Opinion
Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine policy hits a dead end
On July 23, the third round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine concluded successfully in Istanbul, Turkey. Both sides agreed to exchange 250 prisoners of war each and also agreed to exchange more than 1,200 prisoners in the near future. Additionally, Russia proposed the establishment of three working groups on political, humanitarian, and military issues, which Ukraine accepted. On the same day, both sides completed the exchange of 500 prisoners. This progress shows that after U.S. President Trump’s attempt to quickly end the Russia-Ukraine conflict failed, Russia and Ukraine have regained control of the negotiation process.
As Russia and Ukraine exchanged a new batch of prisoners and expressed willingness to continue with a fourth round of negotiations, the U.S. announced the approval of a $322 million military aid package to Ukraine, aimed at strengthening Ukraine’s air defense and armored vehicle capabilities. Continuing military aid to Ukraine not only reinforces the shift in the Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine conflict policy, but also indicates that the U.S.’s dominant intervention over the past six months has reached a dead end.
However, the Trump administration seems unwilling to play a marginal role in the Russia-Ukraine conflict and is instead seeking to pressure Russia indirectly. On July 21, U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent said in an interview with CNBC that the U.S. intends to include China’s energy purchases from Russia and Iran in the scope of negotiations.
Analysts believe Bessent’s remarks indicate that the U.S. is trying to steer U.S.-China negotiations toward geopolitics and China-Russia/Iran relations, aiming to achieve a “three birds with one stone” effect through so-called “secondary sanctions” and “long-arm jurisdiction”: to pressure China into importing more U.S. energy and balance bilateral trade; to leverage China’s energy import structure to tighten the economic noose around Russia and Iran; and to reap geopolitical benefits for the U.S.
Disregarding U.S.-China and U.S.-Iran relations, the U.S.’s inclusion of Russian energy exports—especially to China—into U.S.-China trade talks is essentially an attempt to block Russia’s main energy export route, force concessions on the Russia-Ukraine issue, and boost U.S. energy exports and the Trump administration’s policy success.
After losing the European market due to the Russia-Ukraine conflict, China became Russia’s main energy buyer, making China-Russia energy trade a key foreign exchange source supporting Russia’s economy and war capability. In 2024, total China-Russia trade surpassed $244.8 billion, doubling from $190.271 billion in 2022, with energy trade reaching $113 billion, a 20% increase from 2023.
Statistics show that 47% of Russia’s oil exports, 44% of coal exports, and 21% of natural gas exports are destined for China. As of June 2025, China’s imports of Russian energy accounted for 38% of Russia’s monthly export revenue. According to the Moscow Exchange, the share of RMB in Russian foreign exchange trading jumped from 1% before the war to 99.6%, with daily trading volume exceeding 70 billion RMB. Clearly, the Trump administration’s targeting of China-Russia trade—particularly energy—is striking at Russia’s “Achilles’ heel.”
On July 14, Trump declared during a meeting with NATO Secretary General Rutte that if Russia fails to reach a peace agreement with Ukraine within 50 days, the U.S. will impose a 100% tariff on Russia and implement so-called “secondary sanctions” on countries maintaining trade with Russia.
It is well known that Russia was not originally a major trading partner of the U.S. Before the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the highest trade volume between the two countries was about $50 billion—roughly one-tenth of Russia’s trade with Europe. After the conflict broke out, Russia-U.S. trade almost completely ceased. Therefore, the Trump administration’s threat of a tariff war with Russia has no practical significance. However, imposing “long-arm jurisdiction” and “secondary sanctions” on countries that maintain trade with Russia—especially its main partners—could strike a fatal blow to Russia’s energy exports and drain its war potential.
After half a year in power, the Trump administration changed course to impose indirect “bloodletting” sanctions on Russia, which not only reflects the chaos and disorder of its Russia-Ukraine policy, but also shows that its quick-fix strategy has reached a dead end. It further reveals a lack of systemic thinking and deep planning behind the policy, and that once it hits a hard wall, it turns into a reckless and desperate act of bullying.
Before his election, Trump boasted that he could easily end the Russia-Ukraine conflict overnight after taking office. Once in power, he immediately made the conflict a diplomatic priority, not only swiftly seeking to improve U.S.-Russia relations, but also abandoning European partners and pressuring Ukraine to cede territory in hopes of a quick resolution. When this impulse-driven, transactional diplomacy—aimed at securing U.S. hegemony by sacrificing other countries’ interests—failed, Trump, with his blunt style and polarized thinking, poured all his anger onto the “disappointing” Russia.
On one hand, the Trump administration adjusted its original policy, continued military aid to Ukraine, and pressured European NATO members to raise their defense budgets to 5% of GDP to shoulder more security responsibilities. On the other hand, it pushed European partners to purchase more U.S. arms for the Ukrainian battlefield. These actions indicate a policy reversal from the original “pro-Russia, anti-Europe, abandon-Ukraine” stance to a new direction of “alienate Russia, draw in Europe, and support Ukraine.”
This “pendulum-style” shift in Russia-Ukraine policy proves the Trump administration’s diplomacy lacks strategic vision, long-term planning, and systemic thinking. It is essentially a short-term, reactive approach—treating the symptoms, not the root causes—aimed more at fulfilling campaign promises and serving election politics, rather than considering the overall U.S. interest or global strategy. Precisely because of its unreliability, neither Russia nor Ukraine could follow the White House’s lead. Instead, both handle the war based on their own interests, power dynamics, and battlefield conditions.
The “Afghanistanization” of the Russia-Ukraine war—that is, its protracted and deadlocked nature—has become the general trend that is difficult to reverse in the short term. On the battlefield, Russia has gained overwhelming advantage, controlling most of the territory outlined in its objectives and gradually expanding its military dominance in hopes of forcing Ukraine and Europe to accept the reality. Strategically, although Ukraine is running out of manpower, it still controls nearly half its territory and can continue resisting. NATO allies, especially Germany, the UK, and France, are increasingly showing determination and practical actions to support Ukraine until the end.
Thus, the decisive power in the Russia-Ukraine war has returned to the European continent—back to the battlefields and negotiation tables of Russia and Ukraine. The U.S. has become a non-decisive factor. The Trump administration clearly will not follow the Democratic Party’s strong pro-Ukraine policy. Instead, it can only rely on trade talks, economic sanctions, and “long-arm jurisdiction” to contain Russia. This indirect, non-military approach to “saving Ukraine” involves major interests of Russia’s energy trade partners like China and India, and the complex dynamics of U.S.-China and U.S.-India relations—ultimately making it difficult for the Trump administration to fully achieve its goals.
In other words, the Trump administration’s new Russia-Ukraine conflict policy is like distant water that cannot quench present thirst when it comes to fundamentally changing the battlefield situation. In the end, Ukraine and its European partners are left with no choice but to engage in a strategic struggle with Russia: maintaining a proxy war with controlled intensity, while also seeking direct negotiations to achieve damage control for Ukraine and a de-escalation or even cessation of the entire conflict.
On July 23, Ukrainian President Zelensky emphasized that “the priority of the Istanbul meeting is to prepare for a leaders’ summit… Ukraine hopes for further opportunities to advance matters with Russia and will never waste any chance.” This shows that Ukrainian authorities have realized that resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the war ultimately depends on the two national leaders reaching an agreement. Russian Presidential Assistant Medinsky stressed after the third round of Istanbul talks that a leaders’ summit can only happen after full discussion of the agreement. “A leaders’ meeting should be the final punctuation to the agreement, not a place to debate the details as we’re doing now.”
It takes the person who tied the bell to untie it. Ultimately, the Trump administration’s Russia-Ukraine war policy serves America’s immediate interests, rather than addressing the fundamental interests and long-term relations of Russia and Ukraine themselves. The war and conflict between Russia and Ukraine essentially depend on the contest of strength, will, and wisdom between Moscow and Kyiv. The general outline of the war’s future is already surfacing: Ukraine is unlikely to join NATO or recover lost territories; the most probable outcome is adopting an armistice model similar to the Korean War, where both sides sign a ceasefire agreement along the current line of contact, leaving the issue of border changes to be resolved slowly by future generations and time.
Prof. Ma is the Dean of the Institute of Mediterranean Studies (ISMR) at Zhejiang International Studies University in Hangzhou. He specializes in international politics, particularly Islam and Middle Eastern affairs. He previously worked as a senior Xinhua correspondent in Kuwait, Palestine, and Iraq.
Opinion
What did the Israeli attack in Syria reveal?
Following Israel’s strike on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in Syria on August 18, relations between Damascus and Tel Aviv have reportedly broken down. Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Hassan Sheybani announced in the wake of the attack that all communication with Israel had been severed. “We anticipate that talks regarding a security agreement with Israel will resume in the near future. At present, we do not trust Israel. Our priority is the cessation of attacks against our sovereign territory,” he stated.
The minister’s utter helplessness reverberates through his words.
The post-Assad regime in Damascus ascended to power on the back of American and Israeli support. Consequently, the United States and Israel stand as the primary arbiters of Syria’s destiny. It is precisely for this reason that the Damascus administration has abandoned all claims to its rights over the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights—virtually resigning itself to the occupation and striking it from the agenda. Upon seizing power, it pledged immediate fealty to Washington: “We will pose no security threat to Israel, and we shall thwart anyone who attempts to do so.” It operated under the delusion that it could forge a functional relationship with Israel—led by Netanyahu, a perpetrator of genocide and a convicted war criminal—by appeasing it through concessions. It was gravely mistaken.
For Israel currently holds sway over a substantial portion of Syrian territory. It establishes military outposts across the country, carries out airstrikes at will, and deploys its armor unimpeded.
Similarly, the Israeli-backed PYD-YPG terrorist organization exercises control over an expanse of land vastly disproportionate to its actual strength—territory exceptionally rich in energy resources—solely through the patronage of the US and Israel. Leveraging that very support, it wrenches outsized political, military, and administrative concessions from the Damascus government.
Evidently, the displacement of Iranian and Russian influence in Syria by that of the United States and Israel has brought profound satisfaction to certain circles in our country. Yet what these quarters fail to see, refuse to see, or cannot bring themselves to acknowledge even when confronted with it, is this fundamental reality: Washington envisions a Middle Eastern order wherein Israel commands supremacy, projects expanding power, and dictates terms, while Türkiye raises no objection whatsoever and instead accommodates itself to this architecture. To compel Türkiye’s acquiescence, the US is actively deploying its vast and varied arsenal of leverage.
Lest we forget, the United States had already brought several Arab states to the desired threshold through the Abraham Accords. That process was ultimately intended to culminate in the open, formal consecration of the de facto rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. That trajectory has not been abandoned; it has merely been placed on ice for the time being. Behind the scenes, Washington maintains an intense flurry of diplomacy with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Once the wider Middle East, the Islamic world, and the Arab sphere have been fully conditioned to accept the ongoing reality in Gaza—and once the oppressed, grieving, and beleaguered Palestinian people have been driven entirely from their ancestral homeland—this shelved agenda will be revived.
We know that the Zionist establishment in Israel, aligned with American imperialism, chose not to strike Iran first before confronting the Iranian-backed Axis of Resistance, the Shia Crescent, and Tehran’s proxy forces. It executed the exact inverse: it struck first at Syria, at Hamas in Palestine, and at Hezbollah in Lebanon. Only after eroding their efficacy did it turn its sights directly upon Iran. In Syria, the previous regime held out far longer than anticipated—enduring for 13 years and 8 months. As a consequence of the civil war that erupted in March 2011, Assad was ultimately overthrown, finding refuge in Moscow.
When 61 years of Baathist rule, including 53 years of the Assad dynasty, came to a close in December 2024, the emergent regime in Damascus wasted no time in pledging its allegiance to the United States, to Israel, and to the Arab states that backed it, chief among them Saudi Arabia. It proclaimed that it would erect a bulwark against Iran, raise not the slightest objection to Israel, and execute Washington’s directives to the letter.
A broad demographic in Türkiye that welcomed this turn of events swiftly began asserting—under the banner of religious and sectarian fraternity—that this transition worked entirely in Türkiye’s favor. The sheer fallacy of this premise was exposed in short order.
And how was it exposed?
It was exposed by Israel immediately laying the groundwork for a Syria partitioned into four enclaves (Druze, Kurdish, Alawite, and Arab). It was exposed by the renewed revelation that the US-Israel axis intends, sooner or later, to carve up Syria along sectarian and ethnic fault lines—mirroring the precedents of Lebanon and Iraq—in a country roughly composed of 70 percent Sunni Arabs, 10 percent Alawites, 10 percent Kurds, 5 percent Christians, and 5 percent Druze and Turkmens.
It was exposed by the fact that the PYD-YPG terrorist organization, even if denied the entirety of its territorial ambitions, has managed to secure a portion of its political, military, and administrative demands through US–Israeli patronage, thereby being permitted to preserve its existence by settling for a reduced perimeter.
And it was exposed by the resilience of Iran, which, despite suffering immense exhaustion and attrition in the face of American and Israeli aggression, refused to capitulate and maintained its resistance. It was exposed by the failure of the US-Israel tandem to achieve its overarching political and military objectives in Iran, bringing to the fore once again the undeniable truth that Iran possesses an institutionalized state tradition, a national consciousness, and an armed force of a depth and resilience that defy any comparison to Libya, Iraq, or Syria.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
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