Opinion
The coming armistice: Preparing for a bigger one – 2
I concluded the first part of this series with the following words:
“In the current situation, an armistice along the line of contact seems inevitable.”
The reasoning behind this is straightforward: Ukraine has largely ceased to be an ‘issue’ because it is losing its potential to be one. It has become increasingly evident that Russia will never permit Kiev to join NATO. Moreover, Ukraine’s existing military potential has been significantly depleted. Even if the imperialist bloc were to fully mobilize its productive capacity, it would fail to offset these losses.
On 17 December, Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov revealed that the Kiev regime had received over $350 billion in ‘aid’ from 30 countries since February 2022, with $170 billion allocated for military purposes. Despite this staggering sum, it is no longer sufficient to sustain the fight—let alone secure a victory against Russia.
This reality is universally acknowledged—which is precisely why time is needed for preparation.
‘Preparation’
But preparation for what?
On 13 December, Rutte stated that “there is now neither war nor peace between Russia and the West,” adding that “Russia is preparing for a protracted confrontation with Ukraine and the West.” The implication is that the West is preparing for war with Russia.
This preparation is no longer concealed at any level. On 25 November, Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of NATO’s Military Committee, revealed that NATO was discussing “preemptive strikes against high-precision targets” on Russian territory in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO countries. According to Bauer: “The smart thing is not to wait but to hit launchers in Russia if Russia attacks us. A high-precision combined strike to disable the systems that would be used against us is essential—we must strike first.” Furthermore, Bauer called on the “business community” to prepare for a “wartime scenario” and to adjust production and distribution accordingly: “If we can ensure the supply of all critical services and goods, this will be an important part of our deterrence.”
This signifies a complete capitalist reorganization: not deindustrialization but the militarization of industry in Europe. The fact that this call comes not from neoconservative zealots but from military leaders—who typically adopt a more measured approach, primarily because they understand the realities of war—makes it all the more significant. This is not a new plan, nor is it tied to the events of 24 February 2022. The project was already in place as early as September 2021, as the US’s so-called “Reichsführer” in Europe, the “baroness” at the helm of the European Commission, openly stated at the 2023 Munich Conference. However, due to their mediocrity, incompetence, and unpredictability, they failed to execute it effectively. Now, they need time to accelerate this process once again.
Trump’s recent announcement that NATO members should increase their military spending to well above 2% of GDP (reportedly suggesting 3.7%, while The New York Times mentioned 5% last month), if realized, would benefit not only the U.S. but also the European elite. Such a move would be precisely what is needed to expedite this reorganization.
If your opponent is preparing for war, so are you. For some time, Russia has avoided the idea of a conventional war with the West in Europe. At least in its statements, it seemed more likely that any potential conflict with NATO would occur in or around Ukraine. Earlier this month, for example, Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov stated that “the actions of the U.S. and other NATO members aimed at escalating the Ukrainian crisis” have increased the likelihood of a direct conflict with NATO. On 16 December, Defence Minister Belousov, after speaking for the first time about the necessity to “fulfil various tasks and maintain a military presence in Central Asia, Africa, the Caucasus, and Transnistria,” added: “In the medium term, we must be fully prepared for any development of the situation, including a possible military confrontation with NATO in Europe within the next decade. The decisions taken at the NATO summit last July are preparation for this. This is also reflected in the doctrinal documents of the U.S. and other NATO countries.”
It seems that nearly everyone in their right mind views the prospect of a war between NATO and Russia as increasingly likely. The West, because it is provoking such a conflict—because it needs it. Russia, because it lacks the power to prevent it.
Both sides must undergo significant reorganization. The West must fully militarize its economy. Last year, when Kaja Kallas, the EU’s foreign policy chief (effectively its war minister, succeeding the fascist-leaning Borrell), was prime minister of Estonia, she advocated issuing war bonds using Russia’s frozen assets as collateral. In mid-December, the same Kallas stated that although Russia has a legal right to the assets “seized” by the West, it would not regain them until the funds were used to restore the Kiev regime. She added: “I’m not sure there is anything left of them.” Foreign assets, after all, are based on reputation. They do not need to remain in an account to be traded; they only need to be perceived as valuable. Therefore, there is reason to believe that Kallas is not merely indulging in rhetorical excess but is describing the reality of the situation.
As for Russia, its Soviet-era defense complex is so vast and so deeply intertwined with the civilian economy that it does not require reorganization—only improvement and expansion. However, preparing for war demands more than just military readiness. It requires arguments to convince the population of its necessity, individuals capable of defending these arguments, and cadres skilled in executing current tasks. It necessitates reducing income inequality to foster shared values, raising birth rates to ensure societal reproduction and the adequacy of human resources, increasing the output of civilian industry, achieving technological superiority, and maintaining economic independence. This complex process will take time to complete.
In short, a truce is necessary for all sides—not just because Trump desires it. The question is how this will be achieved and whether it will lead to a lasting peace agreement.
Russia’s position
There have been two programmatic statements from the Russian side in the past week.
On 25 December, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov clearly outlined the situation with the West: “Regarding the meaning of the negotiations currently taking place in the West and in Ukraine, we are only talking about an armistice—about allowing the Kiev regime, with the help of the West, to once again consolidate its power and make new attempts to fulfil the instructions of its masters to inflict a ‘strategic defeat’ on Russia. … We are not satisfied with an armistice; we need reliable, legally binding agreements.” According to Lavrov, these agreements must also address the root causes of the Ukrainian conflict: “Common security in Europe, the enlargement of NATO, the EU’s recent decision to subordinate itself to NATO, and essentially to eliminate all differences between these organisations—including, of course, the rights of people in certain regions who have expressed their desire to unite with Russia.”
The following day, in response to the comment that “Western experts expect the Ukrainian conflict to end in 2025,” Putin remarked: “Your words are dripping with honey” (a Russian expression meaning to speak sweetly or optimistically). He added, “We aim to end the conflict.” However, when asked about plans to freeze the conflict in exchange for a guarantee delaying the Kiev regime’s entry into NATO for 10–20 years, Putin responded: “I don’t know what is being discussed in the current team of the US president-elect. What I do know is that President Biden proposed this to me in 2021. He suggested postponing Ukraine’s entry into NATO for 10–15 years—because Ukraine is not yet ‘ready.’ And I gave him a reasonable answer: Of course, it’s not ready today, but you’ll prepare it and accept it. … What’s the difference for us? Whether it’s today, tomorrow, or 10 years later. I don’t know about the statements of the future team of the president-elect, but in this sense, if such a proposal is made, what is the difference between the current leadership and the ideas you just mentioned? There is no difference. I don’t know how the situation will develop from now on or what instructions the president-elect will give to his administration. Let’s see.”
Thus, Russia’s position can be summarized as follows: It seeks a permanent political agreement, not a temporary ceasefire or armistice. However, a permanent agreement does not exclude temporary armistices. The basis for peace can only be Putin’s ultimatum from July, and nothing else. Ideally, it should include a new security architecture in Europe (with the EU operating independently of NATO), a resolution to the Transnistrian and perhaps Gagauz issues, and a guarantee that NATO will not expand further. The latter includes not only Ukraine but also Moldova and Georgia.
The Western position
I have labeled this section ‘The West,’ but this should not be misunderstood. In August, I wrote in Harici as follows: “The question of a ceasefire should be discussed day and night from Kiev to Washington, from London to Budapest—but not in other European capitals, as they are insignificant, drifting aimlessly like mosquitoes in the wind.” Thus, there are only two meaningful positions in the West: the United States and Britain. Britain aims to extend the war to all its borders and to use Europeans as live ammunition for this purpose. This also appears to be the stance of global finance capital, represented primarily by The City. While this strategy has no chance of ultimate success, that is not its goal; it merely seeks to prolong the conflict for the foreseeable future.
It has become clear that the U.S. will present a scenario with three alternatives. These have been discussed for some time, but the most precise formulation was published on December 6 in the Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano. The alternatives are as follows:
1) The partition of Ukraine according to the ‘German model’ and the incorporation into NATO of the regions under the control of the Kiev regime. 2) The second scenario is ‘Israel in Europe’: Ukraine would no longer be a NATO member but would continue to receive military ‘aid.’ 3) An international mission composed of peacekeepers from non-NATO countries such as China and India would be established.
The first alternative is untenable, not only due to Russia’s position but also because of the U.S. determination under Trump to postpone a major conflict with Russia. The second alternative would amount to a continuation of the Minsk deception, while it is the most favorable formula from the U.S. perspective, Russia cannot accept it.
The third alternative appears to be the most viable, but it would only result in a truce. For now, the issue will likely center on the composition of the peacekeeping force. Russia will not accept the participation of NATO countries (with the possible exceptions of Hungary and Slovakia) in such a force. Instead, a contingent could be assembled from the so-called ‘global south.’
One reason for Russia’s emphasis on the third alternative may be to avoid undermining Trump’s position, given his potential role in disrupting the current system.
The ‘triple alliance’ in Kiev
In any case, the current leadership in Kiev must be under immense pressure. It can only survive with Britain’s support, and London is actively working to ensure this. Poroshenko’s recent call to avoid elections in the near future “in order not to weaken the state” is a clear indication of this effort. It seems they are attempting to form a formal or informal coalition consisting of a bankrupt and defunct commander-in-chief, a bankrupt and defunct president, and a bankrupt comedian-turned-president.
The first is a staunch fascist, reckless enough to display Bandera’s portrait behind him when addressing the international press. The second, the so-called ‘chocolate king,’ has also cultivated ‘trusted’ relations with Poland. The third owes his position solely to being the weakest among them (ultimus inter pares). His remarks on military-political matters suggest he may see himself as a modern-day Napoléon I, though, setting aside Napoléon I’s fate, it would be more accurate to describe him as a farcical Napoléon III.
This ‘triple alliance’ is unlikely to materialize, as it is primarily focused on pursuing the first alternative.
What will happen?
From the very beginning of the conflict, Russia set itself three goals: demilitarization, denazification, and ensuring Ukraine’s non-accession to NATO. All three were agreed upon in the Istanbul pre-agreement, which was subsequently rendered worthless—less than toilet paper—at the behest of the U.S. administration and a single visit by Johnson to Kiev. In July, the ‘situation on the ground’ was added, accompanied by Putin’s ultimatum, which was declared in front of the Foreign Affairs coliseum.
The Trump administration’s third alternative poses a challenge for Russia, primarily due to the goal of ‘denazification’ of the regime. By its very nature, this entails the removal of the current leadership in one way or another, preferably through elections. The determination of the ‘chocolate king,’ the comedian, and the bankrupt ‘commander-in-chief’ to avoid holding elections is precisely aimed at preventing this outcome.
So, what will happen? It seems to me that a truce based on the third alternative will be reached by February-March, with elections in Kiev organized in May at the insistence of the U.S.—provided Britain can be overcome as an obstacle. The organization of these elections will be crucial for maintaining the armistice. I doubt Britain’s pressure on the Kiev trio to block the elections will weaken Trump’s resolve. The comedian president in Kiev, who has already been publicly humiliated by Trump Jr. on social media—first by cutting off the dollar flow and then by kicking him out of the frame—is likely well aware of this.
And all of this is to ‘prepare.’
Opinion
Great powers and the fierce rivalry in Africa
In tandem with the retreat of US imperialism and the erosion of its hegemonic capacity, the rivalry among the world’s great powers is intensifying across vast geographies and divergent fronts alike. From Africa to Central Asia, from electric vehicles to artificial intelligence, an acute contest is unfolding—most conspicuously between the United States and China.
History instructs us that wherever great power rivalry takes root, peace remains elusive. Stability cannot endure there. Wars, internal conflicts, coups d’état, and the mass migrations they inevitably trigger dominate the horizon. Nor do great powers desire the cultivation of participatory democracy, human rights, the rule of law, or class consciousness in these lands. Instead, they bolster dictatorships, authoritarian regimes, totalitarian systems, and repressive governance. The imperialist powers harbor no concern for the scarcity of water, drought, or famine in Africa. Their focus is solely fixed on exploitation, plunder, pillaging the resources of the nations upon which they descend, and capturing their domestic markets.
Africa holds singular importance in this context. It commands attention simultaneously by virtue of its sheer expanse, its demographic weight, and its subterranean wealth. In the rivalry across this ancient and impoverished continent, the United States and China lead the vanguard. Russia, too, makes notable maneuvers, though on a less extensive scale. Between the United States and China, the race is particularly fierce regarding the extraction, processing, and conveyance of subterranean resources to world markets.
Africa—endowed with abundant mineral wealth, a population approaching 1.5 billion, and critical strategic importance along global trade routes—whet the appetites of capitalist, advanced, industrialized, imperialist states as a vast, populous, and expanding market. Geopolitically as well, its position cannot be ignored. Africa’s wealth in rare earth elements, precious minerals such as diamonds and gold, and strategic minerals indispensable to advanced technologies—notably copper, cobalt, and lithium—is indisputable.
AFRICA CARRIES NO WEIGHT IN GLOBAL POLITICS
Unlike other continents such as Europe, Asia, or the Americas, Africa possesses no single country that commands prominence in global politics or the world economy. Nor does Africa host an alliance, international organization, or bloc of comparable global stature. In the Americas, there stands a superpower: the United States. In Asia, there are great powers: Russia and China, with India also ascending. In Europe, major, consequential powers endure: the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. Yet on the African continent, no such states exist. What exists in Africa is the rivalry of non-African great powers. Even the 55-member African Union, the institutional body of the continent’s nations, remains far from exerting any real influence—not only in global politics, but even across the African continent itself.
Over the past fifteen to twenty years, Africa has undergone substantial upheavals. Armed conflicts, civil wars, and violence have become pervasive. From Ethiopia to Somalia, Libya to Sudan, armed hostilities have claimed countless lives, destabilized governments, and provoked massive waves of displacement. Terrorist organizations have seized upon these conditions as an opportune opening, and the great powers, in turn, have instrumentalized these terror networks.
In Africa, former nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial powers such as Britain and France indulge in reveries of bygone eras. They attempt to assert themselves, yet their efforts prove futile. Germany, as Europe’s leading economic, industrial, and technological powerhouse, takes a keen interest in Africa; yet despite this attention, its institutional knowledge and historical experience regarding the continent pale in comparison to those of the British and French. Italy strives to act, but lacks the requisite capacity. The Netherlands and Belgium, once deeply entrenched in Africa, are far removed from their imperial past. Spain and Portugal assert no claim to global primacy. All of these nations languish, to borrow Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar’s phrase, in “a vague longing for a bygone past.”
China, well aware of Africa’s significance, is investing heavily across the continent. It stands as Africa’s largest trading partner and the primary destination for the continent’s exports. In the provision of loans, credit facilities, and grants to African states, it has outpaced Western institutions. China’s investment and foreign aid capacity, economic leverage, and extensive commercial ties naturally consolidate its political and diplomatic influence across Africa, elevating its visibility and prestige. Under the auspices of the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing continues to finance large-scale infrastructure investments as well as major communications and transport projects.
THE FEROCITY AND DIMENSIONS OF THE RIVALRY
It is, of course, impossible for Russia to mount massive economic investments, conduct extensive aid operations, or sustain the volume of trade in Africa that China commands. Consequently, it seeks to distinguish itself by guaranteeing the security of local leaders, corporate enterprises, and ruling elites, relying predominantly on private military companies (the operations of the Wagner Group being a case in point). Russia has deployed mercenaries to Mali and the Central African Republic.
The United States, for its part, endeavors to counter China’s expanding influence, economic footprint, visibility, and public diplomacy initiatives in Africa, while simultaneously laboring to reinforce its own economic and political ties with African states. One need only recall that the United States, having intervened in Libya in 2011 through NATO, has directly struck ISIS targets in Somalia. The strategic depth of Washington’s relationship with Cairo is likewise well known.
The United States, China, and Russia also stand out prominently in arms sales to African nations. As the great power rivalry on the continent grows ever sharper, the spectrum of contestation widens accordingly. Cultural rivalry is superimposed upon economic, political, and military dimensions. Because every great power seeking to expand its sphere of influence and reach is determined to block the advance of its competitors, Africa serves both as the stage for and the witness to this unsparing contest. Some experts explain this rivalry through the lens of a new strain of colonialism; others account for it by pointing to the inherent nature, complexity, and multifaceted character of competition between imperialist metropoles.
Opinion
The women who refuse to be erased: On Japan’s surrender anniversary, the fight over wartime sexual slavery continues
BUSAN, South Korea — On the day Japan marks the 81st anniversary of its surrender in World War Two, a conference room in Busan’s city council building has become the latest front in a battle over memory.
Allan Wilson, Journalist
Last month, on 23 July, academics, activists and lawmakers gathered here for a symposium on one of the war’s most painful legacies: the estimated tens of thousands of women — euphemistically labelled “comfort women” — forced into sexual slavery by the Imperial Japanese Army. The event was co-hosted by the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia division and the Korean Women’s Forum.
“The records of the Japanese military’s comfort women are historical assets that the international community must preserve together,” Nam Myung-sook, the Busan city councillor who co-organised the symposium, told the gathering. “Social consensus must be broadened.”
Her words were aimed at more than the audience in the room.
For three decades, survivors and their advocates have pressed Japan for a full and unequivocal accounting. They have met a familiar pattern: moments of apparent progress — the 1993 Kono statement acknowledging military involvement, the 2015 bilateral agreement with South Korea — followed by retreat. Japanese officials continue to dispute the term “sexual slavery.” Textbooks soften the language. Senior politicians visit Yasukuni Shrine, where convicted war criminals are honoured alongside the dead.
The symposium came as UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee convened in Busan, and the timing was deliberate. One of the gathering’s stated goals was to revive the push to have comfort women records inscribed on UNESCO’s Memory of the World register — an effort Japan has repeatedly blocked.
“Our aim is to reaffirm the historical facts of comfort women (受害) to the international community and explore directions that contribute to peace and human rights,” said Yu Ying-mo, senior adviser to the Carter Human Rights Center’s Asia region, in remarks prepared for the event.
A statue, a warning
The symposium also addressed an incident that has become a diplomatic flashpoint: the recent removal of a comfort women memorial statue in Taiwan.
The statue, one of dozens erected across East Asia and beyond, was taken down in recent months. Organisers in Busan described the removal as “an erroneous approach that erases historical wounds and weakens collective memory,” according to the symposium’s programme.
For advocates, the Taiwan case illustrates what happens when political pressure is allowed to dictate historical memory. “Statues, memorial halls, and archives related to comfort women are important spaces of memory that testify to the victims’ suffering and history,” the Carter Human Rights Center said in its written address. “They must be respected.”
Dozens of comfort women memorials now stand in cities from Seoul to San Francisco to Berlin. Each has become a site of diplomatic friction: Japan’s government has consistently objected to them, arguing they perpetuate what it calls an inaccurate narrative.
The shrinking window
Time is running out. Of the few hundred women who came forward in the 1990s, the number of surviving registered victims in South Korea has dwindled to single digits.
This demographic reality has injected new urgency into the preservation effort. Shim Ok-ju, a research professor at George Mason University Korea, told the symposium that the focus must now shift from oral testimony — soon to be lost — to documentation and education.
Seo Kyung-soon, a professor at Pukyong National University, presented findings from the so-called “Gwanbu Trial” records — a series of postwar legal proceedings in which comfort women sought compensation through Japanese courts. The documents, she argued, contain incontrovertible evidence of state orchestration.
A designated discussant panel followed, bringing together Kim Tae-wan, a political science professor at Dong-eui University; Kim Kyung-hee, an independent researcher; and Ahn Jun-young, a journalist from the Busan Ilbo newspaper. The format was designed to bridge academia and public consciousness — to test whether scholarly findings could survive the scrutiny of working journalists and political scientists.
The international dimension
The comfort women issue has never been purely bilateral. In 1996, the UN Special Rapporteur on violence against women concluded that the system constituted “military sexual slavery.” In 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women urged Japan to “ensure that the issue is accurately reflected in school curricula.”
Yet the gap between international consensus and Japanese government policy remains wide. Prime ministerial statements offer “apologies and remorse” but stop short of accepting legal responsibility. Reparations have come from private funds, not the state.
For organisers of the Busan symposium, the path forward runs through multilateral institutions. UNESCO recognition, they argue, would make historical revisionism harder to sustain. But Japan has made clear it will oppose any such move, as it did when Chinese documents related to the 1937 Nanjing Massacre were inscribed in 2015.
“Facing history squarely and respecting it is a fundamental value that the international community should share,” the symposium’s organisers concluded.
This 15 August, as Japan observes its National Memorial Service for the War Dead, the women who survived — and those who did not — will be remembered in rooms like the one in Busan. Their numbers are dwindling. The question is whether their story will outlast them.
Opinion
The U.S. Economy and NATO’s Function
Although the U.S. President Trump has repeatedly told his counterparts and the rest of the world to “trade with the United States” and “invest in the United States,” he has so far failed to get the results he hoped for. There are several reasons for this.
First, the United States is no longer as attractive as it once was. Second, China, America’s biggest rival, stands out as a more attractive country for production and investment not only for the rest of the world but also for major U.S. companies themselves. This is because the United States simply cannot compete with China when it comes to production costs. China produces far more, at much lower cost. Moreover, it produces high-quality goods and is rapidly building global brands. For this reason, President Trump’s call on U.S. companies to dismantle their factories in China and relocate them to the United States has also failed to generate the response he expected.
Trump has repeatedly called on European entrepreneurs, investors, and business leaders to invest in the United States as well. “Build your factories in the United States. We will offer you the most favorable and lowest tax rates in the world. Otherwise, you will continue to pay high tariffs. In fact, we will raise those tariffs even further,” he said. It was virtually a threat. Yet despite this, he failed to attract the level of interest he expected from Europeans either.
It is impossible for this picture regarding the economy, trade, and tariffs not to have repercussions for politics and foreign policy. Therefore, when the United States fails to receive the response it expects to its economic invitations and trade proposals, it increasingly resorts to political pressure and foreign-policy threats. On NATO, Trump scolds his European allies. He pressures Europeans to contribute more to NATO. At times, he goes even further, virtually threatening them by saying that the United States could withdraw from NATO. Europe’s leaders, each more miserable and ignorant than the next, sit beside the U.S. president and swallow his insults. Sometimes they even applaud him.
WOULD THE UNITED STATES LEAVE NATO?
The United States will not leave NATO. Having used NATO very effectively, invested so heavily in the alliance, and gained enormous influence through NATO over its allies’ domestic and foreign policies—from their economies to their defense and security policies—the United States will not give it up. If the United States were to leave NATO, the alliance would lose its current meaning, effectiveness, and deterrent power. No NATO member could fill the vacuum left by the United States. Alongside America’s political, economic, military, industrial, and technological weight, it should also be remembered that the United States covers 14.9 percent of NATO’s common budget and accounts for 57 percent of total defense spending within the alliance.
We know that NATO’s European members have neither the strength, courage, political will, nor money to stand up to the United States in pursuit of a “more European NATO.” Nor is there any consensus among them in this regard. The idea of a European defense and security identity that is at least somewhat distinct and autonomous from NATO, occasionally championed by Germany and France, should not be taken too seriously either. Berlin and Paris have failed to persuade NATO’s other European members on this issue. Groups such as the European Political Community, which was brought to the agenda after the Ukraine-Russia war in an effort to also bring in countries such as Turkey and Britain, which are NATO members but not EU members, likewise have little function, influence, or weight.
A few years ago, President Trump demanded that NATO members raise defense spending from 2 percent to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. There was no serious objection to this demand. This alone is one indication that NATO is important to the United States not only politically and militarily but economically as well. America’s influence within NATO also benefits the U.S. arms industry, the largest in the world.
Because Trump wants to turn the United States once again into the world’s foremost manufacturing hub, increase exports, and attract more investment into the country, the defense industry is also of great importance within this broader agenda. Since lowering energy costs is essential to achieving this, Trump both sidelines environmentalist energy projects at home and, as in the case of Venezuela, abducts the leader of an energy-rich country and virtually seizes control of its energy resources. Trump knows that otherwise the United States will struggle to compete with China, and that it is impossible for America to produce more, produce more cheaply, and sell more than China, which is far ahead of the United States in global manufacturing.
That is why, as was once again evident at the NATO summit held in Turkey, discussions within NATO about strategic threats and deterrence, regional security and energy corridors, partnerships and global networks all ultimately serve U.S. priorities and interests. Whether this is explained in terms of geopolitical balances, economic interests, regional dynamics, security needs, diplomatic pressure, or all of these factors combined, NATO is an instrument of aggression and occupation serving U.S. imperialism.
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