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Upcoming Modi-Putin summit: India’s primary objective is expanding its S-400 fleet

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India is preparing to host Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 4-5 for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit. This will be Putin’s first visit to India since December 2021. The Defense Ministers of India and Russia are also scheduled to meet in New Delhi on December 4 as part of Putin’s official visit. The agenda for the upcoming Modi-Putin Summit is set within a comprehensive framework covering issues ranging from energy and defense to trade and investment; while the summit may be instrumental in finalizing new agreements, these will likely be kept confidential.

India’s primary objective at the summit is to present a major S-400 expansion package to Russia; in parallel, Delhi is preparing a plan to modernize its Sukhoi-30MKI fleet. Delhi relies heavily on Russian S-400 systems to strengthen its air defense capabilities. The Indian Air Force (IAF) evaluated the performance of these systems during “Operation Sindoor” as “extremely good,” emphasizing the S-400’s role as a “game changer” against Pakistan. It is expected that Delhi will also negotiate for additional surface-to-air missiles for its existing S-400 units. A separate proposal is on the table for S-400 missiles with ranges of 120 km, 200 km, 250 km, and 380 km to replenish stocks and bolster reserves. All of this serves as a concrete sign of the confidence Delhi places in these systems.

Furthermore, there is a plan to modernize the Indian Air Force’s 259 Sukhoi fighter jets. While the modernization is expected to be conducted domestically, Russia is anticipated to contribute in specific areas. Accordingly, an upgrade plan for the initial batch of 84 Su-30MKIs will likely be brought to the table. With this upgrade plan, India aims to extend their combat relevance for another thirty years through new radars, avionics, long-range weapons, and multi-sensor fusion.

Ensuring the creation of supply and reserve lines, a total of five additional S-400 squadrons, missile procurements, and Su-30MKI upgrades are main agenda items on the table. All of this indicates that Delhi’s dependence on Russian platforms for its air defense and combat structure continues. However, due to delays linked to the Ukraine crisis, Russia has not yet delivered the final two S-400 squadrons from the 2018 agreement. It is reported that Moscow has conveyed to Delhi that these will be delivered by November 2026, yet the Indian Air Force remains cautious. In June of this year, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov met in China on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Defense Ministers’ Meeting, where Moscow reiterated its commitment to the timely delivery of the S-400s. India had initially ordered five S-400 units, three of which have been delivered. The remaining two are scheduled for delivery in 2026 and 2027.

From Delhi’s perspective, the S-400 system has proven its strategic importance in recent Indian operations, including Operation Sindoor, and has been officially named the Sudarshan Chakra by Indian forces, inspired by the mythological weapon of Lord Vishnu. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense had reached an agreement with an Indian firm to establish a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) facility for the S-400 system within the country. Consequently, Moscow is expected to establish an MRO facility in India. Narendra Modi, who previously announced the Sudarshan Chakra Mission—an ambitious ten-year initiative to strengthen India’s national security architecture—during his Independence Day speech, explained this in detail last Friday. He stated that the mission aims to build an impenetrable protective wall around key national, industrial, and public sector assets, adding: “If the enemy dares to show audacity, India’s Sudarshan Chakra will destroy them.”

Also on India’s agenda is the procurement and co-production of Russia’s next-generation S-500 system, which is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at ranges of up to 600 km and air targets at ranges of up to 400 km. The Defense Ministers are also scheduled to discuss shipbuilding and jointly developed weapon systems. Meanwhile, the Russian Sukhoi-57 fifth-generation fighter jet, which Moscow presents as a rival to the American F-35, is also a topic of discussion. However, India, which is currently calculating its moves regarding air defense systems and the improvement of existing fleets, does not yet seem to have made a decision regarding politically sensitive fifth-generation fighter jet commitments—namely the Sukhoi-57, F-35, or any competitor aircraft—that will define its long-term Air Force capabilities.

Regarding the co-production of S-500 air defense systems and the Su-57 fighter jet, negotiations between the two countries appear to be in the early stages and will take some time to materialize. Russia, which has been marketing the S-500s to India since 2021, had stated that India would be the “potential” first foreign buyer of this system. However, Moscow’s priority is undoubtedly to meet the needs of its own armed forces; therefore, S-500 exports seem like a distant possibility at the moment. Meanwhile, mass production of missiles for the S-500 system began in mid-2021, while the mass production of the air defense systems themselves was announced in April 2022.

Regarding the Su-57 issue, the paradox is that India withdrew from the joint fifth-generation fighter program with Russia in 2018, citing the jet’s insufficient stealth and supercruise capabilities, as well as limited technology transfer. However, considering the need to address capability gaps and fleet strength deficits, the Indian Air Force is not dismissing the potential acquisition of the Su-57 as an “interim” solution. Sensing the right moment, Moscow is showing a willingness to meet Delhi’s demands, including unlimited technology transfer and the production of the jets on Indian soil. Moscow is already supplying Su-57s to foreign partners; Algeria received the first two of 12 jets under a 2019 agreement. Despite these marketing efforts, given that Russia uses the aircraft only to a limited extent, there are still many doubts in Delhi regarding the reliability of the Su-57. Therefore, even if India decides to make a deal, coordinating technical details and responding to the Air Force’s specific requirements would likely be a long process.

Delhi continues to weigh its relationship with its traditional defense partner, Russia, against its relationship with America, which displayed a more transactional attitude under the President Donald Trump administration, while Washington continues to exert pressure on countries purchasing Russian energy and weapons. The upcoming Modi-Putin summit offers an opportunity for India and Russia to consolidate their gains in energy, defense, and trade, despite external pressures complicating the trajectory of bilateral cooperation. Since 2022, energy has been the main driver of the Delhi-Moscow partnership, with Russia becoming India’s largest source of crude oil. Despite several rounds of sanctions, Russian companies have continued to ship oil to Indian refineries. While recent American restrictions on Russia’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, have complicated the supply business slightly, it is unlikely that these measures will deal a fatal blow to the oil connection between Delhi and Moscow. Russia believes the oil flow will find a way and relies on India’s ability to continue indirect purchases through a series of intermediaries and workaround mechanisms. Delhi is not keen on bowing to Washington’s pressure in areas that align with its national interests, and publicly traded companies are reiterating their intention to continue importing Russian oil from non-sanctioned entities. In other words, even if the process becomes more complex, both countries will attempt to maintain their mutually beneficial engagements.

However, with the latest American sanctions coming into effect on November 21, it is highly probable that Delhi will reduce its oil-related transactions with Moscow. While this is not something Delhi would want to announce upon Putin’s arrival in India, it is the most likely scenario for 2026. Russian decision-makers would certainly want Delhi to remain a long-term oil customer, which would help Moscow stabilize budget projections and balance its growing dependence on China as its largest export destination. For this reason, Moscow is preparing a range of measures, from significantly higher discounts on oil shipments to deals made through newly established companies and intermediaries, maintaining the hope that business will return to normal after a certain interval. Moscow is also eager to expand civil nuclear cooperation with India, with Rosatom proposing the localization of large and small-scale nuclear power plant projects. In addition to completing Phases II and III of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu, the Russian company has long been suggesting that Delhi start a new plant. Another proposal from Rosatom is to build small modular reactors (SMRs) at coal plants that have limited grid infrastructure or are being phased out. Although the company signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Maharashtra government for thorium-based small modular reactors in April 2025*, its implementation remains uncertain as Delhi is considering procuring similar technologies from other partners like America and France. Delhi also continues to cooperate with Moscow on the construction of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh, where Rosatom procures some necessary equipment for the project from Indian contractors.

Another focus of the upcoming summit will be discussions on how to expand trade and industrial cooperation. Moscow is expected to present a series of measures that would grant Indian companies greater access to its market, with the aim of increasing India’s exports of machinery, telecommunications equipment, chemicals, food, and pharmaceutical products. The acceleration of India’s trade talks with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to be an extension of these bilateral measures. The 18-month work plan agreed upon under the Terms of Reference signed in August 2025* involves opening new markets to Indian micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)—a vital sector for Delhi—as well as farmers and fishermen.

Meanwhile, banking integration between the two countries is expanding. Some of the largest Russian banks are increasing their assets and operations in India, and direct payments in national currencies are dominating bilateral trade. To deepen financial interaction and promote the integration of payment and financial messaging systems, the Central Bank of Russia plans to open a representative office in India. Regarding expected summit outcomes, Delhi is also expected to announce the establishment of a urea production facility in Russia to ensure a stable supply of fertilizer. In the civil aviation sector, Hindustan Aeronautics has signed an agreement with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation to produce the SJ-100, a twin-engine narrow-body passenger aircraft designed for short-haul flights. Moscow is also making various proposals to Delhi to deepen maritime cooperation. These proposals include the establishment of shipbuilding and ship repair clusters with Russian participation at the Mumbai and Chennai ports. Other initiatives in this field include the joint construction of non-nuclear icebreakers, crew training, cooperation on scientific activities in ocean research, and Russian support for the development of green shipping.

All these issues and more will be on the table; however, as both countries grapple with geopolitical challenges and face external obstacles hindering their relations, the summit will remain heavily symbolic, and the priority of converting Delhi and Moscow’s intentions into working agreements will remain just that—a priority. Meanwhile, some projects in the pipeline are designed to highlight the resilience of bilateral relations, while others will be deliberately kept low-profile to avoid appearing on sanctions radars. The ideal time for a revitalized India-Russia partnership is still being awaited…

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What did the Israeli attack in Syria reveal?

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Following Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Syria on August 18, relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv have reportedly broken down. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Sheybani announced in the wake of the attack that all communication with Israel had been severed. “We anticipate that talks regarding a security agreement with Israel will resume in the near future. At present, we do not trust Israel. Our priority is the cessation of attacks against our sovereign territory,” he stated.

The minister’s utter helplessness reverberates through his words.

The post-Assad regime in Damascus ascended to power on the back of American and Israeli support. Consequently, the United States and Israel stand as the primary arbiters of Syria’s destiny. It is precisely for this reason that the Damascus administration has abandoned all claims to its rights over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights—virtually resigning itself to the occupation and striking it from the agenda. Upon seizing power, it pledged immediate fealty to Washington: “We will pose no security threat to Israel, and we shall thwart anyone who attempts to do so.” It operated under the delusion that it could forge a functional relationship with Israel—led by Netanyahu, a perpetrator of genocide and a convicted war criminal—by appeasing it through concessions. It was gravely mistaken.

For Israel currently holds sway over a substantial portion of Syrian territory. It establishes military outposts across the country, carries out airstrikes at will, and deploys its armor unimpeded.

Similarly, the Israeli-backed PYD-YPG terrorist organization exercises control over an expanse of land vastly disproportionate to its actual strength—territory exceptionally rich in energy resources—solely through the patronage of the US and Israel. Leveraging that very support, it wrenches outsized political, military, and administrative concessions from the Damascus government.

Evidently, the displacement of Iranian and Russian influence in Syria by that of the United States and Israel has brought profound satisfaction to certain circles in our country. Yet what these quarters fail to see, refuse to see, or cannot bring themselves to acknowledge even when confronted with it, is this fundamental reality: Washington envisions a Middle Eastern order wherein Israel commands supremacy, projects expanding power, and dictates terms, while Türkiye raises no objection whatsoever and instead accommodates itself to this architecture. To compel Türkiye’s acquiescence, the US is actively deploying its vast and varied arsenal of leverage.

Lest we forget, the United States had already brought several Arab states to the desired threshold through the Abraham Accords. That process was ultimately intended to culminate in the open, formal consecration of the de facto rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That trajectory has not been abandoned; it has merely been placed on ice for the time being. Behind the scenes, Washington maintains an intense flurry of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Once the wider Middle East, the Islamic world, and the Arab sphere have been fully conditioned to accept the ongoing reality in Gaza—and once the oppressed, grieving, and beleaguered Palestinian people have been driven entirely from their ancestral homeland—this shelved agenda will be revived.

We know that the Zionist establishment in Israel, aligned with American imperialism, chose not to strike Iran first before confronting the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, the Shia Crescent, and Tehran’s proxy forces. It executed the exact inverse: it struck first at Syria, at Hamas in Palestine, and at Hezbollah in Lebanon. Only after eroding their efficacy did it turn its sights directly upon Iran. In Syria, the previous regime held out far longer than anticipated—enduring for 13 years and 8 months. As a consequence of the civil war that erupted in March 2011, Assad was ultimately overthrown, finding refuge in Moscow.

When 61 years of Baathist rule, including 53 years of the Assad dynasty, came to a close in December 2024, the emergent regime in Damascus wasted no time in pledging its allegiance to the United States, to Israel, and to the Arab states that backed it, chief among them Saudi Arabia. It proclaimed that it would erect a bulwark against Iran, raise not the slightest objection to Israel, and execute Washington’s directives to the letter.

A broad demographic in Türkiye that welcomed this turn of events swiftly began asserting—under the banner of religious and sectarian fraternity—that this transition worked entirely in Türkiye’s favor. The sheer fallacy of this premise was exposed in short order.

And how was it exposed?

It was exposed by Israel immediately laying the groundwork for a Syria partitioned into four enclaves (Druze, Kurdish, Alawite, and Arab). It was exposed by the renewed revelation that the US-Israel axis intends, sooner or later, to carve up Syria along sectarian and ethnic fault lines—mirroring the precedents of Lebanon and Iraq—in a country roughly composed of 70 percent Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Alawites, 10 percent Kurds, 5 percent Christians, and 5 percent Druze and Turkmens.

It was exposed by the fact that the PYD-YPG terrorist organization, even if denied the entirety of its territorial ambitions, has managed to secure a portion of its political, military, and administrative demands through US–Israeli patronage, thereby being permitted to preserve its existence by settling for a reduced perimeter.

And it was exposed by the resilience of Iran, which, despite suffering immense exhaustion and attrition in the face of American and Israeli aggression, refused to capitulate and maintained its resistance. It was exposed by the failure of the US-Israel tandem to achieve its overarching political and military objectives in Iran, bringing to the fore once again the undeniable truth that Iran possesses an institutionalized state tradition, a national consciousness, and an armed force of a depth and resilience that defy any comparison to Libya, Iraq, or Syria.

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India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships

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Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.

India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.

Today, India’s achievements extend  beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.

India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.

India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.

The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.

Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.

India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with  NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.

These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.

To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.

India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.

The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.

In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.

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Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa

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In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.

History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.

Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.

Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.

AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS

Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.

Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.

In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”

China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.

THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY

It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.

The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.

The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.

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