Opinion
The UN Security Council’s Gaza plan and US-China cooperation in the Middle East
On November 17, the UN Security Council reached a rare consensus and adopted Resolution 2803, a comprehensive governance plan for the Gaza Strip proposed by the United States. Through the full implementation of the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (Trump’s 20-Point Plan) put forward by the Trump administration, the aim is to maintain the ceasefire in Gaza, restore humanitarian aid, promote reconstruction and economic recovery in Gaza, and lay the foundation for restarting the “two-state solution.” Since neither China nor Russia voted against it, this marks a very rare moment in the more than two years since the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council maintaining a unified stance. It is expected to help shape a new pattern in Israeli-Palestinian relations, bring new hope for Middle East peace, highlight the United States’ strong geopolitical shaping capability, and reflect China’s rapidly evolving policy adjustment and strategic approach to Middle Eastern hotspot issues.
When draft Resolution 2803 (with the Trump 20-Point Plan as an annex) was submitted for a vote among the 15 Security Council members, it received 13 votes in favor, with China and Russia abstaining, allowing it to pass and become a document representing the highest will of the international community, carrying irresistible legal force and binding obligations on all UN member states. This bridges the long-standing divisions and confrontations in the Security Council over the Gaza conflict and the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the past two to three years, demonstrating the flexibility and appropriate compromise of major powers—particularly China and Russia—when addressing Middle East crises.
Resolution 2803 stipulates the establishment of a Peace Board (Board of Peace, BP), an entity with international legal status, as a transitional administrative body to supervise the Palestinian Authority (PA) in completing its reform plan, ensuring that it can safely and effectively regain control of Gaza and create conditions for Palestinian self-determination and statehood.
The resolution authorizes the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), which, under the unified command of the Peace Board and in cooperation with Israel, Egypt, and newly trained Palestinian police forces, will ensure border security, dismantle military and attack facilities, promote demilitarization, protect civilians, and secure humanitarian aid corridors. Funding will come from voluntary contributions and a dedicated trust fund, with the World Bank and other financial institutions participating in reconstruction financing. The operations of the Peace Board and the Stabilization Force will be subject to international oversight, with progress reports submitted to the Security Council every six months. The mandate is valid until the end of 2027. Countries participating in the Stabilization Force must be approved by Egypt and Israel, and the mission can only end once Israel deems that appropriate demilitarization and the elimination of threats have been achieved.
The overall objective of the resolution is to achieve ceasefire, reconstruction, stability, and peace in Gaza under international coordination, thereby laying the foundation for long-term peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis and for the future construction of a Palestinian state. Although the resolution does not emphasize whether the international stabilization force will be responsible for disarming Gaza’s armed groups, including Hamas, nor does it clearly define its organizational structure, mandate, or participation criteria, it contains positive indications that the Palestinian Authority will effectively and safely administer Gaza after reforms. Considering Israel’s strong resistance to the United Nations, Resolution 2803 downplays the role of the UN and the Security Council in active involvement or oversight, though it does mention them.
After the adoption of Resolution 2803, Hamas—long-term controller of the Gaza Strip—expressed dissatisfaction, condemning the resolution for attempting to impose international trusteeship over Gaza and potentially advancing a governance plan favoring Israel. It explicitly rejected any form of international trusteeship, foreign military presence, or the establishment of international bases in Gaza, arguing that such arrangements would directly violate Palestinian national sovereignty.
Israel, on the other hand, demonstrated divided perceptions and stances. Israeli President Herzog praised it as “a rather incredible moment in world politics, a situation that only President Trump could have brought about, and of course, he also brought back all our hostages. We must create a hopeful future, and I hope that this Security Council resolution, along with civic activities and new initiatives… will bring some positive results.” However, Prime Minister Netanyahu and right-wing and far-right factions expressed dissatisfaction, arguing that the resolution contains the possibility of allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state and does not clearly mandate the complete disarmament of Hamas or full demilitarization in Gaza. Netanyahu asserted that regardless of how difficult the future may be, Gaza must be “demilitarized” and Hamas must be “disarmed.”
Regarding this U.S.-led draft resolution supported by several Arab and Islamic countries, China and Russia—who allowed its passage through abstention rather than veto—each issued clarifying remarks afterward to emphasize their reservations or dissatisfaction.
China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, stated that the Security Council must ensure a lasting ceasefire, address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and begin reconstruction, but expressed “deep concern” over the unclear structure and mandate of the Peace Board and International Stabilization Force.
Fu Cong said that China believes the draft pays too little attention to Palestine and fails to explicitly affirm Palestinian sovereignty and the “two-state solution.” “The draft resolution does not reflect the basic principle that ‘Palestinians should govern Palestine.’ Gaza belongs to the Palestinian people, not to anyone else,” he said, expressing concern over the resolution’s failure to “ensure the effective participation of the UN and its Security Council.” He stated that due to these concerns and regional positions, China cast an abstention vote.
Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Nebenzya, stated that Russia could not support the draft, arguing that it undermines the framework of the “two-state solution” and improperly grants the “International Stabilization Force” peacekeeping authority, effectively making it a party to the conflict. In addition, Nebenzya warned that the draft could serve as a cover for the United States and Israel to conduct “experiments” in the occupied Palestinian territories. He also recalled previous U.S.-driven initiatives that ran counter to their declared objectives.
Objectively speaking, although China and Russia pointed out many ambiguities and inappropriate elements in the draft resolution, their decision not to veto it indicates that both countries generally recognize the positive intention of promoting a ceasefire in Gaza, restoring humanitarian assistance, and focusing on postwar reconstruction and long-term arrangements, despite the imperfect path to implementation. In other words, faced with more than two years of disaster in Gaza, accepting this U.S.-backed plan—which attempts to consider multiple interests yet still favors Israel—amounts to “choosing the lesser of two evils.”
Since the “Sixth Middle East War” was triggered by a new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023, it has expanded from the Israeli-Palestinian arena to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. More than ten regional states and external powers have become involved. The conflict ultimately led Israel and the United States into direct war with Iran, the unexpected collapse of the Syrian government, and Qatar being bombed by Israel despite its innocence. Warfare has erupted across the Middle East, with flames spreading in all directions. Most distressingly, 2.3 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have endured an unprecedented national catastrophe. The civilized world has witnessed the killings and genocidal acts committed by one of the most brutally behaving state actors.
During this period, because the United States repeatedly blocked and vetoed ceasefire proposals, continually “handing knives” to Israel and even directly acting as an accomplice to its militarism, the battlefield in the Middle East kept expanding and slipping out of control. Only when it eventually backfired on core U.S. interests and international reputation did the Trump administration introduce the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (Trump’s 20-Point Plan). Through strong pressure on Israel’s right-wing factions, a partially incomplete ceasefire in Gaza was finally achieved, paving the way for the Security Council to consider a new governance framework for Gaza and a new configuration for Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Frankly, this draft resolution represents the result of strenuous diplomatic effort and extensive mediation by the Trump administration and only managed to gain broad support with difficulty. Inevitably, it is filled with loopholes, deliberate ambiguities, and a lack of detail, constituting a peace roadmap that must address the concerns of all parties—an unavoidable “rushed solution.” Therefore, dissatisfaction from the parties involved, especially the bitterly opposed Israel and Hamas, is entirely expected, as both sides currently adhere to zero-sum thinking on several issues.
Resolution 2803, which reflects Trump’s Middle East foreign policy—particularly his approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—passed smoothly in the Security Council. This reflects the international community’s consensus and determination to end Gaza’s suffering as soon as possible, restore peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and ultimately implement the “two-state solution.” It also represents a diplomatic victory for the United States in leading Middle East peace efforts, shaping the regional order, and demonstrating its status and influence as a superpower. It may help offset the frustration and distrust Middle Eastern states have felt toward the U.S. due to a series of previous policy failures.
In addition, the endorsement of the Gaza governance plan through a Security Council resolution strengthens and continues Trump’s Middle East policy from version 1.0 to 2.0. During his first term, Trump—marked by a distinctly pro-Israel stance—broke long-standing taboos of previous U.S. administrations by moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, introducing the “Deal of the Century,” which unilaterally compromised core Palestinian interests, cutting off contact with the Palestinian Authority, drastically reducing or completely halting humanitarian aid to Palestinians, withdrawing from UNESCO (which was considered sympathetic to Palestine), and successfully pushing four Arab states to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel, thereby expanding the pro-peace and reconciliation camp in the Middle East.
In his second term, Trump inherited a Middle East already engulfed in war. While ensuring U.S. leadership, he provided Israel with unwavering and unlimited support, even jointly striking Iranian nuclear facilities with Israel. At the same time, he worked to prevent the expansion of war, to limit its intensity, and to keep the United States out of a new quagmire. This included ultimately reaching a ceasefire agreement with Yemen’s Houthi movement, advancing normalization with post-transition Syria, and exerting pressure on multiple parties—including Israel—to prevent further regional destabilization, particularly to achieve a Gaza ceasefire as quickly as possible. Trump also successfully brought Kazakhstan into the Abraham Accords, expanding the Middle East peace process into Central Asia and into Muslim-majority states beyond the Arab world.
The adoption of Resolution 2803 marks a new milestone, indicating that the United States has once again become the key external power in Middle Eastern diplomacy and that Washington has returned to a central decision-making position in regional affairs. This will undoubtedly enhance the United States’ global political influence and leadership, strengthening its presence and discourse power in the Middle East. A few days earlier, under U.S. leadership, the Security Council adopted a resolution on November 14 extending sanctions on Yemen, condemning Houthi attacks, reaffirming the arms embargo, and adding new maritime inspection measures.
At the moment the UN Security Council voted on Resolution 2803, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made a highly publicized visit to the United States and may receive “U.S. ally” treatment, including the purchase of F-35 fighter jets. Prior to the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” Saudi Arabia and the United States were actively negotiating a military alliance. Washington’s conditions required Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel and drastically reduce economic, technological, and military cooperation with China. The Gaza war and the resulting unprecedented humanitarian disaster caused a major reversal in Saudi positions, with Riyadh reiterating that the Palestinian issue must be resolved first before Saudi-Israeli reconciliation can occur. As the Gaza ceasefire takes hold and U.S.-led reconstruction begins, the future direction of Saudi-U.S. and Saudi-Israeli relations has drawn close attention.
Observers have also noted that in 2023 China successfully mediated an end to the seven-year rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran, creating a diplomatic sensation and astonishing the world. In 2024 China facilitated a broad consensus among 14 Palestinian factions in Beijing. At a time when the United States was preoccupied with elections and unwilling to engage deeply in Middle Eastern affairs, international opinion exclaimed that China’s diplomacy in the region had become powerful, dynamic, and highly productive, and that Beijing seemed to have replaced Washington as the diplomatic decision-making center of the Middle East.
However, subsequent major developments in the Middle East delivered heavy setbacks to China’s regional diplomacy: Hamas leader Haniyeh, who participated in Beijing’s reconciliation talks, was openly assassinated by Israel in Tehran; Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—whose regime had survived with China’s support—was unexpectedly overthrown; Iran, which had signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with China, lost large portions of its sphere of influence; Russia, China’s “comprehensive strategic coordination partner for the new era,” was forced to abandon Syria, its only Cold War asset in the Middle East; China had to conduct large-scale evacuations from Syria, Israel, and Iran; China’s efforts to build a high-quality Belt and Road Initiative with Middle Eastern states suffered from the effects of war; the Red Sea route—China’s main trade corridor to Europe—faced severe security threats, increasing trade costs.
Recently, as new opportunities have emerged in the Middle East and China-U.S. relations have gradually stabilized with multiple agreements reached at the Busan summit, China has significantly adjusted its policies and strategies regarding regional hotspots. This includes actively seeking cooperation with the United States on the Gaza ceasefire and Red Sea governance and twice abstaining to allow U.S.-led Security Council resolutions to pass. Most notably, China rapidly shifted its stance toward the Syrian transitional government, received its foreign minister for the first time, and issued a joint communiqué outlining the future of bilateral relations. These new developments indicate that China’s Middle East diplomacy is becoming more flexible, adapting to changing circumstances and evolving conditions.
Looking ahead, with the Middle East moving in a positive direction and China-U.S. relations continuing to stabilize, China will keep consulting and cooperating with the United States on regional governance. It will also work to explore its potential and leverage its strengths in promoting Syria’s comprehensive reconstruction, Gaza’s postwar administration, ending Yemen’s “one country, three governments” situation, and restoring Red Sea maritime security, helping create a new landscape of peace and stability in the Middle East.
The saying “even an impartial judge struggles to settle family disputes” applies. China’s strength in the Middle East lies in its lack of deep entanglements with any party to the conflicts and its ability to communicate with all sides, especially various Palestinian factions and parties within Yemen. However, the challenge remains that internal reconciliation and integration—whether in Palestine or Yemen—are extremely difficult and complex. This means China’s regional diplomacy, particularly its mediation efforts, will require greater wisdom, determination, and investment.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
What did the Israeli attack in Syria reveal?
Following Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Syria on August 18, relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv have reportedly broken down. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Sheybani announced in the wake of the attack that all communication with Israel had been severed. “We anticipate that talks regarding a security agreement with Israel will resume in the near future. At present, we do not trust Israel. Our priority is the cessation of attacks against our sovereign territory,” he stated.
The minister’s utter helplessness reverberates through his words.
The post-Assad regime in Damascus ascended to power on the back of American and Israeli support. Consequently, the United States and Israel stand as the primary arbiters of Syria’s destiny. It is precisely for this reason that the Damascus administration has abandoned all claims to its rights over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights—virtually resigning itself to the occupation and striking it from the agenda. Upon seizing power, it pledged immediate fealty to Washington: “We will pose no security threat to Israel, and we shall thwart anyone who attempts to do so.” It operated under the delusion that it could forge a functional relationship with Israel—led by Netanyahu, a perpetrator of genocide and a convicted war criminal—by appeasing it through concessions. It was gravely mistaken.
For Israel currently holds sway over a substantial portion of Syrian territory. It establishes military outposts across the country, carries out airstrikes at will, and deploys its armor unimpeded.
Similarly, the Israeli-backed PYD-YPG terrorist organization exercises control over an expanse of land vastly disproportionate to its actual strength—territory exceptionally rich in energy resources—solely through the patronage of the US and Israel. Leveraging that very support, it wrenches outsized political, military, and administrative concessions from the Damascus government.
Evidently, the displacement of Iranian and Russian influence in Syria by that of the United States and Israel has brought profound satisfaction to certain circles in our country. Yet what these quarters fail to see, refuse to see, or cannot bring themselves to acknowledge even when confronted with it, is this fundamental reality: Washington envisions a Middle Eastern order wherein Israel commands supremacy, projects expanding power, and dictates terms, while Türkiye raises no objection whatsoever and instead accommodates itself to this architecture. To compel Türkiye’s acquiescence, the US is actively deploying its vast and varied arsenal of leverage.
Lest we forget, the United States had already brought several Arab states to the desired threshold through the Abraham Accords. That process was ultimately intended to culminate in the open, formal consecration of the de facto rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That trajectory has not been abandoned; it has merely been placed on ice for the time being. Behind the scenes, Washington maintains an intense flurry of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Once the wider Middle East, the Islamic world, and the Arab sphere have been fully conditioned to accept the ongoing reality in Gaza—and once the oppressed, grieving, and beleaguered Palestinian people have been driven entirely from their ancestral homeland—this shelved agenda will be revived.
We know that the Zionist establishment in Israel, aligned with American imperialism, chose not to strike Iran first before confronting the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, the Shia Crescent, and Tehran’s proxy forces. It executed the exact inverse: it struck first at Syria, at Hamas in Palestine, and at Hezbollah in Lebanon. Only after eroding their efficacy did it turn its sights directly upon Iran. In Syria, the previous regime held out far longer than anticipated—enduring for 13 years and 8 months. As a consequence of the civil war that erupted in March 2011, Assad was ultimately overthrown, finding refuge in Moscow.
When 61 years of Baathist rule, including 53 years of the Assad dynasty, came to a close in December 2024, the emergent regime in Damascus wasted no time in pledging its allegiance to the United States, to Israel, and to the Arab states that backed it, chief among them Saudi Arabia. It proclaimed that it would erect a bulwark against Iran, raise not the slightest objection to Israel, and execute Washington’s directives to the letter.
A broad demographic in Türkiye that welcomed this turn of events swiftly began asserting—under the banner of religious and sectarian fraternity—that this transition worked entirely in Türkiye’s favor. The sheer fallacy of this premise was exposed in short order.
And how was it exposed?
It was exposed by Israel immediately laying the groundwork for a Syria partitioned into four enclaves (Druze, Kurdish, Alawite, and Arab). It was exposed by the renewed revelation that the US-Israel axis intends, sooner or later, to carve up Syria along sectarian and ethnic fault lines—mirroring the precedents of Lebanon and Iraq—in a country roughly composed of 70 percent Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Alawites, 10 percent Kurds, 5 percent Christians, and 5 percent Druze and Turkmens.
It was exposed by the fact that the PYD-YPG terrorist organization, even if denied the entirety of its territorial ambitions, has managed to secure a portion of its political, military, and administrative demands through US–Israeli patronage, thereby being permitted to preserve its existence by settling for a reduced perimeter.
And it was exposed by the resilience of Iran, which, despite suffering immense exhaustion and attrition in the face of American and Israeli aggression, refused to capitulate and maintained its resistance. It was exposed by the failure of the US-Israel tandem to achieve its overarching political and military objectives in Iran, bringing to the fore once again the undeniable truth that Iran possesses an institutionalized state tradition, a national consciousness, and an armed force of a depth and resilience that defy any comparison to Libya, Iraq, or Syria.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
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