Middle East
The formula of Türkiye-Egypt relation: “The past should remain in the past”
The foreign policy priorities of Turkey, after the presidential elections, can be divided into two categories: to find a position in new Asian initiatives while lowering tensions with the West. The primary factors promoting Turkey’s normalization with its neighbors and Middle Eastern nations are the economic challenges that require this foreign policy direction.
In the normalization train of the Arab states, who assessed the damage after the Arab Spring, Turkey believes there is a wagon set out for it. Following the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, a final settlement in Syria will take up a sizable portion of Ankara’s post-election foreign policy agenda.
On the other side, relations with Egypt have a greater impact, the contacts between Ankara and Cairo are extensive, encompassing Turkey’s contacts with the West in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya. In this context, we interviewed Dalia Ziada, Director of the Center for Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Studies regarding how Egyptians considered about the Turkish election process.
- Egyptian President congratulated President Erdogan. What can that say about a new era which has begun between the two countries?
The Egyptian and Turkish presidents’ phone call in the wake of the elections is an important indication of the sincere intentions of the top policymakers in both countries to start a new page in their relationship. Honestly speaking, there are some giant differences between the perception of each of the two presidents on crucial regional and domestic policies. That includes for example the situation in Libya, the complex maritime conflicts in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Islamists’ right for political participation. However, we are seeing an unprecedented determination by both sides to get over these differences and focus on the common ground of economic and geopolitical cooperation.
Ironically, many observers had expressed their pessimism about the potential of the rapprochement process between Turkey and Egypt to succeed as long as the two heads of state, El-Sisi and Erdogan, remained in power. Yet, in December 2022, the two heads of state met in Doha, warmly saluted each other, and then spent 45 minutes talking about the next steps they should take to overcome the obstacles that kept their countries separated for too long. The friendly encounter between the Turkish and the Egyptian presidents cannot be seen as a standard act of courtesy that happened out of sheer coincidence. It was the climax of a year of backstage arrangements by dedicated diplomatic missions and concerned civil society organizations in both countries.
Since then, the Turkish and Egyptian foreign ministers have been exchanging visits and making public promises about implementing the reconciliation process as soon as the general elections in Turkey are completed. As the election in Turkey has been completed successfully, this week, the two countries need to continue working on completing the reconciliation process for their mutual benefit and the entire region’s benefit.
Mending broken ties between Turkey and Egypt is not only beneficial for the political well-being of the two states. It is equally important for the personal image enhancement of each of the two presidents before their peoples and also before observers from the international community. Egypt is having a presidential election in less than a year. Improving his relationship with President Erdogan will dramatically increase President El-Sisi’s support among the huge Islamist-biased voter base.
- How the Turkish elections resonated in Egypt. What are the prominent evaluations in the Egyptian press?
In general, the Egyptian people are so impressed and inspired by the democratic process in Turkey and the political maturity of the Turkish people who massively participated in the voting at the parliamentary elections and the two rounds of the presidential elections. We wish – we dream – to see a similar democratic process in the coming presidential election which is expected to happen in mid-2024. In other words, the successful democratic practice in Turkey has set the bar high for election processes in Middle East countries, in general, in countries where people are yearning for democratization, such as Egypt and most North Africa countries, in particular.
On another level, the street reaction to President Erdogan’s victory varies greatly from one citizen group to the other. The majority of the Egyptian grassroots citizens, who are mainly characterized by their religious piety, are so excited. They are celebrating President Erdogan’s victory, as they perceive it as a victory of a Muslim idol over the opposition party leaders who exhibited hatred towards Muslims and Arabs.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian intellectual elite, who are mostly secular, are expectedly not so happy with President Erdogan’s victory. Some of them warned that he will encourage the political Islamist groups – such as the Muslim Brotherhood – to seek political competition in Egypt once again and renew the state of political instability in the country. But, in my opinion, that is a little too exaggerated, especially in light of improved ties between the Egyptian and Turkish presidents in the past few months.
On the political stage, most members of the government, political parties, and media agree that it is time for Egypt to reconcile with Turkey and with its elected president. “The past should remain in the past;” they say. That is a healthy attitude, I think, because it will pave the way for a lot of mutual benefits for Egypt and Turkey in the future, and will also be beneficial to the regions of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.
- How do you consider the normalization process between the two countries to proceed after the election? Which steps could be taken initially?
In their first phone call after the successful completion of the Turkish presidential elections, presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi agreed to immediately proceed with their reconciliation process by elevating their diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level. That is a very significant first step for two reasons:
First, it fixes the rift that had been broken between the two states in 2013 and had kept the two countries estranged for ten years. The ambassadors were the first scapegoats to be slaughtered during the dramatic breakup between Egypt and Turkey, then. Each of the two countries immediately declared their mutual ambassadors as persona non grata. Therefore, the return of the ambassadors today is like an official declaration of the end of the decade-long conflict and the beginning of the negotiations phase.
Second, upgrading the diplomatic missions to ambassadorial levels is so crucial to accelerate and facilitate the discussions on critical bilateral and regional issues that represent a conflict of interest between the two states. Right now, the mutual diplomatic missions in both countries are limited in size and scope to the level of chargés d’affaires. Therefore, most negotiations between the two countries had to happen through security channels and intelligence bureaus more often than they happened between diplomatic missions. This caused the reconciliation process to go very slowly in 2021.
The rapprochement process only started to leap when the Turkish ambassador, Salih Mutlu Şen, got hired as charges d’affaires in Cairo, in the second half of 2022. He exerted a tremendous effort to wake the embassy from the dead by directly engaging with ordinary citizens in the Egyptian streets and reaching out to media personnel, civil society organizations, and political groups. That paved the way for a successful meeting between the two presidents, El-Sisi and Erdogan, in November 2022 in Doha. After the presidential meeting, the reconciliation process took a whole new turn.
Therefore, I believe that raising the diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level will allow diplomatic channels to take the lead in the negotiation process, thus accelerating the rapprochement process and improving the quality of the outcomes of future negotiations.
However, that is not enough. There must be direct and personal talks between presidents Erdogan and El-Sisi, at the nearest time possible. It is not a secret that the two leaders adopt divergent – if not contradicting – political ideologies. For example, El-Sisi’s political image is mostly built upon his role in removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 2013. In contrast, Erdogan’s legacy is entirely based on his image as a successful Muslim leader, coming from a political Islamist party, in a secular democratic system of governance. How the two presidents are going to compromise their ideological differences is so important for the success of the reconciliation process between Egypt and Turkey and for ensuring its sustainability in the long term. Such a compromise can only happen through direct face-to-face and heart-to-heart conversations between the two presidents over the coming weeks or months.
In parallel to that, the senior policymakers and government officials from Egypt and Turkey should engage in lengthy discussions about enhancing their areas of cooperation and limiting their areas of conflict. For example, Egypt and Turkey already have a successful record of economic cooperation that can be further improved. In the meantime, there are a lot of areas of potential cooperation between our two militaries, building upon the history of cooperation in the defense industry sector between the two countries. They will also need to discuss their conflicting foreign policies in the Levant region, and the Eastern Mediterranean region, keeping into consideration the concerns and the interests of other key players in these regions, such as Libya, Syria, Greece, and Israel.
Middle East
UNDP estimates $1.38 billion in building damage across southern Lebanon
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Lebanon’s National Council for Scientific Research have released a rapid assessment report on building damage in southern Lebanon.
According to Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar newspaper, the study relied on satellite imagery and geospatial artificial intelligence (GeoAI) technologies to assess externally visible damage to buildings along the southern border between October 23, 2025, and April 29, 2026.
The report found that a total of 11,095 buildings had been completely destroyed in the areas surveyed. Based on an assumed average apartment size of 150 square metres, these destroyed structures are estimated to correspond theoretically to 17,891 housing units.
The volume of debris generated in the region is estimated at 3,107,756 cubic metres.
In addition to the buildings that were completely destroyed, the assessment identified partial damage to 2,242 buildings and minor damage to 9,311 others.
At the housing-unit level, the report estimates that alongside the approximately 17,891 units that were completely destroyed, around 5,219 homes sustained partial damage and 18,282 suffered minor damage.
The report stressed that these housing figures are not based on direct field surveys but on mathematical modelling using average floor-space assumptions and therefore constitute theoretical estimates.
Preliminary cost of building damage estimated at $1.38 billion
The report calculated reconstruction costs using a standard benchmark value of $450 per square metre. On that basis, the total preliminary cost of building damage was estimated at $1.384 billion.
Geographically, Nabatieh Governorate accounted for the largest share of the damage, estimated at $1.053 billion, while losses in South Governorate were assessed at $331 million.
At the district level, preliminary costs were estimated at $688 million in Bint Jbeil, $333 million in Marjayoun, $315 million in Tyre, $32 million in Nabatieh district and $16 million in Sidon.
The report emphasised that these figures cover only external physical damage to buildings and do not represent the final cost of reconstruction or the total economic losses caused by the war.
In Bint Jbeil district, the highest levels of destruction were recorded in Aitaroun, where 1,658 buildings were destroyed, followed by Bint Jbeil city with 1,076, Ayta al-Shaab with 539, Beit Lif with 371, Yaroun with 242 and Ainata with 227.
In Marjayoun district, 969 destroyed buildings were recorded in Mais al-Jabal, 824 in Taybeh, 285 in Houla, 199 in Markaba, 184 in Blida and 174 in Deir Siryan.
In Nabatieh district, 71 buildings were destroyed in Yahmar al-Shaqif, 69 in Zoutar al-Sharqiya and 37 in Kfar Sir. In Tyre district, 370 buildings were completely destroyed in Burj al-Shamali, 216 in Naqoura, 162 in Abbassiyeh, 80 in Tyre city and 65 in al-Mansouri. In Sidon district, destruction was concentrated mainly in Zirariyeh, where 65 buildings were destroyed, and Arzi, where 62 buildings were levelled.
The report also outlined significant limitations that prevent the findings from being treated as a definitive final assessment.
The study did not cover entire administrative districts but was limited to areas where clear satellite imagery was available.
As a result, the area south of the Litani River constituted the main focus, while only limited data from areas north of the river were included. Some municipalities were fully surveyed, while only selected sections of others could be examined.
For example, all cadastral zones in Bint Jbeil district were surveyed. In Tyre district, 74 of 75 cadastral areas were fully covered, while one was only partially included.
In Marjayoun, 17 of 33 areas were fully surveyed and 21 partially covered. In Nabatieh, only four of 52 areas were fully analysed, while 15 were partially examined. In Sidon, none of the 77 areas underwent a complete survey, with only five areas partially included in the assessment.
The report listed several additional limitations:
Critical infrastructure damage, including roads, bridges, electricity networks, water systems and telecommunications facilities, was not assessed.
Damage to underground shelters, basements and non-visible interior sections of buildings could not be detected.
No clear distinction could be made between residential, commercial and industrial structures.
Buildings with minor damage were excluded from debris-volume and cost calculations.
Structural density, shadows and narrow streets introduced potential margins of error in satellite analysis.
No field visits or on-site inspections were conducted to verify the findings. The assessment was carried out entirely through desk-based analysis of satellite imagery.
Given the scale of destruction and confidence in the methodology employed, no on-site verification procedures were undertaken in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces or the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).
UNDP said the findings should be regarded as preliminary planning data and that the scope of the assessment would be expanded as additional satellite imagery and field information become available.
Officials noted that once excluded categories and infrastructure losses are taken into account, the true cost of the destruction in southern Lebanon is likely to be significantly higher than the estimates contained in the report.
Middle East
Iran makes Lebanon ceasefire prerequisite for final agreement with US
Assessments that efforts to restrain Israel in Lebanon are being shaped less in Beirut or Tel Aviv than in closed-door talks between Iranian and American negotiators resurfaced ahead of negotiations in the Swiss town of Bürgenstock.
Unlike the current approach adopted by the Lebanese government, Iran continues to pursue a strategy of leveraging its influence on the ground to secure diplomatic gains.
The Lebanese government, meanwhile, remains committed to a separate negotiating track that critics say facilitates concessions to Israel at the negotiating table in Washington that could not be achieved on the battlefield.
US Vice President JD Vance, who arrived in Switzerland to participate in the latest round of talks, confirmed that efforts to make the ceasefire in Lebanon permanent would be among the negotiations’ top priorities.
According to CNN, citing a diplomatic source familiar with the matter, the US and Iranian delegations agreed to convene an emergency session on the situation in Lebanon as the first item of discussion, placing the issue at the top of the agenda.
US says it faces difficulties over Israeli withdrawal
According to diplomatic sources cited by Al-Akhbar newspaper, US officials informed the Iranian side that Washington had made intensive efforts to persuade the Israeli government to complete a full withdrawal from Lebanon but had encountered significant difficulties in the process.
US officials requested Iranian support in facilitating Hezbollah’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon as part of efforts to enable an Israeli pullout.
The Iranian delegation responded that Hezbollah was an internal Lebanese matter. While indicating that Tehran did not oppose an agreement by the Lebanese authorities on a timetable providing for a rapid Israeli withdrawal, the delegation outlined what it viewed as its own area of responsibility.
Iranian representatives said both Tehran and Washington had committed to implementing measures aimed at ending the war across the region, including in Lebanon, and argued that the United States should exert pressure on Israel not only to uphold a ceasefire but also to withdraw quickly.
Iran reiterates Lebanon condition for final agreement
An Iranian official also told CNN that ending the conflict in Lebanon was the most important item on the Iranian delegation’s agenda.
During the talks, Vice President Vance said Washington would continue working toward peace between Lebanon and Israel and expressed hope that the temporary ceasefire could be transformed into a permanent agreement capable of delivering long-term stability.
Speaking before the session, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said Tehran would not begin negotiations on a final agreement with Washington unless the war in Lebanon was halted, as stipulated in the US-Iran memorandum of understanding.
In a post on X, Baghaei wrote: “It is not possible to move to the negotiation stage for a final agreement unless these provisions are implemented, foremost among them the first clause, which calls for ending the war on all fronts, including Lebanon.”
Military and diplomatic developments ahead of the Bürgenstock talks threatened to undermine the understanding reached between the parties. Following Israeli attacks in Lebanon and what Iran described as an escalation of military tensions in violation of the US-Iran agreement, Tehran announced that it had closed the Strait of Hormuz to traffic.
In a statement, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters said the closure of the strait was only the first step in a series of measures planned by Tehran. Iran’s Foreign Ministry subsequently announced the suspension of the Geneva negotiations with the United States.
Following those developments, reports indicated that Washington intervened and increased pressure on Israel, leading Israeli military commanders to issue definitive orders for a complete halt to military operations in southern Lebanon for the second time within 24 hours.
Israeli media reports said the decision was not taken solely on Tel Aviv’s own initiative and that military operations were curtailed as a result of intense US pressure following Iran’s move in the Strait of Hormuz.
Middle East
US lifts naval blockade of Iran after ceasefire memorandum signed
The United States has lifted its naval blockade of Iran on the orders of President Donald Trump, ending restrictions on vessels entering and leaving Iranian ports.
Announcing the development, the US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the US military was no longer blocking maritime traffic to Iranian ports and had halted all operations related to enforcing the naval blockade.
The statement added that US warships would remain in the region to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement.
The decision to lift the blockade follows the memorandum of understanding signed by the United States and Iran on June 18, aimed at ending the war and reopening the Strait of Hormuz to maritime traffic.
After signing the document in France, where he was attending the G7 summit, Trump sent the agreement to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian for approval.
In a statement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry said a formal signing ceremony between the two delegations, previously scheduled to take place in Geneva on June 19, would no longer be held.
Negotiations to continue in Switzerland
According to Axios, citing sources familiar with the matter, the signing process for the memorandum of understanding was accelerated in order to reopen the Strait of Hormuz to shipping as quickly as possible.
A planned meeting between US and Iranian representatives in Switzerland has not been cancelled. The talks are expected to focus on launching negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programme, with US Vice President James David Vance and Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf set to take part.
According to CNN, the 14-point memorandum calls for an immediate ceasefire on all fronts, the lifting of the naval blockade, the resumption of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, the removal of oil sanctions on Iran and the withdrawal of US troops from areas surrounding Iran.
The agreement also includes the allocation of $300 billion for Iran’s economic reconstruction, the release of $24 billion in frozen Iranian assets and a 60-day negotiation process aimed at reaching a final agreement on the nuclear programme.
In return, the authorities in Tehran pledged not to develop nuclear weapons.
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