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Upcoming Modi-Putin summit: India’s primary objective is expanding its S-400 fleet

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India is preparing to host Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 4-5 for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit. This will be Putin’s first visit to India since December 2021. The Defense Ministers of India and Russia are also scheduled to meet in New Delhi on December 4 as part of Putin’s official visit. The agenda for the upcoming Modi-Putin Summit is set within a comprehensive framework covering issues ranging from energy and defense to trade and investment; while the summit may be instrumental in finalizing new agreements, these will likely be kept confidential.

India’s primary objective at the summit is to present a major S-400 expansion package to Russia; in parallel, Delhi is preparing a plan to modernize its Sukhoi-30MKI fleet. Delhi relies heavily on Russian S-400 systems to strengthen its air defense capabilities. The Indian Air Force (IAF) evaluated the performance of these systems during “Operation Sindoor” as “extremely good,” emphasizing the S-400’s role as a “game changer” against Pakistan. It is expected that Delhi will also negotiate for additional surface-to-air missiles for its existing S-400 units. A separate proposal is on the table for S-400 missiles with ranges of 120 km, 200 km, 250 km, and 380 km to replenish stocks and bolster reserves. All of this serves as a concrete sign of the confidence Delhi places in these systems.

Furthermore, there is a plan to modernize the Indian Air Force’s 259 Sukhoi fighter jets. While the modernization is expected to be conducted domestically, Russia is anticipated to contribute in specific areas. Accordingly, an upgrade plan for the initial batch of 84 Su-30MKIs will likely be brought to the table. With this upgrade plan, India aims to extend their combat relevance for another thirty years through new radars, avionics, long-range weapons, and multi-sensor fusion.

Ensuring the creation of supply and reserve lines, a total of five additional S-400 squadrons, missile procurements, and Su-30MKI upgrades are main agenda items on the table. All of this indicates that Delhi’s dependence on Russian platforms for its air defense and combat structure continues. However, due to delays linked to the Ukraine crisis, Russia has not yet delivered the final two S-400 squadrons from the 2018 agreement. It is reported that Moscow has conveyed to Delhi that these will be delivered by November 2026, yet the Indian Air Force remains cautious. In June of this year, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov met in China on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Defense Ministers’ Meeting, where Moscow reiterated its commitment to the timely delivery of the S-400s. India had initially ordered five S-400 units, three of which have been delivered. The remaining two are scheduled for delivery in 2026 and 2027.

From Delhi’s perspective, the S-400 system has proven its strategic importance in recent Indian operations, including Operation Sindoor, and has been officially named the Sudarshan Chakra by Indian forces, inspired by the mythological weapon of Lord Vishnu. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense had reached an agreement with an Indian firm to establish a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) facility for the S-400 system within the country. Consequently, Moscow is expected to establish an MRO facility in India. Narendra Modi, who previously announced the Sudarshan Chakra Mission—an ambitious ten-year initiative to strengthen India’s national security architecture—during his Independence Day speech, explained this in detail last Friday. He stated that the mission aims to build an impenetrable protective wall around key national, industrial, and public sector assets, adding: “If the enemy dares to show audacity, India’s Sudarshan Chakra will destroy them.”

Also on India’s agenda is the procurement and co-production of Russia’s next-generation S-500 system, which is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at ranges of up to 600 km and air targets at ranges of up to 400 km. The Defense Ministers are also scheduled to discuss shipbuilding and jointly developed weapon systems. Meanwhile, the Russian Sukhoi-57 fifth-generation fighter jet, which Moscow presents as a rival to the American F-35, is also a topic of discussion. However, India, which is currently calculating its moves regarding air defense systems and the improvement of existing fleets, does not yet seem to have made a decision regarding politically sensitive fifth-generation fighter jet commitments—namely the Sukhoi-57, F-35, or any competitor aircraft—that will define its long-term Air Force capabilities.

Regarding the co-production of S-500 air defense systems and the Su-57 fighter jet, negotiations between the two countries appear to be in the early stages and will take some time to materialize. Russia, which has been marketing the S-500s to India since 2021, had stated that India would be the “potential” first foreign buyer of this system. However, Moscow’s priority is undoubtedly to meet the needs of its own armed forces; therefore, S-500 exports seem like a distant possibility at the moment. Meanwhile, mass production of missiles for the S-500 system began in mid-2021, while the mass production of the air defense systems themselves was announced in April 2022.

Regarding the Su-57 issue, the paradox is that India withdrew from the joint fifth-generation fighter program with Russia in 2018, citing the jet’s insufficient stealth and supercruise capabilities, as well as limited technology transfer. However, considering the need to address capability gaps and fleet strength deficits, the Indian Air Force is not dismissing the potential acquisition of the Su-57 as an “interim” solution. Sensing the right moment, Moscow is showing a willingness to meet Delhi’s demands, including unlimited technology transfer and the production of the jets on Indian soil. Moscow is already supplying Su-57s to foreign partners; Algeria received the first two of 12 jets under a 2019 agreement. Despite these marketing efforts, given that Russia uses the aircraft only to a limited extent, there are still many doubts in Delhi regarding the reliability of the Su-57. Therefore, even if India decides to make a deal, coordinating technical details and responding to the Air Force’s specific requirements would likely be a long process.

Delhi continues to weigh its relationship with its traditional defense partner, Russia, against its relationship with America, which displayed a more transactional attitude under the President Donald Trump administration, while Washington continues to exert pressure on countries purchasing Russian energy and weapons. The upcoming Modi-Putin summit offers an opportunity for India and Russia to consolidate their gains in energy, defense, and trade, despite external pressures complicating the trajectory of bilateral cooperation. Since 2022, energy has been the main driver of the Delhi-Moscow partnership, with Russia becoming India’s largest source of crude oil. Despite several rounds of sanctions, Russian companies have continued to ship oil to Indian refineries. While recent American restrictions on Russia’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, have complicated the supply business slightly, it is unlikely that these measures will deal a fatal blow to the oil connection between Delhi and Moscow. Russia believes the oil flow will find a way and relies on India’s ability to continue indirect purchases through a series of intermediaries and workaround mechanisms. Delhi is not keen on bowing to Washington’s pressure in areas that align with its national interests, and publicly traded companies are reiterating their intention to continue importing Russian oil from non-sanctioned entities. In other words, even if the process becomes more complex, both countries will attempt to maintain their mutually beneficial engagements.

However, with the latest American sanctions coming into effect on November 21, it is highly probable that Delhi will reduce its oil-related transactions with Moscow. While this is not something Delhi would want to announce upon Putin’s arrival in India, it is the most likely scenario for 2026. Russian decision-makers would certainly want Delhi to remain a long-term oil customer, which would help Moscow stabilize budget projections and balance its growing dependence on China as its largest export destination. For this reason, Moscow is preparing a range of measures, from significantly higher discounts on oil shipments to deals made through newly established companies and intermediaries, maintaining the hope that business will return to normal after a certain interval. Moscow is also eager to expand civil nuclear cooperation with India, with Rosatom proposing the localization of large and small-scale nuclear power plant projects. In addition to completing Phases II and III of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu, the Russian company has long been suggesting that Delhi start a new plant. Another proposal from Rosatom is to build small modular reactors (SMRs) at coal plants that have limited grid infrastructure or are being phased out. Although the company signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Maharashtra government for thorium-based small modular reactors in April 2025*, its implementation remains uncertain as Delhi is considering procuring similar technologies from other partners like America and France. Delhi also continues to cooperate with Moscow on the construction of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh, where Rosatom procures some necessary equipment for the project from Indian contractors.

Another focus of the upcoming summit will be discussions on how to expand trade and industrial cooperation. Moscow is expected to present a series of measures that would grant Indian companies greater access to its market, with the aim of increasing India’s exports of machinery, telecommunications equipment, chemicals, food, and pharmaceutical products. The acceleration of India’s trade talks with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to be an extension of these bilateral measures. The 18-month work plan agreed upon under the Terms of Reference signed in August 2025* involves opening new markets to Indian micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)—a vital sector for Delhi—as well as farmers and fishermen.

Meanwhile, banking integration between the two countries is expanding. Some of the largest Russian banks are increasing their assets and operations in India, and direct payments in national currencies are dominating bilateral trade. To deepen financial interaction and promote the integration of payment and financial messaging systems, the Central Bank of Russia plans to open a representative office in India. Regarding expected summit outcomes, Delhi is also expected to announce the establishment of a urea production facility in Russia to ensure a stable supply of fertilizer. In the civil aviation sector, Hindustan Aeronautics has signed an agreement with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation to produce the SJ-100, a twin-engine narrow-body passenger aircraft designed for short-haul flights. Moscow is also making various proposals to Delhi to deepen maritime cooperation. These proposals include the establishment of shipbuilding and ship repair clusters with Russian participation at the Mumbai and Chennai ports. Other initiatives in this field include the joint construction of non-nuclear icebreakers, crew training, cooperation on scientific activities in ocean research, and Russian support for the development of green shipping.

All these issues and more will be on the table; however, as both countries grapple with geopolitical challenges and face external obstacles hindering their relations, the summit will remain heavily symbolic, and the priority of converting Delhi and Moscow’s intentions into working agreements will remain just that—a priority. Meanwhile, some projects in the pipeline are designed to highlight the resilience of bilateral relations, while others will be deliberately kept low-profile to avoid appearing on sanctions radars. The ideal time for a revitalized India-Russia partnership is still being awaited…

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Macroeconomic consequences of asymmetric UAV attacks in Russia

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Today, the nature of asymmetric threats is undergoing a profound transformation, with their focus shifting increasingly toward economic centers. By mid-2026, the nature of asymmetric warfare within the borders of the Russian Federation entered a qualitatively new and critical phase.

An analysis of the Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes carried out in July 2026 reveals a deliberate shift in targeting. Moving beyond military installations and fuel-energy infrastructure, these attacks directly targeted civilian logistics networks and critical nodes of the macroeconomic infrastructure.

The primary objective of this strategic shift is to deplete the country’s internal resources, induce insurmountable disruptions in supply chains, and exert intense psychological pressure on the civilian population.

Large-scale, coordinated strikes on the distribution centers of Wildberries—Russia’s largest e-commerce platform and part of the RVB joint venture (formed by the 2024 merger of Wildberries and Russ)—became the symbol of this new phase of home-front vulnerability. The geographic scope of these attacks, spanning an unprecedented area from the Northwestern Federal District to Southern Russia and Crimea, exposed critical gaps in national industrial risk insurance mechanisms. Furthermore, this situation sparked severe legal disputes between platform economy giants and small businesses, compelling immediate intervention from both corporate executives and senior state officials.

Tracing the multi-layered consequences of the kinetic impacts resulting from these July attacks on the state’s digital and physical economy will shape the new architecture of civilian sector security.

The zenith of the logistical terror waged by Ukraine was recorded on the night of July 24, 2026, marking the most technically complex UAV attack inflicted on Russian Federation territory since the beginning of the year. According to data from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, domestic air defense systems detected and destroyed 571 fixed-wing Ukrainian UAVs that night.

Two points have become exceptionally critical here: saturating radar fields and the military “swarm” effect. In short, this event is the clearest indication that the enemy has transitioned to a tactic of overwhelming radar systems. At the same time, the “swarm” effect generated across a vast geographic expanse aims to rapidly deplete the ammunition of anti-aircraft missile systems and expose air defense positions deep behind the front lines.

The breadth of the targeted geography attests to the unprecedented scale of the operation. UAVs were neutralized over the Belgorod, Bryansk, Kaluga, Kursk, Leningrad, Novgorod, Oryol, Pskov, Ryazan, Smolensk, Tver, Tula, and Vladimir regions, as well as over Moscow, Krasnodar, the Republic of Crimea, and the waters of the Azov and Black Seas.

Such a dense dispersion of targets across a vast territory points to an attempt to paralyze transportation and logistics arteries within Russia’s European landmass.

In parallel with the mass deployment of UAVs, missile strikes were also conducted against civilian industrial enterprises. During the same period, a missile attack on a local enterprise in the Fileyka district of Kirov resulted in outright catastrophe, leaving 6 people dead and 32 employees injured with varying degrees of severity.

Following the incident, Regional Governor Aleksandr Sokolov stated that the situation required not only the evacuation of the wounded, but also large-scale interventions such as restoring water and power supplies and auditing the security of neighboring settlements. This combined approach—employing inexpensive kamikaze drones to degrade air defenses followed immediately by missile strikes on unprotected industrial zones—presents an entirely new threat paradigm for the civilian economy.

Systematic and sequential attacks directed at the facilities of a single commercial entity completely eliminate the possibility of coincidence. The strategic, macroeconomic, and psychological factors turning civilian commercial warehouses into critical vulnerabilities for an entire state rest upon four pillars:

  1. Role as the central circulatory system of domestic trade: Wildberries plays a critical role in the architecture of the modern Russian economy, connecting millions of consumers with tens of thousands of SMEs. Damage to distribution centers severe supply chains, triggering localized shortages of essential consumer goods and regional inflationary spikes. The primary goal is to destabilize the domestic market and create an artificial supply vacuum.
  2. Immense facility footprints and defense complexity: Spanning hundreds of thousands of square meters across the nation, these hangars constitute massive targets with high radar contrast. Unlike military bases, these commercial warehouses cannot possess their own air defense systems; placing every such facility under an air defense umbrella is physically impossible without compromising frontline systems.
  3. Social and psychological impact: In the eyes of the public, logistics centers symbolize daily economic stability. Black plumes of smoke visible from miles away, massive fires, and civilian casualties represent a hybrid terror tactic designed to transport an atmosphere of fear deep into peaceful cities and shake the internal socio-political climate.
  4. Magnified radius of economic impact: Inventory consumed by flames in these warehouses generally consists of stock purchased by merchants on credit. The destruction of commodity inventories holds the potential to cause mass vendor bankruptcies, bank loan defaults, and cascading layoffs across small businesses.

The events of July 2026 mark an irreversible shift in the threat landscape facing Russian commerce and macroeconomics. Attacks directed at Wildberries hubs in regions such as St. Petersburg, Moscow, and Tambov exposed the utter vulnerability of civilian logistics infrastructure.

Deploying relatively inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles, the enemy is capable of inflicting tens of billions of rubles in direct damage, paralyzing the supply of essential goods, and triggering an acute social crisis in which hundreds of thousands of entrepreneurs face the threat of bankruptcy. According to Russian experts, the total cost of a single fire—similar to the Kotovsk incident on July 18—can range between 50 and 100 billion Rubles ($630 million – $1.2 billion USD).

Despite its massive capital reserves, corporate business was caught unprepared for military threats. The medium-term survival of the e-commerce economy depends on the state and the private sector uniting to engineer unprecedented systemic solutions. Establishing compensation funds and introducing mandatory risk-distribution mechanisms are critical steps that must be taken.

Logistics hubs will remain open targets unless a “state program for subsidized reinsurance of military risks” is established for the critical nodes of the civilian economy. In the future, it will not suffice for large enterprises merely to pour capital into the physical protection of infrastructure; they must also deeply decentralize their logistics networks to prevent the concentration of goods and capital at single points of failure.

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Egypt Under Fire: What Does the Damietta Strike Mean for Global Energy Markets?

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

For the first time since successive waves of escalation between Washington and Tehran began in recent months, an Egyptian liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility has become a direct target.

In the early hours of Wednesday, 29 July 2026, at least one drone struck the floating storage unit Energos Winter, owned and operated by a U.S. company and sailing under the Marshall Islands flag, while it was moored at the Mediterranean port of Damietta. The impact ignited a fire that spread to a neighboring LNG carrier, GasLog Salem. Egyptian authorities confirmed that the blaze was brought under control without any reported casualties, while no group had claimed responsibility for the attack at the time of writing.

A Broader Context That Cannot Be Ignored

The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It came only hours after the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced that it had conducted joint strikes with Saudi forces targeting armed factions in Iraq accused of launching drone attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Tehran responded by warning against a “miscalculation,” at a time when the Middle East is still grappling with the repercussions of an earlier round of escalation that erupted on 8 July, when U.S. forces carried out strikes inside Iranian territory following an attack on a commercial vessel in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran retaliated with attacks targeting U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and the Sultanate of Oman.

Against this tense backdrop, Damietta appears to represent yet another link in the chain of regional escalation—but an exceptional one. For decades, Egypt has sought to keep itself removed from direct military polarization in the region, unlike several Gulf states that have increasingly become arenas of open confrontation.

At the same time, this interpretation does not entirely rule out the possibility of an indirect Israeli role, driven by hostility toward Egypt’s growing diplomatic influence in the Palestinian and Gaza files. Cairo has remained committed to advancing the two-state solution and to implementing the second and third phases of the peace roadmap agreed upon following the Sharm El-Sheikh Peace Summit last October. The Israeli government, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has sought to obstruct these efforts. Netanyahu, who is the subject of arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court, is widely accused of bearing responsibility for committing genocide that, according to Palestinian authorities, have resulted in the deaths of approximately 73,000 Palestinian civilians since 7 October 2023.

Why Egypt?

Over the past two years, Egypt has steadily strengthened its position as a regional hub for liquefying and re-exporting natural gas. This growing role has been supported by its two LNG plants at Idku and Damietta, in addition to a network of pipelines linking the country with Israel and Cyprus.

This infrastructure—unmatched elsewhere in the Eastern Mediterranean in terms of combined liquefaction capacity and direct access to European and global markets—has transformed Damietta and Idku into critical gateways for Eastern Mediterranean gas, including increasing volumes of Israeli/Stolen Palestinian natural gas liquefied and re-exported through Egyptian facilities.

According to local reports, the Energos Winter alone was supplying approximately 450 million cubic feet of gas per day to Egypt’s national grid and was preparing to receive four additional cargoes during August.

This expanding role gives any attack on Egypt’s gas infrastructure significance far beyond the immediate incident itself. It threatens not only Egypt’s domestic energy supplies but also a supply chain upon which Europe has increasingly relied as part of its strategy to diversify away from Russian natural gas.

Who Was Behind the Attack? Open Scenarios

At the time of writing, no organization had officially claimed responsibility, leaving several possible interpretations.

The first scenario cautions against prematurely attributing responsibility to Iran or its regional allies. It argues that the ambiguity surrounding the incident—and the absence of any claim of responsibility—may itself be deliberate, allowing whichever actor carried out the attack to undermine Egyptian stability without incurring immediate political costs.

This possibility includes actors competing over Eastern Mediterranean energy routes, as well as local or transnational groups pursuing agendas unrelated to the U.S.-Iran confrontation. Egyptian officials themselves have adopted a notably cautious approach. Egypt’s Minister of Information warned against “rushing to accuse any party,” while a former official suggested that “certain actors are seeking to drag Egypt into the conflict,” implying that the attack may have been designed precisely to draw Cairo into a confrontation it has consistently sought to avoid.

A second scenario, Israeli Involvement or the Involvement of Israel’s Allies

This, in itself, remains a serious hypothesis that is reportedly being discussed in undisclosed investigative circles. The prevailing analyses, supported by pro-Israeli and pro-American narratives, have largely centered on suspicions directed at Iran or Iran-aligned actors within the context of the ongoing conflict, rather than at Tel Aviv. This is partly because Israel maintains an energy partnership with Egypt, making any attack on an Egyptian export terminal potentially detrimental to its own natural gas interests.

Nevertheless, this hypothesis—like all others—must ultimately be assessed in light of the findings of the official investigations, which are still underway. It is worth recalling, however, that repeated warnings have been voiced regarding the visits of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Washington, as such visits have often been followed by heightened regional instability, as was argued after developments last December. According to this line of analysis, Netanyahu seeks to prolong the conflict with Iran in order to strengthen his domestic political position, secure his continuation in office, and advance Israel’s long-term strategic objective of neutralizing Iran and carrying out “Greater Israel.”

Within this framework, some analysts argue that there are broader efforts to weaken both Egypt and Türkey. They cite remarks attributed to a former Mossad operative during appearances on Israeli television, alleging that such a strategy would also serve to divert international attention away from the Gaza file and the question of Palestinian statehood—an issue on which Egypt has intensified its diplomatic efforts in recent days. According to this interpretation, creating indirect pressure on Egypt—the region’s most stable and secure state—could be viewed as a means of drawing Cairo into a wider regional confrontation.

A third scenario links the incident directly to the broader U.S.-Iran escalation. According to the article, The New York Times, citing two Iranian sources, reported that the attack may have been intended as a signal that global shipping and energy supplies could face deeper disruptions should Tehran or its allies choose to escalate further. The sources, however, did not identify the perpetrators or specify the launch point of the drone.

The Messages Behind the Attack

Regardless of who carried out the operation, the choice of target sends several important signals. An attack on what the article describes as the first American-owned energy asset on Egyptian soil would convey a message to Washington that not only its military installations in the Gulf, but also its economic footprint across the region, has become increasingly vulnerable.

For Egypt, which has consistently pursued a policy of strategic restraint and regional neutrality, the incident serves as a reminder that its geographic position—adjacent to some of the world’s most important energy and maritime corridors—no longer guarantees insulation from the conflicts unfolding around it.

For global markets, the attack suggests that the geographic scope of potential disruption is expanding beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf into the Eastern Mediterranean, increasing insurance premiums for shipping and critical energy infrastructure in a region long regarded as comparatively secure.

Egypt’s Official Response

The Egyptian government handled the incident with considerable caution and procedural professionalism, treating it primarily as a crisis-management operation rather than a political event.

The Cabinet confirmed that the fire had been caused by a drone attack without attributing responsibility to any specific party, emphasizing that investigations were continuing “to take all necessary measures to safeguard Egypt’s interests and national security.”

Prime Minister Mostafa Madbouly described the response as a test of the state’s crisis-management capabilities, praising emergency teams for successfully moving the burning vessels away from the port, thereby preventing what could have become a far larger disaster.

President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi addressed the incident publicly for the first time during a telephone conversation with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez. During the call, he confirmed that the competent authorities were conducting a comprehensive investigation, warned of the dangers posed by the escalating regional situation, and stressed the importance of cooperation between Egypt and the international community to contain the crisis while adhering to peaceful solutions.

This measured diplomatic approach—avoiding direct accusations while emphasizing de-escalation—reflects Cairo’s determination not to be drawn into a broader regional confrontation despite having come under direct attack on its own territory.

Several Gulf states also expressed their full solidarity with Egypt and voiced support for its efforts to safeguard its national security and sovereignty.

The Impact on Global Energy Markets

The Damietta incident occurred at a time when global energy markets were already under considerable strain. Brent crude had been hovering around US$90 per barrel following the escalation of 8 July, while the European Title Transfer Facility (TTF) benchmark for natural gas had climbed above US$700 per 1,000 cubic meters for the first time since March.

Any additional disruption affecting an Egyptian LNG export terminal risks reinforcing this upward trend. Europe has increasingly relied on Egyptian liquefied natural gas as part of its broader strategy to diversify supplies away from Russian pipeline gas. Consequently, even a temporary interruption to Egypt’s export infrastructure could heighten market concerns over supply security.

The incident also adds to the geopolitical risk premium already factored into insurance costs for vessels operating in the Eastern Mediterranean. Higher perceived risks could translate into increased shipping and insurance costs for LNG carriers throughout the region, even if subsequent investigations conclude that the attack was an isolated event unlikely to be repeated.

What Should Be Done to Prevent Similar Incidents?

First, Egypt should further strengthen its short-range air defense capabilities and counter-drone systems around strategic energy installations along its Mediterranean coastline. This includes deploying advanced early-warning radar networks and cost-effective interception systems capable of neutralizing small unmanned aerial vehicles before they reach critical infrastructure.

Second, broader regional intelligence-sharing mechanisms should be expanded among Egypt and neighboring states—including Cyprus, Greece, and Türkiye—in recognition of the increasingly interconnected nature of Eastern Mediterranean gas infrastructure and the shared strategic importance of safeguarding regional energy corridors.

Third, given that the targeted floating storage unit is owned by a U.S. company, Washington should contribute to financing and modernizing the protection of such critical infrastructure rather than limiting its response to statements indicating that it is merely “monitoring the situation,” as the article characterizes the U.S. reaction.

Finally—and perhaps most importantly—reducing the broader cycle of regional escalation between Washington and Tehran remains the only sustainable guarantee against similar incidents in the future. Any purely technical or localized security measures can mitigate immediate risks but cannot eliminate them so long as the underlying geopolitical drivers of confrontation remain unresolved.

Conclusion

The Damietta incident serves as a stark reminder that geographic neutrality alone is no longer sufficient to shield a country that has become a pivotal node in the global energy network.

References:

1- https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c39ez3klwmro

2- https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/egypt-confirms-drone-caused-fire-two-gas-vessels-damietta-2026-07-30/

3- https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/drone-hits-gas-storage-tanker-egypts-mediterranean-port-2026-07-29/

4- https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/29/world/middleeast/ships-drone-strike-egypt.html

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Rising populist parties in Europe and liberalism

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Leon Trotsky, one of the foremost leaders of the October Revolution, defined fascism as the totalitarian organization of society by monopoly capital. Magnates of large-scale monopoly capital are acutely aware that their profits cannot be safeguarded in the absence of authoritarian political power. Thus, fascism finds its bedrock of support among capitalist forces, the grand bourgeoisie, monopoly capital circles, and major landowners. We are all too familiar with the calamities fascism wrought upon the world in the era preceding the Second World War.

The post–World War II era is often commemorated as the golden age of capitalism—a period characterized by robust growth rates and low unemployment. Real wages climbed, social rights expanded, demands for a welfare state remained vibrant, and the pursuit of a social state yielded tangible results. This era ultimately met its demise in the 1970s, undone by shifts in the regime of accumulation and structural economic crises.

Today, across Europe, political parties that could virtually be characterized as the direct successors to pre-WWII fascist movements are consolidating their electoral gains. Germany, France, and Italy serve as quintessential examples. These parties weaponize poverty, unemployment, and anti-foreigner, anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim, and anti-Middle Eastern sentiments, while capitalizing on the incompetence of traditional center-right and center-left parties and taking a deeply Eurosceptic, critical stance toward the European Union. They employ caustic rhetoric against the political elites who have dominated governance for decades. Receiving endorsement from both US President Trump and Russian leader Putin, they draw substantial support simultaneously from working-class constituencies—traditionally the bedrock of the left—and from grand capital circles. While monopoly capital quietly pats these populist movements on the back, it simultaneously winks at liberal-democratic and increasingly indistinguishable social-democratic parties that champion unbridled capitalism and aggressive liberalism. Beyond France and Germany, examples abound from Italy to the United Kingdom…

The interests of grand capital, which back populist regimes and advocate authoritarian governance, also champion localization. For the erosion of the national, the public, and the collective—alongside the attenuation of the central state and the elevation of the local—works decisively to the advantage of big capital.

Why?

Because of this:

Under liberalism, the state does not regulate the market; rather, the market regulates, directs, and subdues both the state and society. In a liberal order, the state is expected to act on behalf of capital and in favor of the market—intervening in politics, society, and the law, and enacting statutory frameworks strictly to this end. The state is tasked with engineering legal and institutional arrangements for the market’s account and benefit. Society is reduced to a market-society, wherein the citizen is reimagined as a consumer, a client, and an entrepreneur. Since competition is elevated as the supreme imperative, citizens themselves must become entrepreneurial and competitive—a posture the state actively promotes and incentivizes.

According to liberals, the state bears no obligation to shield its citizens from the pitiless mechanics of the market or the ferocity of unchecked capitalism. On the contrary, the state demands and encourages that citizens establish themselves as entrepreneurial actors within the market arena. Consequently, the state aligns itself with capital, operating at its beck and call. Hence, liberalism harbors an innate preference for unorganized, non-unionized, cheap labor. Wages are suppressed; agricultural subsidies are gutted to a minimum; and strikes are banned on the flimsiest of pretexts.

Because liberalism insists that the state be sculpted, organized, and driven according to market demands—allowing the market to command and direct the state—the liberal vision of the nexus between politics and economics, as well as politics and law, is deeply fractured. In their worldview, law must operate exclusively to the advantage of capital, acting as the vigilant sentinel for the inviolability of property rights. It must dismantle every obstacle standing in the way of free trade, unbridled competition, and the free market, while swiftly and severely penalizing any force that dares to impede them. To conform to the expectations and demands of capital: this is the primary imperative required of the law.

In sum, through its championing of identity politics, its reduction of the citizen to a mere client, and its liquidation of the state’s social character in order to place public power at the disposal of capital, liberalism stands fundamentally opposed to the social, the public, and the national. This is a truth that must be firmly impressed upon left-liberals, nationalist-liberals, and conservative-liberals alike.

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