Opinion
The UN Security Council’s Gaza plan and US-China cooperation in the Middle East
On November 17, the UN Security Council reached a rare consensus and adopted Resolution 2803, a comprehensive governance plan for the Gaza Strip proposed by the United States. Through the full implementation of the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (Trump’s 20-Point Plan) put forward by the Trump administration, the aim is to maintain the ceasefire in Gaza, restore humanitarian aid, promote reconstruction and economic recovery in Gaza, and lay the foundation for restarting the “two-state solution.” Since neither China nor Russia voted against it, this marks a very rare moment in the more than two years since the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council maintaining a unified stance. It is expected to help shape a new pattern in Israeli-Palestinian relations, bring new hope for Middle East peace, highlight the United States’ strong geopolitical shaping capability, and reflect China’s rapidly evolving policy adjustment and strategic approach to Middle Eastern hotspot issues.
When draft Resolution 2803 (with the Trump 20-Point Plan as an annex) was submitted for a vote among the 15 Security Council members, it received 13 votes in favor, with China and Russia abstaining, allowing it to pass and become a document representing the highest will of the international community, carrying irresistible legal force and binding obligations on all UN member states. This bridges the long-standing divisions and confrontations in the Security Council over the Gaza conflict and the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the past two to three years, demonstrating the flexibility and appropriate compromise of major powers—particularly China and Russia—when addressing Middle East crises.
Resolution 2803 stipulates the establishment of a Peace Board (Board of Peace, BP), an entity with international legal status, as a transitional administrative body to supervise the Palestinian Authority (PA) in completing its reform plan, ensuring that it can safely and effectively regain control of Gaza and create conditions for Palestinian self-determination and statehood.
The resolution authorizes the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF), which, under the unified command of the Peace Board and in cooperation with Israel, Egypt, and newly trained Palestinian police forces, will ensure border security, dismantle military and attack facilities, promote demilitarization, protect civilians, and secure humanitarian aid corridors. Funding will come from voluntary contributions and a dedicated trust fund, with the World Bank and other financial institutions participating in reconstruction financing. The operations of the Peace Board and the Stabilization Force will be subject to international oversight, with progress reports submitted to the Security Council every six months. The mandate is valid until the end of 2027. Countries participating in the Stabilization Force must be approved by Egypt and Israel, and the mission can only end once Israel deems that appropriate demilitarization and the elimination of threats have been achieved.
The overall objective of the resolution is to achieve ceasefire, reconstruction, stability, and peace in Gaza under international coordination, thereby laying the foundation for long-term peaceful coexistence between Palestinians and Israelis and for the future construction of a Palestinian state. Although the resolution does not emphasize whether the international stabilization force will be responsible for disarming Gaza’s armed groups, including Hamas, nor does it clearly define its organizational structure, mandate, or participation criteria, it contains positive indications that the Palestinian Authority will effectively and safely administer Gaza after reforms. Considering Israel’s strong resistance to the United Nations, Resolution 2803 downplays the role of the UN and the Security Council in active involvement or oversight, though it does mention them.
After the adoption of Resolution 2803, Hamas—long-term controller of the Gaza Strip—expressed dissatisfaction, condemning the resolution for attempting to impose international trusteeship over Gaza and potentially advancing a governance plan favoring Israel. It explicitly rejected any form of international trusteeship, foreign military presence, or the establishment of international bases in Gaza, arguing that such arrangements would directly violate Palestinian national sovereignty.
Israel, on the other hand, demonstrated divided perceptions and stances. Israeli President Herzog praised it as “a rather incredible moment in world politics, a situation that only President Trump could have brought about, and of course, he also brought back all our hostages. We must create a hopeful future, and I hope that this Security Council resolution, along with civic activities and new initiatives… will bring some positive results.” However, Prime Minister Netanyahu and right-wing and far-right factions expressed dissatisfaction, arguing that the resolution contains the possibility of allowing the establishment of a Palestinian state and does not clearly mandate the complete disarmament of Hamas or full demilitarization in Gaza. Netanyahu asserted that regardless of how difficult the future may be, Gaza must be “demilitarized” and Hamas must be “disarmed.”
Regarding this U.S.-led draft resolution supported by several Arab and Islamic countries, China and Russia—who allowed its passage through abstention rather than veto—each issued clarifying remarks afterward to emphasize their reservations or dissatisfaction.
China’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Fu Cong, stated that the Security Council must ensure a lasting ceasefire, address the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, and begin reconstruction, but expressed “deep concern” over the unclear structure and mandate of the Peace Board and International Stabilization Force.
Fu Cong said that China believes the draft pays too little attention to Palestine and fails to explicitly affirm Palestinian sovereignty and the “two-state solution.” “The draft resolution does not reflect the basic principle that ‘Palestinians should govern Palestine.’ Gaza belongs to the Palestinian people, not to anyone else,” he said, expressing concern over the resolution’s failure to “ensure the effective participation of the UN and its Security Council.” He stated that due to these concerns and regional positions, China cast an abstention vote.
Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Nebenzya, stated that Russia could not support the draft, arguing that it undermines the framework of the “two-state solution” and improperly grants the “International Stabilization Force” peacekeeping authority, effectively making it a party to the conflict. In addition, Nebenzya warned that the draft could serve as a cover for the United States and Israel to conduct “experiments” in the occupied Palestinian territories. He also recalled previous U.S.-driven initiatives that ran counter to their declared objectives.
Objectively speaking, although China and Russia pointed out many ambiguities and inappropriate elements in the draft resolution, their decision not to veto it indicates that both countries generally recognize the positive intention of promoting a ceasefire in Gaza, restoring humanitarian assistance, and focusing on postwar reconstruction and long-term arrangements, despite the imperfect path to implementation. In other words, faced with more than two years of disaster in Gaza, accepting this U.S.-backed plan—which attempts to consider multiple interests yet still favors Israel—amounts to “choosing the lesser of two evils.”
Since the “Sixth Middle East War” was triggered by a new round of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in October 2023, it has expanded from the Israeli-Palestinian arena to the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf. More than ten regional states and external powers have become involved. The conflict ultimately led Israel and the United States into direct war with Iran, the unexpected collapse of the Syrian government, and Qatar being bombed by Israel despite its innocence. Warfare has erupted across the Middle East, with flames spreading in all directions. Most distressingly, 2.3 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip have endured an unprecedented national catastrophe. The civilized world has witnessed the killings and genocidal acts committed by one of the most brutally behaving state actors.
During this period, because the United States repeatedly blocked and vetoed ceasefire proposals, continually “handing knives” to Israel and even directly acting as an accomplice to its militarism, the battlefield in the Middle East kept expanding and slipping out of control. Only when it eventually backfired on core U.S. interests and international reputation did the Trump administration introduce the “Comprehensive Plan to End the Gaza Conflict” (Trump’s 20-Point Plan). Through strong pressure on Israel’s right-wing factions, a partially incomplete ceasefire in Gaza was finally achieved, paving the way for the Security Council to consider a new governance framework for Gaza and a new configuration for Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Frankly, this draft resolution represents the result of strenuous diplomatic effort and extensive mediation by the Trump administration and only managed to gain broad support with difficulty. Inevitably, it is filled with loopholes, deliberate ambiguities, and a lack of detail, constituting a peace roadmap that must address the concerns of all parties—an unavoidable “rushed solution.” Therefore, dissatisfaction from the parties involved, especially the bitterly opposed Israel and Hamas, is entirely expected, as both sides currently adhere to zero-sum thinking on several issues.
Resolution 2803, which reflects Trump’s Middle East foreign policy—particularly his approach to resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—passed smoothly in the Security Council. This reflects the international community’s consensus and determination to end Gaza’s suffering as soon as possible, restore peace between Israelis and Palestinians, and ultimately implement the “two-state solution.” It also represents a diplomatic victory for the United States in leading Middle East peace efforts, shaping the regional order, and demonstrating its status and influence as a superpower. It may help offset the frustration and distrust Middle Eastern states have felt toward the U.S. due to a series of previous policy failures.
In addition, the endorsement of the Gaza governance plan through a Security Council resolution strengthens and continues Trump’s Middle East policy from version 1.0 to 2.0. During his first term, Trump—marked by a distinctly pro-Israel stance—broke long-standing taboos of previous U.S. administrations by moving the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, introducing the “Deal of the Century,” which unilaterally compromised core Palestinian interests, cutting off contact with the Palestinian Authority, drastically reducing or completely halting humanitarian aid to Palestinians, withdrawing from UNESCO (which was considered sympathetic to Palestine), and successfully pushing four Arab states to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel, thereby expanding the pro-peace and reconciliation camp in the Middle East.
In his second term, Trump inherited a Middle East already engulfed in war. While ensuring U.S. leadership, he provided Israel with unwavering and unlimited support, even jointly striking Iranian nuclear facilities with Israel. At the same time, he worked to prevent the expansion of war, to limit its intensity, and to keep the United States out of a new quagmire. This included ultimately reaching a ceasefire agreement with Yemen’s Houthi movement, advancing normalization with post-transition Syria, and exerting pressure on multiple parties—including Israel—to prevent further regional destabilization, particularly to achieve a Gaza ceasefire as quickly as possible. Trump also successfully brought Kazakhstan into the Abraham Accords, expanding the Middle East peace process into Central Asia and into Muslim-majority states beyond the Arab world.
The adoption of Resolution 2803 marks a new milestone, indicating that the United States has once again become the key external power in Middle Eastern diplomacy and that Washington has returned to a central decision-making position in regional affairs. This will undoubtedly enhance the United States’ global political influence and leadership, strengthening its presence and discourse power in the Middle East. A few days earlier, under U.S. leadership, the Security Council adopted a resolution on November 14 extending sanctions on Yemen, condemning Houthi attacks, reaffirming the arms embargo, and adding new maritime inspection measures.
At the moment the UN Security Council voted on Resolution 2803, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman made a highly publicized visit to the United States and may receive “U.S. ally” treatment, including the purchase of F-35 fighter jets. Prior to the outbreak of the “Sixth Middle East War,” Saudi Arabia and the United States were actively negotiating a military alliance. Washington’s conditions required Riyadh to normalize relations with Israel and drastically reduce economic, technological, and military cooperation with China. The Gaza war and the resulting unprecedented humanitarian disaster caused a major reversal in Saudi positions, with Riyadh reiterating that the Palestinian issue must be resolved first before Saudi-Israeli reconciliation can occur. As the Gaza ceasefire takes hold and U.S.-led reconstruction begins, the future direction of Saudi-U.S. and Saudi-Israeli relations has drawn close attention.
Observers have also noted that in 2023 China successfully mediated an end to the seven-year rift between Saudi Arabia and Iran, creating a diplomatic sensation and astonishing the world. In 2024 China facilitated a broad consensus among 14 Palestinian factions in Beijing. At a time when the United States was preoccupied with elections and unwilling to engage deeply in Middle Eastern affairs, international opinion exclaimed that China’s diplomacy in the region had become powerful, dynamic, and highly productive, and that Beijing seemed to have replaced Washington as the diplomatic decision-making center of the Middle East.
However, subsequent major developments in the Middle East delivered heavy setbacks to China’s regional diplomacy: Hamas leader Haniyeh, who participated in Beijing’s reconciliation talks, was openly assassinated by Israel in Tehran; Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—whose regime had survived with China’s support—was unexpectedly overthrown; Iran, which had signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with China, lost large portions of its sphere of influence; Russia, China’s “comprehensive strategic coordination partner for the new era,” was forced to abandon Syria, its only Cold War asset in the Middle East; China had to conduct large-scale evacuations from Syria, Israel, and Iran; China’s efforts to build a high-quality Belt and Road Initiative with Middle Eastern states suffered from the effects of war; the Red Sea route—China’s main trade corridor to Europe—faced severe security threats, increasing trade costs.
Recently, as new opportunities have emerged in the Middle East and China-U.S. relations have gradually stabilized with multiple agreements reached at the Busan summit, China has significantly adjusted its policies and strategies regarding regional hotspots. This includes actively seeking cooperation with the United States on the Gaza ceasefire and Red Sea governance and twice abstaining to allow U.S.-led Security Council resolutions to pass. Most notably, China rapidly shifted its stance toward the Syrian transitional government, received its foreign minister for the first time, and issued a joint communiqué outlining the future of bilateral relations. These new developments indicate that China’s Middle East diplomacy is becoming more flexible, adapting to changing circumstances and evolving conditions.
Looking ahead, with the Middle East moving in a positive direction and China-U.S. relations continuing to stabilize, China will keep consulting and cooperating with the United States on regional governance. It will also work to explore its potential and leverage its strengths in promoting Syria’s comprehensive reconstruction, Gaza’s postwar administration, ending Yemen’s “one country, three governments” situation, and restoring Red Sea maritime security, helping create a new landscape of peace and stability in the Middle East.
The saying “even an impartial judge struggles to settle family disputes” applies. China’s strength in the Middle East lies in its lack of deep entanglements with any party to the conflicts and its ability to communicate with all sides, especially various Palestinian factions and parties within Yemen. However, the challenge remains that internal reconciliation and integration—whether in Palestine or Yemen—are extremely difficult and complex. This means China’s regional diplomacy, particularly its mediation efforts, will require greater wisdom, determination, and investment.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
Gaza exposes the myth of the “most moral army in the world”
Haider Al-Aila, Gaza

Calling the Israeli military the “most moral army in the world” is a claim thoroughly shattered by the facts on the ground and the atrocities committed against the Palestinian people. What morality can an army claim when it massacres civilians, collapses homes on top of families, loots private property, and desecrates the dead—all while its leadership projects an air of moral supremacy to the world?
Morality is not measured by slogans or military technology; it is defined by how force is applied and the degree of respect shown for human life and dignity. From this perspective, Israel’s devastating war on Gaza reveals systematic, criminal practices that cannot be justified under any pretext of security or self-defense.
When killing becomes a display of power
Among the most harrowing dimensions of this war is the relentless bombardment that turns inhabited homes into mass graves, with utter disregard for women, children, and the elderly. In the densely populated Gaza Strip, widespread strikes have decimated entire neighborhoods, burying thousands of families beneath the rubble.
Equally horrifying are the reports of mass graves uncovered near Al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City and Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis. These sites revealed the bodies of women and the elderly, some bearing signs of execution, binding, and stripped of clothing. Eyewitnesses documented similar mass graves near the Indonesian Hospital in northern Gaza. The United Nations has rightfully demanded independent, transparent investigations to establish accountability for these apparent war crimes.
The sanctity of the dead is a fundamental human right. Any violation of this principle demands rigorous investigation and prosecution—free from diplomatic cover or denial.
A single target as a pretext to level entire blocks
I do not speak here merely from reports; I speak as a firsthand witness in Gaza. I have watched entire residential blocks—housing vulnerable families—flattened under the pretext of targeting a single individual. Time and again, the Israeli military has tracked a target via reconnaissance drones, waited until he entered a crowded residential building, and then brought the entire structure down. In doing so, they have wiped out dozens of civilians who had absolutely no connection to the individual being pursued.
This reality raises a damning question: If an army possesses the surveillance technology to track a target with surgical precision, why wait to destroy the building while innocent civilians are inside? What crime did these families commit to pay with their lives?
Deliberately subjecting civilians to catastrophic harm without taking the legally required precautions cannot be excused by the presence of a target. It is a direct violation of International Humanitarian Law and constitutes unlawful collective punishment. These are not abstract statistics or fleeting screen images to me; they are the lived realities of families wiped out in an instant.
Looting at gunpoint
The degradation extends beyond killing and physical destruction. Human rights organizations and a 2024 UN Commission of Inquiry have documented widespread instances of Israeli soldiers looting Palestinian homes—stealing cash, gold, jewelry, and electronics.
Compounding the crime, soldiers have frequently posted videos on social media mocking the victims, showing off stolen goods, and celebrating the destruction of civilian property. Pillaging the belongings of displaced or deceased civilians is not military heroism; it is a war crime and an assault on human dignity.
The racism that precedes the bullet
These actions cannot be separated from a dehumanizing, racist discourse that treats Palestinians as subhuman and undeserving of life. When national supremacy is normalized and Palestinian lives are deemed worthless, military atrocities become the inevitable outcome. In the eyes of an indoctrinated soldier, a dehumanized population becomes an open target for slaughter, torture, and humiliation.
This is not a condemnation of Jewish people, who are not a monolith; rather, it is an indictment of the racist Zionist ideology, the brutal policies of the occupation, and all who enable or justify these crimes.
When killing becomes a hunting game
Among the most chilling accounts are videos and testimonies of snipers targeting young Palestinians as if hunting prey. Soldiers have been filmed stalking victims from fortified positions, then cheering and celebrating as their bullets hit their mark.
Killing here ceases to be an act of war; it becomes sport. What moral decay allows human death to become a source of entertainment? It strips the victim of their humanity, reducing someone with dreams, a future, and a family to mere target practice.
Technology without morality
The Israeli military boasts advanced surveillance, artificial intelligence, and precision weaponry. Yet technological superiority does not confer moral superiority, nor does it grant an army a blank check to use disproportionate force.
International Humanitarian Law mandates distinction, proportionality, and precaution. Technology merely amplifies the capacity for violence; it does not legitimize mass slaughter, nor does it grant immunity from accountability.
Internal dissent: “I can no longer bear the silence”
Cracks in the narrative have also emerged from within. A widely circulated account attributed to Israeli reserve Major Avdar Shailovsky, titled “I Can No Longer Bear the Silence” (published by the Jerusalem News Agency), recounts his refusal to remain silent about the horrors he witnessed in Gaza.
The account details the deliberate targeting of civilian gatherings, aid distribution points, and the sniping of women and children, alongside systemic mockery of Palestinian suffering. Shailovsky expressed profound remorse for his complicity and called for a rejection of the racist indoctrination driving the military. While such voices of conscience exist within Israeli society, they remain a marginalized minority against a prevailing culture of right-wing extremism that condones the occupation and the erasure of Palestinian rights.
What morality remains?
The rhetoric driving this war was made clear early on when former Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant referred to Palestinians as “human animals.” Such language laid the ideological groundwork for the atrocities that followed.
Public relations campaigns cannot erase the reality on the ground in Gaza. Neither military power nor foreign diplomatic protection can hide the mass graves or silence the voices of the victims.
In Gaza, I have seen multistory towers turned into tombs and human beings reduced to collateral damage by an army that views their existence as worthless. How can there be any talk of moral superiority when the dead lie trapped under concrete, emergency responders are barred from reaching them, and a nation’s suffering is trivialized?
Gaza has not only shattered the myth of the “most moral army in the world”—it has placed the conscience of the entire international community on trial.
Opinion
Imperialism, economic power, and foreign policy
In its shortest, leanest, and simplest definition, foreign policy is the management of all manner of relations entered into with other countries. Foreign policy is a costly undertaking. It demands extensive knowledge, skill, experience, and leadership. For the price of failure is heavy, in every respect. A country’s reputation, influence, and deterrence, as well as its human resources, finances, and borders, are all directly affected by the success or failure of its foreign policy.
The program researching the costs of war at Brown University in the US (see https://costsofwar.watson.brown.edu/paper/overview) determined in its research that post-9/11 US attacks and invasions imposed an economic burden of $8 trillion and caused the direct or indirect deaths of more than 4.5 million people. The report also noted that, alongside the financial burden of these attacks and invasions, they displaced millions of people and exacerbated global environmental pollution.
Today, to understand the decline in US imperialism’s capacity for hegemony and its ecological dominance, one must first understand the burden borne by the US economy. For the US is no longer a country that accounts for more than half of global output, as it did in the aftermath of World War II. Its share of total production stands at around 20%. The social, class, and cultural fault lines within the country, as well as the divide between rich and poor, run exceptionally deep. The combined debt of the public sector, private corporations, and households has approached $200 trillion. The total debt of the federal government has exceeded $40 trillion (see: https://www.usdebtclock.org/world-debt-clock.html).
What does the US prioritize when lending?
The 3 largest creditors to the US, according to June 2026 data, are Japan ($1.117 trillion), the United Kingdom ($940 billion), and China ($633 billion). Israel is the country receiving the greatest amount of US economic and military aid in the Middle East, followed by Egypt. Ukraine, too, has received substantial economic and military aid, funds, and loans from the US. One must also not forget that the US lends money to its allies, including Ukraine, so that they will purchase US goods, weapons, and aircraft. The US dictates how they may use this debt. What is more, it has been doing this for years. During World War II, it lent substantial sums to its allies. Britain, for instance, was only able to pay off this debt in 2006; and Britain, alongside Israel, is one of the two strategic allies of the US. Rather than lending directly to countries undergoing economic crises, the US extends credit through the IMF and the World Bank. When lending, the US takes into account not only its economic priorities but also its strategic and geopolitical ones.
As an imperialist power, the US concerns itself with the entire world. It strives to remain effective and influential on a global scale. Yet just as the power of the US itself has waned, its allies no longer possess their former strength either, especially the Europeans. The European Union, an imperialist project, is not a global actor. There is no such cohesion, no such harmony within the European Union. Nor does it have such an objective. Furthermore, the European Union possesses neither the power, nor the will, nor the courage for this. Germany, the leader of the European Union, seeks merely to exert influence in its immediate neighbourhood: the Balkans, the Baltics, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus; that is all. And the extent to which it succeeds even in this remains open to debate. Moreover, there is not a single country in the world that desires or expects the European Union to step forward, take initiative, and project power globally in distant lands.
The methods used by imperialism
When reflecting on the relationship between imperialism and foreign policy, one should remember that the tools and methods employed by imperialism have evolved. In the 19th century, for example, imperialism resorted to cruder, more brutal, and more barbaric methods. Later, while continuing to turn to military methods and brute force, it systematically deployed economic and financial instruments, cultural hegemony, and sophisticated instruments and methods of governance, utilizing them with far greater frequency.
One of the lessons history teaches is this: every empire, every great power that grows too vast, expands too far, and stretches itself too thin also hastens its own demise. This condition is natural. It is inevitable. This holds true for the Roman Empire, just as it does for the Ottoman Empire, which ruled over immense territories stretching from the Caucasus to the gates of Vienna, and from the Arabian Peninsula to North Africa. For governance and rule become increasingly difficult. For the financial burden mounts. For the bureaucracy grows cumbersome. For centrifugal tendencies come to the fore, competition among local powers far from the centre sharpens, and tensions between provincial power bases escalate. For difficulties arise in implementing necessary administrative and military reforms and in taking the required steps.
In summary, when the predicament of the US is evaluated in the light of this iron law of history, the decline in US power becomes all the clearer.
Opinion
Chaos and reckoning on the streets of France
The streets of France have turned into a stage not merely for anger against the government, but for a deep-seated mistrust of the state’s approach to security. The blurring of the line between peaceful demonstrators and looters, lingering questions over police conduct, and the media’s refocusing on the immigration debate are bringing the country to the brink of a political reckoning far deeper than a routine public-order crisis.
In France, a government does not have to wait for an electoral defeat to lose its legitimacy. Sometimes, slogans chanted in a public square, tear gas fired down a boulevard, crowds penned in at the exit of a cordoned-off street, and testimonies of unhindered looting in shops only hundreds of metres away suffice to expose just how fragile the bond of trust between state and society has become.
Events in Paris on Saturday, 17 October point to precisely such a political fracture. Planned demonstrations with the participation of student unions, trade unions, and the Yellow Vests were marked throughout the day by police crackdowns, disputes over march routes, looting in the city centre, and widespread criticism of the government’s perceived inadequacy. The scene that emerged by evening suggested that France was grappling not merely with an issue of public order, but with a burgeoning crisis of confidence regarding the state’s impartiality and political motives.
Whom does the state permit to take to the streets, whom does it obstruct, and which forms of violence does it intervene against, and to what degree? The answer to this question may prove decisive in understanding France’s current political impasse.
The shadow of 17 October 1961
It is impossible to view the date of these demonstrations as a mere coincidence on the calendar. On 17 October 1961, a peaceful demonstration in Paris supporting Algerian independence was brutally crushed by the French police. Scores of people were killed, with some demonstrators drowned after being thrown into the River Seine. The event remains etched in memory as one of the darkest chapters in France’s colonial history and state-sponsored violence.
Sixty-five years later, as police interventions, youth rage, and the state’s stance on the right to protest are debated once again on the streets of Paris on 17 October, the resurgence of this historical memory was inevitable.
This memory may hold a distinct meaning, especially for French citizens of North African descent. Yet it would also be a mistake to reduce all the young people taking part in the demonstrations to a single identity, immigrant origin, or political motivation.
To what extent has the French Republic truly reckoned with the legacy of its colonial past and the relationship its security apparatus maintains with diverse segments of society?
Looters on the streets, where are the police?
Individuals dressed in black and associated in the public eye with the Black Bloc broke into shops at various locations, damaged businesses, and engaged in looting.
While peaceful demonstrators marched under a heavy police presence, fierce criticism arose that looting in certain areas had been allowed to unfold unchecked.
It is striking that while 14,000 police officers were deployed across the capital during the Pope’s visit to Paris, only 10,000 officers in total were assigned across the whole of France for the demonstrations of 17 October.
To which areas were police resources allocated? Had intelligence services assessed the risk of looting beforehand? While a robust security presence flanked the routes of peaceful marches, why was the same effectiveness not demonstrated in safeguarding commercial districts?
The deployment of elite units trained to quell urban unrest, such as CRS 8, does not resolve these questions. On the contrary, the failure to contain the incidents despite the presence of specialized units calls the quality of planning and coordination into question.
A political reckoning extending from Marseille to Limoges
The debate in Paris soon reverberated across the country’s other cities. In a televised address, the socialist mayor of Marseille stated that he had requested police reinforcements from the government, yet the units dispatched fell short given the scale and requirements of the city.
The mayor’s most striking allegation was that while looters stormed Marseille City Hall, the Hôtel de Ville, police officers stood roughly 200 metres away and failed to intervene. Stating that he possessed security camera footage, the mayor affirmed that he would await the scrutiny of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry and demand an explanation from the government.
The mayor of Limoges likewise issued what amounted to an ultimatum to the government, demanding the reconstruction of the torched town hall and the full reimbursement of costs. According to the mayor, the government had failed to protect a public building and neglected to provide the police with the necessary resources and backing.
These statements emerging from two distinct cities demonstrate that a new confrontation over security policy has arisen between local authorities and the central government. How security resources are allocated, which risks are prioritized, and whether the warnings of local administrations are heeded must all be brought to light.
The deepening scrutiny over the administration’s stance was compounded by President Emmanuel Macron’s refusal to accept the resignation tendered by Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez. The rejection of the resignation raises the question of whether the executive aims to preserve the chain of accountability, or fears that a political reshuffle would only exacerbate the crisis.
In either case, the government faces a crisis of trust.
An eight-minute speech and unanswered demands
Macron’s roughly eight-minute televised address failed to meet expectations regarding the political dimensions of the crisis. The president announced that he would meet with student unions and that the prime minister would engage with political parties, yet he presented neither tangible decisions nor a comprehensive political roadmap.
Education spending, police violence, the Palestinian cause, anti-fascism, and backlash against the Macron administration appear to have ceased being disparate issues in the eyes of the youth.
To be sure, the true strength of a state lies not in silencing its people and streets, but in addressing legitimate demands. It must not be forgotten that institutions unable to adapt and change are destined to break.
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