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The coming armistice: Preparing for a bigger one – 2

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I concluded the first part of this series with the following words:

“In the current situation, an armistice along the line of contact seems inevitable.”

The coming armistice: preparing for a bigger one — 1

The reasoning behind this is straightforward: Ukraine has largely ceased to be an ‘issue’ because it is losing its potential to be one. It has become increasingly evident that Russia will never permit Kiev to join NATO. Moreover, Ukraine’s existing military potential has been significantly depleted. Even if the imperialist bloc were to fully mobilize its productive capacity, it would fail to offset these losses.

On 17 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov revealed that the Kiev regime had received over $350 billion in ‘aid’ from 30 countries since February 2022, with $170 billion allocated for military purposes. Despite this staggering sum, it is no longer sufficient to sustain the fight—let alone secure a victory against Russia.

This reality is universally acknowledged—which is precisely why time is needed for preparation.

‘Preparation’

But preparation for what?

On 13 December, Rutte stated that “there is now neither war nor peace between Russia and the West,” adding that “Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with Ukraine and the West.” The implication is that the West is preparing for war with Russia.

This preparation is no longer concealed at any level. On 25 November, Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, revealed that NATO was discussing “preemptive strikes against high-precision targets” on Russian territory in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO countries. According to Bauer: “The smart thing is not to wait but to hit launchers in Russia if Russia attacks us. A high-precision combined strike to disable the systems that would be used against us is essential—we must strike first.” Furthermore, Bauer called on the “business community” to prepare for a “wartime scenario” and to adjust production and distribution accordingly: “If we can ensure the supply of all critical services and goods, this will be an important part of our deterrence.”

This signifies a complete capitalist reorganization: not deindustrialization but the militarization of industry in Europe. The fact that this call comes not from neoconservative zealots but from military leaders—who typically adopt a more measured approach, primarily because they understand the realities of war—makes it all the more significant. This is not a new plan, nor is it tied to the events of 24 February 2022. The project was already in place as early as September 2021, as the US’s so-called “Reichsführer” in Europe, the “baroness” at the helm of the European Commission, openly stated at the 2023 Munich Conference. However, due to their mediocrity, incompetence, and unpredictability, they failed to execute it effectively. Now, they need time to accelerate this process once again.

Trump’s recent announcement that NATO members should increase their military spending to well above 2% of GDP (reportedly suggesting 3.7%, while The New York Times mentioned 5% last month), if realized, would benefit not only the U.S. but also the European elite. Such a move would be precisely what is needed to expedite this reorganization.

If your opponent is preparing for war, so are you. For some time, Russia has avoided the idea of a conventional war with the West in Europe. At least in its statements, it seemed more likely that any potential conflict with NATO would occur in or around Ukraine. Earlier this month, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that “the actions of the U.S. and other NATO members aimed at escalating the Ukrainian crisis” have increased the likelihood of a direct conflict with NATO. On 16 December, Defence Minister Belousov, after speaking for the first time about the necessity to “fulfil various tasks and maintain a military presence in Central Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and Transnistria,” added: “In the medium term, we must be fully prepared for any development of the situation, including a possible military confrontation with NATO in Europe within the next decade. The decisions taken at the NATO summit last July are preparation for this. This is also reflected in the doctrinal documents of the U.S. and other NATO countries.”

It seems that nearly everyone in their right mind views the prospect of a war between NATO and Russia as increasingly likely. The West, because it is provoking such a conflict—because it needs it. Russia, because it lacks the power to prevent it.

Both sides must undergo significant reorganization. The West must fully militarize its economy. Last year, when Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief (effectively its war minister, succeeding the fascist-leaning Borrell), was prime minister of Estonia, she advocated issuing war bonds using Russia’s frozen assets as collateral. In mid-December, the same Kallas stated that although Russia has a legal right to the assets “seized” by the West, it would not regain them until the funds were used to restore the Kiev regime. She added: “I’m not sure there is anything left of them.” Foreign assets, after all, are based on reputation. They do not need to remain in an account to be traded; they only need to be perceived as valuable. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kallas is not merely indulging in rhetorical excess but is describing the reality of the situation.

As for Russia, its Soviet-era defense complex is so vast and so deeply intertwined with the civilian economy that it does not require reorganization—only improvement and expansion. However, preparing for war demands more than just military readiness. It requires arguments to convince the population of its necessity, individuals capable of defending these arguments, and cadres skilled in executing current tasks. It necessitates reducing income inequality to foster shared values, raising birth rates to ensure societal reproduction and the adequacy of human resources, increasing the output of civilian industry, achieving technological superiority, and maintaining economic independence. This complex process will take time to complete.

In short, a truce is necessary for all sides—not just because Trump desires it. The question is how this will be achieved and whether it will lead to a lasting peace agreement.

Russia’s position

There have been two programmatic statements from the Russian side in the past week.

On 25 December, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov clearly outlined the situation with the West: “Regarding the meaning of the negotiations currently taking place in the West and in Ukraine, we are only talking about an armistice—about allowing the Kiev regime, with the help of the West, to once again consolidate its power and make new attempts to fulfil the instructions of its masters to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia. … We are not satisfied with an armistice; we need reliable, legally binding agreements.” According to Lavrov, these agreements must also address the root causes of the Ukrainian conflict: “Common security in Europe, the enlargement of NATO, the EU’s recent decision to subordinate itself to NATO, and essentially to eliminate all differences between these organisations—including, of course, the rights of people in certain regions who have expressed their desire to unite with Russia.”

The following day, in response to the comment that “Western experts expect the Ukrainian conflict to end in 2025,” Putin remarked: “Your words are dripping with honey” (a Russian expression meaning to speak sweetly or optimistically). He added, “We aim to end the conflict.” However, when asked about plans to freeze the conflict in exchange for a guarantee delaying the Kiev regime’s entry into NATO for 10–20 years, Putin responded: “I don’t know what is being discussed in the current team of the US president-elect. What I do know is that President Biden proposed this to me in 2021. He suggested postponing Ukraine’s entry into NATO for 10–15 years—because Ukraine is not yet ‘ready.’ And I gave him a reasonable answer: Of course, it’s not ready today, but you’ll prepare it and accept it. … What’s the difference for us? Whether it’s today, tomorrow, or 10 years later. I don’t know about the statements of the future team of the president-elect, but in this sense, if such a proposal is made, what is the difference between the current leadership and the ideas you just mentioned? There is no difference. I don’t know how the situation will develop from now on or what instructions the president-elect will give to his administration. Let’s see.”

Thus, Russia’s position can be summarized as follows: It seeks a permanent political agreement, not a temporary ceasefire or armistice. However, a permanent agreement does not exclude temporary armistices. The basis for peace can only be Putin’s ultimatum from July, and nothing else. Ideally, it should include a new security architecture in Europe (with the EU operating independently of NATO), a resolution to the Transnistrian and perhaps Gagauz issues, and a guarantee that NATO will not expand further. The latter includes not only Ukraine but also Moldova and Georgia.

The Western position

I have labeled this section ‘The West,’ but this should not be misunderstood. In August, I wrote in Harici as follows: “The question of a ceasefire should be discussed day and night from Kiev to Washington, from London to Budapest—but not in other European capitals, as they are insignificant, drifting aimlessly like mosquitoes in the wind.” Thus, there are only two meaningful positions in the West: the United States and Britain. Britain aims to extend the war to all its borders and to use Europeans as live ammunition for this purpose. This also appears to be the stance of global finance capital, represented primarily by The City. While this strategy has no chance of ultimate success, that is not its goal; it merely seeks to prolong the conflict for the foreseeable future.

It has become clear that the U.S. will present a scenario with three alternatives. These have been discussed for some time, but the most precise formulation was published on December 6 in the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano. The alternatives are as follows:

1) The partition of Ukraine according to the ‘German model’ and the incorporation into NATO of the regions under the control of the Kiev regime. 2) The second scenario is ‘Israel in Europe’: Ukraine would no longer be a NATO member but would continue to receive military ‘aid.’ 3) An international mission composed of peacekeepers from non-NATO countries such as China and India would be established.

The first alternative is untenable, not only due to Russia’s position but also because of the U.S. determination under Trump to postpone a major conflict with Russia. The second alternative would amount to a continuation of the Minsk deception, while it is the most favorable formula from the U.S. perspective, Russia cannot accept it.

The third alternative appears to be the most viable, but it would only result in a truce. For now, the issue will likely center on the composition of the peacekeeping force. Russia will not accept the participation of NATO countries (with the possible exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia) in such a force. Instead, a contingent could be assembled from the so-called ‘global south.’

One reason for Russia’s emphasis on the third alternative may be to avoid undermining Trump’s position, given his potential role in disrupting the current system.

The ‘triple alliance’ in Kiev

In any case, the current leadership in Kiev must be under immense pressure. It can only survive with Britain’s support, and London is actively working to ensure this. Poroshenko’s recent call to avoid elections in the near future “in order not to weaken the state” is a clear indication of this effort. It seems they are attempting to form a formal or informal coalition consisting of a bankrupt and defunct commander-in-chief, a bankrupt and defunct president, and a bankrupt comedian-turned-president.

The first is a staunch fascist, reckless enough to display Bandera’s portrait behind him when addressing the international press. The second, the so-called ‘chocolate king,’ has also cultivated ‘trusted’ relations with Poland. The third owes his position solely to being the weakest among them (ultimus inter pares). His remarks on military-political matters suggest he may see himself as a modern-day Napoléon I, though, setting aside Napoléon I’s fate, it would be more accurate to describe him as a farcical Napoléon III.

This ‘triple alliance’ is unlikely to materialize, as it is primarily focused on pursuing the first alternative.

What will happen?

From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia set itself three goals: demilitarization, denazification, and ensuring Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO. All three were agreed upon in the Istanbul pre-agreement, which was subsequently rendered worthless—less than toilet paper—at the behest of the U.S. administration and a single visit by Johnson to Kiev. In July, the ‘situation on the ground’ was added, accompanied by Putin’s ultimatum, which was declared in front of the Foreign Affairs coliseum.

The Trump administration’s third alternative poses a challenge for Russia, primarily due to the goal of ‘denazification’ of the regime. By its very nature, this entails the removal of the current leadership in one way or another, preferably through elections. The determination of the ‘chocolate king,’ the comedian, and the bankrupt ‘commander-in-chief’ to avoid holding elections is precisely aimed at preventing this outcome.

So, what will happen? It seems to me that a truce based on the third alternative will be reached by February-March, with elections in Kiev organized in May at the insistence of the U.S.—provided Britain can be overcome as an obstacle. The organization of these elections will be crucial for maintaining the armistice. I doubt Britain’s pressure on the Kiev trio to block the elections will weaken Trump’s resolve. The comedian president in Kiev, who has already been publicly humiliated by Trump Jr. on social media—first by cutting off the dollar flow and then by kicking him out of the frame—is likely well aware of this.

And all of this is to ‘prepare.’

Opinion

A voice rising from New Delhi: BRICS’s manifesto for a new world order

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The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in the Indian capital of New Delhi on May 15, 2026, carries a significance that extends far beyond the confines of routine diplomacy. This gathering culminated in the signing of one of the most comprehensive political documents to date, outlining the vision of the world order that BRICS envisions for 2026. Reading between the lines, the document reveals not merely the proceedings of a ministerial summit, but the contours of a comprehensive alternative vision challenging the Western-centric international system. Indeed, this text must be read as a political manifesto of the shifting balances of power, the accelerating global struggle for influence, and the emerging new world order of recent years.

The overarching theme dominating the entire document is “The Rise of the Global South.” BRICS members contend that the current international order is unjust, insufficiently representative, and fails to reflect the interests of developing nations. Consequently, they emphasize the urgent need to restructure foundational institutions such as the UN, IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In doing so, BRICS now positions itself as the voice of the non-Western world. Today, the global arena is traversing an era in which the post-World War II international system has plunged into a profound crisis of legitimacy and representation. Developments such as the wars in Ukraine, Iran, and Lebanon, the Gaza crisis, global trade wars, the weaponization of sanctions, energy security challenges, and technological competition demonstrate that the current system struggles to mirror contemporary global realities. It is precisely from this premise that the BRICS nations operate, sending a clear message to the world through the New Delhi Outcome Document: “The status quo is no longer sustainable.”

One of the most striking aspects of the document is how clearly it demonstrates that BRICS no longer views itself as a mere platform for economic cooperation. Having long focused primarily on economic development, trade, and finance since its inception, BRICS has now reached a far more ambitious posture. In the New Delhi Outcome Document, issues of security, geopolitical crises, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, climate policies, energy transition, and international governance reforms occupy a place as central as economics. This indicates that BRICS’s ambition to become a foundational actor in global politics is steadily gaining traction. Reading between the lines, the strongest emphasis emerges on the concept of a “multipolar world.” The core approach of BRICS is animated by the premise that the Western-centric, largely US-led international order, which took shape over the decades following the end of the Cold War, is no longer the sole alternative. Throughout the declaration, the repeated use of phrases like “more just,” “more representative,” “more democratic,” and “more inclusive” international system constitutes a direct critique of the current distribution of global power.

The sections concerning the reform of the United Nations Security Council are particularly critical. Indeed, the call for UN reform stands out as one of the most pivotal political segments of the document. BRICS nations explicitly state that the current structure fails to reflect contemporary realities. They contend that Africa, Latin America, and emerging Asian powers are underrepresented in decision-making mechanisms. What is even more remarkable is that China and Russia have reaffirmed their support for India and Brazil to assume greater roles within the Security Council. This state of affairs reveals, first and foremost, the elevation of India and Brazil to global-power status. Secondly, it demonstrates an increasing political cohesion within BRICS. Finally, it illustrates a fundamental questioning of the post-WWII international order.

Another prominent element in the document is the sharp critique of the sanctions policies pursued by the United States and the West. The intensive use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool in recent years has engendered collective discomfort among BRICS nations. The text emphasizes that unilateral sanctions violate international law and severely hamper the economic development of developing nations. Although no countries are named directly, this formulation can be read as a potent critique targeted at measures such as US sanctions on Iran, Russia, and Venezuela, as well as the embargo on Cuba. This approach is a continuation of BRICS’s long-standing critique regarding the “weaponization of economics.” Indeed, one of the most strategic segments of the declaration emerges here. For BRICS is no longer merely criticizing the existing financial architecture; it is actively endeavoring to construct alternative mechanisms. Initiatives such as cross-border payment systems, trade in local currencies, financial integration, and the strengthening of the New Development Bank can be read as harbingers of a long-term quest to forge an alternative to the dollar-centric global economic structure. While it is premature to speak of a system capable of fully displacing the dollar, the steps taken by BRICS are beginning to demonstrate that the current financial order is not the only option.

Another major political segment of the New Delhi Document concerns the Gaza and Palestine issue. Here, we witness one of the strongest stances BRICS has ever taken on the matter. The document employs highly resolute language regarding Gaza and Palestine, with a notable emphasis on an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Furthermore, South Africa’s legal action against Israel and the rulings of the International Court of Justice are directly recalled in the text. In the face of recent offensives and the unfolding humanitarian crisis, BRICS nations have displayed one of their clearest collective stances to date. The call for an immediate ceasefire, the demand for unhindered humanitarian aid delivery, support for Palestinian statehood, and the emphasis on international law stand among the declaration’s most potent political messages. This can be interpreted as an indication of BRICS’s desire to become a more visible and effective political actor in global crises.

On the other hand, the text does not entirely gloss over the internal divergences within BRICS. It openly acknowledges that members hold differing views, particularly on Middle Eastern issues. This is significant because today’s BRICS is no longer a bloc comprised solely of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. With the integration of new members such as Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, it has evolved into a far more complex geopolitical entity. Interestingly, the document explicitly notes that rather than a unified stance, differing perspectives exist on certain issues. Specifically, it is conceded that members hold divergent positions on matters concerning Iran, the Gulf states, and Yemen. Despite these differences, the bloc’s ability to establish common ground demonstrates an expansion of BRICS’s diplomatic capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the New Delhi process also represents a significant diplomatic triumph for India. While the recent wave of expansion—bringing in Iran, the UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Indonesia—has enriched the platform’s geopolitical diversity, it has also rendered collective decision-making processes more intricate. Particularly at a juncture where the war in Iran continues, the deep-seated divergences between Iran and the Gulf states led many experts to predict that BRICS would struggle to find common political ground and that the summit would be fraught with severe diplomatic friction. However, despite all these differences, India succeeded in rallying members with diverging interests and priorities around the same platform, proving that BRICS retains its capacity to generate dialogue rather than fracture. In this context, the outcome in New Delhi is not limited merely to the content of the published joint text. The true, striking success lies in the preservation of a diplomatic arena that enabled members—who find themselves directly opposed on certain issues in an extremely sensitive and polarized crisis environment—to compromise on other matters and continue negotiating under the BRICS umbrella.

Furthermore, one of the document’s most critical messages emerges in the realm of technology. The extensive coverage of topics such as artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, data security, and cybersecurity is no coincidence. Indeed, the global power struggle of the future will be shaped heavily through technological supremacy. BRICS nations clearly demonstrate their awareness of this reality and their intent to act in unison in the technological race. Particularly noteworthy is their quest to develop alternatives to Western-centric norms in artificial intelligence governance. A distinct approach is also observed in energy and climate policies. Instead of the rapid energy transition frequently championed by Western nations, the concept of a “just energy transition” is prioritized. At the heart of this approach lies the conviction that the economic growth needs of developing nations must not be disregarded. BRICS countries advocate for a balance between environmental responsibility and the right to development. This points to a major fault line that will become increasingly pronounced in global climate debates in the coming years.

When all these headings are evaluated together, the resulting picture is remarkably clear: BRICS is no longer merely a platform for safeguarding economic interests. It is a center of power beginning to articulate its own vision of how the international system ought to operate. At the core of this vision lies the objective of greater representation, sovereign equality, deeper multipolarity, and a stronger voice for developing nations in global decision-making processes.

The New Delhi Document, brought to the table at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, is far more than a mere communique; it is one of the landmark texts of the historic transformation unfolding in global politics. As the world rapidly moves away from a unipolar structure, BRICS is emerging as one of the most powerful political and economic vehicles of this transition. Today, many rules of the international system may still be written by the West. Yet, the message rising from New Delhi is clear: far more actors now demand a seat at the table to rewrite those very rules. BRICS is transitioning from an economic club into a political, diplomatic, financial, and technological powerhouse. Its claim to serve as the collective voice and compass of the Global South is strengthening. It pursues a dual strategy: offering an alternative to Western-centric institutions while simultaneously working to transform them. BRICS is not yet establishing institutions to directly replace the UN, IMF, World Bank, or WTO; rather, it is striving to change the rules and the distribution of power within them.

The 2026 New Delhi Document of the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, hosted by India under its presidency, can be regarded as one of the most comprehensive strategic documents in the twenty-year history of BRICS. The text serves as a political manifesto for an era marked by the sunset of the US- and Western-led unipolar epoch, the demands of rising powers for greater agency, and the accelerating quest of the Global South to establish a permanent weight in the international system.

The essence of the document can be distilled into a single sentence: while BRICS remains a platform that adapts to the rules of the existing international order, it is simultaneously transforming into a global actor that seeks to rewrite them.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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NATO as the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism

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Contrary to what is written in its founding charter and press releases, or what its proponents claim, NATO is no ordinary defense and security organization. It is far more than that. It is a multidimensional, multifaceted organization driven by distinct ideological, political-economic, and class-based preferences. Moreover, as an organization born in the early stages of the Cold War, while its primary objective was ostensibly defined as “opposing the USSR and communism,” its actual function went far beyond this: it served as a mechanism to keep alliance members aligned with and under the control of the United States. Through NATO, the US has established immense influence not only over the defense, security, and foreign policies of member states, but also over their domestic politics, economic policies, educational institutions, universities, academia, think tanks, trade unions, and cultural industries.

As the apparatus of aggression and occupation of US imperialism, NATO launched its first out-of-area military operation in the mid-1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Balkans. This was followed by the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. In the Gulf War of 1990–1991, during the US assault on Iraq, NATO was not directly involved as an alliance or a corporate entity. Instead, there was a US-led coalition that included numerous NATO members. At the time, NATO provided air defense systems to Türkiye but did not launch a direct military attack on Iraq.

In those years, with less than a decade having passed since the end of the Cold War in 1991, liberals and neoliberals alike were busy extolling the virtues of a single-centered, monocentric world order (note: not a “unipolar” world order, as a “pole” logically requires at least two opposites; to call it unipolar is incorrect both linguistically and logically). A tempest of liberalism, capitalism, postmodernism, globalization, and the “New World Order” was sweeping the globe. The United States had triumphed. The USSR had dissolved. The Warsaw Pact had collapsed. The Eastern Bloc had been consigned to history. The Berlin Wall had fallen. Socialism and communism had been defeated.

Under those circumstances, since NATO’s raison d’être had ceased to exist, it should logically have been consigned to history as well. Its utility was being questioned; people were asking whom it would protect, and against whom. Consequently, there was an active search for an enemy—or enemies—for NATO. And indeed, they were found.

Weapons of mass destruction and weapons of mass persuasion

NATO—which stood idly by, biding its time and waiting for the right conditions while Yugoslavia was being torn apart, its people massacred, and ethnic cleansing and mass rapes were being carried out—finally mobilized at the exact moment and under the specific conditions dictated by US imperialism, delivering a clear message to the world. It announced to the globe that its mandate now encompassed missions such as “peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and combating radical movements and terrorism.” This, of course, aligned seamlessly with the rhetoric of “human rights, freedom, democracy, and the civilized world” championed by the United States as NATO’s founding leader. For the United States cast itself as the guardian of these values and concepts; yet in their name, and hiding behind them, it attacked, bombed, and occupied other nations. It would go so far as to first instigate disputes and conflicts in target nations, lay the groundwork for ethnic, religious, and sectarian strife, actively encourage and provoke these clashes, and then proceed to occupy those countries under the pretext of resolving these very problems and restoring stability.

And there were millions of people across the world who believed these American lies. In particular, the US media, along with global outlets, academics, non-governmental organizations, and think tanks supported by Washington, operated virtually as weapons of mass persuasion, designed to convince and deceive the public.

The United States grew so arrogant in this policy that US Presidents began to declare this mission to be far more than a mere political duty—it was, they claimed, a religious, divine, and moral responsibility. The US peddled this falsehood in Iraq, as it did in Yugoslavia. As Yugoslavia was disintegrating—or being disintegrated—NATO sought to project an image and send a message that, as an alliance whose sole Muslim member was Türkiye, it was defending Muslim Bosniaks and Kosovars against Christian Serbs, thereby shielding the righteous and oppressed from the unjust and tyrannical.

The collapse of the Atlantic system

Years have passed. The global balance of power has shifted. The imperialist dominance and hegemonic capacity of the United States have eroded and continue to decay. Russia, particularly after Putin took power, staged a rapid recovery starting in the 2000s. It consolidated its influence, beginning with its near abroad. China, alongside its economic prowess, expanded its political, military, scientific, and technological power, emerging as the primary competitor and most worrisome adversary of the United States. Within the Atlantic system and the Western alliance—whose rules and institutions were established by the US itself—deep-seated divisions have emerged, running parallel to its fragmentation and loss of power. Under these conditions, the United States is both failing to manage its own deep internal fault lines and socio-class contradictions, and experiencing major friction with its allies. Its intent to reduce Canada to a mere province, its ambition to annex Danish-administered Greenland, its barbarism in Venezuela and Palestine, its joint aggression with Israel against Iran, and its threats directed at Cuba must all be interpreted through this lens.

In the past, an imperialist power would at least superficially fabricate lies to rationalize, justify, and legitimize its invasions, aggression, plunder, and barbarism. For instance, when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, immediately following the September 11 attacks, it cited the presence of Osama bin Laden—the Saudi leader of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—in Afghanistan as its justification for the invasion. Similarly, during its 2003 invasion of Iraq, the US propagated the lie that “Saddam Hussein possesses chemical weapons and weapons of mass destruction.” When the German dictator Adolf Hitler invaded Poland in 1939, and the Italian dictator Mussolini invaded Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, they too presented historical, political, and geopolitical pretexts, however fabricated, to justify their actions.

Today, US imperialism does not even feel the need to construct such lies or manufacture pretexts. US President Trump openly talks of withdrawing from NATO, while scolding member states and insulting European leaders with arrogant remarks.

For this reason, NATO must be analyzed not by reading the words written in its founding treaty, but by grasping the shifting needs of US imperialism.

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Chinese diplomacy ascendant under Xi: All roads lead to Beijing

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Beginning in late 2025 and extending throughout 2026, one of the most striking developments in world politics has been the successive convergence of major powers upon Beijing. Direct, high-level engagement with China by actors at the very core of the global system—such as the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—is widely interpreted as a potent signal of a shifting international order. These visits are indubitably far from routine diplomatic encounters. Rather, they represent symbolic and strategic maneuvers indicative of a fundamental realignment of the world’s power centers. In particular, the intensive engagement with China by four of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council within a brief window demonstrates that Beijing has evolved far beyond a mere economic powerhouse, establishing itself as a principal locus of global diplomacy.

For decades, the global order was predominantly US-centric. Following the end of the Cold War, the United States attained an unrivaled position militarily, economically, and diplomatically. China, conversely, was viewed as a rapidly growing economy defined primarily by its manufacturing capacity and cheap labor force. While Beijing possessed influence within the global system, the primary decision-making mechanisms of world politics remained firmly anchored in Washington. However, the transformation of the past two decades has elevated China from a mere economic giant to the epicenter of global strategic competition.

Today, China stands as one of the most pivotal actors in world trade. The vast majority of global supply chains are intricately linked to Chinese networks. Across a multitude of critical sectors—ranging from electric vehicles and battery technologies to artificial intelligence and solar energy—China has established itself as both a dominant producer and a global standard-setter. This immense economic capacity has naturally engendered commensurate political and diplomatic leverage. Global leaders now recognize that international challenges cannot be effectively managed by bypassing or ignoring China.

It is precisely here that the core significance of these recent visits to China becomes apparent. Donald Trump’s journey to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping underscored that despite the intense rivalry between Washington and Beijing, direct engagement has become an absolute necessity. Similarly, while Vladimir Putin’s strategic alignment with China has long been established, Moscow’s deepened cooperation with Beijing in the wake of its profound crisis with the West has significantly bolstered China’s geopolitical weight across Eurasia. Meanwhile, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s visit was interpreted as a sign of Europe pivoting toward a more pragmatic trajectory in its policy toward China. The prior engagements of French President Emmanuel Macron had already demonstrated that Europe has no desire for a complete decoupling from China. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s discussions in Beijing were particularly noteworthy from an economic standpoint, as the Chinese market remains indispensable to German industry. Furthermore, the intensive diplomatic relations maintained by Serbian President Alexander Vučić with China demonstrate that Beijing’s influence on the European continent is by no means confined to major Western European states. Through infrastructure investments, transport projects, technology transfers, and defense cooperation in recent years, Serbia has emerged as one of China’s closest partners in Europe.

The common denominator among these visits was the pursuit of direct engagement with Xi Jinping. Xi is no longer viewed merely as the leader of China; for many nations, he has become a preeminent figure shaping the future of the global system. The transformation of China under Xi into a more centralized, visionary state structured around long-term strategic planning has magnified the personal significance of his leadership. Today, the international community is intensely focused on Xi Jinping’s decision-making. Consequently, pilgrimages to Beijing represent an effort to establish a direct, unmediated channel to Xi himself.

Symbolism is of paramount importance here; in international politics, the optics of “who travels to meet whom” are central to the perception of power. If global leaders continuously travel to Beijing while Xi travels sparingly—yet remains the figure everyone seeks to audience with—it naturally reinforces the message: Xi Jinping is no longer just the leader of China, but a chief architect of the global system. Remarkably, Xi’s reduced international travel has not diluted China’s influence. On the contrary, Beijing’s emergence as the primary destination of diplomatic pilgrimage projects an image of profound self-assurance. To many observers, this stands as one of the most visible symbols of a shifting world order. By rendering their respects in Beijing as much as in Washington, global leaders signal that the global equation is now being formulated here.

This shift is driven by tangible geopolitical realities. The contemporary world operates within a highly interdependent framework. While intense competition defines US-China relations, their economies remain deeply intertwined, rendering total decoupling virtually impossible. Across a vast spectrum of critical arenas—including trade, semiconductor technology, artificial intelligence, energy security, the Taiwan question, the Russia-Ukraine war, the Iranian crisis, and global supply chains—China has emerged as a decisive actor. Consequently, no major power, including Washington, can formulate a viable global strategy by sidelining China.

For Europe in particular, the China question has grown increasingly complex. The period between 2022 and 2024 saw Europe adopt a more hawkish and distant posture toward Beijing. However, slowing economic growth, energy crises, and trade frictions with the United States have compelled Europe to seek a more balanced approach. The pivot of European leaders toward Beijing reveals that complete economic decoupling from China would carry prohibitive costs for Europe. This dynamic also underscores the divergent internal priorities within the US-led Western bloc.

China’s rise should not be viewed solely through the prism of its relations with the West; the sphere of influence Beijing has cultivated across the Global South is of equal significance. In recent years, Chinese influence has expanded dramatically across Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, the Gulf States, and South Asia. Within this context, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to China carries profound weight. The China-Pakistan relationship has long been characterized as an “ironclad friendship.” Through the Belt and Road Initiative, China has constructed ports, railways, energy facilities, and critical infrastructure in numerous countries, most notably Pakistan. Furthermore, unlike Western financial institutions, Beijing extends credit and investment with fewer political conditionalities. Consequently, many developing nations view China not only as a vital economic partner but also as a geopolitical counterweight to the West.

All of this inevitably raises the question: “Is China ascendant?” Based on the current landscape, the answer must be in the affirmative. For global leaders, Beijing has now emerged as a diplomatic hub as critical as Washington. Moreover, beyond its sheer economic scale, China is increasingly distinguished by its capacity for conflict resolution. Its pivotal role in facilitating the Iran-Saudi Arabia normalization, coupled with its close ties to Russia and its sweeping influence over the Global South, has significantly amplified Beijing’s diplomatic gravity.

The diplomatic traffic observed throughout 2026 highlights a fundamental truth: the world is no longer unipolar or monocivilizational. Opposite the United States stands a China capable of challenging it economically, technologically, culturally, and diplomatically. Consequently, this new era diverges sharply from the unipolar structure of the “American Century,” resembling instead a multipolar, multi-civilizational order where all actors cooperate and compete with one another simultaneously.

Xi Jinping’s position is central to this paradigm shift. For many leaders today, meeting with Xi in Beijing is not merely a matter of bilateral diplomacy, but a strategic imperative for positioning oneself within the global balance of power. This has immensely enhanced Xi’s personal prestige. Within the international system, there is a growing consensus that on most critical issues, “if Beijing is not at the table, no resolution can be complete.” The acceleration of visits to China since late 2025 is not merely a reflection of a crowded diplomatic calendar; it must be understood as a tangible indicator of a shifting world order. Beijing has transcended its status as an economic core to become one of the primary power centers of global politics. Consequently, Chinese President Xi Jinping is emerging as one of the most influential figures of this new, multipolar, and multi-civilizational world order.

Today, the diplomatic traffic directed toward Beijing is by no means limited to the United States, Russia, or the major European powers. The efforts of leaders from a vast geographical span—from Serbia and Pakistan to the Gulf States and African nations—to establish direct contact with China render Beijing’s central position in the global system increasingly conspicuous. Consequently, these recent visits are interpreted as signs that the power map of the new international order is being redrawn. For many capitals, the path to understanding global developments and formulating future strategies now runs through Beijing as much as it does through Washington. Thus, the adage “All roads lead to Beijing” is rapidly transforming from a rhetorical trope into a defining reality of contemporary international politics.

Umur Tugay Yücel – Political Scientist & Author of the book “The Decline of American Power and the Rising Powers” (China-Russia-India-Brazil).

X: @umur_tugay

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