Opinion
The coming armistice: Preparing for a bigger one – 2
I concluded the first part of this series with the following words:
“In the current situation, an armistice along the line of contact seems inevitable.”
The reasoning behind this is straightforward: Ukraine has largely ceased to be an ‘issue’ because it is losing its potential to be one. It has become increasingly evident that Russia will never permit Kiev to join NATO. Moreover, Ukraine’s existing military potential has been significantly depleted. Even if the imperialist bloc were to fully mobilize its productive capacity, it would fail to offset these losses.
On 17 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov revealed that the Kiev regime had received over $350 billion in ‘aid’ from 30 countries since February 2022, with $170 billion allocated for military purposes. Despite this staggering sum, it is no longer sufficient to sustain the fight—let alone secure a victory against Russia.
This reality is universally acknowledged—which is precisely why time is needed for preparation.
‘Preparation’
But preparation for what?
On 13 December, Rutte stated that “there is now neither war nor peace between Russia and the West,” adding that “Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with Ukraine and the West.” The implication is that the West is preparing for war with Russia.
This preparation is no longer concealed at any level. On 25 November, Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, revealed that NATO was discussing “preemptive strikes against high-precision targets” on Russian territory in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO countries. According to Bauer: “The smart thing is not to wait but to hit launchers in Russia if Russia attacks us. A high-precision combined strike to disable the systems that would be used against us is essential—we must strike first.” Furthermore, Bauer called on the “business community” to prepare for a “wartime scenario” and to adjust production and distribution accordingly: “If we can ensure the supply of all critical services and goods, this will be an important part of our deterrence.”
This signifies a complete capitalist reorganization: not deindustrialization but the militarization of industry in Europe. The fact that this call comes not from neoconservative zealots but from military leaders—who typically adopt a more measured approach, primarily because they understand the realities of war—makes it all the more significant. This is not a new plan, nor is it tied to the events of 24 February 2022. The project was already in place as early as September 2021, as the US’s so-called “Reichsführer” in Europe, the “baroness” at the helm of the European Commission, openly stated at the 2023 Munich Conference. However, due to their mediocrity, incompetence, and unpredictability, they failed to execute it effectively. Now, they need time to accelerate this process once again.
Trump’s recent announcement that NATO members should increase their military spending to well above 2% of GDP (reportedly suggesting 3.7%, while The New York Times mentioned 5% last month), if realized, would benefit not only the U.S. but also the European elite. Such a move would be precisely what is needed to expedite this reorganization.
If your opponent is preparing for war, so are you. For some time, Russia has avoided the idea of a conventional war with the West in Europe. At least in its statements, it seemed more likely that any potential conflict with NATO would occur in or around Ukraine. Earlier this month, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that “the actions of the U.S. and other NATO members aimed at escalating the Ukrainian crisis” have increased the likelihood of a direct conflict with NATO. On 16 December, Defence Minister Belousov, after speaking for the first time about the necessity to “fulfil various tasks and maintain a military presence in Central Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and Transnistria,” added: “In the medium term, we must be fully prepared for any development of the situation, including a possible military confrontation with NATO in Europe within the next decade. The decisions taken at the NATO summit last July are preparation for this. This is also reflected in the doctrinal documents of the U.S. and other NATO countries.”
It seems that nearly everyone in their right mind views the prospect of a war between NATO and Russia as increasingly likely. The West, because it is provoking such a conflict—because it needs it. Russia, because it lacks the power to prevent it.
Both sides must undergo significant reorganization. The West must fully militarize its economy. Last year, when Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief (effectively its war minister, succeeding the fascist-leaning Borrell), was prime minister of Estonia, she advocated issuing war bonds using Russia’s frozen assets as collateral. In mid-December, the same Kallas stated that although Russia has a legal right to the assets “seized” by the West, it would not regain them until the funds were used to restore the Kiev regime. She added: “I’m not sure there is anything left of them.” Foreign assets, after all, are based on reputation. They do not need to remain in an account to be traded; they only need to be perceived as valuable. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kallas is not merely indulging in rhetorical excess but is describing the reality of the situation.
As for Russia, its Soviet-era defense complex is so vast and so deeply intertwined with the civilian economy that it does not require reorganization—only improvement and expansion. However, preparing for war demands more than just military readiness. It requires arguments to convince the population of its necessity, individuals capable of defending these arguments, and cadres skilled in executing current tasks. It necessitates reducing income inequality to foster shared values, raising birth rates to ensure societal reproduction and the adequacy of human resources, increasing the output of civilian industry, achieving technological superiority, and maintaining economic independence. This complex process will take time to complete.
In short, a truce is necessary for all sides—not just because Trump desires it. The question is how this will be achieved and whether it will lead to a lasting peace agreement.
Russia’s position
There have been two programmatic statements from the Russian side in the past week.
On 25 December, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov clearly outlined the situation with the West: “Regarding the meaning of the negotiations currently taking place in the West and in Ukraine, we are only talking about an armistice—about allowing the Kiev regime, with the help of the West, to once again consolidate its power and make new attempts to fulfil the instructions of its masters to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia. … We are not satisfied with an armistice; we need reliable, legally binding agreements.” According to Lavrov, these agreements must also address the root causes of the Ukrainian conflict: “Common security in Europe, the enlargement of NATO, the EU’s recent decision to subordinate itself to NATO, and essentially to eliminate all differences between these organisations—including, of course, the rights of people in certain regions who have expressed their desire to unite with Russia.”
The following day, in response to the comment that “Western experts expect the Ukrainian conflict to end in 2025,” Putin remarked: “Your words are dripping with honey” (a Russian expression meaning to speak sweetly or optimistically). He added, “We aim to end the conflict.” However, when asked about plans to freeze the conflict in exchange for a guarantee delaying the Kiev regime’s entry into NATO for 10–20 years, Putin responded: “I don’t know what is being discussed in the current team of the US president-elect. What I do know is that President Biden proposed this to me in 2021. He suggested postponing Ukraine’s entry into NATO for 10–15 years—because Ukraine is not yet ‘ready.’ And I gave him a reasonable answer: Of course, it’s not ready today, but you’ll prepare it and accept it. … What’s the difference for us? Whether it’s today, tomorrow, or 10 years later. I don’t know about the statements of the future team of the president-elect, but in this sense, if such a proposal is made, what is the difference between the current leadership and the ideas you just mentioned? There is no difference. I don’t know how the situation will develop from now on or what instructions the president-elect will give to his administration. Let’s see.”
Thus, Russia’s position can be summarized as follows: It seeks a permanent political agreement, not a temporary ceasefire or armistice. However, a permanent agreement does not exclude temporary armistices. The basis for peace can only be Putin’s ultimatum from July, and nothing else. Ideally, it should include a new security architecture in Europe (with the EU operating independently of NATO), a resolution to the Transnistrian and perhaps Gagauz issues, and a guarantee that NATO will not expand further. The latter includes not only Ukraine but also Moldova and Georgia.
The Western position
I have labeled this section ‘The West,’ but this should not be misunderstood. In August, I wrote in Harici as follows: “The question of a ceasefire should be discussed day and night from Kiev to Washington, from London to Budapest—but not in other European capitals, as they are insignificant, drifting aimlessly like mosquitoes in the wind.” Thus, there are only two meaningful positions in the West: the United States and Britain. Britain aims to extend the war to all its borders and to use Europeans as live ammunition for this purpose. This also appears to be the stance of global finance capital, represented primarily by The City. While this strategy has no chance of ultimate success, that is not its goal; it merely seeks to prolong the conflict for the foreseeable future.
It has become clear that the U.S. will present a scenario with three alternatives. These have been discussed for some time, but the most precise formulation was published on December 6 in the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano. The alternatives are as follows:
1) The partition of Ukraine according to the ‘German model’ and the incorporation into NATO of the regions under the control of the Kiev regime. 2) The second scenario is ‘Israel in Europe’: Ukraine would no longer be a NATO member but would continue to receive military ‘aid.’ 3) An international mission composed of peacekeepers from non-NATO countries such as China and India would be established.
The first alternative is untenable, not only due to Russia’s position but also because of the U.S. determination under Trump to postpone a major conflict with Russia. The second alternative would amount to a continuation of the Minsk deception, while it is the most favorable formula from the U.S. perspective, Russia cannot accept it.
The third alternative appears to be the most viable, but it would only result in a truce. For now, the issue will likely center on the composition of the peacekeeping force. Russia will not accept the participation of NATO countries (with the possible exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia) in such a force. Instead, a contingent could be assembled from the so-called ‘global south.’
One reason for Russia’s emphasis on the third alternative may be to avoid undermining Trump’s position, given his potential role in disrupting the current system.
The ‘triple alliance’ in Kiev
In any case, the current leadership in Kiev must be under immense pressure. It can only survive with Britain’s support, and London is actively working to ensure this. Poroshenko’s recent call to avoid elections in the near future “in order not to weaken the state” is a clear indication of this effort. It seems they are attempting to form a formal or informal coalition consisting of a bankrupt and defunct commander-in-chief, a bankrupt and defunct president, and a bankrupt comedian-turned-president.
The first is a staunch fascist, reckless enough to display Bandera’s portrait behind him when addressing the international press. The second, the so-called ‘chocolate king,’ has also cultivated ‘trusted’ relations with Poland. The third owes his position solely to being the weakest among them (ultimus inter pares). His remarks on military-political matters suggest he may see himself as a modern-day Napoléon I, though, setting aside Napoléon I’s fate, it would be more accurate to describe him as a farcical Napoléon III.
This ‘triple alliance’ is unlikely to materialize, as it is primarily focused on pursuing the first alternative.
What will happen?
From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia set itself three goals: demilitarization, denazification, and ensuring Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO. All three were agreed upon in the Istanbul pre-agreement, which was subsequently rendered worthless—less than toilet paper—at the behest of the U.S. administration and a single visit by Johnson to Kiev. In July, the ‘situation on the ground’ was added, accompanied by Putin’s ultimatum, which was declared in front of the Foreign Affairs coliseum.
The Trump administration’s third alternative poses a challenge for Russia, primarily due to the goal of ‘denazification’ of the regime. By its very nature, this entails the removal of the current leadership in one way or another, preferably through elections. The determination of the ‘chocolate king,’ the comedian, and the bankrupt ‘commander-in-chief’ to avoid holding elections is precisely aimed at preventing this outcome.
So, what will happen? It seems to me that a truce based on the third alternative will be reached by February-March, with elections in Kiev organized in May at the insistence of the U.S.—provided Britain can be overcome as an obstacle. The organization of these elections will be crucial for maintaining the armistice. I doubt Britain’s pressure on the Kiev trio to block the elections will weaken Trump’s resolve. The comedian president in Kiev, who has already been publicly humiliated by Trump Jr. on social media—first by cutting off the dollar flow and then by kicking him out of the frame—is likely well aware of this.
And all of this is to ‘prepare.’
Opinion
What is scale in foreign policy? How is success measured in foreign policy?
By its very nature, foreign policy feeds into and draws nourishment from numerous, disparate, and varied fields. It is a domain with manifold and diverse inputs. For foreign policy is examined alongside a broad array of subjects, ranging from geography to history, economics to intelligence, and military might to public diplomacy, commonly termed soft power elements.
The capacity of the state, that is, the scale of the state, or in other words the aggregate of its elements of power (namely political, economic, military, and soft power components), is decisive in foreign policy. Geography is decisive in foreign policy. Commercial relations are decisive in foreign policy. Energy dependence on another country or countries, if present, is decisive in foreign policy. Foreign policy cannot be conducted in spite of these four factors.
There is more. A country’s capacity, its scale, does not increase overnight, from one day to the next. It requires planning. It requires national consensus. It requires time. It requires preparation. Nor are these enough. The regional and global environment, the conjuncture, and the international plane must also allow for it. The stance of allies and adversaries is, of course, also important.
For the international environment is, by its nature, complex. It is an environment rife with contradiction, turmoil, conflict, and tension. To draw an analogy, the person in the driver’s seat of foreign policy is not a motorist speeding along the road as they please. There are things they must not forget, rules they must obey, red lights, vehicles speeding up from behind, a truck moving ahead, and a heavy vehicle hurtling toward them from the opposite direction.
Success in foreign policy does not arrive simply because a politician we like has become foreign minister. For a foreign minister is only as effective as the power, capacity, and weight of their country. One must accept this plain truth.
Moreover, there are simple, straightforward questions that reveal whether foreign policy, which some find deeply complex and inscrutable, is successful or not.
There are undoubtedly ways to measure the effectiveness, prestige, influence, and success of foreign policy.
For instance, the number of countries that respect a passport, how many countries can be visited visa-free, and how many countries impose visa requirements and grant those visas only with great difficulty are important indicators of a country’s standing.
Let us take ourselves as an example. Which countries require a visa for the Turkish passport? Which ones do not? Is it easy for our citizens to obtain visas for the countries they primarily wish to visit?
Let us give another example from the Turkic world.
On the Cyprus issue, which we regard as a national cause across government and opposition, right and left, Kemalist and Milli Görüş adherents alike, how many countries have we succeeded in having recognize the TRNC? Why do the Turkic states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) not recognize the TRNC? Far from recognizing the TRNC, how do the Turkic states in Central Asia (Turkistan) explain to Ankara their developing relations with the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus, which Türkiye does not recognize, their appointment of ambassadors, and their recognition of Southern Cyprus as the island’s sole legitimate government?
We must also ask this question, of course: What is the state of Türkiye’s bilateral trade with the Turkic states?
Let us give an example of the relationship between foreign policy and big capital.
In which countries are big capital circles, among the greatest supporters of the ruling bloc, winning major tenders?
In our country, across both ruling and opposition ranks, there is a political party order that supports Türkiye’s EU membership. Yet how much progress has been made on EU membership?
Why is US President Trump not keeping the promises he made to Türkiye at the NATO summit held in Ankara a few months ago?
How many contracts has the new regime in Syria, the al-Sharaa administration, awarded to Turkish companies for the reconstruction of its country?
Has the government in Libya that Türkiye supports paid the money owed to Turkish construction firms, outstanding for years?
How does Qatar, with whom our relations are very good, explain its developing ties, energy agreements, and joint military drills with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration, disregarding our sensitivities?
Who is the addressee of the harsh statements used in recent weeks by Azerbaijan, which we view as “two states, one nation”? To what extent does Azerbaijan share Türkiye’s policy on Israel? What does Türkiye think about the scale, depth, and intimacy of Azerbaijan-Israel relations?
These questions can certainly be multiplied.
Yet without taking into account the scale of the state and observing the criteria for measuring foreign policy, no sound assessment can be made.
Opinion
The era of corridor alliances in the Middle East
In the Middle East, war is no longer waged merely to seize territory. The true contest turns on who will control the energy pipelines, trade routes, ports, and railways of tomorrow. Missiles may strike cities today, but the maps of the future are being drawn through transport and energy corridors.
In this context, interpreting Türkiye’s presence in the Mecca Alliance solely as military support for Saudi Arabian security remains incomplete; it fails to explain why two states that viewed each other with mutual suspicion until recently would take steps toward a cooperation close enough to constitute a shared destiny.
Alongside Saudi Arabia’s existential motives, Ankara’s participation in this alliance is anchored in a profound geopolitical foundation: to position itself within, and if possible at the very centre of, the Middle East’s reconfigured energy and transport corridors.
Today, it cannot be said that Riyadh and Ankara see eye to eye on every regional issue. The threat perceptions and priorities of the two countries do not, quite naturally, entirely coincide. On the geopolitical chessboard, partnerships do not always arise from identical agendas. When reasons are sufficiently compelling, particularly existential ones, they can override political differences and enable common ground along the same strategic path.
A new war of corridors unfolds in the Middle East
On one side lies IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), planned to extend from India through the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel to Europe. On the other stands the Development Road, which aims to link the Persian Gulf across Iraq to Türkiye, and onward to Europe.
These two undertakings are, of course, far more than mere transport projects. They represent two divergent geopolitical answers to where the future flow of trade and energy between Asia and Europe will traverse; for Türkiye, this issue is of vital importance.
If a corridor system taking shape to Türkiye’s south, beyond Ankara’s orbit, becomes permanent, Türkiye could forfeit not only an economic opportunity but also a substantial portion of its strategic centrality in the Middle East. It is through this prism that the Mecca Alliance must be evaluated.
Türkiye’s seat at the same table with Saudi Arabia signifies more than military solidarity. Riyadh and Ankara must sit together to avoid exclusion from the region’s emergent security and economic architecture, for the security of a corridor and the corridor itself are no longer separate matters.
The Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandab, and the Suez Canal are links in the very same chain. A security crisis in one directly impacts the others. While the vulnerability of Hormuz makes alternative export routes for Gulf oil indispensable, instability across the Red Sea heightens the strategic cost of Suez.
Saudi Arabia’s alternative pipelines connecting its eastern oil fields to Red Sea terminals are therefore not merely energy infrastructure; they are strategic bypasses mitigating dependence on Hormuz.
For Türkiye, the Development Road fulfills the same function across a broader geography. Stretching from the Persian Gulf through Iraq to Türkiye, and from Türkiye into Europe, this artery possesses the potential to forge a new overland backbone connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean and Europe. As security concerns in the Red Sea mount and the vulnerability of Suez deepens, the value of this route rises accordingly.
The Hejaz Railway: Revived once again
The return of the Hejaz Railway to the regional agenda signifies far more than mere nostalgia. Once linking Istanbul to Damascus, Amman, and the Hejaz, the railway served as one of the primary transport and logistical arteries of the Ottoman geography.
Reviving the idea of the Hejaz Railway could become the emblem of Türkiye’s drive to reimagine its historical transport connections between the Gulf, the Hejaz, and the Levant through modern rail, energy, and logistics networks.
The objective here is not to restore the past, but to transpose the strategic logic of that historical geographical linkage into the twenty-first century. For this reason, Türkiye’s role in the Mecca Alliance and the resurgence of the Hejaz Railway project must be viewed as components of the same overarching picture.
Corridors do not consist solely of energy pipelines. Railways, ports, highways, electrical interconnectors, logistical hubs, and security architectures are all facets of the same geopolitical grid, and safeguarding these networks requires political alliances.
Herein lies the strategic significance of Saudi Arabia and Türkiye sitting at the same table in Mecca, even at a juncture when their views on Syria diverge.
Ankara and Riyadh do not need to agree on every subject. Yet neither wishes to see the new map of the Middle East drawn to its detriment. Türkiye’s aim is not to build an anti-bloc against any specific country alongside Saudi Arabia; rather, the goal is to avoid exclusion from the future energy and trade systems of the Middle East, while securing a decisive voice in establishing their security architecture.
Hence, for Türkiye, the Mecca Alliance is far more than a simple defence pact. Securing the Development Road, shielding Gulf energy corridors, stabilising the Red Sea, rethinking connections across the Hejaz and the Levant, and bolstering trade corridors reaching Europe all intersect within this single strategic equation.
In this equation, Türkiye’s foremost advantage remains its geography. Ankara sits at the northern terminus of the overland routes linking the Gulf to Europe; within NATO; and at the crossroads connecting the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East.
Will Türkiye become one of the powers shaping the Middle East’s energy and trade architecture over the coming decades, or will it be reduced to a mere transit state traversed by routes designed by others? That question defines the true strategic significance of the Mecca Alliance for Ankara.
In the Middle East of tomorrow, it will be impossible to separate the corridor carrying energy, the security framework protecting that corridor, and the alliance constructing that security framework.
Whoever controls the corridor shapes commerce. Whoever guarantees the routes through which trade flows holds sway over the regional balance of power. This is the true dimension of the contest currently underway in the Middle East.
A succession of distinct and largely mutually exclusive ambitions are competing for dominance in the current climate: India’s linkage to Europe, the Gulf’s new economic horizons, Saudi Arabia’s alternative energy routes, the security crisis in the Red Sea, the strategic weight of Hormuz, and Türkiye’s aspiration to open outward to Europe via the Development Road. Ironically, perhaps, the conflict that will decide which corridor underpins global stability has already begun, and it will likely continue spreading to new fronts. Regrettably, the fires in our region appear poised to intensify long before they abate.
Opinion
Istanbul’s East-West Forum: A conversation the world can no longer avoid
Dr. Ahmed Moustafa, Director & Founder, Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt
In a city that has spent centuries translating the language of one civilization to another, the first East-West Forum arrived at a moment when the world itself seemed to have lost the vocabulary for talking across its divisions.
Held in Istanbul on Sept. 26–27 and preceded by meetings around the event, the forum brought together diplomats, academics, journalists, strategists and political thinkers from a wide range of countries. Hosted by Harici Media in partnership with the Berlin-based European Transcontinental Initiative, the gathering was conceived as an attempt to examine a world increasingly defined by competing power centers, regional wars, economic fragmentation, artificial intelligence and the erosion of confidence in institutions created after the Second World War. Harici reported that participants came from roughly 30 countries.
For us, the significance of Istanbul was not simply a matter of the speakers on the panel or the structure of the programme. Its deeper importance lay in the willingness to put difficult — and sometimes uncomfortable — questions on the table.
We would like to extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to my friend and brother, Mr. Tunç Akkoç, Founder and Editor-in-Chief of Harici Media, for his gracious invitation to a representative of the Asia Center for Studies & Translation, Egypt, to participate in the Forum as a speaker and commentator. His initiative in creating a platform where competing geopolitical narratives could meet directly deserves recognition.
In his opening remarks, Akkos stressed that the initiative was intended to establish a permanent platform where people representing different political and intellectual traditions and perspectives could meet and engage in direct dialogue.
This vision is particularly significant because the traditional language used in international relations has increasingly struggled to explain the realities of a rapidly changing world.
The Problem of Proxy Wars
During the session that discussed proxy wars in the region and ways to reach solutions to their crises, the Center put forward the view that the Middle East cannot simply be understood through the traditional map that divides the parties into “good” and “evil,” or into “responsible states” and “rogue states.”
Such terms, in our assessment, often reflect the perspective of powers that possess extensive influence over international media and financial and security institutions.
The Center particularly criticised what we see as political bias within important sectors of the Western media and some non-governmental organisations that receive Western funding. From our perspective, these institutions can, in some cases, move from being mere observers of geopolitical conflicts to becoming influential parties in the battle over the narrative and the story.
However, this view should remain open to debate and should not automatically be accepted as an absolute truth.
The more important question is not whether every Western journalist, every NGO, or every Western institution works to serve a single geopolitical agenda clearly, this is not the case, but whether the information environment itself has become so highly polarised that the public is now receiving radically different interpretations of the very same war.
In our assessment, the answer is increasingly approaching “yes.”
The problem becomes particularly clear when searching for the term “proxy wars” in the Middle East. Some of the first results focus on groups associated with Iran, including Hezbollah and the Houthis, as well as Hamas, whereas the history of regional conflicts is far more complex.
Al-Qaeda and ISIS emerged through different historical trajectories, with Anglo-Saxon support that was “created by Britain and the United States.” In environments dominated by the United States and Britain, Al-Qaeda emerged from the environment associated with Osama bin Laden and the Afghan jihad, while ISIS developed largely from Al-Qaeda in Iraq, under American sponsorship, to pursue a certain agenda in the region and advance the scenario of “creative chaos” promoted by Condoleezza Rice, the radical US Secretary of State.
At the same time, US policy toward Afghanistan during the Cold War contributed to shaping the broader environment from which some militant jihadist movements later emerged.
These distinctions matter.
Because propaganda often begins where complex historical details end.
Who Has the Right to Define a “Rogue State”?
The same problem appears in the vocabulary used to describe states.
Countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea are frequently portrayed in Western strategic discourse as states challenging the existing international order.
Egypt, despite the different nature of its relationship with Washington, can also become the subject of criticism when its foreign policy does not conform to certain Western expectations.
The question is not whether these governments should be exempt from criticism. Of course not.
The deeper question is this: can the international system remain sustainable when one geopolitical camp increasingly assumes the authority to define which governments are legitimate, which movements are terrorist, which wars are defensive and which forms of resistance are acceptable?
That was one of the central questions behind our intervention in Istanbul.
The Middle East has repeatedly been presented through the lens of the “Iranian threat” as the principal strategic danger.
There is no question that Iran possesses significant military and regional capabilities, and that its policies are deeply contested by many neighbouring states. At the same time, reducing virtually every regional security problem to Tehran can obscure the interests and roles of other actors, including Israel, the United States, Gulf states, armed groups and local political forces.
The region has repeatedly paid a heavy price for simplistic interpretations of complex conflicts.
The Economics of Fear
The discussions in Istanbul also led us to a broader American question: to what extent can fear itself become a source of political and economic power?
Historically, the United States has experienced intense political campaigns shaped by perceived racial, ideological and security threats.
One does not need to accept every interpretation of this history to recognise that fear can become a factor with tangible economic consequences.
A 2020 study by Citi estimated that racial discrimination against Black Americans had cost the US economy approximately $16 trillion in lost economic output since 2000, based on an analysis of disparities in wages, education, housing and investment.
This figure demonstrates the extent of the economic losses associated with racial discrimination and exclusion. It also raises questions about the relationship between fear-based narratives concerning Black Americans, media influence, the political power of the gun lobby and the broader economic consequences of insecurity.
More importantly, however, the study highlights a fundamental point: bias and insecurity carry substantial and measurable economic costs.
The broader lesson has direct relevance to foreign policy.
When societies are continually presented with existential enemies, military spending and the expansion of security institutions become politically easier to justify.
America After Iran
In Istanbul, we also advanced the view that the United States after its confrontation with Iran in 2026 should not simply be understood through the traditional image of unlimited American power.
The conflict exposed economic and strategic vulnerabilities.
The Strait of Hormuz emerged as a major strategic pressure point for global energy markets, amid disruptions to international trade that forced governments and companies to search for alternative routes and supplies.
The consequences were reflected in oil prices and energy costs in Europe and elsewhere.
This does not mean that American power has disappeared. Rather, it suggests that military power is no longer synonymous with strategic control.
The rise of China, Russia, ASEAN, Iran and other centres of economic and diplomatic influence has made the international order increasingly complex and dispersed.
The East-West Forum itself reflected this reality, bringing together voices from Europe, Asia, the Middle East and North America while explicitly addressing multipolarity and the ongoing transformation of the global order.
America Is Changing From Within
The domestic dimension of American politics also deserves attention.
The emergence of figures such as Zohran Mamdani in New York and Abdul El-Sayed in Michigan reflects changes in the American political debate over inequality, foreign policy, healthcare, identity and the influence of established political and economic interests.
Their political trajectories should not be treated as evidence of a predetermined future for the United States.
They do, however, illustrate how issues that were once treated as peripheral including the costs of war, US policy toward Israel, economic inequality and the political influence of younger and more diverse generations have moved closer to the centre of American political debate.
This is another reason why East-West dialogue cannot remain confined to foreign ministries and military institutions.
A Dinner for Dialogue
One of the most memorable moments on the margins of the Forum was the private dinner held on the evening of Friday, September 25, hosted by H.E. Mr. Hasan Capan, Chairman of the Turkish-Chinese Friendship Foundation, and H.E. Ambassador Ersin Erçin, Vice Chairman of the Foundation, in honour of the speakers and participants.
We extend our sincere thanks and appreciation to both of them for their generosity, friendship and support.
The gathering was more than simply a dinner. It provided an opportunity for personal interaction, an exchange of ideas and the building of relationships among participants — precisely the kind of human diplomacy that formal conferences sometimes lack.
Real dialogue does not always begin behind conference podiums.
Very often, it begins around a single table.
Istanbul’s Larger Message
The first East-West Forum should be regarded as the beginning of a dialogue, not the end of a debate.
The organisers have already articulated a vision of transforming the initiative into an annual gathering in Istanbul, developing expert working groups, establishing an East-West Forum network and potentially creating a business council capable of connecting intellectual dialogue with economic cooperation.
This may ultimately prove to be one of its most important contributions.
The world that emerges from the current conflicts including the crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz will require more than ceasefire agreements.
It will require a new conversation about security, energy, sovereignty, development, technology and coexistence.
Istanbul is an exceptional setting for such a dialogue. One participant even proposed moving the headquarters of international organisations, including the United Nations, to Istanbul.
For centuries, the city has stood between two continents without belonging exclusively to either.
The East-West Forum can follow the same principle: not choosing one civilisation against another, but creating a space in which East and West can confront their differences without turning disagreement into permanent conflict.
For this reason, we see the Istanbul gathering as an announcement of intent.
It was not an attempt to erase differences.
It was an attempt to make dialogue possible despite them.
At a time when proxy conflicts increasingly risk evolving into direct confrontations, this may be among the most important political conversations the world can undertake today.
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