Opinion
The coming armistice: preparing for a bigger one — 1
The Kiev regime, i.e. the Western bloc, is facing a number of constraints which, apart from the massive human and material losses, are severely limiting its ability to sustain the conflict in Ukraine and leading to its constant retreat under the onslaught of the Russian army.
The regime manages to maintain drone strikes deep inside Russia. However, the targets hit are mostly of no military significance; the regime only wants to show that it can reach deeper and, if possible, disrupt the operation of civilian airfields. The political goal is to provoke Russia into thwarting ceasefire initiatives, which will multiply under the Trump administration.
But the West can no longer sustain a war with Russia on the military front with the conventional means at its disposal.
Let’s take a rough look.
Limitations
Each Patriot battalion has 4-6 batteries, and each battery has 6-8 launchers. When referring to the Patriot system, it is usually the batteries that are meant, as each battery is an operational unit with a radar, engagement station, launchers and missiles. In the U.S., there are 15 Patriot battalions (active), which means an average of 75 Patriot systems. It is unclear how many Patriot batteries are active around the world, but it is generally estimated to be between 150 and 170 (ignoring the more rare and therefore extreme numbers of 60 or 220). The comedian-president of the Kiev regime said on 24 July that they had already received 25 Patriot systems, i.e. 15-17 per cent of all active batteries. On 9 December he announced that they would buy 10-12 more batteries – with what money? Russia’s frozen assets:
I really don’t understand, one system costs 1.5 billion dollars. Please take it from Russia’s assets, take this money – $ 30 billion. The price is $30 billion, but it will completely protect our airspace’.
When the figures are so loosely expressed, astronomical escalations in tariffs become unclear. If we ignore the Kiev regime’s promises to transfer $30 billions of Russia’s assets to the RTX vaults, which are reminiscent of the ‘president’s’ previous occupation, like something out of a bad headlight, and look at the proportion of systems that Ukraine is to receive, we get the following picture:
In August this year, at the start of the conflict, Russia announced that it had destroyed 12 Patriot batteries. This means that 7-8 per cent of the world’s active Patriot systems on Ukrainian territory have been destroyed. Not content with this, the regime wants a further 8-9 per cent of the world’s remaining active Patriot batteries. In total, this would amount to 19-21 per cent of active batteries by February 2022.
It is not just a question of willingness to provide these systems, or the theft of Russia’s frozen assets to pay for them. There is a more fundamental issue: production capacity. At best, Raytheon can produce 3-4 batteries a year. In other words, the 12 batteries that Russia destroyed in two years are the product of a 3-year production process.
Production capacity constraints exist for all weapon systems, including ammunition. On 5 May 1941, Stalin said at the graduation ceremony of the War Academies: “Artillery is the god of modern warfare. This statement will remain true as long as war is fought by conventional methods. That is why the ongoing crisis over 155mm artillery ammunition is so significant, despite the fact that stocks are being shipped to the Kiev regime from countries’ stockpiles, some of which are known and some of which are kept secret. In May this year, Sky News reported that the US and Europe were expected to produce a total of 1.3 million rounds of artillery ammunition over the course of the year, while Russia produced 3.5 times that amount at 4.5 times the cost. In other words, even the total ammunition production of the countries at war with Russia does not meet the needs of the war.
A third constraint is the impact of Russian electronic warfare systems. As early as July this year, the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia had succeeded in neutralizing high-precision projectiles through electronic warfare, for example, the M982 Excalibur was no longer usable, the HIMARS was ‘deafened’, the GLSDB high-precision ammunition jointly produced by Boeing and Saab, and even some radio-electronic warfare equipment. In other words, between the lines of Western sources, the statements of the Russian Defense Ministry are generally confirmed: the destructive effect of the conventional weapons systems of the Western bloc is being weakened, and this is pushing them to work on even more advanced electronic warfare systems. Undoubtedly, they can and will develop more militarily advanced systems, but if they do so while Russia develops its own electronic warfare systems at the same pace, this move means maintaining superiority.
The fourth limitation is military resources. The Western bloc is determined to fight Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’ (in the pithy words of Johnson, Britain’s bankrupt and defunct prime minister), but Ukrainians are not infinite. Earlier this month, Trump put the Ukrainian death toll at 400,000. (At the same time, he put Russia’s at more than 600,000.) Rutte, NATO’s young secretary-general, said recently that the total number of casualties since the conflict began had reached 1 million, with 10,000 killed or wounded every week. Russia says its own casualties bear no relation to these figures, and that the Kiev regime’s losses are much higher. On 27 December, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced that this year alone the other side’s losses in terms of dead and wounded amounted to 560,000, of which only 40,000 were in the Kursk direction. This means that Ukraine’s total losses since 24 February are over 1 million.
Given that earlier this year Putin put the ratio of ‘irreversible losses’ at five to one, Russia’s losses must be closer to 200,000. In any case, Russia’s human losses are not irretrievable, as it recruited an additional 450,000 contract soldiers during the year. In early April, Kiev lowered the age of conscription from 27 to 25. In early December, the U.S. State Department announced (on the run) that ‘the United States and its allies have found it necessary to lower the age of conscription in Ukraine to 18’. U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller also said that if the age of mobilization was lowered to 18, the Kiev army would be able to meet its needs for additional equipment. Dmitry Litvin, an aide to the comedian-turned-president of Kiev, claimed that there were no plans to lower the age of mobilization, but the Rada immediately announced that work was underway to lower the age of mobilization.
Lowering the age of conscription to 18 will not, however, completely solve the shortage of personnel in the armed forces. As the Independent wrote a few days ago, quoting the Finland-based Black Bird Group: ‘Even assuming everything else is perfect, that nobody leaves the country, that there are no desertions, that people don’t dodge the draft, that they turn up at recruitment offices, the age of 18 will not bring the army anywhere near 85 per cent of its required strength.
The fifth constraint is manpower. According to the UN, by February 2024 a total of 14 million Ukrainians had left their homes and 6.5 million had left the country. This does not include 5 million people who have gone to Russia (and not just the inhabitants of the four federal districts that have joined Russia). From around 40 million at the beginning of 2022, the Ukrainian population fell to 29 million by the middle of this year, according to the best estimates. In addition, the number of people leaving the country is growing rapidly throughout the year. According to Ukrainian data, a total of 3.2 million people left Ukraine (excluding Russia) from the beginning of this year until 19 December alone. Nikolai Azarov, Ukraine’s prime minister from 2010 to 2014, rightly said last week that these people cannot be expected to return even if the war ends: ‘It must be admitted that 50 per cent of those who left Ukraine will never return, because they left with their families, they found jobs and houses. About half or a certain percentage of those who want to return will only return when there is a normal government, and a real reconstruction of the country begins. As long as the current regime remains in place, 90 per cent of those who left will not return because they see no future for themselves in this situation.
Armistice
It is necessary to put the terms in their proper place. A ceasefire is an agreement on the military situation on the ground, which may cover part or all of the front. It does not necessarily have to be in writing, especially if it covers only a certain part of the front, and in some cases, it is applied only as a gentleman’s agreement. An armistice is a general ceasefire. A ceasefire is signed or agreed between the military parties on the front, while a ceasefire is signed between states. It gives time for the final political organization to remove the causes of the conflict. A peace agreement aims to remove the political causes of the conflict.
In the current situation, an armistice at the line of contact seems inevitable.
Opinion
India’s space sector: A launchpad for global partnerships
Ambassador Gurjit Singh, former Indian Ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, and the ASEAN and African Union missions

Growing competition in outer space provides India with a unique opportunity to shape a narrative in which collaboration, rather than confrontation, drives space exploration. Recognised as a trustworthy and cost-effective spacefaring nation, India is now well placed to transform its technological advances into enduring international partnerships that contribute to scientific progress, economic growth, and sustainable development.
India’s journey into space has been distinctive. Unlike many space programmes that emerged from Cold War rivalries, India’s programme was conceived as an instrument of national development. Dr. Vikram Sarabhai anchored India’s space vision in practical applications that would improve the lives of ordinary people. Under his leadership, satellites were developed to strengthen communications, weather forecasting, disaster management, healthcare, agriculture and education. This development-oriented philosophy remains central to India’s space programme and resonates strongly with the needs of countries in the Global South, which seek practical applications of space technology rather than prestige alone.
Today, India’s achievements extend beyond developmental applications. The Chandrayaan missions, the Mars Orbiter Mission, the Aditya-L1 solar observatory, and the forthcoming Gaganyaan human spaceflight programme have established India as a nation capable of executing sophisticated and reliable space missions. Chandrayaan-3’s successful soft landing near the Moon’s south pole placed India among an exclusive group of space powers while demonstrating that world-class innovation can be achieved at comparatively modest cost.
India’s growing credibility comes at a time when the global space economy is expanding rapidly. Valued at over US$600 billion today and projected to approach US$1.8 trillion by 2035, the sector is increasingly driven by commercial activity in satellite communications, Earth observation, navigation, climate services, broadband connectivity, and emerging fields such as in-orbit servicing and lunar exploration. Many countries aspire to participate but lack indigenous capabilities. They seek dependable long-term partners rather than merely launch providers.
India possesses the capabilities to meet these requirements. The liberalisation of the space sector in 2020 transformed the ecosystem by opening it to private participation. The establishment of the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe), the expanding commercial role of NewSpace India Limited, and the growth of private enterprises have created one of the world’s most dynamic emerging space ecosystems. Indian startups are developing launch vehicles, satellite platforms, geospatial applications and propulsion technologies that are attracting global investment and customers. Companies such as Skyroot Aerospace, Pixxel and Agnikul Cosmos have demonstrated that Indian private enterprise can compete internationally in advanced space technologies.
The next step is to internationalise this ecosystem.
Rather than positioning itself only as a low-cost launch destination, India will offer comprehensive partnerships encompassing satellite design, launch services, mission operations, ground stations, astronaut training, capacity building and downstream applications in agriculture, disaster management and maritime security. Such integrated partnerships would be valuable for countries across the Global South and the Indo-Pacific seeking affordable, customised and reliable technologies to meet their development priorities.
India has demonstrated the diplomatic value of such cooperation. Through the South Asia Satellite, it provided communication and developmental benefits to neighbouring countries. Indian launch vehicles have successfully placed hundreds of foreign satellites into orbit for governments, universities and commercial operators around the world. India’s decision to join the Artemis Accords reflects its willingness to participate in the peaceful exploration of the Moon through international collaboration. Cooperation with NASA, the European Space Agency and JAXA has strengthened India’s scientific and technological capabilities.
These partnerships reinforce India’s standing as a leading voice of the Global South. India offers development partnerships based on affordability, reliability and mutual respect rather than creating technological dependence. Space cooperation has therefore become an increasingly important instrument of Indian diplomacy, strengthening bilateral relationships while delivering tangible developmental benefits.
To realise its full potential, India will aim to sustain the momentum of reform. Faster regulatory approvals, greater access to venture capital, stronger intellectual property protection, and closer collaboration among research institutions, industry and academia will be essential. Public procurement policies would continue supporting Indian startups, enabling them to scale up, innovate and integrate into global supply chains.
India is positioned to play a larger role in shaping the governance of outer space. Orbital congestion, space debris, responsible resource utilisation and equitable access to emerging space opportunities are becoming pressing international concerns. As space activities expand, there will be an increasing need for countries capable of building consensus on responsible norms and practices. India’s long-standing commitment to the peaceful uses of outer space, combined with its growing technological capabilities, equips it to contribute meaningfully to the development of rules that promote transparency, sustainability and equitable access.
The coming decade will determine not only which countries lead in space but also how space is governed. With its scientific capabilities, entrepreneurial ecosystem and international credibility, India is uniquely placed to bridge the gap between established and emerging space nations. By building collaborative partnerships founded on inclusivity, mutual benefit and innovation, India can transform its space programme into a major pillar of its global engagement.
In an increasingly divided world, India’s space sector offers a powerful reminder that the greatest achievements in space are those that bring nations together. That may well become India’s most enduring contribution to humanity’s next frontier.
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
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