The disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean, which have previously brought Lebanon and Israel -two countries with no diplomatic relations to this day- to the brink of war, is about to be resolved once and for all. Although the deal may seem more profitable for Israel from an economic point of view, the political concessions given are still a topic of debate. And it is being argued that the economic upsides of this to Lebanon, a country on the brink of economic collapse, could take some time. However, the fact that the risk of a possible war is now gone even with some gains from the maritime zones claimed by Israel, offers Beirut an opportunity to finally recover.

Israel and Lebanon, which hold no diplomatic relations to this day, have managed to reach an agreement delimiting their maritime jurisdictions. And if the agreement, which is expected to be signed on October 26-27, is approved by the parliaments of both countries, another dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean will finally be resolved.

Signatures for a final agreement are yet to be put up, but there are already debates going on about which country has come out as benefiting more in such grounds of political instability that both countries are in. We have compiled the most debated questions and answers about the history of this maritime border dispute in the region, the dynamics that led the two countries to sign after previously bringing them to the brink of war, and the agreement’s pros and cons.

1-What is the background of this dispute?

Although the disputes over the 860 square kilometer wide maritime area between the two countries has come up with the drilling and exploration activities by both countries in recent years, its origins date back to 2007. An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)  agreement was signed between Lebanon and the Greek Cypriot Administration that year. The transcript of the agreement, which left a gap for other maritime boundary agreements with neighboring countries, has still not been ratified by the Lebanese Parliament. And the formal status of the agreement, which Lebanon still has not sent to the United Nations (UN) for ratification, is still a matter of debate today. The Lebanese Minister’s cabinet has established a committee to review the agreement signed with the Greek Cypriots, and to revise the borders of the EEZ. The Committee has unilaterally notified the UN of the EEZ borders in 2010.

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot Administration has also signed an agreement with Israel in 2010 on delimitation of the EEZ. However, this deal violates a part of the EEZ border set together with Lebanon. And due to the fact that an 860 square kilometer area was shown as belonging to Israel, Lebanon announced to not recognize the Greek Cypriot-Israeli agreement and objected to it, at the UN. The disputed area covers a part of the Karish and Qana Gas Fields off the coast between the two countries.

In 2017, Lebanon agreed upon a consortium of several energy companies such as French TotalEnergies, Italian Eni and Russian Novatek to conduct hydrocarbon exploration at the maritime zones dedicated to its continental shelf, including the previously disputed territory. Works have already begun, and it has been announced that there is enough detected gas reserves for drilling operations, however the French TotalEnergies still required Lebanon to reach an agreement with Israel, in order to begin drilling efforts. Moreover, Lebanon was excluded from the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) just like Turkey, but countries like Israel, Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration was included. And instead of an agreement from the UN-supervised negotiations, a position was taken in which both parties have gained higher ground.

But in 2020, a step came from Israel. The Tel Aviv administration announced that  a contract was given over the Karish gas field, and in the summer of 2021 the Tel Aviv management announced that the British contractor company Energean Power was ready for drilling operations. And when a possible scenario of war came on the agenda with Hezbollah’s announcement that it would target drilling and exploration ships entering the disputed zone, the United States has stepped in.

2-Why would there be an understanding right now?

Europe’s dependence on the Russian gas has come forth as a major problem, now with the Ukraine crisis. Both the European countries and the United States have put up a soft power to end the regional tensions and to focus more on gas production, which they hope could increase European energy diversification.

On the other hand, both Lebanon and Israel have good reasons to avoid risking a possible war. The economic reasons are outweighing for Lebanon, a country that is experiencing one of the most severe economic crises in the history of the country, even more so after the catastrophic explosion at the Port of Beirut. Although it is not quite possible to profit from the gas field being ceded in the short term, the reduction of the conflict risks will surely attract more foreign investors, who had been refraining to make an investment in this country. In a country where 80 percent of the population live below the poverty line and basic public services such as electricity are in an irredeemable situation, a relatively stable political environment could create an opportunity to at least make small recovers.

The resolution of the dispute over Karish gas field near the Tanin field, where billions of cubic meters of natural gas are estimated to be in reserves, will surely ease the economy of Israel, which already got to the stage of gas production in this field. This has been an important source of morale for Israel, which has been liquefying its gas in Egypt and selling it to the European markets for the last two years, in search of an alternative to the Russian gas.

3- What are the contents of this agreement?

Although the full transcript of the agreement has not been officially announced, the statements made by officials from both countries and the details shared by both sides to the public, give a rough idea about the content of the articles.

In light of these information;

Lebanon previously argued that it owned the north of Line 29, which in total covers an area of 1,430 square kilometers. Israel on the other hand, previously claimed the south of Line 1, which is a 860 square kilometer wide zone. And the limitation shown on the map as Line 23, was drawn from the middle of the jurisdictions claimed by both countries, in the preliminary deal.

Lebanon has renounced its claims over the Karish gas field. In return, Lebanon will have the right to explore and exploit the oil and gas reserves in Qana field. However, TotalEnergies, which is the company authorized take drilling operations in this field, will pay a compensation to Tel Aviv for the remaining 17 percent of the field, that was previously under Israeli jurisdiction.

4- What did Lebanon demand and what did it get?

Officials from both countries say their demands have been met. And even Hezbollah, which was previously seen as the biggest obstacle to such an agreement, gave its implicit approval to the agreement. However, Lebanon has given up on its previous claims of;

* All rights over Karish gas field,

* Its claim that the maritime and land borders should be determined simultaneously,

* And also it seems to given up the freedom to choose the company that would take exploration and drilling operations over the Qana field.

Still, given the two countries’ initial maritime claims, it seems that Lebanon has gained more maritime zones than Israel. However, the exact quantity of the hydrocarbon reserves in the region are yet to be known. It is also estimated that it may take three to five years to exploit this gas, so it will not have any direct contributions to the Lebanese economy in the short term. And for the Lebanese economy, which could not suffer through another conflict, the total annihilation of this risk is considered to be a more comforting effect.

5- What did Israel demand and what did it get?

And it seems that Tel Aviv, which has gained full sovereignty in the disputed region and also is already in the process of exploitation of the gas field, can gain more in the short term by focusing on gas production since the threat of Hezbollah is now raveled. Despite its economic benefits, the deal has come under severe political criticism in Israel.

The most spoken criticisms of the agreement from the Israeli politicians and from the public opinion are as follows;

* Israel has made an indirect deal with the terrorists (Hezbollah).

* Israel has failed to get Lebanon to accept the phrase “international maritime border” in the transcript of the agreement. The agreement instead uses the term “no conflict area for the defined limits.

* Although the Israeli authorities say that they will receive a share of the income from the Qana field, there is no such clear statement in the agreement transcript. And it is also not clear the percentage of the income Israel will receive, the source companies, or the terms and conditions of that income percentage. In addition, Israel does not have any right of objection for the company that would work in the region. The only criteria in this context, is that “it is not subject to any international sanctions.”

* This agreement was signed by an caretaker government that does not have a majority in the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), right before the legislative elections. Moreover, the Israeli law requires a public referendum or an absolute majority in the Knesset for any handouts of the Israeli territories or jurisdictions to another country. Although the government that has signed the agreement has acknowledged the transfer of part of the Israeli EEZ to Lebanon, it has still not voted it in through a referendum and neither bringing it to the vote through Knesset, which the government is sure this deal would not pass.

*The Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that an caretaker government cannot make decisions that are binding on the subsequent government, without a valid reason.

The caretaker Prime Minister of Israel, which is going through an election this November, Yair Lapid, who has signed this deal, is less likely to be elected into office than Benjamin Netanyahu, who announced that he will not recognize this maritime deal at all. Netanyahu, who has based his election strategies against his center-left political rivals entirely on right-wing rhetoric, is more likely to be a dark horse. Moreover, it would only be a surprise if a party or an alliance that would run the country for a long time, to form a government all alone. Such uncertainty in the Israeli politics and objections to the contents of it, puts the agreement in the situation of a lame duck, before it is even ratified.