Opinion

The coming armistice: Preparing for a bigger one – 2

Published

31.12.2024 12:51

Hazal Yalın

I concluded the first part of this series with the following words:

“In the current situation, an armistice along the line of contact seems inevitable.”

The coming armistice: preparing for a bigger one — 1

The reasoning behind this is straightforward: Ukraine has largely ceased to be an ‘issue’ because it is losing its potential to be one. It has become increasingly evident that Russia will never permit Kiev to join NATO. Moreover, Ukraine’s existing military potential has been significantly depleted. Even if the imperialist bloc were to fully mobilize its productive capacity, it would fail to offset these losses.

On 17 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov revealed that the Kiev regime had received over $350 billion in ‘aid’ from 30 countries since February 2022, with $170 billion allocated for military purposes. Despite this staggering sum, it is no longer sufficient to sustain the fight—let alone secure a victory against Russia.

This reality is universally acknowledged—which is precisely why time is needed for preparation.

‘Preparation’

But preparation for what?

On 13 December, Rutte stated that “there is now neither war nor peace between Russia and the West,” adding that “Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with Ukraine and the West.” The implication is that the West is preparing for war with Russia.

This preparation is no longer concealed at any level. On 25 November, Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, revealed that NATO was discussing “preemptive strikes against high-precision targets” on Russian territory in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO countries. According to Bauer: “The smart thing is not to wait but to hit launchers in Russia if Russia attacks us. A high-precision combined strike to disable the systems that would be used against us is essential—we must strike first.” Furthermore, Bauer called on the “business community” to prepare for a “wartime scenario” and to adjust production and distribution accordingly: “If we can ensure the supply of all critical services and goods, this will be an important part of our deterrence.”

This signifies a complete capitalist reorganization: not deindustrialization but the militarization of industry in Europe. The fact that this call comes not from neoconservative zealots but from military leaders—who typically adopt a more measured approach, primarily because they understand the realities of war—makes it all the more significant. This is not a new plan, nor is it tied to the events of 24 February 2022. The project was already in place as early as September 2021, as the US’s so-called “Reichsführer” in Europe, the “baroness” at the helm of the European Commission, openly stated at the 2023 Munich Conference. However, due to their mediocrity, incompetence, and unpredictability, they failed to execute it effectively. Now, they need time to accelerate this process once again.

Trump’s recent announcement that NATO members should increase their military spending to well above 2% of GDP (reportedly suggesting 3.7%, while The New York Times mentioned 5% last month), if realized, would benefit not only the U.S. but also the European elite. Such a move would be precisely what is needed to expedite this reorganization.

If your opponent is preparing for war, so are you. For some time, Russia has avoided the idea of a conventional war with the West in Europe. At least in its statements, it seemed more likely that any potential conflict with NATO would occur in or around Ukraine. Earlier this month, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that “the actions of the U.S. and other NATO members aimed at escalating the Ukrainian crisis” have increased the likelihood of a direct conflict with NATO. On 16 December, Defence Minister Belousov, after speaking for the first time about the necessity to “fulfil various tasks and maintain a military presence in Central Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and Transnistria,” added: “In the medium term, we must be fully prepared for any development of the situation, including a possible military confrontation with NATO in Europe within the next decade. The decisions taken at the NATO summit last July are preparation for this. This is also reflected in the doctrinal documents of the U.S. and other NATO countries.”

It seems that nearly everyone in their right mind views the prospect of a war between NATO and Russia as increasingly likely. The West, because it is provoking such a conflict—because it needs it. Russia, because it lacks the power to prevent it.

Both sides must undergo significant reorganization. The West must fully militarize its economy. Last year, when Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief (effectively its war minister, succeeding the fascist-leaning Borrell), was prime minister of Estonia, she advocated issuing war bonds using Russia’s frozen assets as collateral. In mid-December, the same Kallas stated that although Russia has a legal right to the assets “seized” by the West, it would not regain them until the funds were used to restore the Kiev regime. She added: “I’m not sure there is anything left of them.” Foreign assets, after all, are based on reputation. They do not need to remain in an account to be traded; they only need to be perceived as valuable. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kallas is not merely indulging in rhetorical excess but is describing the reality of the situation.

As for Russia, its Soviet-era defense complex is so vast and so deeply intertwined with the civilian economy that it does not require reorganization—only improvement and expansion. However, preparing for war demands more than just military readiness. It requires arguments to convince the population of its necessity, individuals capable of defending these arguments, and cadres skilled in executing current tasks. It necessitates reducing income inequality to foster shared values, raising birth rates to ensure societal reproduction and the adequacy of human resources, increasing the output of civilian industry, achieving technological superiority, and maintaining economic independence. This complex process will take time to complete.

In short, a truce is necessary for all sides—not just because Trump desires it. The question is how this will be achieved and whether it will lead to a lasting peace agreement.

Russia’s position

There have been two programmatic statements from the Russian side in the past week.

On 25 December, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov clearly outlined the situation with the West: “Regarding the meaning of the negotiations currently taking place in the West and in Ukraine, we are only talking about an armistice—about allowing the Kiev regime, with the help of the West, to once again consolidate its power and make new attempts to fulfil the instructions of its masters to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia. … We are not satisfied with an armistice; we need reliable, legally binding agreements.” According to Lavrov, these agreements must also address the root causes of the Ukrainian conflict: “Common security in Europe, the enlargement of NATO, the EU’s recent decision to subordinate itself to NATO, and essentially to eliminate all differences between these organisations—including, of course, the rights of people in certain regions who have expressed their desire to unite with Russia.”

The following day, in response to the comment that “Western experts expect the Ukrainian conflict to end in 2025,” Putin remarked: “Your words are dripping with honey” (a Russian expression meaning to speak sweetly or optimistically). He added, “We aim to end the conflict.” However, when asked about plans to freeze the conflict in exchange for a guarantee delaying the Kiev regime’s entry into NATO for 10–20 years, Putin responded: “I don’t know what is being discussed in the current team of the US president-elect. What I do know is that President Biden proposed this to me in 2021. He suggested postponing Ukraine’s entry into NATO for 10–15 years—because Ukraine is not yet ‘ready.’ And I gave him a reasonable answer: Of course, it’s not ready today, but you’ll prepare it and accept it. … What’s the difference for us? Whether it’s today, tomorrow, or 10 years later. I don’t know about the statements of the future team of the president-elect, but in this sense, if such a proposal is made, what is the difference between the current leadership and the ideas you just mentioned? There is no difference. I don’t know how the situation will develop from now on or what instructions the president-elect will give to his administration. Let’s see.”

Thus, Russia’s position can be summarized as follows: It seeks a permanent political agreement, not a temporary ceasefire or armistice. However, a permanent agreement does not exclude temporary armistices. The basis for peace can only be Putin’s ultimatum from July, and nothing else. Ideally, it should include a new security architecture in Europe (with the EU operating independently of NATO), a resolution to the Transnistrian and perhaps Gagauz issues, and a guarantee that NATO will not expand further. The latter includes not only Ukraine but also Moldova and Georgia.

The Western position

I have labeled this section ‘The West,’ but this should not be misunderstood. In August, I wrote in Harici as follows: “The question of a ceasefire should be discussed day and night from Kiev to Washington, from London to Budapest—but not in other European capitals, as they are insignificant, drifting aimlessly like mosquitoes in the wind.” Thus, there are only two meaningful positions in the West: the United States and Britain. Britain aims to extend the war to all its borders and to use Europeans as live ammunition for this purpose. This also appears to be the stance of global finance capital, represented primarily by The City. While this strategy has no chance of ultimate success, that is not its goal; it merely seeks to prolong the conflict for the foreseeable future.

It has become clear that the U.S. will present a scenario with three alternatives. These have been discussed for some time, but the most precise formulation was published on December 6 in the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano. The alternatives are as follows:

1) The partition of Ukraine according to the ‘German model’ and the incorporation into NATO of the regions under the control of the Kiev regime. 2) The second scenario is ‘Israel in Europe’: Ukraine would no longer be a NATO member but would continue to receive military ‘aid.’ 3) An international mission composed of peacekeepers from non-NATO countries such as China and India would be established.

The first alternative is untenable, not only due to Russia’s position but also because of the U.S. determination under Trump to postpone a major conflict with Russia. The second alternative would amount to a continuation of the Minsk deception, while it is the most favorable formula from the U.S. perspective, Russia cannot accept it.

The third alternative appears to be the most viable, but it would only result in a truce. For now, the issue will likely center on the composition of the peacekeeping force. Russia will not accept the participation of NATO countries (with the possible exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia) in such a force. Instead, a contingent could be assembled from the so-called ‘global south.’

One reason for Russia’s emphasis on the third alternative may be to avoid undermining Trump’s position, given his potential role in disrupting the current system.

The ‘triple alliance’ in Kiev

In any case, the current leadership in Kiev must be under immense pressure. It can only survive with Britain’s support, and London is actively working to ensure this. Poroshenko’s recent call to avoid elections in the near future “in order not to weaken the state” is a clear indication of this effort. It seems they are attempting to form a formal or informal coalition consisting of a bankrupt and defunct commander-in-chief, a bankrupt and defunct president, and a bankrupt comedian-turned-president.

The first is a staunch fascist, reckless enough to display Bandera’s portrait behind him when addressing the international press. The second, the so-called ‘chocolate king,’ has also cultivated ‘trusted’ relations with Poland. The third owes his position solely to being the weakest among them (ultimus inter pares). His remarks on military-political matters suggest he may see himself as a modern-day Napoléon I, though, setting aside Napoléon I’s fate, it would be more accurate to describe him as a farcical Napoléon III.

This ‘triple alliance’ is unlikely to materialize, as it is primarily focused on pursuing the first alternative.

What will happen?

From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia set itself three goals: demilitarization, denazification, and ensuring Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO. All three were agreed upon in the Istanbul pre-agreement, which was subsequently rendered worthless—less than toilet paper—at the behest of the U.S. administration and a single visit by Johnson to Kiev. In July, the ‘situation on the ground’ was added, accompanied by Putin’s ultimatum, which was declared in front of the Foreign Affairs coliseum.

The Trump administration’s third alternative poses a challenge for Russia, primarily due to the goal of ‘denazification’ of the regime. By its very nature, this entails the removal of the current leadership in one way or another, preferably through elections. The determination of the ‘chocolate king,’ the comedian, and the bankrupt ‘commander-in-chief’ to avoid holding elections is precisely aimed at preventing this outcome.

So, what will happen? It seems to me that a truce based on the third alternative will be reached by February-March, with elections in Kiev organized in May at the insistence of the U.S.—provided Britain can be overcome as an obstacle. The organization of these elections will be crucial for maintaining the armistice. I doubt Britain’s pressure on the Kiev trio to block the elections will weaken Trump’s resolve. The comedian president in Kiev, who has already been publicly humiliated by Trump Jr. on social media—first by cutting off the dollar flow and then by kicking him out of the frame—is likely well aware of this.

And all of this is to ‘prepare.’

Up Next

Year-End Review: A Tumultuous and Thrilling 2024

Don't Miss

America of multipolarity

Hazal Yalın

Opinion

“Blue wave” fears at Mar-a-Lago: What will the midterms bring for the US?

Published

4 days ago

03/11/2026

Sarp Sinan Hacır

The US is heading to the midterms under the shadow of the Iran War. While the American media debates whether Trump will use nuclear weapons against Iran after the midterm elections, a more realistic tension looms over Mar-a-Lago: a blue wave.

If the Trump administration can wrap up the night having surrendered only the House of Representatives, I am certain Trump will frame this as a victory. In part, one might even say it would be. Amidst so much public discontent—economic troubles, oil and electricity prices, broken promises regarding wars—nobody could plausibly claim Trump had lost if he emerged from battle carrying the Senate on his back. In any case, it is hardly unusual for the governing party to forfeit one chamber of Congress in a midterm election.

Although expectations long pointed to the Senate either remaining red or coming down to a razor-thin outcome, the situation has turned even bleaker for the Trump administration over the past month. According to polls, Democrats are leading in every single neck-and-neck state in the Senate race.

Let me lay out the arithmetic:

Presently, Republicans hold a 53-to-47 majority in the Senate. If the Democrats pick up three states tonight without losing any of their own, they reach a 50-50 tie, which can be broken by the vice president’s vote. Consequently, the Democrats must flip four states blue. For this cycle, Alaska, Kansas, Iowa, Maine, Ohio, Texas, Michigan, and North Carolina can be considered the battleground states. Contests in Iowa and Kansas are particularly likely to be fierce. It is worth noting that Texas has not elected a Democratic senator since 1988, and Kansas has not done so since 1932.

Will the polls be wrong?

The accuracy of polling varies considerably from cycle to cycle in the US. In the 2024 elections, for instance, the forecasts proved roughly accurate. Even in 2024, however, Republican support was slightly understated in the final count. One should not automatically ascribe this to malice. While Republicans are generally strong in rural areas, urban Republicans often prefer to conceal their leanings in liberal settings. This complicates the work of pollsters.

It remains possible that the surveys are overly optimistic on behalf of Democrats. Nonetheless, the absence of Trump’s name on the midterm ballot demobilizes the Republican base. When the expected “red wave” failed to materialize in the 2022 midterms, it was claimed that Trump had lost his aura, prompting a search for new leadership. Tonight, too, Republican turnout may fall short of projections.

The road to 2028

Beyond determining the composition of Congress, this election carries another critical function: it will chart the course to 2028 for both parties. Although the Democratic Party has begun to attract interest due to Trump’s missteps, it faces formidable internal struggles, marked by both a leadership deficit and an ideological vacuum.

Following the 2024 debacle, as resentment swelled against centrist Democrats like Chuck Schumer, Kamala Harris, and the Clintons, a new current emerged on the progressive left. Spearheaded first by New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani and subsequently by Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed, this 2026-model leftist movement dwells less on identity politics than its predecessor, striking Republicans directly at their points of vulnerability: the economy and Israel.

These two battlegrounds are the decisive factors in the 2026 midterms. Americans heading to the ballot box are squeezed by an electricity bill crisis stemming from the massive power consumption of expanding data centres following the AI boom, alongside oil prices driven by the Iran War and diesel costs tied to the Russia-Ukraine War.

In the first Trump term, an economy that performed well in its early years was derailed by the pandemic, costing him re-election. Now, however, Trump is being held accountable not for crises that developed outside his control, but for his own failures. He initiated the Iran War himself. He failed to honour his pledge to deliver peace regarding Ukraine.

El-Sayed and progressive leftists went before the public with promises to combat the cost of living and halt support for Israel, a message that resonated across the wider electorate. Yet, as in every election, what truly matters are the independents in the battleground states.

The Israel question

The Democratic Party’s mainstream establishment is uneasy with the party drifting away from Israel. Chuck Schumer, who could be regarded as the party’s leader, once even remarked, “my job is to keep the left with Israel.”

Yet centrist Democrats are currently avoiding an open confrontation with progressive leftists in light of their own recent failures. The pressure and dismissive conduct once directed at Bernie Sanders no longer seem tolerable to the party’s rank and file.

Dissenting voices persist, of course. For instance, Democratic Representative Haley Stevens of Michigan could not contain herself just days before the vote: not only did she withdraw her endorsement from El-Sayed, but she also crossed the aisle to back his Republican opponent, Mike Rogers!

Stevens faced fierce condemnation within her party, explaining her decision by claiming that “Sayed did not involve her in the campaign.” Those close to Stevens even suggested that she was pressured by her fiancé, who is Jewish, though she is not.

Radical Zionists like Stevens and Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman are attempting to hold the line against internal party transformation.

Another major consequence of this election will be the fate of this new progressive leftist current, also characterized as “Woke 2.0.” El-Sayed is attempting to defend an already Democratic-held seat, and he looks strong in the polls. Should an upset occur and he loses, Democratic hopes of securing the Senate would require a miracle, and the progressive momentum inside the party could evaporate overnight. Ultimately, with El-Sayed, this new progressive left faces its first true test outside major metropolitan centres.

Rubio waits in the wings

This election holds significant stakes for the quiet rivalry playing out within Trump’s cabinet. If Republicans suffer a devastating defeat, Marco Rubio and JD Vance, both jockeying for the 2028 presidential nomination, may find their ambitions dampened. Entering an election weighed down by the record of an administration widely judged a failure would carry severe risks. That dynamic brought defeat to Kamala Harris, who bore the burden of Joe Biden’s missteps. Rubio is a politician who avoids unwinnable contests; because he remains well regarded by the establishment, he can afford to bide his time.

JD Vance, on the other hand, made a sudden ascent through the ranks straight to the vice presidency. While he enjoys support from Peter Thiel and his circle, his backing among the party’s senior leadership is far thinner. Because he is vice president, convention dictates that the broader party will defer to his candidacy. For that reason, 2028 remains Vance’s best opportunity despite everything.

Lame duck

In summary, while the situation heading into the midterms looks grim for Republicans, it is hardly bright for Democrats. A persistent lethargy has hung over them since 2024. They produce few compelling arguments, scarcely raising their voices against Trump as they once did. The rift between the centrist establishment and the progressive left may well generate more friction than the turmoil among Republicans. Trump exploited this fault line throughout his campaign. Conservative media and politicians did not hesitate to target El-Sayed over his Muslim faith and his ties to the controversial Turkish streamer Hasan Piker.

Should Trump truly suffer a rout tonight, the incoming Congress seated in January will curtail his room for manoeuvre on international matters. It is still too early to predict the course of the Iran War, as the political landscape that emerges in both Israel and the US will exert a direct influence on its trajectory.

Ultimately, the fate of the war also hinges on the blue wave that may crash ashore in Florida tonight.

Opinion

What are Europe’s ignorant leaders failing to see?

Published

4 days ago

03/11/2026

Barış Doster

The European Union (EU) has reportedly reacted against the agreement reached between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which temporarily lifts US sanctions on Russian diesel. While Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, demanded that pressure on Russia be intensified to end the war, the foreign ministers of EU member states stated that sanctions targeting Moscow would continue despite the US decision.

While this report is striking for laying bare the ignorance of those governing the EU, it also demonstrates that, contrary to European perceptions, the US does not view the EU as an ally and does not care about its sensitivities. Clearly, priorities, goals, concerns, definitions of threats, and threat perceptions between the two sides of the Atlantic are starkly different.

What those who govern Europe fail to understand is this: neither is the US the old US, nor is Europe the old Europe, nor is the world the old world. Sadly, the EU’s rulers are blind to this plain truth. Clearly, the ignorance that is so deeply organized and institutionalized in academia, politics, and the bureaucracy in our own country is widespread in Europe as well.

Those who rule Europe need to be reminded of the words of my late, revered master, Attila Ilhan: “If only you had known a little political economy.”

At international summits and in bilateral meetings, European leaders unashamedly applaud US President Trump even as he insults them to their faces.

Yet this is not the first time in history that the US has scolded Europe; it has done so before. It was none other than the US that drove Europe from the American continent, declared “America for the Americans” (the Monroe Doctrine), and defined Latin America as its backyard. Indeed, they were the first to introduce the term “backyard” into political science. They maintained that there was no room for any other state in their backyard. Under the Monroe Doctrine, no European power, including Spain, had any place anywhere in Latin America. Only the US was to call the tune across the continent. And for long years, with the exception of Cuba, that was precisely the case.

The dictators, the presidents, the prime ministers, the chiefs of the general staff, and the senior bureaucrats were all appointed by the US. Coups, political assassinations, and conspiracies were executed or orchestrated by the US. To that end, a school was even established in the US in 1946 for their training: The School of the Americas.

The political influence of the US in the region opened the wealth of regional countries – be it oil, coffee, gold, or sugar – to plunder by US corporations. In the end, the peoples of Latin America were reduced to impoverished watchmen over bountiful resources. They were ruthlessly exploited by politicians elected by themselves, yet working for and on behalf of the US. For that reason, the US could never stomach the changing political climate in Latin America, nor could it accept losing in Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras. It feared the influence of Hugo Chavez’s line across the countries of the region. It viewed China’s growing weight, trade volume, and investments in the region as a threat.

Because Europe’s current leaders view the US as an unshakeable ally, they fail to grasp what the US has done, including its actions in Latin America, and how the US actually views its own hemisphere, the world, and Europe. What is more, they are afraid. And because they are afraid, they cannot respond to the humiliating remarks about Europe made by Trump and his close associates, or to their contempt for Europe’s history, values, culture, and political understanding. They dread finding themselves in the predicament that Ukrainian leader Zelensky faced at the White House a few years ago.

Those who govern Europe do not know this: no one respects those who lack self-respect, and a leader as insolent, arrogant, egotistical, and untrustworthy as Trump will have no respect for them at all.

Opinion

Energy and electoral politics in Gagauzia: the promise of Russian gas through Türkiye’s image

Published

4 days ago

03/11/2026

Harici.com.tr

Dr. Violeta Stratan İlbasmış, lecturer

A few weeks before the presidential election scheduled for 15 November 2026 in Gagauzia, the promise of cheap natural gas is returning to the region’s political discourse. This time, the message in question is being linked to Türkiye, the TurkStream natural gas pipeline, and the possibility of procuring gas under more favourable terms. Beyond an economic pledge, this initiative raises a geopolitical question: How can Türkiye’s image be used to bolster Russia’s interests in the Republic of Moldova?

An electoral promise with geopolitical dimensions

Fiodor Gagauz, the candidate for the presidency of Gagauzia supported by the Socialist Party, announced on 21 October that he had been invited to the Verona Eurasian Economic Forum held in Istanbul on 22–23 October 2026. According to his statement, his son Dmitri Gagauz was to attend the event and discuss with Turkish partners the possibility of allocating a quota for supplying natural gas to Gagauzia under more advantageous conditions via the TurkStream pipeline.

This initiative comes at a time when Igor Dodon, leader of the Socialist Party and former president of the Republic of Moldova, announced that the socialists had reached an agreement with Russia regarding cheaper natural gas, and that a company was being sought to transport the gas to the border of the Republic of Moldova. To date, however, public statements lack sufficient detail regarding a concrete contract, the final price of the gas, transport costs, or actual delivery terms.

Türkiye: an image capable of lending credibility to Russian gas

Türkiye is a major regional actor and an economic partner to many countries, including the Republic of Moldova. It also plays a strategic role in the transit of Russian gas across the Black Sea via the TurkStream pipeline. This standing provides a concrete and credible basis for discussions concerning energy routes. In political communications, however, Türkiye’s image can serve a purpose extending well beyond the mere promotion of a transit route.

Associating the promise of cheap Russian gas with Türkiye can make the initiative more persuasive to the public: Russia is presented as the supplier of an affordable resource, and Türkiye as the regional partner capable of facilitating access to it. Thus, the image of a state with multifaceted economic and diplomatic ties can contribute to legitimizing a political message that ultimately promotes reliance on Russian gas.

From a geopolitical perspective, Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the Republic of Moldova and keep alive the notion that dependency on Russian energy sources can yield economic benefits. Particularly in a region where the cost of living and energy expenditures represent major concerns, promises of lower prices can feed this narrative. It should be noted here that citizens of the Republic of Moldova pay 26 Moldovan lei per cubic metre of natural gas, or roughly 1.30 euros.

The impact of the message can be examined independently of the actors’ intentions: Türkiye’s image can be utilized for political ends to make an offer involving Russian gas appear more credible and to serve Moscow’s geopolitical interests.

A relevant precedent: the promise of 10-leu natural gas

The issue of cheap natural gas is not being deployed in Gagauzia’s political arena for the first time. Supported by the fugitive politician Ilan Șor, who was sentenced to 15 years in prison in a finalized ruling concerning the Republic of Moldova’s bank fraud case, Evghenia Guțul pledged in 2023 to provide natural gas at a price of 10 lei per cubic metre. That offer was tied to the local company “NordGaz-Furnizare” and a chain of intermediaries, including the Türkiye-based Zen Solar Enerji. Investigative journalism published at the time raised questions regarding the supply model’s structure and feasibility. Ultimately, the promise did not materialize for consumers under the announced terms and within the stated timeframe.

This precedent demonstrates how potent the issue of cheap natural gas can be as an electoral tool, and how the names of foreign companies or partners can help generate a perception of reliability around an offer. Nevertheless, the involvement of a Turkish company in an earlier supply model does not, on its own, prove the involvement of the Turkish state or the existence of coordination orchestrated by Russia.

Beyond the price: who gains politically?

As the 15 November election approaches, the promise of cheap natural gas can operate on two levels simultaneously. On the economic plane, it offers voters the prospect of lower utility bills. On the political plane, it can reinforce the idea that the solution to the region’s difficulties must be sought in energy ties with Russia and in the partnerships that make this option appear viable.

The mention of Türkiye introduces a significant dimension to this message. Rather than being framed solely as an initiative tied to Russian gas, the proposal is linked to an influential regional power and an existing energy route. Türkiye’s image can thus play a role in legitimizing a pledge that serves the discourse advocating for the preservation of energy ties with Moscow.

Even so, the existence of the TurkStream pipeline does not automatically mean that Gagauzia can access natural gas at a preferential rate. Such an offer requires contracts, suppliers, transport capacity, compliance with the regulatory framework, and transparency regarding the final cost. Until verifiable documentation and explicit supply terms are put forward, this pledge remains an electoral promise.

The essential issue is not merely whether Gagauzia will receive cheaper natural gas, but how this promise is framed. When Türkiye’s image is paired with Russian gas to enhance the credibility of an electoral offer, the potential gains may extend well beyond the economic realm and help advance Russia’s geopolitical interests in the Republic of Moldova.