Interview
“The Cuban people are making it clear that they do not want to return to the bondage of capitalism”
The Cuban Revolution, which succeeded with Batista’s flight on January 1, 1959, is striving to preserve its socialist character despite the U.S. blockade, which has reached genocidal proportions. Imperialist attempts at invasion, which reached their peak with the Bay of Pigs intervention, have been significantly “spiced up” with elements such as biological attacks, assassinations, economic aggression, and the support of counterrevolutionary fascist groups. With the second Trump administration, the operation to strangle Cuba—clearly carrying the tone of regime change and led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who harbors the resentment of his counter-revolutionary parents who fled and were dispossessed from Cuba—appears to have sworn to destroy not only the Revolution but the Cuban people as a whole.
Frank Josué Solar Cabrales, a Cuban historian, writer, and academic who answered our questions from the island—where power outages have become routine due to the U.S. blockade—says the Cuban people will resist U.S. imperialism to avoid losing both socialism and national sovereignty. In his view, what the U.S. sees in Cuba is a small island just 150 km away defying the odds to demonstrate that another world is possible—that is, serving as a “model” not only for the peoples of Latin America but for the entire world.
Cabrales, who candidly acknowledges the challenges of the socialist construction process in Cuba, points out that market reforms—accelerated particularly after 2011—have significantly increased inequality. He argues that while taking steps backward may be legitimate, he objects to the presentation of tools drawn from the capitalist toolkit as a means to build socialism. He argues that the “trench” mentality is rational due to the American threat; however, he believes efforts must be intensified to ensure the continuous renewal and revitalization of popular participation. He considers the warnings of Fidel and Che to remain relevant today.
He suggests that if the U.S. were to invade Cuba, imperialism would face not only an armed Cuban people and a “war of the entire people,” but also a continent-wide counterattack by the peoples of Latin America.
Cuba is struggling with a terrible blockade imposed by the US immediately after the revolution. The “Donroe Doctrine” announced during Donald Trump’s second term and the rogue actions against Venezuela, one of Cuba’s most important allies, appear to have exacerbated the negative effects of this blockade. Can you describe both the historical effects of the blockade and the distinctive features of the new era ushered in by the Trump administration? What concrete dangers do the Cuban Revolution and the Cuban people face today?
The U.S. economic, commercial, and financial blockade against Cuba, which began in 1962 under the administration of John F. Kennedy, has been the spearhead, the central core of a total war waged by U.S. imperialism against the Cuban Revolution throughout its more than six decades of existence.
When history books about this era are written in the future, Cuba’s heroic resistance will have to be recorded in capital letters and gold. The epic story of a small, underdeveloped island with scarce economic resources resisting the longest siege by the most powerful empire in history is a modern version of the legendary confrontation between David and Goliath. Against that small nation, ninety miles from its shores, the United States has employed nearly every means available in its arsenal.
And in this broad strategy of subversion, where everything has been tried, from terrorist sabotage and personal attacks to direct military aggression, including biological warfare, the main battering ram has always been the economic blockade, the attempt to cut off any possibility of trade or formal economic relations for Cuba, not only with the United States but also with other countries. Any company or business in the world that dares to do business with Cuba risks fines or sanctions from the U.S. government.
The relentlessness of the United States, which devotes an army of officials and a massive amount of federal funds to pursuing Cuban commercial operations, stems from its refusal to forgive the Caribbean island for the audacity of being rebellious and upholding its independence. They have gone to great lengths to ensure the failure of a revolutionary experiment in building a different society, one of prosperity, justice, and dignity for all, so that its example does not spread throughout Latin America.
While the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc existed, the effects of the blockade were greatly mitigated by favorable economic relations with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance [COMECON], which allowed Cuba to successfully overcome its obstacles. When the Berlin Wall fell and the USSR disintegrated, Cuba found itself in very difficult circumstances, losing almost all of its international trade and the market where it sold its products and procured vital supplies.
In those circumstances of extreme weakness and isolation for the Cuban Revolution, when it seemed it had only months left to live, U.S. imperialism believed the time had come to deliver the coup de grâce by tightening the economic blockade. Two new laws, the Torricelli Act in 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, tightened the screws of commercial suffocation against Cuba. The latter has been particularly damaging because it codified the blockade into legislation that can only be repealed by the U.S. Congress, and established a series of requirements for doing so that imply Cuba’s total surrender and the loss of its sovereignty. It also accentuated its extraterritorial nature by allowing foreign companies to be sued in U.S. courts for conducting business on properties or lands that were expropriated by the Cuban Revolution.
Against all odds, Cuba survived the severe blow dealt by the fall of the USSR. With Fidel Castro still at the helm of the country, the market-opening measures, inevitable but temporary in nature, taken during the “special period in peacetime” allowed its productive apparatus to withstand the onslaught of intensified imperial pressure and come out on top. This trend was later reinforced by a favorable context of progressive governments across Latin America and by the brief period of thaw and rapprochement attempted under the Barack Obama administration.
Donald Trump’s rise to power marked a return to a policy of maximum pressure against Cuba, implemented with even greater force. Already during his first term, he took some 240 measures that reinforced the blockade, sought to strike at every sector of our economy, and targeted any commercial exchange with the rest of the world. And in this second term, with Marco Rubio serving as Secretary of State, a direct representative of the far-right Cuban counterrevolutionary lobby, he intends to finish the job and fulfill the long-cherished dream of U.S. imperialism: the overthrow of the Cuban Revolution.
The first thing he did, on the very day he took office, was to re-include us on the list of countries that supposedly sponsor terrorism, which automatically prevents us, among other things, from opening accounts and conducting financial transactions at many banks around the world. Being on that list imposes additional restrictions on our country regarding the use of the dollar for international trade and access to credit or loans. Cuba cannot access any of the international financing mechanisms that all nations rely on in today’s highly interconnected economy. Threats of retaliation by the world’s leading imperialist power act as a strong deterrent, causing many companies and financial institutions to refrain from doing business with Cuba.
Far from being a trade embargo on specific goods, as the United States portrays it, the blockade is a full-scale, broad economic war, with a variety of measures that have extended, strengthened, and deepened it over the past six decades. The blockade has been a policy designed with the express purpose of causing the greatest possible harm to the Cuban people, in order to bring about a regime change through a counterrevolutionary uprising.
This is reflected in official U.S. government documents, such as the memorandum by Lester Mallory, Under Secretary of State, in April 1960, which clearly states that the objective of the blockade is to deprive the country of material and financial resources to achieving the surrender of the Cuban revolution through hunger, need, suffering, and despair. Acknowledging the reality that the revolutionary government enjoyed majority popular support, the document proposes economic suffocation as the most effective means for its overthrow, to create conditions that would provoke discontent and opposition among the people. In the reasoning of that memorandum, one can see, in all its starkness, the cynicism of imperialism and how it treats peoples who break free from its domination.
Surrender or death is the dilemma that U.S. imperialism imposes on peoples who, like the Cuban people, dare to be free and dignified, and to take their destiny into their own hands. Such a policy has inflicted enormous damage on the Cuban economy: official figures show that since the date of its imposition, the blockade has cost Cuba some $164 billion. Every sector of the economy—industry, agriculture, and services—has been affected by the imperial siege, which in recent times, under Trump, has been characterized by systematic persecution and surgical damage to any activity that brings foreign currency revenue to the country, primarily tourism and international medical collaboration.
Beyond figures and macroeconomic indicators, the blockade is felt in all its harshness in the daily lives of Cubans, in the difficulties in providing social and public services such as health care, education, transportation, electricity, and water supply, and in the shortages of food, medicine, and basic consumer goods necessary for daily life. The daily existence of Cubans is truly very hard and complicated by the effects of the blockade, not only due to the lack of supplies and resources, but also due to the deterioration of the entire economic and civil infrastructure.
The recent measures taken by Donald Trump, declaring Cuba an unusual and extraordinary threat to U.S. national security, threatening to impose tariffs on anyone who sends oil to the island, and cutting off the main source of crude oil for Cubans, along with the armed aggression against Venezuela on January 3, have exacerbated a deep economic crisis that the Cuban people were already suffering. The impacts of more than three months without receiving a single drop of fuel are already being felt in the daily lives of the country’s inhabitants, in the most diverse ways, affecting above all two dimensions that cut across the entire society and economy and ensure their vitality: transportation and electricity generation. The lack of electricity not only affects households, with more than twenty hours of daily blackouts and all the difficulties this entails, for example, in food preservation and cooking, but also paralyzes industry and productive activity.
The absence of fuel for transportation, for its part, practically brings the country to a standstill and affects the functioning of all its spheres and structures. In general, there is already a noticeable rise in prices for food and consumer goods, and the material conditions of life for Cubans are becoming even harsher.
Faced with such a difficult situation, the decision of the majority of the people is firm: to continue resisting and not submit to the vassalage that U.S. imperialism seeks to impose on us.
We read that the US government is planning a Venezuela-style invasion operation for Cuba. How is Cuba preparing to respond militarily to such an action? What is Revolutionary Cuba’s war strategy? How will Havana’s relations with Moscow and Beijing, and primarily with the peoples of Latin America, be mobilized in the event of a possible American intervention?
Cuba relies on regular troops and a professional armed forces for its defense, where all young people receive training during their military service.
But the main bulwark against external aggression stems from the involvement of the entire population in a comprehensive armed defense strategy known as the “War of the Whole People.” This military doctrine of widespread popular struggle, conceived by Fidel Castro in the 1980s, ensures that every citizen has the means, a place, and a mission to resist the invader, and seeks to deter and defeat any enemy, regardless of their military superiority, by confronting them with political and human costs they cannot bear. In the face of renewed threats of attacks from the U.S. administration, we Cubans have strengthened our preparedness by increasing the frequency of periodic training exercises on the basic aspects of armed conflict.
Without modern technologies or sophisticated weaponry, but with a long historical tradition of guerrilla warfare, we share the conviction that foreign troops who dare to enter Cuba “will only gather the dust of its blood-soaked soil, if they do not perish in the fight,” in the words of Antonio Maceo¹, one of the heroes of our struggle for independence.
Unlike the relationship with the Soviet Union or the socialist camp, or even with Venezuela, which was not only an economic but also a political and ideological alliance, in the case of today’s Russia, China, or the BRICS in general, these are friendly nations that condemn the blockade and wish to maintain normal trade relations with Cuba, but which operate under capitalist logic, and whose business dealings and interests with Cuba are not driven by altruistic or humanitarian purposes, but rather by the pursuit of their own profits and geopolitical advantages.
The international economic crisis of capitalism also limits any potential alternative that the BRICS might represent for Cuba. Russia is embroiled in a war; China’s growth figures are no longer what they were in previous decades, and it faces certain economic difficulties. The support from Russia and China has been strategic, for example, in recent times, in the implementation of large-scale solar energy projects through the installation of photovoltaic panels, and in the recovery and modernization of the country’s electrical infrastructure. Without Russian and Chinese cooperation, it would have been more difficult for Cuba to address the current electricity generation crisis, caused by oil shortages and the precarious state of its power grids and thermoelectric plants.
But I believe it would be naive to expect any kind of military aid from their governments if Cuba were to come under attack. It is not in their calculations to risk triggering a third world war to defend the Caribbean island. The safeguarding of national sovereignty and the Cuban revolution depends on the Cubans themselves, and the defeat of imperialism, ultimately, will only be guaranteed by the international advance of revolutionary, socialist processes that propose alternatives for radical transformation and break with capitalism.
Amid its relative decline as a global imperialist power, the United States seeks to rebuild its hegemony and regain direct control over the territory it has historically considered its backyard. Under the cynical and crude guise of a supposed fight against drug trafficking, this revival of the Monroe Doctrine and the big stick actually seeks to ensure its unchallenged dominance south of the Rio Grande, where it can impose its will without disobedience or rebellion.
If U.S. imperialism dares to set foot on the sacred soil of our homeland, it must face the united response of our peoples.
We must make it pay dearly for its audacity, and not limit ourselves to resistance, but move to the counteroffensive. Let Bolívar’s sword and Che’s rifle multiply from one end of the continent to the other. Let not a single Yankee soldier or base remain in Latin America. Let our peoples rise up and direct their struggles not only against the foreign military presence but against the local oligarchies and puppet governments that serve as their accomplices and supporters in the imperialist adventure. May the revolutionary wave knock on the doors of Wall Street and inspire a rebellion there, in the belly of the beast, against the rule of the millionaires and the 1%, who send the same old people, the dispossessed of the North, to fight the wars of the powerful. In the face of the imperialist military onslaught, let us turn Latin America into a zone of revolutions and popular power.
History has amply demonstrated that no abstract appeal to respect for sovereignty and international law, no appeal to the UN and other international bodies, based on a supposed rules-based world order, will be capable on its own of stopping the missiles or preventing the bombs from falling. The imperialist war machine will only be stopped by the organized and combative strength of the working class, by the power of struggle and resistance demonstrated by the oppressed when they unite and fight for common causes of freedom and justice.
In an article you wrote in 2024 (“Cuba’s Socialism: Certainties and Crossroads”), you point out that reforms carried out in Cuba, primarily with the aim of improving economic efficiency, carry the threat of capitalist restoration. Is it possible to transform the Cuban economy and improve the material conditions of workers while maintaining a system where inequality increases and market mechanisms take root for a long time?
Following the release of the Cuban Communist Party’s “Guidelines on the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution” in 2011, a reform process began, known as the “update” of the Cuban economic model, that embraces a series of market-oriented, capitalist-style measures, all within a socialist legal, state, and political framework. These measures could potentially help overcome the economic crisis that has plagued the island since the “Special Period,” by relying on practical approaches that seem to have always worked, such as material incentives to boost production, encouraging foreign investment, and greater openness to the private sector, which began with self-employment and later expanded to include small and medium-sized enterprises.
This model, which seeks to address economic problems through the growing strengthening of the market and private property, constrained from above by a socialist legal and state infrastructure, could, under certain conditions of necessity such as those Cuba has been experiencing, and for a limited time, help revive some sectors of the economy. However, it will always pose a threat to the existence of socialism. Without a counterweight, without real and effective popular control, it generates its own logic that does not work in favor of a socialist direction, but rather in the interest of capital accumulation and the pursuit of profit above social and collective interests, and which ultimately aims at the restoration of capitalism.
This is the path that has been followed since the Guidelines, and many of these measures have even been intensified, which has generated all kinds of negative phenomena, harmful to the socialist project of the Cuban Revolution.
One of the most painful and worrying, with an enormous impact because it is also clearly visible in the daily life of Cubans today, is inequality, which had already emerged very timidly during the crisis of the 1990s, a crisis that Fidel later tried to address with the Battle of Ideas, but which has been intensifying and accelerating since the start of the reforms. A minority segment, associated with private economic activities, reaps significant profits, grows wealthy, and experiences a considerable rise in its standard of living, while another significant portion of the population survives in conditions of severe material deprivation.
One of the most painful signs of this inequality is the increased presence on the streets of our major cities of begging and elderly people wandering the streets, living on the streets. Other harmful phenomena, related to the advance of capitalist dynamics, include mass emigration, with many young people who see no way out of the crisis or no life plan in Cuba and seek it beyond our borders, and corruption, a fertile ground where opacity, favoritism, and the direct and indirect ties of the bureaucracy to certain businesses and ventures flourish. Pro-capitalist reforms promote a type of relationship and common sense that are not conducive to socialism as a project, not only political, but also cultural, aimed at creating a better society that ends all injustices and guarantees real equality for all human beings. Individual solutions and the reliance on money as the primary means of accessing consumer goods are dangerous elements for socialism in Cuba.
The main mistake with this reform, in my opinion, has been presenting it as a way to build socialism through the market, using capitalist tools, when history has proven time and again in practice that the instruments of capitalism only serve to produce more capitalism and in no way contribute to creating socialism. They can help us survive in a situation of extreme crisis and revive the country’s economy, but if they are prolonged over time and without real workers’ control, they will give rise to a series of effects contrary to our goals of justice and emancipation.
As early as the 1960s, Che warned against the danger of using the blunt weapons of capitalism in his analyses of the socialist transition. Fidel, too, when he launched the process of rectifying errors and negative tendencies in the 1980s, called for a return to Che’s conception, the same one that guided the Cuban Revolution in its early days, of building socialism without resorting to the economic categories of capitalism. And during the Special Period, when he had no alternative but to use them and explained that we were forced to live with them and their effects, he always presented them as temporary, necessary at that moment, but antithetical in the long term to the ideal society we sought to achieve.
You point out that the restoration of capitalism in Cuba would not only mean a return to poverty and misery for workers, but also a humiliation for the Cuban nation. What is the connection between the suffocating blockade of US imperialism and the capitalist restorationists within the country? Furthermore, would a possible American invasion also mean a class-based civil war for Cuba? What kind of “non-socialism zones” do you have in Cuba and does not that mean there are enclaves that the Cuban (national) sovereignty could not reach?
The regression we have experienced in property relations, economic relations, and relations of production inevitably has its political and ideological counterpart. If you teach that any criticism or disagreement with decisions and policies approved by higher-level structures is a political problem, and is harmful because it undermines unity, you cannot expect a response to emerge to views that are antithetical to our social project, no matter how evident they may be, when they come from above. We must educate people to engage in debate about our core principles and to be able to identify threats to our liberation project, whatever their origin. The socialist revolution is much more than a government or a political power; it is a broad emancipatory project that seeks the liberation of human beings from all the chains that oppress them. It needs that power to be realized, and it needs that power to be firm, to confront the formidable opposing forces of reaction and imperialism.
But it must always serve the higher interests of the project. The day it ceases to serve that project and becomes an obstacle to the achievement of its emancipatory goals, when, instead of responding to the ultimate aims of liberation, it serves the conservative and narrow interests of power groups, even while usurping the name, symbols, and traditions of the liberation project for its own benefit, we must fight to redirect or replace it. The reins of that power must always remain in the hands of the people, to prevent its degeneration. Socialism is a movement, a permanent change, not a fixed model of society, state, or government.
Prolonged resistance is synonymous with success, but only up to a point. The cost of the siege can lead to defeat. Systematic attrition can slowly work in favor of capitalist restoration, not only through the formation of objective and common-sense factors, but also through the creation of social sectors inclined toward it, who would view it as desirable and preferable. A revolution is not undertaken for the sake of indefinite resistance and sacrifice, nor to replace one order of domination with another, even if of a different nature, but to bring freedom, justice, and well-being to all people through their conscious mobilization.
To accomplish tasks of such magnitude, socialism needs, for a limited time, a state apparatus of coercion, violence, and consensus that allows for the defeat of internal and external reaction and the organization of all of society toward an unprecedented elevation of the productive forces and the creation of a new culture, but this apparatus must begin to disappear from day one and must be in the hands of the workers from the very beginning.
The resistance capacity of the Cuban people and the revolution seems to depend on the advancement of that same revolution. What measures is the leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba taking today to deepen the socialist transformation and strengthen resistance against imperialism? You point out that one of the biggest obstacles to these measures is the blockade, noting that “while digging trenches on one hand, you are trying to establish a parliament on the other.”
Cintio Vitier’s metaphor about our need to build a parliament in a trench serves to illustrate the constant tension between power and the project, which, according to Fernando Martínez Heredia, is the fundamental contradiction in any experience of socialist transition.
The trench is necessary, even more so in a process like Cuba’s, 90 miles from the United States, where unity has been fundamental to resisting nearly seven decades of attacks from the most powerful empire in history. But at times, that necessity has also served as a justification for the trench to swallow up the parliament, and it becomes a convenient argument for those in power, who can label any differing opinion as divisive or fifth-columnist.
Among the negative and perverse impacts of the blockade and imperialist hostility, we must always include the limitations on our democratic functioning. While prioritizing the trenches over parliament may yield short-term benefits in defending the revolutionary process, because it allows those in charge greater control over internal order, prevents cracks from forming, and effectively counters the enemy’s work, it is harmful in the long run to socialist construction, which needs workers’ democracy and control from below as much as the human body needs oxygen to function and move forward.
Fidel’s leadership, with its charisma and historical legitimacy, was a major factor in the balance between these two poles, between power and the project. Under current conditions, of economic hardship, the intensification of the blockade and enemy activity, and growing social unrest, and now without Fidel’s physical presence, there is a risk of entrenchment and of believing that the most effective way to ensure the defense and continuity of the Revolution is through the strictest political control, which views any divergent opinion with suspicion and sees it as a threat.
In a closed environment, marked by bureaucratic control and a trench mentality with no room for debate, where criticism and dissent are viewed as dangerous, corruption, inefficiency, and reactionary thinking flourish; and calls for unity to defend sovereignty and collective achievements often serve, in reality, to mask the defense of the privileges and interests of powerful groups, which thus shield themselves from the scrutinizing and watchful gaze of the rank and file.
What is the position of young people born during Cuba’s post-Soviet “special period” regarding the threat of an American invasion? You insist that the Cuban Revolution is not a finished project, and the improvement of material conditions on an individual basis is not a solution for the shortcomings of the Revolution. What could be done in front of a gargantuan, and a permanent invasion threat, to raise up the spirit of the communist utopia?
Despite the blackouts, shortages, and intense pressure, the overwhelming majority of the Cuban people have decided to continue resisting. The survival of socialism in Cuba also depends on the success of revolutionary movements in other parts of the world.
Cuba lacks significant natural resources, no viable oil reserves, no major rivers, and no rare earth minerals that might attract direct invasions for their extraction, which makes its example of resistance all the more remarkable.
The economic situation has caused unrest, as evidenced by the protests on July 11, 2021. This event was a “perfect storm”: the pandemic, the tightening of the blockade, food shortages, and a massive social media propaganda campaign funded from abroad with federal funds, using influencers and YouTubers to incite an uprising. However, a majority of the population took to the streets to defend the Revolution, understanding that the alternative, a return to neocolonial capitalism, would be worse, as demonstrated by the cases of Haiti, Puerto Rico, or the Dominican Republic, where there are power outages, even without a blockade, and levels of violence unknown in Cuba.
Migration is exploited politically by the United States through the Cuban Adjustment Act, which encourages illegal emigration to destabilize the country. Cubans are encouraged to “flee” illegally to propagandistically portray them as escaping a dictatorship, when in reality they emigrate for economic reasons exacerbated by the blockade.
Despite the difficulties, mechanisms for popular participation exist in Cuba. Candidates for municipal assemblies are elected by direct vote in neighborhoods without party intervention. Laws, such as the Family Code², recently approved with 70% support following an intense public debate, are discussed in all workplaces and communities. While there are bureaucratic limitations justified by the need for unity against the external enemy, a single party to prevent division that would benefit the empire, there is an effort to deepen a socialist, direct, and participatory democracy.
What truly bothers the hegemonic power and explains its relentless hostility toward Cuba is that on this island a way of life has been put into practice that has proven to be far more just, humane, and dignified than that found in other parts of the world. A way of life where equality, healthcare, education, and housing are guaranteed for all under a socialist model of a planned national economy.
The very existence of Cuba, ninety miles from the United States, is a dangerous example that the empire seeks to destroy at all costs so that it does not spread to the rest of Latin America and the world. The very fact that the blockade exists is tangible proof of the superiority of the Cuban example; if socialism were so inefficient, the United States could lift the blockade and let the revolution fail on its own, but they do not do so because they need the blockade as an excuse to justify the shortages.
The main way out of Cuba’s crisis is international solidarity and the advancement of the global revolutionary movement. Socialism cannot be fully built in a single isolated country. Meanwhile, Cuba remains a beacon of hope, demonstrating that it is possible to prioritize human beings over business, even under pressure from the empire. The Cuban utopia is a reality that resists and continues to advance. The Cuban people are clear that they do not want to return to the slavery of capitalism and subordination to imperialism, and they are willing to pay whatever price is necessary for their dignity, sovereignty, and social justice.
Frank Josué Solar Cabrales (Santiago de Cuba, 1981). Essayist and researcher. Bachelor’s degree in History (2005) and Master’s degree in Cuban and Caribbean Studies (2007) from the University of Oriente; Ph.D. in Historical Sciences (University of Havana, 2016). Historian at the University of Oriente. Full Professor in the Department of History and University Heritage at the University of Oriente. Vice President of the Scientific Council of the University of Oriente. Member of the Leonardo Griñán Peralta Chair of Historical Studies of the State and Law, and President of the Honorary Chair for the Study of the Thought and Work of Fidel Castro at the University of Oriente. Member of the National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba (UNEAC) and of the National Committee of the Union of Historians of Cuba (UNHIC). Associate researcher at the Office of Historical Affairs of the Presidency of the Republic of Cuba. National corresponding member of the Cuban Academy of History. Member of the La Tizza publishing collective. “Juan Pérez de la Riva” Historical-Social Essay Award (UNEAC), 2017. “Ramiro Guerra” National Historical Criticism Award (UNHIC), 2021. “Hortensia Pichardo” National Historical Criticism Award (UNHIC), 2023. Scientific and Technical Criticism Award (ICL), 2023. He has published The Labyrinths of Unity in Insurrect Cuba (2019), Between the Letter and the Assault (2021), Stories of Rebellion (2021), and July 26: The Assault That Set the Clouds Ablaze (2023).
¹ One of the generals of the Cuban Liberation Army, which fought for independence from Spain and the abolition of slavery. The famous quote attributed to Maceo is as follows: “Whoever tries to take power over Cuba will only get the dust of its soil, drenched in blood, if he doesn’t perish in the struggle.” (Editor’s note)
² On September 25, 2022, Cuba approved a new Family Code in a referendum, repealing the one in place since 1975. The period of public debate around the new Family Code began in 2018, and the new code includes more rights for women and legalizes same-sex marriages. (Editor’s note)
Foreign affairs writer Lily Lynch discusses the shifting political landscape of Central Europe and the Balkans in this interview with Harici. Lynch, whose work frequently appears in the New Statesman, New Left Review, and The Baffler, addresses a range of topics from Hungary’s recent elections to Serbia’s complex foreign policy maneuvers. A recipient of a 2025 LA Press Club award, she examines the “clarifying effect” of the Ukraine war on regional leadership and the evolving nature of right-wing populism across the continent. The conversation offers a detailed analysis of the challenges facing the European right and the persistent geopolitical tensions in the region.
I would like to begin with Hungary, specifically with the recent electoral victory of the right-wing populist Tisza Party, much like Viktor Orbán and Fidesz, and of its leader, Péter Magyar. What does this victory signify for Hungary’s future? The deep corruption and abuses of power involving Orbán’s circle had also received coverage in the international press. The fact that the country’s three major parties at the top of the electoral list are all right-wing paints a rather bleak picture.
I think that Magyar’s victory demonstrates several things. One is that right-wing ideas are still broadly popular in Hungary. The fact that Magyar is not so different from Orban on issues like immigration demonstrates that. So right-wing politics were not defeated in this election; instead, it is clear now that they are very much entrenched in Hungary and do reflect the sentiments of the public.
At the same time, I think there’s a particular brand of right-wing populism that is starting to cause some fatigue. This is a sort of clownish, personality-driven Trumpian populism that is wedded to Zionism, and which Orban embodied as well. I think Magyar’s success hints at a desire for a more sober and serious right-wing politics, decoupled from MAGA populism, and perhaps somewhat less revisionist: a politics that are anti-immigration and conservative but also more content with the status quo.
The electoral result also suggests that Trump’s brand has grown increasingly toxic, and that Orban’s choice to embrace Trump–going so far as having JD Vance campaign for him ahead of the election–hurt more than it helped. Trump is becoming a burden for the right, particularly in Europe. After Trump’s threats towards Greenland, no one in Europe can say they support Trump and also support respect for sovereignty. Of course, this is exactly what Orban once preached, as he fashioned himself a sovereigntist. In the end, it appeared that he only opposed encroachments from Brussels, but gave Trump’s America a pass.
At the same time, Orban’s deliberate stoking of the culture war ended up producing diminishing returns for him. Without decent economic performance, and with so much perceived corruption, his culture war crusades on issues such as gender simply were not enough to keep him afloat. In addition, Orban’s re-traditionalization efforts failed. The pro-natality policies he put in place were expensive but did little to boost the birth rate. Church attendance under Orban was even lower than it was during the socialist period, when religion was frowned upon by the authorities.
It may also be useful to touch on Serbia. The government led by Aleksandar Vučić appears to be pursuing what is often described as a “multi-vector foreign policy.” On the one hand, there is the prospect of EU membership; on the other, there are Serbia’s historically rooted ties with Russia. Yet in the course of the war in Ukraine, how should we interpret the statements coming from Moscow, particularly the strong reaction led by the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) to alleged arms deliveries to Kyiv via third parties? How sustainable is this condition of being a “swing state”?
There was a time when Vučić managed Serbia’s complex geopolitical position relatively well. At the height of the Vučić era, which was already a decade ago now, Serbia had relations with Russia, China, Turkey, the US, and many countries of the Global South that are members of the Non-aligned Movement–all while remaining a candidate for EU membership. But February 2022 changed everything for him. A major war in Europe–no longer confined to Donbass–meant that he was suddenly under much more pressure to harmonize Serbia’s policy with that of other European countries. In practice this meant things like imposing sanctions on Russia, and by voting in lockstep with EU and NATO member countries on resolutions on Ukraine in UN General Assembly votes.
It is true of course that Vucic was permitting indirect Serbian arms sales to Ukraine, which bought him a lot of credibility in Western capitals. With the Russians, meanwhile, he made excuses: He claimed that he was under a tremendous amount of pressure, and basically could not tell the West “no”. For a while I think the Russians accepted this, if grudgingly. But then as the arms sales to Ukraine didn’t stop after Vucic said they would, there were strong reactions in Russia.
I don’t think any of these actors, with the possible exception of China, trust Vucic anymore. For a long time, Vucic was all things to all people. A great example was in a UNGA vote Serbia voted in favor of a resolution on Ukraine, then Vucic immediately issued a statement saying that it had been “a mistake” and that they’d meant to vote against it. This was a deliberate strategy of ambiguity: which message to believe? The actual vote or Vucic’s statement to the press. He was masterful at this, for years: give one message to Washington, one to Moscow, and one to Brussels. I think you can sustain that kind of ambiguity for a time, and perhaps even a long time, but war has a clarifying effect. At a certain point, you just have to choose.
Vucic has also been one of the losers of the second Trump administration. This is the exact opposite of what he had hoped: he expected Serbia to be a natural ally to Trump. Instead, Vucic has been rebuffed by the administration, and repeatedly. Vucic stayed faithful to his mutli-vector foreign policy with the expectation that Trump would come to power and immediately end the war in Ukraine. I think he really believed that would happen–that Trump would end the war in Ukraine immediately. If that happened, Vucic’s job would have been a lot easier: there would be far less pressure on him from the EU, for one. So long story short, two recent developments have imperiled his multi-vector approach. First, the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, and second, Trump winning a second term, and subsequent ambivalent relations with the White House.
It may also be worthwhile here to address the issue of Kosovo, which, as is well known, has in recent years become a fault line that periodically simmers and boils over. In the December elections in Kosovo, Albin Kurti once again returned to the office of prime minister. Would it be possible for you to share some information on this, or perhaps your observations and/or firsthand impressions? It seems likely that this is a place we will be discussing in the years ahead.
Albin Kurti has staked his career in part on his opposition to the creation of something called “the Association of Serbian Municipalities” of “Community of Serbian Municipalities” in northern Kosovo. Northern Kosovo is home to a Serbian-majority population who absolutely do not recognize Kurti’s government as legitimate and largely answer to Belgrade, though they often feel left on their own by the Serbian government as well. According to the 2013 Brussels Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, the government of Kosovo has to create something called the Association/Community of Serbian Municipalities, a sort of thin layer of sovereignty or self-government that is nonetheless subordinate to Prishtina. Meanwhile, Serbia would extract itself from the north, ceding control of it to the government of Kosovo.
This has always been hugely controversial in Kosovo, as some believe it will create the conditions for eventual Serbian secession. Kurti remaining in office effectively means that there will be little progress made on this front. This is something that has made Western capitals very frustrated with Kurti, and he was under EU sanctions until last year.
However tense the current status quo is, I disagree with those who say a return to full-scale war is imminent or inevitable. There are something like 4,500 peacekeeping troops in Kosovo as a part of KFOR, NATO’s Kosovo peacekeeping force. That said, I am sure there will be the occasional flare up of localized violence. This currently happens every 1-2 years. But I highly doubt that these spasms of violence will lead to a full-scale war. Despite all the acrimonious feelings and distrust, there is little appetite for another big war in the Balkans by any side.
Finally, I am curious about your assessment, in broader terms, of what has given rise to the right-wing populist wave across Europe and/or how it is likely to shape Europe’s future overall. The supposedly “anti-establishment” profile, as in the case of Giorgia Meloni, either ends up directly submitting to the establishment, that is, to the Brussels bureaucracy, or produces state structures of astonishing corruption. This is a genuinely compelling issue, and I would be very interested in your views.
My answer about what has given rise to the right-wing populist wave is not at all original. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that this wave was preceded by the 2007-2008 financial crisis, which led to an overall crisis in faith in institutions, experts, and in liberalism. This was fertile ground for a populist backlash against “elites”. Of course, these anti-establishment politicians ride to power on promises to “drain the swamp” or fight the powers that be, and then turn around and adopt very conventional policies once in office. Or, in Orban’s case, they may actually break with established consensus, but turn out even more corrupt than the liberal “elites” they rail against. There is always a rhetoric-policy gap in politics, but it’s especially pronounced on the populist right.
Interview
‘The so-called international order is crumbling; national interest is the only remaining truth’
In this extensive interview with Harici Medya at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, Swiss journalist, Editor-in-chief of Die Weltwoche Roger Köppel provides a piercing diagnostic of the fracturing global order. Analyzing the downfall of the so-called “rule-based international system” through the cold lens of realism, Köppel articulates the inherent fragility of modern alliances when confronted by the supremacy of national interests. From the volatile Iran-Israel axis to the internal schisms within NATO, and from China’s emergence as a strategic alternative to the complex interplay between theology and power, each pivotal issue is reshaped by Köppel’s distinct and uncompromising perspective.
The dialogue further explores the friction between the Vatican and the American populist right, interrogating the resurgence of religion as a potent geopolitical instrument. Placing significant emphasis on Türkiye’s central role as a mediator within this “biblical” theater of conflict, Köppel champions the necessity of authentic diplomacy over moralizing rhetoric. Ultimately, this conversation offers a profound intellectual roadmap for navigating the sanctuary of pragmatism in an era redefined by the maneuvers of “great predator countries.”
I’d like to start with the ongoing talks about Iran. There is this current discussions between United States and Iran that they had an agreement about the Strait of Hormuz, but then things soured quite a bit and now Iran claims that they’re going to close the strait again because the American side also is not opening the blockade. So in a more general sense, what do you think about this ceasefire? How do you think it’s going to evolve in the upcoming days?
If I knew, I would have great qualified knowledge. Probably I could be a very rich man because I could foresee the stock market development. Unfortunately, we are in a very difficult situation where national interest, security concerns and even religious convictions are in the field of battle. And I can just hope that at the end of the day, goodwill prevails and that all sides find a way to settle this terrible situation. But how it can be achieved… I’m a Swiss. It’s very, very difficult to give here any kind of advice. I think I can understand all sides. I can understand the security concerns of Israel. I have a lot of sympathy with that. I can understand the American position, which was, since President Reagan, rather clear concerning Iran. And then you have Iran, this amazing civilization, which at least in European eyes, is also on a way, which can be—let’s be very cautious here—which can be considered a threat for other countries, building up ballistic arsenals, experimenting with nuclear explosives. It’s a very, very demanding issue. But somehow I’m still optimistic. I believe that they find a solution. But at the moment, it’s very hard to see how.
The United States and Europe had some sort of conflict between each other when it came to the Iran war. Donald Trump had certain expectations from its European allies, which already had a strained relationship after the Greenland debacle. When it comes to why Europe did not send any help, how do you describe that? Do you think Trump was right? Do you think Europe was right? What is the situation between the two parts of NATO?
I think what we see in the relationship between the EU and the United States is a symptom of the topic that has been discussed at this conference here in Antalya, which is the crumbling, which is the downfall of the so-called international order. And you can see it even on the level of military alliances such as NATO, that these alliances, they mean nothing in today’s world. We are in a world where national interest rules. And I believe that always national interest has ruled. But sometimes there was a lot of hypocrisy and the big talk about international order, rule-based order. But at the end of the day, it was only and always national interest. And we see it now with NATO: when it’s in the national interest that the Europeans can talk and use NATO, they say, “We are NATO members.” If the biggest NATO power, United States, says “Now you have to help us,” the Europeans say “No.” So I don’t want to judge this. I don’t want to say who is right and who is wrong. But I would like to say that this just indicates to us that these international rule-based systems, alliances such as NATO, they give no security today, they give no order today. The only thing that matters are national interest and the capacity of national leaders to sit together and find solutions for conflicts. And this is why this forum here in Antalya is very important. Because in such a world of national interest, where conflicts can pop up any second, any minute, it’s very important to bring back diplomacy, to talk, to create platforms such as these in order to interact. I think this is great that we have on one day the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and on the other day the Russian Foreign Minister. I wish we had more such forums also in Europe. And this is my critique of the European Union. We are too much… The European Union is too much moralizing, telling everybody who is the bad guy, who is the good guy, and is not engaging enough in finding common ground, common solutions via diplomacy.
When you look into the relationship between Europe and Russia or Europe and China, especially with the NATO meetings previously, before the second Trump administration, it was always claimed that these countries are adversaries to the Western order in general. But now, especially strained relations between Europe and the United States, we are seeing many members of the European Union trying to find alternatives to their security arrangements with the United States, which can be considered with China. Especially now we are seeing the Spanish Prime Minister going to China. Emmanuel Macron said something similar. And there were Keir Starmer’s meeting with Xi Jinping in China. So in general, do you see China being an alternative to United States? Do you think that Europe will change its course towards East?
Well, I’m from Switzerland, from a neutral country. And we try not to make enemies. We are too small; we have to be able to defend ourselves. And Switzerland is very much open to the world. We work with everybody. And even our neutrality has a bit suffered in the last years because the European Union has pushed Switzerland a lot in order to participate in the sanctions against Russia, even delivering weapons to Ukraine. Fortunately, we did never that. We were strictly neutral in the juristic sense. But with the sanctions, we have lost a bit our absolute impartiality. So Switzerland is totally open to the world. And I think many European countries should follow this path and should not talk themselves into these kind of confrontational views of the world. Of course, I mean, there might be other interests. If you look at the Baltic states, with their history with the Soviet Union, with Russia, it’s complicated. Poland has another tradition; they have to find out for themselves. But generally speaking, I would say in today’s world, we have to invest in great bilateral relationships. The European countries should cooperate with the United States, of course, with China, with Russia. I mean, Russia is a neighbor of Europe, but Europe, what is Europe? Europe is a group of small and middle countries with different histories and also different national interests. And somehow the EU is a structure which is too heavy-handed for this multiplicity of interests. So I would strongly argue from a Swiss perspective: make peace with Russia as soon as you can. Make no war, no conflict with China. Stop this moralizing attitude and patronizing of others. Just try to be a small bunch of countries who is not in big power politics anymore. Let the others be big powers. We can be big economic powers, big scientific powers, big powers of diplomacy and understanding and leave the rest to the big predator countries that are also on this planet. Of course, the big powers have big problems. We are smaller countries with smaller problems.
There’s a sentiment, there was a sentiment in the first Trump administration that if the European countries hang on tight for as long as possible, there will be eventually a leader that is willing to work together with Europe once again, which was Joe Biden in that. And when Joe Biden was elected, the Ukraine war started. And then we saw a reconsolidation of European countries under NATO umbrella in general. But now we are seeing the strain in the relationship is so hard that things may not go back as much as it can. But still, in the many international meetings, we are seeing figures like Gavin Newsom from California, which could be potentially the next president of the United States. And he was saying, “You need to once again hang on tight until 2028.” Do you think that if a Democrat president or a president that is someone that’s more close to American establishment… Do you think if someone like that gets into the presidency in United States, the concept of “collective West” will come back and Europe and United States will go back to their relationship like it was before?
Well, I hope not that we will go back in the time before Trump in that sense, because Donald Trump made—the American President made—something which was to me overdue: he said we have to talk with Russia again. We have to engage in diplomacy. Under Biden, there was no diplomacy. And if Gavin Newsom wants to be the second Biden—no diplomacy with Russia, the collective West meaning “we, the West, the best against the rest”—then I don’t think that this is a philosophy with which you can win the future. Of course, the United States is a big country; you could say a Godzilla country. And a Godzilla country has a lot of problems. They have a lot of alliances in the region of China, with Taiwan, with Japan, entanglements. It’s not easy. Of course, you have global interests. You have to see what you can do. And I think the reality, the dominating trend in the reality is—and I think Trump has realized this—the time of unilateral dominance of the United States of America is over. That was the case after the downfall of the Soviet Union in 1990. Then the Russians were lying on the ground. China was still very weak after Mao Zedong. I mean, they were starting to recover. Now we have a different world. We have China, which is basically number one economically. We have India, which is growing very fast. Russia has recovered. Russia doesn’t swallow a NATO enlargement to the east, you know, neglecting all the security concerns of Russia. I have great understanding. The Russians say “No, we don’t want this.” The Americans would never tolerate Russians or Chinese with their military structures in Canada or in Mexico. I mean, they wouldn’t wait as President Putin for eight years; they would intervene in eight hours if something like that happens. So Trump has realized America is not strong enough to be the dominant hegemon of the world. So he starts to focus, to concentrate on his prime spheres of influence, which is South America, which is the Middle East with all the oil. He has a rivalry with China. But I think Trump is, ultimately, he’s a pragmatist. Probably he was being overconfident with Iran. I can understand that. He didn’t want… I mean, he doesn’t want… He’s not interested in the interests of the United States and of Israel if Iran gets nuclear weapons. So they had to do something. But you know, they probably overestimated themselves. We will see. I don’t know, but we’re seeing this kind of multipolar world is in the making, and therefore, we need a lot of diplomacy and pragmatism. I think Trump is a pragmatist. I didn’t think that Biden was a pragmatist. I don’t think that Gavin Newsom seems like a pragmatist. I don’t know. So I hope that we see leaders, whoever it might be, who will not go back to the old times with no diplomacy, no talking, with this kind of Western supremacy attitude. This is not good. It’s not good for the West. It’s not good for the rest of the world. It’s not good for everybody.
In the first question, you mentioned a little bit of the religious conflicts. From what I understand, at least, you were talking about the Trump and Pope little fight maybe. So this situation in the last week has really gone out of control. The statements coming from both sides were pretty harsh. Donald Trump and especially a Catholic, J.D. Vance, was telling the Pope that he should be careful when he’s talking about theological matters, which was pretty interesting on its own. But when you look into this, do you think it is happening because Donald Trump saw someone that is critical of himself and he just didn’t want to take that, or you see a more sectarian conflict on the background of the situation? Because we have many figures like Peter Thiel of Palantir having meetings in Rome, talking about the Pope, talking about the Antichrist. And there was Steve Bannon who was mentioning we should overthrow Pope Francis and overthrow Vatican. There are plenty of figures in the American populist right that have a problem with Vatican. So in general, what do you say? Do you think that this is a sectarian issue?
In my first answer, I actually alluded to another biblical conflict, which is the conflict between the Israelites and the Ishmaelites, you know, going back to the great prophet Abraham and those great peoples which emerged from that great father, grandfather of civilization: the Israelites and the Ishmaelites. And Iran, you know, being one of the great empires, of course, also during the Islamic rule of the world. And then, of course, then you got the Jews, God’s chosen people. And I would say that religion is also a big part of Middle Eastern politics. But it’s great, it’s good you mentioned this dimension also in Western politics. Well, I would suggest, I mean, not to take Trump literally, but to take Trump seriously. And not every utterance of people from his camp or from other camps has to be taken totally seriously. I’m a Protestant, but I’m theologically interested. I saw with certain bewilderment these, you could say this wrestling, this verbal wrestling between the Vatican and then we saw these absurd pictures of Donald Trump, the American president, like posing as some kind of Jesus. But we have seen some similar stuff. I mean, there are people who think that Trump is losing his mind. Well, I don’t hope that’s a sign of that. I don’t know. That’s what the Americans have to find out for themselves. But I would say this is, for me, just an absurd indicator of probable—and I hope I’m wrong—nervousness on the side of the American leadership which realizes that things in the Middle East are not going according to plan. And I think that the American President has put himself under no less stress because he said he wants to finish the war in Ukraine. It’s still going on. He has his vision for Israel, he has his vision for the Middle East, he has his Abraham Accords, which is a great achievement. But now they are somehow not, you know, really, really in the spotlight anymore. You see this war in Iran, he doesn’t seem to find an end, an emergency exit. So probably these verbal entanglements are a symptom of stress. But on the other side, we have seen so many things Trump has said and strange stuff, you know, and I wouldn’t take it too seriously. Of course, the Pope, it’s his duty to criticize, to criticize war-making powers. I mean, this is his duty. And he is also… he’s right when he says it’s a crime to use God for politics, which is not only true for Christians; it’s also true for other religions today. Some powers use God to make politics. That’s always dangerous. And I think this is the ultimate sacrilege. As a Protestant, the people who speak about God meaning themselves… that’s a very dangerous species. We should be careful of these guys. So the Pope is right in saying this. And Trump, of course, he wants to present his point. I wouldn’t give too much attention to that. Peter Thiel… I have been to these lectures in Rome. I have listened to them. Yes, of course. I was there and it was confidential, so I shouldn’t say anything. But I’m smiling when I’m reading the newspapers about these lectures, what he was supposed to have said. My father was a Catholic too. Peter Thiel’s notion of the Vatican is not that the Vatican is the Antichrist. That’s not his position. I made an interview with him in my newspaper and he was explaining what he meant with Antichrist. He said the Antichrist is a worldwide bureaucracy which is grabbing power and putting sand into the eyes of the people, saying, “We save you from the apocalypse, we save you from Armageddon, from the climate catastrophe. We will bring eternal peace.” So Peter Thiel is not against the Vatican. Peter Thiel is not against whatever. You know, he’s concerned about the global bureaucratic state, which he identifies from his studies with that what the Bible called the Antichrist. But there are a lot of theologians who would not accept this description. They have a more narrow definition of the Antichrist. But it was a very interesting lecture and it was on a very high intellectual level. And I think not many politicians who criticize Peter Thiel are capable of having such a lecture themselves. So it was very interesting for me to listen to that.
Okay, one last question. It’s going to be about Türkiye. More specifically, the latest affairs that we’re seeing all around the region is bringing out a new situation where Türkiye and Israel are the new rivals in the region itself. Iran seems to be taking a little bit of a backside. And now that this is recognized by both sides, by both Türkiye and Israel, the rhetoric is getting stronger. Yesterday Mr. Tom Barrack was here and he was asked this very question and he said that it’s only rhetoric, it’s nothing more. These countries do not have to fight, are not on a path to fight. But he’s of course a side note in this situation and he obviously doesn’t want to see these two countries to get into a quarrel like that. But what do you say about this? Do you think in the near future of Middle East you expect a conflict between Israel and Türkiye?
Well, if I listen to certain statements of involved statesmen, there is not much diplomacy there. It’s very confrontational. We have listened yesterday to the Turkish President. Erdogan was very clear in his views. Also the Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, a very thoughtful person, but still with strong words. And I fear that now we are here in a still very serious conflict between Israel and probably Türkiye. I hope as a Swiss, that Türkiye—which under President Erdogan has in a… I’m not talking about interior politics; I don’t want to interfere, this Turks have to sort out themselves what they see appropriate. From outside, I see a very strong head of state, the President, in a smart way, who has positioned Türkiye as a key player of international diplomacy. And I hope that Türkiye can use this weight, this respect it has gained, in order to find a way also to accommodate the legitimate security concerns of Israel. Then I can understand Israel in this sense that Israel has had a lot of wars in the last eight years. It didn’t start these wars. Israel has been built out of a terrible catastrophe which is in the responsibility of the Europeans, especially the Germans, which is the Holocaust. They have created this state of Israel after the Second World War, which was not accepted by some of the nations in the Middle East. And so there were wars; Israel won these wars, they gained territory, they gave this territory back in the philosophy “land for peace.” So they gave the land, they didn’t get the peace. And there is now a new, you can say, more hardline political agenda which says, “Well, after the massacre of Hamas, we switch. We don’t believe in land for peace. Now land is peace.” It’s a bit, you could say, the Russian perspective. Russia was attacked many times. They said, “We need a cordon sanitaire in order to protect ourselves. We start to think in square kilometers.” Problem is, Israel, they start to think the same way. But at the core are legitimate security concerns. I don’t think that Israel is an imperialist power who wants to have an empire reaching from Pakistan to Portugal or, you know, a huge territorial player. But I think there are legitimate security concerns. And Türkiye, as this great moderator, has this great diplomatic force in the center of the world, of this world. I just hope that President Erdogan will find a way in order to bring Israel to the table. Now with Syria, which is very close to Türkiye, they have a great understanding, as far as I could see here, with other powers and the track record of President Erdogan, I think he’s in a unique position to bring here peace. But how this should be, I don’t know. In Switzerland, we say in the Middle East, “This is a biblical conflict.” It’s so hard to find a solution. We are glad that we are not living in this conflict field. We are living in the center of Europe. We had many wars there as well. But thanks God, they are behind us. Let’s hope they are not returning.
If it’s a biblical conflict, then we are all doomed. It’s not a thing.
No, then we are not doomed if it’s a biblical conflict, because then we can say we are all children of God and God didn’t create this world in order that human beings make war all the time. So we just have to find our… There must be a solution. We just haven’t found it yet.
Well, someone said we should be careful when talking about theology, so I should just stop here.
I agree.
Thank you.
Thank you.
In an exclusive exchange conducted by Harici Medya on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum, former Israeli peace negotiator Daniel Levy offers a clinical dissection of the shifting tectonic plates in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Amidst the fog of ongoing negotiations between Washington and Tehran, Levy delineates a region caught between the unpredictable whims of the Trump administration and Israel’s ambitious pursuit of regional hegemony.
Daniel Levy, a senior adviser to the government of former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, was part of the Israeli team that attended the Taba summit with the Palestinians in 2001. He also participated in the second Oslo negotiations in 1995 with then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Between 2012 and 2016, Mr Levy served as Director for the Middle East and North Africa at the European Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently president of the New York-based think tank US/Middle East Project.
The veteran diplomat provides a sobering analysis of the fragile ceasefires in Lebanon and the intrinsic link between Netanyahu’s political survival and the perpetuation of conflict. Crucially, Levy draws attention to a burgeoning sentiment within the Israeli establishment that increasingly frames Türkiye as a long-term strategic challenge, mirroring the rhetoric once reserved for Iran. This profound dialogue serves as a roadmap for understanding the complex interplay of personal egos, military-industrial interests, and the calculated destabilization of state structures across the Levant.
First of all, of course, the talks are going on right now with Iran and United States. There were certain news coming in the morning. First, Donald Trump claimed that everything is fine, the Strait of Hormuz is open. Then things didn’t go that way. It seems that the Americans didn’t open their own blockade and now the Iranians want to go back to closing the Strait themselves. So, so what do you expect from the ongoing talks right now? Which direction do you think that things will lead into?
I think there are three or four basic possibilities, scenarios. One is there is a deal of some kind. Second is there may be some quiet understandings or expectations, but there’s not something you could really announce as a deal. But the American President decides he’s had enough anyway. He declares victory and walks away. Of course, Iran, with equal, if not greater justification, will also declare victory and everyone will give their speeches. But essentially the ceasefire will hold, there’ll be an arrangement in Hormuz, etc. And that could transition later to negotiations. But, so that’s the second scenario. Third scenario is Trump decides that the way to get a deal is to do one big final strike just to show that he’s still the tough guy, he’s the warmongers. The Israelis and others, those inside his administration, convince him to strike again.
Like an amphibious assault. Like a what?
Well, it could be. What I’m saying is there’s another American-Israeli aggression, maybe from Trump. The goal is you escalate to de-escalate like he did in June of 2025. But once you do that, you’re no longer in control of events because Iran will respond. If that’s the third scenario, then either that segues towards a resumption of a prolonged conflict, or that segues towards walking away, declaring victory. Sorry, negotiation. We seem to be more in the non-escalation trajectory at the moment. Even though there are the things going on in Hormuz, which if the Americans are going to blockade, of course the Iranians are as well. So that’s where we are. The problem is in trying to decipher what will happen next. Of course, there are lots of moving parts, but the thing that makes this most difficult is you have an American president who is not only unpredictable, not only incompetent, but also incoherent. He has no strategy and therefore he doesn’t really know why he went to war, what he wants to get out of the war. I know there are people who think that’s naive to claim that; no, of course, there’s American geostrategy. You’re trying to take hold of an important choke point in world energy. It’s good for the American military-industrial complex. All those arguments are fine. There’s an element of that. But that’s not what’s defined this war. What’s defined this war is the fragile ego, the peculiar personality, easy to manipulate, as we saw with Netanyahu. The reports of how Netanyahu went to the White House, went to the Situation Room, told the American president a story which in any other American administration, the experts would say, “Mr. President, now that our guest, the Israeli Prime Minister, has left, here’s what’s really the story. We’re not doing this.” This president fell into the trap that no other president has before. The trap’s been laid before by the Israeli prime minister. So because of those things, it’s more hard to predict than it would otherwise be. And the president, President Trump, can lurch from, you know, one… he can wake up one morning, he’s spoken to someone, he’s heard an interview on Fox TV and make one decision, and then the next morning makes another one. So it seems that he is fed up with the war. He knows that the politics, the economics are difficult for him to manage. But maybe he thinks he’s Jesus again tomorrow and he carries on the war.
The Lebanon part of the war was really on the spotlight because Pakistan was saying one thing, Iran was saying one thing, then the United States and Israel were saying the complete opposite of what they were claiming. So what we have seen from the beginning of those talks with the ceasefire, it seems that the initial discussion was about actually involving Lebanon, too. And now we come to a point where Israel was reluctant to listen to what Donald Trump or the entirety of American systems tells them to do. But now, for some reason, Donald Trump managed to push Israel to hold a ceasefire on their own. So do you think that this is a failure by Israeli government to not be able to hit their war goals, which was reaching out to the Litani River? What do you think about it?
So, first of all, and this is playing out inside Israel, this doesn’t feel like a win on Lebanon. They’ve destroyed things. That’s their modus operandi. But being told, and especially the very particular language that President Trump uses in his Truth Social postings, “Enough.” This isn’t where Israel thought it would be. It also makes it quite clear that this was part of the deal, that it was the Iranians and the Pakistanis who were telling us the truth on Lebanon. It is also probably the clearest indication we have that Trump actually wants to close the escalatory logic of this war and to be in an ending this deal, de-escalation place because he’s imposed this ceasefire in Lebanon on Israel. It also shows us that if the Americans want to impose something on Israel, they can. Not that we needed any proof of that. Because it’s obvious America has the leverage. America gives them the weapons, America gives them the political support. If America says stop, Israel says yes; it tries everything to avoid that. It will continue to try to provoke. So inside Israel, there is a lot of criticism. First, as usual, Israel overestimated its own capacity and underestimated that of its adversary. You had the Northern Commander of the Israeli military saying, “We were surprised by Hezbollah still having this capacity to send rockets to fire on the ground.” But, and the “but” is important. As usual, it’s a ceasefire, Israel style. And it’s a ceasefire that the Americans have accepted, at least in this respect, Israeli stipulations on the ceasefire. Which means Israel is still physically inside Lebanon. So it doesn’t have the larger security buffer, but it has a significant security buffer. In fact, they took additional land inside Lebanon, bordering Syria, in the hours leading up to this declaration. And Israel, according to the document, the text, can act to prevent immediate operations from the other side. But who defines what that is? Who defines what the threat is? As long as Israel defines the threat, it will define it widely. Nonetheless, Israel has been significantly curtailed, which never happens on the Palestinian front, of course.
With Netanyahu government, there are a lot of, maybe conspiracy theories, maybe more normal comments. But people are claiming that Netanyahu is pursuing more and more war around their neighbors and with Iran because he wants to, you know, just keep going in the political scene. If they stop, maybe he’s going to get into a court case, he’s going to get arrested. Do you think that’s the case or do you think that the Israeli government and Israeli state itself wants to pursue these wars?
So I don’t think it has to be one or the other. It can be both. And I think in this case it is both. Netanyahu, who is alive, by the way, in terms of rumors of conspiracy theories… Well, it’s a weekly rumor. Exactly. It has served him politically since October 7th to be a permanent wartime leader, for Israel to be in perpetual war. Every week he’s still supposed to be in court. Every week he still sends his lawyers to the courthouse to say, “I can’t come this week, I’m busy with the war,” which is genuinely what’s happening. It seems like with the election getting closer, he wants these conditions and he has many options: Lebanon, Iran, Gaza, West Bank. So it’s not just a continuation of war, it’s a continuation of war on multiple fronts. There are other elements to this. Economically, part of how Israel has managed its economy is a version of military Keynesianism, which has been to pump money into the economy not only through the military-industrial complex, but also through the compensation that reservists receive. So part of the money in the Israeli economy at the moment is the very generous packages that those who sign up for more and more and more weeks of military service are getting. And Israel went into this war with a low debt-to-GDP ratio, so it has headspace to keep doing that. But then there is the part of this that’s not about Netanyahu, his personal court case and political management. This is about something that goes much deeper. He has support from the opposition. The opposition criticized: “Why didn’t you get the Americans to do more with us in Lebanon? Why didn’t you build more shelters?” They’re actually mad that they stopped. The opposition are just as belligerent in this respect as the Prime Minister. Back when there were discussions over the Israelis being held in Gaza, the opposition would say, “Get the hostages released and then resume the attack. Why don’t you at least get the hostages released?” So this goes much deeper into Israeli conceptual thinking and how the state has gone on a journey to promoting and then manufacturing societal consent for genocide against the Palestinians and war in the region. And so the way one has to understand this is Israel has a vision for regional domination that requires the weakening and collapsing of surrounding states, of any potential power balances or anything that could emerge as a peer competitor. Of course, Israel’s not the only one that has been involved in encouraging the collapse of states. Israel wasn’t the primary actor in Syria for sure. Israel did then go and smash up what was left of what the Syrian successor leadership could have done after Assad fell. And it even includes trying to… there are some states you’re not going to collapse, but you want to co-opt them. You want them to become dependent on Israel, more vulnerable, like the Gulf. Israel’s desired intentional outcome from this war with Iran was that the Gulf would be more weakened. And of course, the Israeli system is very clear in which country next needs to be weakened; it’s a country called Türkiye.
Yeah, I’ll get to that. But firstly, the cost of doing all of that, the road to regional hegemony, if you will. It’s always claimed that it’s Israel’s reputation and Israel’s friendships, all in the West, in Europe, in the United States and everything. But there’s this idea that if this war stops, somehow, not just Iran, all of that stops. Probably Israel has the idea that things will go back to how it was before. There won’t be any sanctions, there won’t be any, quote-unquote, “hard feelings” with the Western countries. Do you think that’s going to be the case? Because when Germany put sanctions on weapons sales to Israel, they waited for a ceasefire in Gaza, and the moment that it took place, there was just no more sanctions or no more ban for weapons sales. So do you think that’s going to happen with European states who right now are showing negative emotions towards Israel’s actions?
So I think this is a project of overreach, of exaggeration, which is typical of a state that goes to a very extreme place, which is the case in Israel today. But the Israeli, Netanyahu and others’ counter-narrative would be: so far it works. So one thing that’s going on here is while we’re in this moment of fluidity and while he still has Trump onside in the White House, and while everyone else is going, “Oh, my God, what do we do with Trump?”—Europeans, Arab allies, even Tier One Asian-American allies—Netanyahu is saying, “Let’s exploit this moment to strengthen our position to the maximum possible, and then things will settle down again, but we’ll be that much stronger.” So the bet he is placing is if Israel is successful enough, then the others won’t have a choice. They’ll be dealing with a much more powerful Israel. You know, as soon as Germany went one way, it went back the other way. And not only went back the other way, Germany has now signed one of its biggest drone manufacturing deals with an Israeli military arms company. So Netanyahu is saying, “Look, if I can pull this thing enough in my direction, if I get more of the Gulf with me, then India will be less reticent about taking sides. It will be more with me. I have the relations with Greece and Cyprus on energy. Maybe I force Lebanese gas to come this way, maybe I force the Syrians into a similar arrangement. Even if we’ve lost image, even if the reputation looks different, power talks and we can lose the campus and we can lose public opinion, but we can retain enough power that people won’t have a choice. And then they’ll basically accept in Europe as well.” Everyone will look at America as unreliable. This is even thinking for a post… kind of how do we function with an America that has reduced power? If we can assert this, others will fall in line. That’s the gamble. That’s the bet that Netanyahu is placing. There is, to my mind, sadly too much evidence that it’s not a crazy bet. Now, I don’t think it’s going to work. I think there will be blowback. I don’t think he can succeed. But that’s what he’s trying to do. And at the moment it’s not clear that he will fail.
Final question. You already mentioned about their will to, you know, have a quarrel with Türkiye. They’re making it evident in the media, they’re making it evident by their politicians and the claims they do. But at the same time yesterday Mr. Tom Barrack was here and he asked the same question if there will be a fight between Israel and Türkiye. And he said that it’s just rhetoric, there’s nothing serious behind it, that they are just being pushed by people around the leaders like Netanyahu and Erdogan. So I would like to ask you, is there a realistic scenario where Türkiye and Israel are going to face each other and what position the United States will take in such case?
So we’re not talking short term, but this is more than rhetoric. Israeli officials go around the world to their friends and they say, “We need to talk to you about Türkiye, why this country is dangerous.” They are beginning to talk about Türkiye in the way they used to talk about Iran. And Iran was not a short-term project. Iran was a decades-long project of creating the conditions for a confrontation. They warn about the Turkish missile program. That’s the language that they use. But it’s not just that. Türkiye would be not a serious actor in statecraft if it wasn’t now testing on the other side, which I’m sure it is, which is to look at… we’re not talking about war in the short term. What we’re looking at is what vulnerabilities can we begin to create or exploit. One should, for instance, see the energy relationship not only with Greece and Cyprus, but with Egypt. And if they can pull, as I said, Lebanon and maybe try and pull Syria just to test… maybe we can’t, but let’s try. Try the first time. If there is a Syria-Israel relationship, they will see where it can go. Now, I’m not saying that will happen; I don’t think it can. But on Lebanon they will try. They may get further. On Syria, they will try. The relationship on the Kurdish front, Israel got a defeat there when the Americans came in and said, “No, we’re not going to,” when the SDF was forced into the climb down that it was forced into with the Syrian state. So they get setbacks as well. Somaliland, the Israeli recognition of… So there are going to be things happening in places that you go, “What was that about?” and then you say, “Oh, okay.” One of the angles to this story, like the Somaliland story, is a Turkish angle. Israel putting a base somewhere next to where Türkiye has an influence. Sudan. Israel’s not a main actor in Sudan, but Israel’s closest friend in the Gulf is a very main actor in Sudan. So let’s see what we can do there. So you will see sometimes under the surface things going on if Israel is able to continue to pursue this. Now, the counterpoint to that is whether you begin to get an alliance in the region which includes containing and deterring Israel as part of its DNA, as part of its mission statement, if you like. And that’s the subtext to a lot of what is going on is whether Israel can pull more people in its direction or whether we get something that begins to look like containment. But if Israel could continue to pick off country after country, one at a time, then it will continue to escalate its future planning in a belligerent way vis-à-vis Türkiye. If it is forced to roll back some of its ambitious domination project, then the Türkiye thing is too much of a stretch.
Thank you so much, sir.
Pleasure.
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