Russia has updated its nuclear deterrence policy, defining threats to the security of Belarus as a potential justification for the use of nuclear weapons. While experts argue that these changes are largely declaratory, they also suggest that the timing of this update may be linked to U.S. missile support for Ukraine.

Russian President Vladimir Putin approved the amendments to the doctrinal document entitled Fundamentals of the State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence. The announcement was made during a meeting on 25 September 2024, where Putin revealed the changes to Russia’s nuclear doctrine.

In June 2024, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov hinted at the need for an update, citing lessons learned from military operations. The new text, in line with Putin’s directives, introduces significant changes to the conditions under which nuclear weapons can be used:

Nuclear retaliation is now justified in cases where critical threats arise to the security of not only Russia but also Belarus.

The updated doctrine expands the scope of threats to include cruise missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), hypersonic weapons, and other aerospace attack systems. Previously, the scope was limited to ballistic missile attacks.

The doctrine highlights the importance of continuous updates to adapt to evolving security conditions.

When asked whether the publication of this doctrine was connected to the U.S. decision to send ATACMS missiles to Ukraine, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov dismissed the idea of coincidence, stating that the document was published “on time.”

Peskov emphasized a critical new provision: If a non-nuclear state attacks Russia with the backing of a nuclear-armed state, it will be treated as a joint nuclear attack. This underscores Russia’s heightened sensitivity to Western support for Ukraine, especially in light of escalating tensions with NATO.

Several experts have weighed in on the implications of the updated nuclear doctrine:

Alexander Yermakov, a specialist at the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), noted that the changes largely clarify existing provisions. For instance, the scope of retaliation has expanded to include drones and cruise missiles, whereas previous documents only referred to ballistic missile attacks.

According to Yermakov, the timing of the doctrine could be a strategic response to recent U.S. military aid to Ukraine: “These changes were announced earlier. However, in light of recent developments, they were published to remind of the risks of possible escalation.”

Dmitry Stefanovic, an expert from the Centre for International Security at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, highlighted that the new doctrine reflects global nuclear trends.

Stefanovic noted that some countries have increased their arsenals, new nuclear-weapon states have emerged, and the importance of the nuclear factor has increased in recent years.

The expert added that the doctrine contains elements that strengthen nuclear cooperation with Belarus.

“The updated document further clarifies the issue of the ‘nuclear threshold’ – the necessary conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. This is no cause for relief, either for Russia or its rivals. If the risk of direct confrontation with the US and NATO remains, a scenario of rapid nuclear escalation is always possible,” Stefanovic said.

In an interview with RIA Novosti, Alexander Lavrentiev, the Russian President’s special envoy to Syria, stated that Moscow could not provide Israel with guarantees to prevent “arms smuggling” from Syria to Lebanon.

Earlier reports from the Israeli press indicated that Israel would like to see Russia as a mediator in the Middle East peace settlement. Lavrentiev confirmed that Israel had requested guarantees from Russia to prevent Shiite groups from moving military equipment through Syria to Lebanon. However, he clarified that this demand could not be met.

“This would require the establishment of new checkpoints along the border, a task that does not fall within the competence of the Russian military in Syria,” Lavrentiev explained.

When asked about Israel’s expectation of a security guarantee, Lavrentiev responded, “First of all, we cannot give such a guarantee.”

Reports have previously indicated that Israel has been in contact with Moscow regarding the regional settlement process. It was even suggested that Strategic Planning Minister Ron Dermer, one of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s closest advisors, was planning a confidential visit to Moscow.

Meanwhile, Itamar Eichner, a columnist for Yedioth Ahronoth, noted in his column yesterday that Israel understands Russia’s influence over Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran. “This is why Tel Aviv seeks guarantees from Moscow to prevent arms smuggling and to stop the Lebanese terrorist organization from recovering from the war,” Eichner wrote.

Commenting on Israel’s desire to secure the Syrian-Lebanese border, Lavrentiev highlighted a recent attack near Khmeimim Air Base in Syria. Although this incident took place about a month ago and did not directly impact Russian troops, Lavrentiev felt compelled to address it.

“Israel carried out an airstrike near Khmeimim. They did not target the air base directly, as they know this would have serious consequences for Israel. Reports suggest that the strike targeted warehouses and buildings in the vicinity,” Lavrentiev stated.

He also mentioned that the Russian Defense Ministry had “sent a representative to Israel” for further discussions.

Russia’s federal budget has returned to a deficit in 2024 due to increased spending, with the deficit reaching 389 billion roubles in October.

The Russian Finance Ministry announced that the federal budget returned to deficit in the first ten months of 2024, with expenditures exceeding revenues by 220 billion roubles—or 0.1% of gross domestic product (GDP).

According to preliminary data from the ministry, the budget showed a surplus of 169 billion roubles from January to September. Thus, the October budget deficit may have reached 389 billion roubles.

Despite the current deficit, this year’s budget deficit remains lower than in the same period last year, when it reached 1.05 trillion roubles (0.6% of GDP) due to a decline in Russia’s energy revenues following Western sanctions imposed in response to Moscow’s military intervention in Ukraine.

Last month, budget revenues rose by around 4% compared with September, reaching levels similar to October 2023. Ten-month revenues increased 28.4% year-on-year, totaling 29.67 trillion roubles.

Non-oil and gas revenues grew 26.6% year-on-year to 20.13 trillion roubles, while oil and gas revenues climbed 32.3% year-on-year to 9.54 trillion roubles.

The monthly expenditure also continued its upward trend. According to the Ministry of Finance, spending in October increased 23.3% month-on-month and 26.8% year-on-year.

From January to October, the Finance Ministry spent 29.89 trillion roubles, a 23.7% rise from 24.16 trillion roubles spent in the same period last year.

This autumn, authorities approved an increase in spending above the planned 2024 budget rule from 1.3 trillion roubles to 1.5 trillion roubles.

Consequently, the Finance Ministry now forecasts total budget spending for 2024 to reach 39.41 trillion roubles—7.5% higher than initially planned and 21.8% more than last year.

If this forecast holds, an additional 9.52 trillion roubles will be spent in the remaining two months of the year, comprising nearly a quarter of the annual target.

Following this extra spending, the Russian budget is projected to close 2024 with a deficit of 3 trillion roubles or 2% of GDP, marking the third consecutive year in deficit.