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Upcoming Modi-Putin summit: India’s primary objective is expanding its S-400 fleet

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India is preparing to host Russian President Vladimir Putin on December 4-5 for the 23rd India-Russia Annual Summit. This will be Putin’s first visit to India since December 2021. The Defense Ministers of India and Russia are also scheduled to meet in New Delhi on December 4 as part of Putin’s official visit. The agenda for the upcoming Modi-Putin Summit is set within a comprehensive framework covering issues ranging from energy and defense to trade and investment; while the summit may be instrumental in finalizing new agreements, these will likely be kept confidential.

India’s primary objective at the summit is to present a major S-400 expansion package to Russia; in parallel, Delhi is preparing a plan to modernize its Sukhoi-30MKI fleet. Delhi relies heavily on Russian S-400 systems to strengthen its air defense capabilities. The Indian Air Force (IAF) evaluated the performance of these systems during “Operation Sindoor” as “extremely good,” emphasizing the S-400’s role as a “game changer” against Pakistan. It is expected that Delhi will also negotiate for additional surface-to-air missiles for its existing S-400 units. A separate proposal is on the table for S-400 missiles with ranges of 120 km, 200 km, 250 km, and 380 km to replenish stocks and bolster reserves. All of this serves as a concrete sign of the confidence Delhi places in these systems.

Furthermore, there is a plan to modernize the Indian Air Force’s 259 Sukhoi fighter jets. While the modernization is expected to be conducted domestically, Russia is anticipated to contribute in specific areas. Accordingly, an upgrade plan for the initial batch of 84 Su-30MKIs will likely be brought to the table. With this upgrade plan, India aims to extend their combat relevance for another thirty years through new radars, avionics, long-range weapons, and multi-sensor fusion.

Ensuring the creation of supply and reserve lines, a total of five additional S-400 squadrons, missile procurements, and Su-30MKI upgrades are main agenda items on the table. All of this indicates that Delhi’s dependence on Russian platforms for its air defense and combat structure continues. However, due to delays linked to the Ukraine crisis, Russia has not yet delivered the final two S-400 squadrons from the 2018 agreement. It is reported that Moscow has conveyed to Delhi that these will be delivered by November 2026, yet the Indian Air Force remains cautious. In June of this year, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh and Russian Defense Minister Andrey Belousov met in China on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Defense Ministers’ Meeting, where Moscow reiterated its commitment to the timely delivery of the S-400s. India had initially ordered five S-400 units, three of which have been delivered. The remaining two are scheduled for delivery in 2026 and 2027.

From Delhi’s perspective, the S-400 system has proven its strategic importance in recent Indian operations, including Operation Sindoor, and has been officially named the Sudarshan Chakra by Indian forces, inspired by the mythological weapon of Lord Vishnu. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense had reached an agreement with an Indian firm to establish a Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) facility for the S-400 system within the country. Consequently, Moscow is expected to establish an MRO facility in India. Narendra Modi, who previously announced the Sudarshan Chakra Mission—an ambitious ten-year initiative to strengthen India’s national security architecture—during his Independence Day speech, explained this in detail last Friday. He stated that the mission aims to build an impenetrable protective wall around key national, industrial, and public sector assets, adding: “If the enemy dares to show audacity, India’s Sudarshan Chakra will destroy them.”

Also on India’s agenda is the procurement and co-production of Russia’s next-generation S-500 system, which is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles at ranges of up to 600 km and air targets at ranges of up to 400 km. The Defense Ministers are also scheduled to discuss shipbuilding and jointly developed weapon systems. Meanwhile, the Russian Sukhoi-57 fifth-generation fighter jet, which Moscow presents as a rival to the American F-35, is also a topic of discussion. However, India, which is currently calculating its moves regarding air defense systems and the improvement of existing fleets, does not yet seem to have made a decision regarding politically sensitive fifth-generation fighter jet commitments—namely the Sukhoi-57, F-35, or any competitor aircraft—that will define its long-term Air Force capabilities.

Regarding the co-production of S-500 air defense systems and the Su-57 fighter jet, negotiations between the two countries appear to be in the early stages and will take some time to materialize. Russia, which has been marketing the S-500s to India since 2021, had stated that India would be the “potential” first foreign buyer of this system. However, Moscow’s priority is undoubtedly to meet the needs of its own armed forces; therefore, S-500 exports seem like a distant possibility at the moment. Meanwhile, mass production of missiles for the S-500 system began in mid-2021, while the mass production of the air defense systems themselves was announced in April 2022.

Regarding the Su-57 issue, the paradox is that India withdrew from the joint fifth-generation fighter program with Russia in 2018, citing the jet’s insufficient stealth and supercruise capabilities, as well as limited technology transfer. However, considering the need to address capability gaps and fleet strength deficits, the Indian Air Force is not dismissing the potential acquisition of the Su-57 as an “interim” solution. Sensing the right moment, Moscow is showing a willingness to meet Delhi’s demands, including unlimited technology transfer and the production of the jets on Indian soil. Moscow is already supplying Su-57s to foreign partners; Algeria received the first two of 12 jets under a 2019 agreement. Despite these marketing efforts, given that Russia uses the aircraft only to a limited extent, there are still many doubts in Delhi regarding the reliability of the Su-57. Therefore, even if India decides to make a deal, coordinating technical details and responding to the Air Force’s specific requirements would likely be a long process.

Delhi continues to weigh its relationship with its traditional defense partner, Russia, against its relationship with America, which displayed a more transactional attitude under the President Donald Trump administration, while Washington continues to exert pressure on countries purchasing Russian energy and weapons. The upcoming Modi-Putin summit offers an opportunity for India and Russia to consolidate their gains in energy, defense, and trade, despite external pressures complicating the trajectory of bilateral cooperation. Since 2022, energy has been the main driver of the Delhi-Moscow partnership, with Russia becoming India’s largest source of crude oil. Despite several rounds of sanctions, Russian companies have continued to ship oil to Indian refineries. While recent American restrictions on Russia’s largest oil companies, Rosneft and Lukoil, have complicated the supply business slightly, it is unlikely that these measures will deal a fatal blow to the oil connection between Delhi and Moscow. Russia believes the oil flow will find a way and relies on India’s ability to continue indirect purchases through a series of intermediaries and workaround mechanisms. Delhi is not keen on bowing to Washington’s pressure in areas that align with its national interests, and publicly traded companies are reiterating their intention to continue importing Russian oil from non-sanctioned entities. In other words, even if the process becomes more complex, both countries will attempt to maintain their mutually beneficial engagements.

However, with the latest American sanctions coming into effect on November 21, it is highly probable that Delhi will reduce its oil-related transactions with Moscow. While this is not something Delhi would want to announce upon Putin’s arrival in India, it is the most likely scenario for 2026. Russian decision-makers would certainly want Delhi to remain a long-term oil customer, which would help Moscow stabilize budget projections and balance its growing dependence on China as its largest export destination. For this reason, Moscow is preparing a range of measures, from significantly higher discounts on oil shipments to deals made through newly established companies and intermediaries, maintaining the hope that business will return to normal after a certain interval. Moscow is also eager to expand civil nuclear cooperation with India, with Rosatom proposing the localization of large and small-scale nuclear power plant projects. In addition to completing Phases II and III of the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu, the Russian company has long been suggesting that Delhi start a new plant. Another proposal from Rosatom is to build small modular reactors (SMRs) at coal plants that have limited grid infrastructure or are being phased out. Although the company signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Maharashtra government for thorium-based small modular reactors in April 2025*, its implementation remains uncertain as Delhi is considering procuring similar technologies from other partners like America and France. Delhi also continues to cooperate with Moscow on the construction of the Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant in Bangladesh, where Rosatom procures some necessary equipment for the project from Indian contractors.

Another focus of the upcoming summit will be discussions on how to expand trade and industrial cooperation. Moscow is expected to present a series of measures that would grant Indian companies greater access to its market, with the aim of increasing India’s exports of machinery, telecommunications equipment, chemicals, food, and pharmaceutical products. The acceleration of India’s trade talks with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) appears to be an extension of these bilateral measures. The 18-month work plan agreed upon under the Terms of Reference signed in August 2025* involves opening new markets to Indian micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs)—a vital sector for Delhi—as well as farmers and fishermen.

Meanwhile, banking integration between the two countries is expanding. Some of the largest Russian banks are increasing their assets and operations in India, and direct payments in national currencies are dominating bilateral trade. To deepen financial interaction and promote the integration of payment and financial messaging systems, the Central Bank of Russia plans to open a representative office in India. Regarding expected summit outcomes, Delhi is also expected to announce the establishment of a urea production facility in Russia to ensure a stable supply of fertilizer. In the civil aviation sector, Hindustan Aeronautics has signed an agreement with Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation to produce the SJ-100, a twin-engine narrow-body passenger aircraft designed for short-haul flights. Moscow is also making various proposals to Delhi to deepen maritime cooperation. These proposals include the establishment of shipbuilding and ship repair clusters with Russian participation at the Mumbai and Chennai ports. Other initiatives in this field include the joint construction of non-nuclear icebreakers, crew training, cooperation on scientific activities in ocean research, and Russian support for the development of green shipping.

All these issues and more will be on the table; however, as both countries grapple with geopolitical challenges and face external obstacles hindering their relations, the summit will remain heavily symbolic, and the priority of converting Delhi and Moscow’s intentions into working agreements will remain just that—a priority. Meanwhile, some projects in the pipeline are designed to highlight the resilience of bilateral relations, while others will be deliberately kept low-profile to avoid appearing on sanctions radars. The ideal time for a revitalized India-Russia partnership is still being awaited…

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A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order

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The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.

The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”

One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.

The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.

Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.

Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.

On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.

Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.

When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.

The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.

The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.

The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism

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Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.

As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.

In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.

Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.

Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion

NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.

And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.

The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.

The collapse of the Atlantic system

Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.

In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.

Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.

For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.

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Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing

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Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.

For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.

Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.

It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.

The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.

Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.

This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.

For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.

China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.

All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.

The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.

Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.

Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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