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The coming armistice: preparing for a bigger one — 1

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The Kiev regime, i.e. the Western bloc, is facing a number of constraints which, apart from the massive human and material losses, are severely limiting its ability to sustain the conflict in Ukraine and leading to its constant retreat under the onslaught of the Russian army.

The regime manages to maintain drone strikes deep inside Russia. However, the targets hit are mostly of no military significance; the regime only wants to show that it can reach deeper and, if possible, disrupt the operation of civilian airfields. The political goal is to provoke Russia into thwarting ceasefire initiatives, which will multiply under the Trump administration.

But the West can no longer sustain a war with Russia on the military front with the conventional means at its disposal.

Let’s take a rough look.

Limitations

Each Patriot battalion has 4-6 batteries, and each battery has 6-8 launchers. When referring to the Patriot system, it is usually the batteries that are meant, as each battery is an operational unit with a radar, engagement station, launchers and missiles. In the U.S., there are 15 Patriot battalions (active), which means an average of 75 Patriot systems. It is unclear how many Patriot batteries are active around the world, but it is generally estimated to be between 150 and 170 (ignoring the more rare and therefore extreme numbers of 60 or 220). The comedian-president of the Kiev regime said on 24 July that they had already received 25 Patriot systems, i.e. 15-17 per cent of all active batteries. On 9 December he announced that they would buy 10-12 more batteries – with what money? Russia’s frozen assets:

I really don’t understand, one system costs 1.5 billion dollars. Please take it from Russia’s assets, take this money – $ 30 billion. The price is $30 billion, but it will completely protect our airspace’.

When the figures are so loosely expressed, astronomical escalations in tariffs become unclear. If we ignore the Kiev regime’s promises to transfer $30 billions of Russia’s assets to the RTX vaults, which are reminiscent of the ‘president’s’ previous occupation, like something out of a bad headlight, and look at the proportion of systems that Ukraine is to receive, we get the following picture:

In August this year, at the start of the conflict, Russia announced that it had destroyed 12 Patriot batteries. This means that 7-8 per cent of the world’s active Patriot systems on Ukrainian territory have been destroyed. Not content with this, the regime wants a further 8-9 per cent of the world’s remaining active Patriot batteries. In total, this would amount to 19-21 per cent of active batteries by February 2022.

It is not just a question of willingness to provide these systems, or the theft of Russia’s frozen assets to pay for them. There is a more fundamental issue: production capacity. At best, Raytheon can produce 3-4 batteries a year. In other words, the 12 batteries that Russia destroyed in two years are the product of a 3-year production process.

Production capacity constraints exist for all weapon systems, including ammunition. On 5 May 1941, Stalin said at the graduation ceremony of the War Academies: “Artillery is the god of modern warfare. This statement will remain true as long as war is fought by conventional methods. That is why the ongoing crisis over 155mm artillery ammunition is so significant, despite the fact that stocks are being shipped to the Kiev regime from countries’ stockpiles, some of which are known and some of which are kept secret. In May this year, Sky News reported that the US and Europe were expected to produce a total of 1.3 million rounds of artillery ammunition over the course of the year, while Russia produced 3.5 times that amount at 4.5 times the cost. In other words, even the total ammunition production of the countries at war with Russia does not meet the needs of the war.

A third constraint is the impact of Russian electronic warfare systems. As early as July this year, the Wall Street Journal reported that Russia had succeeded in neutralizing high-precision projectiles through electronic warfare, for example, the M982 Excalibur was no longer usable, the HIMARS was ‘deafened’, the GLSDB high-precision ammunition jointly produced by Boeing and Saab, and even some radio-electronic warfare equipment. In other words, between the lines of Western sources, the statements of the Russian Defense Ministry are generally confirmed: the destructive effect of the conventional weapons systems of the Western bloc is being weakened, and this is pushing them to work on even more advanced electronic warfare systems. Undoubtedly, they can and will develop more militarily advanced systems, but if they do so while Russia develops its own electronic warfare systems at the same pace, this move means maintaining superiority.

The fourth limitation is military resources. The Western bloc is determined to fight Russia ‘to the last Ukrainian’ (in the pithy words of Johnson, Britain’s bankrupt and defunct prime minister), but Ukrainians are not infinite. Earlier this month, Trump put the Ukrainian death toll at 400,000. (At the same time, he put Russia’s at more than 600,000.) Rutte, NATO’s young secretary-general, said recently that the total number of casualties since the conflict began had reached 1 million, with 10,000 killed or wounded every week. Russia says its own casualties bear no relation to these figures, and that the Kiev regime’s losses are much higher. On 27 December, Defense Minister Andrei Belousov announced that this year alone the other side’s losses in terms of dead and wounded amounted to 560,000, of which only 40,000 were in the Kursk direction. This means that Ukraine’s total losses since 24 February are over 1 million.

Given that earlier this year Putin put the ratio of ‘irreversible losses’ at five to one, Russia’s losses must be closer to 200,000. In any case, Russia’s human losses are not irretrievable, as it recruited an additional 450,000 contract soldiers during the year. In early April, Kiev lowered the age of conscription from 27 to 25. In early December, the U.S. State Department announced (on the run) that ‘the United States and its allies have found it necessary to lower the age of conscription in Ukraine to 18’. U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller also said that if the age of mobilization was lowered to 18, the Kiev army would be able to meet its needs for additional equipment. Dmitry Litvin, an aide to the comedian-turned-president of Kiev, claimed that there were no plans to lower the age of mobilization, but the Rada immediately announced that work was underway to lower the age of mobilization.

Lowering the age of conscription to 18 will not, however, completely solve the shortage of personnel in the armed forces. As the Independent wrote a few days ago, quoting the Finland-based Black Bird Group: ‘Even assuming everything else is perfect, that nobody leaves the country, that there are no desertions, that people don’t dodge the draft, that they turn up at recruitment offices, the age of 18 will not bring the army anywhere near 85 per cent of its required strength.

The fifth constraint is manpower. According to the UN, by February 2024 a total of 14 million Ukrainians had left their homes and 6.5 million had left the country. This does not include 5 million people who have gone to Russia (and not just the inhabitants of the four federal districts that have joined Russia). From around 40 million at the beginning of 2022, the Ukrainian population fell to 29 million by the middle of this year, according to the best estimates. In addition, the number of people leaving the country is growing rapidly throughout the year. According to Ukrainian data, a total of 3.2 million people left Ukraine (excluding Russia) from the beginning of this year until 19 December alone. Nikolai Azarov, Ukraine’s prime minister from 2010 to 2014, rightly said last week that these people cannot be expected to return even if the war ends: ‘It must be admitted that 50 per cent of those who left Ukraine will never return, because they left with their families, they found jobs and houses. About half or a certain percentage of those who want to return will only return when there is a normal government, and a real reconstruction of the country begins. As long as the current regime remains in place, 90 per cent of those who left will not return because they see no future for themselves in this situation.

Armistice

It is necessary to put the terms in their proper place. A ceasefire is an agreement on the military situation on the ground, which may cover part or all of the front. It does not necessarily have to be in writing, especially if it covers only a certain part of the front, and in some cases, it is applied only as a gentleman’s agreement. An armistice is a general ceasefire. A ceasefire is signed or agreed between the military parties on the front, while a ceasefire is signed between states. It gives time for the final political organization to remove the causes of the conflict. A peace agreement aims to remove the political causes of the conflict.

In the current situation, an armistice at the line of contact seems inevitable.

Opinion

Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid

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Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt

In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.

Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.

For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.

We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.

In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.

This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.

The Problem of Proxy Wars

During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”

Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.

The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.

However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.

The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.

In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”

The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.

Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.

At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.

These distinctions matter.

Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.

Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?

The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.

Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.

Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.

The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.

The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?

That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.

The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.

There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.

The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.

The Economics of Fear

The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?

Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.

One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.

A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.

This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.

More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.

The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.

When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.

America After Iran

In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.

The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.

The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.

The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.

This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.

The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.

The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.

America Is Changing From Within

The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.

The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.

Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.

They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.

This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.

A Dinner for Dialogue

One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.

We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.

The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.

Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.

Very often, it begins around a single table.

Istanbul’s Larger Message

The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.

The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.

This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.

The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.

It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.

Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.

For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.

The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.

For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.

It was not an attempt to erase differences.

It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.

At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.

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A new world in the East, old dogmas in the West

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Much commentary followed the US president greeting the visiting Chinese leader at the foot of the aircraft stairs: both because a US president had not done so in many years, and because the leader he welcomed heads a state that the US defines as a competitor, an adversary, and an enemy. That photograph demonstrated that the US itself now recognizes China not merely as an economic power, but as a political, military, scientific, industrial, and technological one; yet it revealed other realities as well.

It showed that a multipolar order has arrived. It showed that the failure of the US to abide by the order whose rules it laid down and whose institutions it established has exacted a heavy toll on the US itself. It showed that the US-centric Atlantic system is unravelling. It showed that the collapse of a world order flouted, and indeed subverted, by its own rule-maker is both legitimate and inevitable. It showed that East-centred institutions, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS, enjoy an open path against Western-dominated bodies. It showed that the US regards China as a rival not merely economically, but ideologically and technologically. It showed that the US has proven unable to exercise deterrence against China, Russia, and Iran to the degree it desires.

Let us admit it: after the Cold War ended, the US assumed it could act as it pleased by bringing the European Union to its side and constantly invoking human rights, democracy, and freedom. It was mistaken. The more it spoke of a rules-based world order, of a liberal world order, the more it flouted those very rules. In the end, that order collapsed as well. The birth of a multipolar, multilateral, and multicentric world accelerated; and it was just as well. Now is the time to debate the rules, institutions, traditions, and solutions of this new order.

Yet who will conduct this debate? Who will take part in this search?

It is not right to expect this from the US; nor is it realistic. It is likewise impossible to expect it from the European Union. Europeans follow so subserviently in Washington’s wake that they refuse to consider even Russia as European, despite the fact that, alongside its Eurasian identity, millions of its citizens live across territory spanning Europe and Asia while viewing their nation as historically, politically, socially, culturally, artistically, and intellectually European. They attempt to construct a European defence and security architecture by excluding Russia, in defiance of Russia, and by harbouring hostility toward Russia. In the end, they are both mistaken and defeated.

As the new order emerges, India must also be examined under a distinct heading, alongside China and Russia. For India is a nuclear power possessing the world’s largest population and its 5th largest economy. It maintains disputes with China and Pakistan, yet enjoys good relations with Russia, the US, and Britain. It is a member of both the SCO and BRICS. On the other hand, within the Quad grouping, alongside the US, Japan, and Australia, it positions itself against China.

In summary, as an order takes shape in which the West runs out of breath while the East rises, and Atlantic institutions dissolve while those of Eurasia and the broader Global South come to the fore, we must first rid ourselves of Cold War dogmas and habits.

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Neither Turkic states heed us, nor does anyone ask us on Syria

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At the NATO summit held in Ankara last month, US President Donald Trump made promising remarks to Türkiye regarding the lifting of CAATSA sanctions, clearing the path for the sale of F-35 fighter jets to Türkiye, and supplying the engines required for the domestic Kaan aircraft. He has yet to keep his word.

This is quintessential Trump. He is neither a reliable nor a predictable leader. He approaches diplomacy like a merchant. In bargaining, he opens with the highest possible bid. Rather than institutional consultations, negotiations, formal diplomatic channels, and classical statecraft, he favours personal ties, bilateral encounters, and leader-to-leader diplomacy. He is notoriously erratic. A figure he praises one day, he drags through the mud the next, humiliating, scolding, and even insulting them.

US moves in the Mediterranean

Failing to honour the promises made to Türkiye, the US eased and partially lifted the arms embargo it had enforced on the Greek Cypriot Administration (GCA) since 1987 in 2020, before abolishing it entirely in 2022. Not content with this, the US signed a military cooperation agreement with the GCA in 2024 and hosted its leader at the White House. The GCA, whose path to acquiring weaponry from the US was cleared in 2024, has also recently been deepening its relations with France. Even though two British sovereign bases already exist in the southern part of Cyprus, with the US utilizing them whenever necessary, both the US and France signed separate basing agreements with the GCA. The GCA’s relations with Israel are also remarkably sound, as are those with Qatar. Meanwhile, relations between Greece and France have been exceptionally warm in recent years.

Amid all these tangible developments, Türkiye has largely relinquished its vigilance regarding the Blue Homeland. Drilling vessels and seismic survey ships have been withdrawn from the eastern Mediterranean.

The most distressing of these developments has been that four Turkic states in Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan), none of which officially recognize the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as a state, expanded their ties with the GCA and opened embassies in exchange for European Union financial assistance. Through this recognition, by acknowledging the Greek Cypriot Administration as the sole representative of the entire island under the name of the Republic of Cyprus, they effectively rejected the existence of the TRNC, whatever they might claim to the contrary.

Whatever anyone may say, and from whichever angle one evaluates it, the conduct of these four friendly and brotherly states cannot be explained merely by their lack of loyalty or their disregard for Türkiye’s sensitivities on this matter. Alongside this, one must acknowledge the failure of Turkish foreign policy. If Türkiye cannot convince even fellow Turkic states, let alone others, on an issue where its position is most legitimate and justified, such as Cyprus; if, far from persuading them, it cannot prevent them from cultivating relations with the GCA and opening embassies, this represents a monumental failure on the part of Turkish foreign policy.

Moreover, the failure in the Mediterranean is not confined to Cyprus. There is more.

Who is sidelining Türkiye in Syria?

Türkiye is persistently excluded from European-organized meetings on Syria. Türkiye’s views are not sought. So much so that even Qatar, our closest ally in the Arab world, on whose soil we established a military base and to whom we sold major assets, does not hesitate to take part in initiatives that exclude Türkiye from energy projects in the Eastern Mediterranean, or to cooperate with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Much has changed in Syria since the days when Ahmet Davutoğlu, former prime minister, former foreign minister, former AKP chairman, and leader of the now-dissolved Future Party, carried away by his own momentum, declared: “Not a bird can fly in the Middle East without our knowledge”, “We know the Middle East street by street, inch by inch”, and “We are the masters, pioneers, and spokesmen of the emerging Middle East”, all while eagerly seeking to act as a subcontractor on behalf of the US. The regime has changed. The government has changed.

So let us ask: did we get what we wanted?

Israel, which most recently struck Abu al-Duhur Military Airbase east of Idlib in northern Syria; Israel, a backer of the PKK-PYD-YPG terrorist organization; Israel, which usurped Syrian land in the Golan Heights, attacking Syria and rolling in its tanks whenever it pleases; Israel, which seeks to partition Syria into four entities (Kurdish, Alawite, Arab, and Druze): Israel got what it wanted. And it continues to do so.

Does Israel, which directs scathing rhetoric at Türkiye, fortified by immense US backing and sustained by Europe’s three major powers (Germany, Britain, and France), draw this audacity solely from the imperialist powers standing behind it? Or does Türkiye’s inefficacy in the Turkic world and across the Arab sphere, alongside that backing, also embolden Israel?

In answering this question, we will arrive at a far more accurate assessment if we take into account the depth of Israel’s relations with Azerbaijan.

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