussions. Likud officials are aware that Netanyahu’s political promise alone will not suffice.

For this reason, alongside the presidency concept, more practical mechanisms are being examined in political discussions: commitments regarding the budget and no-confidence votes, legal mechanisms designed to make breaching the agreement difficult, and even the possibility of depositing a letter of resignation with a trustee that would take effect should Netanyahu fail to fulfil his commitments.

Likud officials also point to a fundamental difference between such a scenario and the Netanyahu-Gantz government.

If election results do not provide Netanyahu with an independent majority and he must rely on Eisenkot to keep the government afloat, this dependency would itself become another component of the guarantee system.

Unlike a situation where the partnership could be dissolved and an alternative coalition formed, a breach of the agreement in this scenario could lead to the collapse of the entire government. The number of seats Likud secures will also prove decisive.

In light of current expectations, Likud officials estimate that winning more than 25 to 26 seats would be presented as a success, allowing Netanyahu to argue that he remains the leader of a major political camp that cannot be ignored when forming a government.

Conversely, a significantly weaker result would undermine his ability to demand the first turn in the rotation and shift the balance of power in future negotiations.

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US begins returning staff to Middle East diplomatic missions

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The US administration is beginning to send personnel back to several diplomatic missions in the Middle East that had been evacuated or downsized due to tensions with Iran.

Sources speaking to Reuters stated that posts in Lebanon, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Baghdad in Iraq are among the locations where staff will return.

They added that family members will also be permitted to return to US missions in Riyadh.

The move indicates that Washington views the near-term risk of escalation in the conflict with Iran as lower.

However, some embassies will initially operate below full capacity.

Sources stated that certain embassies will initially operate without exceeding 85% of their authorised staffing levels.

One source said the return of some personnel is expected to begin this week.

Following the start of joint US-Israeli strikes against Iran on 28 February, the US had withdrawn personnel from its embassies across the Middle East.

Some embassies in Gulf Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, were targeted by Iranian retaliatory actions, leading to the temporary closure of those embassies.

Since then, although the US naval blockade on Iranian ports remains in place, the Strait of Hormuz—vital for oil and commodities shipping—remains closed, and diplomatic efforts to end the war have stalled, intense fighting has diminished.

A US State Department spokesperson stated in an emailed response to Reuters that the department continuously reviews the security posture of its diplomatic missions worldwide.

“Based on our latest assessment, we are adjusting our staffing posture at select posts in the Middle East to enable us to continue advancing US foreign policy objectives while maintaining the safety and security of our personnel,” the spokesperson said.

The New York Times previously reported, citing an internal document, that diplomats were returning and emergency measures were being eased, noting that embassies in Jordan, Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar were also expected to restore staffing levels.

The newspaper added that US embassies in Israel, Jordan, and Oman will ultimately return to full staffing levels, while missions in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Lebanon will initially be capped at 85% of their personnel levels.

Missions in Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain will have their staffing levels capped at 75%.

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Trump sends Saudi nuclear pact to Congress tied to Israel ties

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US President Donald Trump has sent a draft civil nuclear energy agreement with Saudi Arabia to Congress.

However, a White House official speaking to Reuters emphasised that the pact would take effect only if the kingdom normalises relations with Israel.

The agreement, reached in July to allow US companies to export civil nuclear technology to Saudi Arabia, was sent to Congress on Monday, according to the US official, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

It remains unclear how Trump expects submitting the nuclear deal to Congress to advance his objectives.

Congress has 90 continuous session days to review the agreement.

“The president’s position has not changed that the agreement will only move forward if Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords,” the US official said in an emailed statement.

Signed in 2020 and 2021, those accords were concluded between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan.

A few days after agreeing to the Saudi nuclear pact in July, Trump, who had worked on a similar deal during his first presidential term, set the normalisation of ties as a condition for the agreement to enter into force.

Former president Joe Biden had also pushed for a nuclear deal and sought to link it to the accords in question.

Diplomats believed Riyadh was close to normalising relations with Israel in 2023, but the war Israel launched against Gaza in October 2023 altered the situation.

Saudi Arabia demands an “irreversible pathway” to a Palestinian state before recognising Israel.

The 30-year nuclear pact provides for the construction of AP1000 reactors, a project worth tens of billions of dollars that would benefit Westinghouse, co-owned by Canada-based Cameco and Brookfield Asset Management.

According to two congressional sources, the agreement was sent to congressional leaders and is expected to be presented to committees on Wednesday.

If Congress does not object to the agreement within 90 session days, it will take effect.

Should Congress reject the agreement, Trump could veto that decision, which would require a two-thirds majority in Congress to override.

Some Democratic members of Congress and non-proliferation advocates have criticised the nuclear agreement for failing to bar Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.

Those two activities represent two potential pathways to producing nuclear weapons. The UAE, by contrast, accepted such measures, known as the “gold standard”, in its 2009 civil nuclear agreement with Washington.

The Trump administration maintains that the agreement contains the non-proliferation measures required by law.

Henry Sokolski, head of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, said Trump’s move in initiating the process created the possibility that Congress might allow the deal to proceed without conditions on normalisation and non-proliferation.

“If you are serious about barring enrichment and recognising Israel, this situation is hardly ideal,” Sokolski said.

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