Opinion
America of multipolarity
The 2024 election year was, in many ways, an existential race that would determine the fate of global power balances. One side of the American electoral debate claimed that if they lost, fascism would descend upon the United States, while the other side warned that their opponents would directly ignite World War III. Sceptics observing the election from around the world echoed the classic interpretation of American politics:
“No matter who wins, America’s foreign policy will not change!”
The man was first tried, then shot, yet somehow survived. With a somewhat comfortable victory, he took control of the entire American legislature.
Donald Trump… Could he ever make peace with the establishment, which he blamed for everything that had happened to him? Now that he held so much power, it was time to settle the score!
As the members of his cabinet were announced, the sceptics’ doubts only hardened. “Look! He’s filling the administration with neo-cons again! What happened to ending wars?”
Former hawkish comments from cabinet members like Marco Rubio and Mike Hegseth were shared widely. To make matters worse, Trump’s aggressive outbursts began even before he took office: “51 Canada, 52 Greenland, 53 Mexico…”
For America, it seemed like the same old story. The establishment would simply repaint blue as red and continue its war plans. There would be not the slightest change in the system! Or would there?
Not quite.
The end of the liberal project
To understand whether there will be a shift in American foreign policy, the defeat of the Democrats must be thoroughly examined. Many attempt to explain the reason for their loss in a single sentence. “The economy, my nephew” and “The Democrats pushed the LGBT issue too hard!” are two arguments that dominate the discourse. Of course, the Democrats’ defeat was driven by a multitude of factors, both large and small, with these issues at the forefront. However, this defeat was not quite the same as the one in 2016.
Trump’s victory in 2016 sent shockwaves through capital, the bureaucracy, and even the politicians who had been part of the race. When he took office at the time, he was unable to pioneer a new project or movement. While his team and cabinet were largely composed of ‘old guard’ Republicans, his battle with capital never ceased. The American establishment refused to accept him. He was unable to implement the policies he desired, particularly on issues like Syria. In 2020, big corporations threw their full weight behind Biden, and somehow, they managed to secure his victory.
However, 2024 was different. From Jeff Bezos to Mark Zuckerberg, many of the individuals and companies that had worked tirelessly for Biden in 2020 were either neutral this time or openly declared their support for Trump. Why? Did they see Trump as an inevitable figure they had to reconcile with? Or did they have doubts about the sustainability of the plan they had once championed? Kamala Harris is not the only loser here… Nor are the Democrats alone in their defeat… The 2024 U.S. elections marked the loss of a project that Barack Obama had inherited from the Republicans.
Around this time last year, I wrote a similar article analyzing 2023 from the U.S. perspective. In it, I described 2023 as “the most difficult year of the empire.” The reason for this was the U.S.’s struggle with over-expansion, driven by its relentless pursuit of global hegemony. Despite its vast resources, it was increasingly unable to manage the crises erupting worldwide. Unless it could address this issue, every passing year would continue to be the most difficult year of its empire.
One year later, Trump promises a scenario of change that will either solve or at least mitigate this crisis.
First, the phrase “trying to be everywhere” requires some explanation. After the Cold War, the U.S. declared itself the global policeman. It wasn’t just going to defend liberalism—it was going to spread it across the world. It aimed to overthrow dictators, lower the defenses of countries it believed it could diplomatically engage through economic ties, and unconditionally support liberal governments it saw as akin to itself. Remember the famous McDonald’s Theory: two countries with McDonald’s restaurants would never go to war! Capitalism and liberalism, hand in hand, would bring world peace.
In other words, the U.S. foreign policy of the unipolar order was entirely ideologically driven. As many would agree, this was a non-partisan plan. George W. Bush continued it, and so did Barack Obama.
However, the Biden era proved that American global hegemony is unsustainable. According to Trump, the U.S. was alienating countries it could have befriended for ideological reasons, while supporting countries that offered no strategic value simply because they were liberal. Take Saudi Arabia, for example. After the Jamal Khashoggi incident, Biden declared, “I will turn them into a pariah state.” Instead, the Saudis aligned with China. Far from becoming a pariah state, they increased their regional influence.
Biden knew that the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia undermined the oft-repeated slogan of “Democracy and Human Rights.” For this very reason, he alienated a country that would normally have been an ally. In Afghanistan, billions of dollars were spent on a “nation-building” model—one that had failed repeatedly—under the guise of protecting “women’s rights.” In Syria, through its association with the PKK terrorist organization, the U.S. demonized Turkey, a NATO member with one of the strongest armies in the alliance, for yet another nation-building project.
Of course, these ideologically driven projects did yield some gains, such as access to underground resources, increased regional influence, and military bases. However, when weighing the pros and cons, it’s hard to argue that U.S. resources were well spent. Over the past four years, the Afghanistan project collapsed. The PKK terrorist organization continues to lose territory in both Iraq and Syria. Despite billions of dollars poured into Ukraine, Russia continues to advance, albeit with bruises and scars.
Trump’s solution: Realpolitik
The series of failed policies is compelling the United States to move away from its unipolar foreign policy approach. This shift explains why at least a portion of the American establishment is now repositioning itself. Of course, individuals and entities like George Soros—the direct architect of projects such as Ukraine—are, for the time being, excluded from this recalibration. The new American foreign policy promises the world a “multipolarity with American characteristics.”
However, it would be naive to envision a multipolar world order as a harmonious utopia where “everyone holds hands and runs down the slope.” Just as a dragon or a bear cannot be caged, an eagle, too, cannot be confined. The United States remains the most powerful nation globally, boasting unmatched manpower, industrial capacity, technological prowess, and a unique geopolitical position. Such a country cannot simply retreat within its borders. Even as the U.S. adapts to multipolarity, it does not automatically follow that it will coexist smoothly with China or Russia. Multipolarity inherently brings chaos. Unlike the classical Cold War paradigm, this chaos is not limited to conflicts among global giants but can also erupt among regional powers. This is the lens through which issues like Syria should be understood. Interpreting every geopolitical confrontation solely through the interests of the U.S. or Russia is a relic of Cold War thinking. Multipolarity inevitably creates space for regional powers to assert their interests—countries like Turkey or India, for instance.
To navigate this new order, the U.S. is seeking to establish a governance framework compatible with Realpolitik. Realpolitik, a political philosophy originating in 19th-century Germany and championed by Otto von Bismarck, the architect of German unification, prioritizes pragmatism over ideology. Its goal is to safeguard state interests by crafting a balanced power dynamic. In the U.S., two of the most prominent advocates of Realpolitik were Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Kissinger.
Kissinger viewed the greatest threat to the U.S. as the potential alliance between the “dragon” (China) and the “bear” (Russia). China possessed the manpower and industrial capacity, while the Soviet Union had the energy resources to sustain it. A partnership between the two could have spelled the end of American hegemony before it even took root. Although the U.S. framed the Cold War as a battle of “tyranny against democracy,” its most decisive actions were guided by Kissinger’s Realpolitik. The “One China” policy regarding Taiwan, which remains in place today, is a legacy of this philosophy.
President Theodore Roosevelt succinctly encapsulated Realpolitik with his famous adage: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”
Roosevelt’s ‘Big Stick Diplomacy’ shaped U.S. foreign policy at the beginning of the 20th century. Roosevelt did not see the United States as the world’s policeman but believed that its own backyard should fall under its sphere of influence. He expanded the Monroe Doctrine, intervening in the politics of South American states. Moreover, it was during this period that the famous Panama Canal was built, thanks to Roosevelt’s efforts. In 1903, Colombia, which controlled Panama, refused to reach an agreement with the U.S. The U.S. fueled rebellions in the Panama region and deployed its navy to prevent Colombia from suppressing the uprising. Panama’s independence was immediately recognized, and construction of the canal began in 1904.
The foreign policy moves of the new Trump era are likely to follow a similar path. The aim is to prioritize U.S. national security interests over the task of ‘spreading liberalism.’ This approach aligns with the principles of Realpolitik. From now on, U.S. foreign policy will be driven by interests rather than ideological impositions.
From this perspective, the rhetoric Trump launched even before taking office makes more sense.
Trump wants to end the war in Ukraine to prevent a ‘dragon-bear’ friendship. Trump wants Greenland to control the trade routes expected to emerge as glaciers melt due to global warming. Trump is considering action against Mexico because he believes China, through the cartels, is attacking the United States via drug trafficking. Trump wants Panama to establish a barrier at the most strategic point to South America, where China is consolidating its influence.
Don’t get me wrong—Trump is no Roosevelt. Roosevelt was a highly popular president in the U.S., and many still regard him as one of the greatest in American history. Trump’s domestic political battles began even before he took office, and it is unlikely that a figure like Kissinger will emerge on his side.
However, the U.S. bureaucracy has already prepared itself for Kissinger-like policies. The clearest evidence of this is Trump’s emphasis on tariffs. These tariffs, which will be imposed not only on China but also on ‘allied’ countries like Canada, are likely to exacerbate the U.S. inflation problem, which is already in a precarious state. If Trump implements the tariffs as he has proposed, it will become clear that this decision was made without regard for electoral consequences or public reaction. If the U.S. is entering a struggle with China, it cannot afford to lose its industrial base there. The return of industry, especially microchip manufacturing, to the U.S. is far more important for the country than the careers of politicians or the votes they seek.
This is precisely why I disagree with the claim that ‘U.S. foreign policy will not change.’ For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. is preparing to adopt policies that align with the multipolar world developing beyond its borders. The aggressive nature of these policies does not negate their compatibility with the new world order. All states, whether they have favorable or unfavorable relations with the United States, must prepare for a drastic shift in American foreign policy. This new plan may fail, and with the return of the Democrats in 2028, the old ways might resurface. But for the next four years, Trump’s Realpolitik awaits us. Let everyone prepare for multipolarity with American characteristics!
Opinion
A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order
The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.
The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”
One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.
The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.
Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.
Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.
On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.
Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.
When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.
The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.
The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.
The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
Opinion
NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism
Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.
As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.
In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.
Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.
Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion
NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.
And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.
The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.
The collapse of the Atlantic system
Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.
In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.
Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.
For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.
Opinion
Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing
Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.
For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.
Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.
It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.
The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.
Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.
This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.
For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.
China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.
All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.
The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.
Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.
Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.
Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).
X: @umur_tugay
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